Un sujet au-delà du handicap mental. Questions éthiques dans la clinique de la déficience mentale

What about possibilities of psychic care when mental retardation hinders considerably capacities of representation? To this question, will be very quickly confronted every clinician who wants to work with mentally handicapped persons. Our meeting with Theo, young adult with Down syndrome, shows us in what to support an ethics in the clinical approach of mental disabilities it's to admit that, however intellectual reasoning level is, a speech act always remains possible. To do it, we don’t have to confuse capacities of representation and abstract reasoning level, which particularly lack to person with mental retardation.     

Alzheimer's Disease: The Death of the Disease

Alzheimer's disease, a form of dementia, affects middle-age and older adults. The disease is becoming more evident because of growing numbers of older people and better diagnosis and detection methods. The author describes the behavioral and physical symptoms of the disease as well as specific suggestions for care of patients with Alzheimer's disease. Counselors can use this article to provide family members and other persons dealing with Alzheimer's disease with information and practical advice about dealing with the changes occurring in the patient.     

Consequence and Normative Guidance

Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning. But is that really so? And if so, in what sense is logic normative for reasoning? As Gilbert Harman has reminded us, devising a logic and devising a theory of reasoning are two separate enterprises. Hence, logic's normative authority cannot reside in the fact that principles of logic just are norms of reasoning. Once we cease to identify the two, we are left with a gap. To bridge the gap one would need to produce what John MacFarlane has appropriately called a bridge principle, i.e. a general principle articulating a substantive and systematic link between logical entailment and norms of reasoning. This is Harman's skeptical challenge. In this paper I argue that Harman's skeptical challenge can be met. I show how candidate bridge principles can be systematically generated and evaluated against a set of well‐motivated desiderata. Moreover, I argue that bridge principles advanced by MacFarlane himself and others, for all their merit, fail to address the problem originally set forth by Harman and so do not meet the skeptical challenge. Finally, I develop a bridge principle that meets Harman's requirements as well as being substantive.     

Surreal decisions

Although expected utility theory has proven a fruitful and elegant theory in the finite realm, attempts to generalize it to infinite values have resulted in many paradoxes. In this paper, we argue that the use of John Conway's surreal numbers shall provide a firm mathematical foundation for transfinite decision theory. To that end, we prove a surreal representation theorem and show that our surreal decision theory respects dominance reasoning even in the case of infinite values. We then bring our theory to bear on one of the more venerable decision problems in the literature: Pascal's Wager. Analyzing the wager showcases our theory's virtues and advantages. To that end, we analyze two objections against the wager: Mixed Strategies and Many Gods. After formulating the two objections in the framework of surreal utilities and probabilities, our theory correctly predicts that (1) the pure Pascalian strategy beats all mixed strategies, and (2) what one should do in a Pascalian decision problem depends on what one's credence function is like. Our analysis therefore suggests that although Pascal's Wager is mathematically coherent, it does not deliver what it purports to, a rationally compelling argument that people should lead a religious life regardless of how confident they are in theism and its alternatives.     

Akrasia,practical reason,and the diversity of motivation: A new defense of tripartition

In akrasia, an agent intentionally acts against her own judgment about what it is best to do. This presents many puzzles for the understanding of human motivation. The Socrates of Plato's Protagoras, for example, denies this is possible because he claims that all action is motivated by an agent's belief about what is best. Plato himself seems to reject this view in the Republic, appealing to three distinct sources of motivation. This paper takes Plato's side in the general debate, arguing for a new tripartite moral psychology. Because the akratic acts for a reason but against the conclusion of her practical reasoning, there must be a way of acting for reasons other than through reasoning about them. This way is desire. But once there is a division between reason and desire, a third capacity is needed to solve conflicts that can arise between them, the will.     

Reconnecting interpretation to reasoning through individual differences

Computational theories of mind assume that participants interpret information and then reason from those interpretations. Research on interpretation in deductive reasoning has claimed to show that subjects' interpretation of single syllogistic premises in an “immediate inference” task is radically different from their interpretation of pairs of the same premises in syllogistic reasoning tasks (Newstead, 1989, 1995; Roberts, Newstead, & Griggs, 2001). Narrow appeal to particular Gricean implicatures in this work fails to bridge the gap. Grice's theory taken as a broad framework for credulous discourse processing in which participants construct speakers' “intended models” of discourses can reconcile these results, purchasing continuity of interpretation through variety of logical treatments. We present exploratory experimental data on immediate inference and subsequent syllogistic reasoning. Systematic patterns of interpretation driven by two factors (whether the subject's model of the discourse is credulous, and their degree of reliance on information packaging) are shown to transcend particular quantifier inferences and to drive systematic differences in subjects' subsequent syllogistic reasoning. We conclude that most participants do not understand deductive tasks as experimenters intend, and just as there is no single logical model of reasoning, so there is no reason to expect a single “fundamental human reasoning mechanism”.     

Children's reasoning about responses to peer aggression: Victim's and witness's expected and prescribed behaviors

This research examined children's reasoning about expected (i.e., what a peer would do) and prescribed (i.e., what a peer should do) responses to unprovoked, intentional aggressive actions in two contexts: as a victim of such a transgression and as a witness to the incident. Physical harm and property damage items were used in a structured interview format. There were 90 subjects drawn from three elementary school grades (2nd, 4th, and 6th). Children differentiated between the expected and prescribed responses of peers and significant developmental differences in children's evaluations were found. Although the majority of the subjects in all grades denounced retaliation on the basis of concerns about others' welfare, older children stated that peers were likely to retaliate against the perpetrator nonetheless. Across different contexts, older children's responses appeared to reveal a greater independence from authority in negotiating peer interactions. In evaluating the witness's responses to aggressive acts, younger children's expected and prescribed responses were less disparate than that of the older children. The utility of including different vantage points of the child in examining children's social reasoning about aggression and the application of the present findings to social information-processing models are discussed. © 1996 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

Possible Environmental Causes of Stages in Moral Reasoning

Both children (6-, 10-, and 14-year-olds) and their mothers were interviewed. The children's responses to moral dilemmas were classified into Kohlberg's three main categories—preconventional, conventional, and postconventional. The mothers were presented with a variety of hypothetical situations—e.g., they had just found out that their child had stolen something, and were asked to tell what they would say or do to their child in each situation. The mothers' hypothetical responses to such situations were divided into either the preconventional, conventional, or postconventional category depending on the level or moral reasoning such responses would imply to their children. The results indicated that as the age of the children increased, both the level of moral reasoning used by the children and the level of moral reasoning implied by the mothers' treatment of the children increased. Even with age partialed out, there was a significant positive relationship between the mothers' implied level of moral reasoning and the children's level of moral reasoning. Thus, although causality cannot be established, the results indicate that there is at least the possibility that environmental changes—i.e., changes in the way the mother treats the child—may be responsible for the appearance of stages in the child's development of moral reasoning.     

WHAT LIARS CAN TELL US ABOUT THE KNOWLEDGE NORM OF PRACTICAL REASONING

If knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning, then we should be able to alter people's behavior by affecting their knowledge as well as by affecting their beliefs. Thus, as Roy Sorensen (2010 ) suggests, we should expect to find people telling lies that target knowledge rather than just lies that target beliefs. In this paper, however, I argue that Sorensen's discovery of “knowledge‐lies” does not support the claim that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. First, I use a Bayesian framework to show that in each of Sorensen's examples, knowledge‐lies alter people's behavior by affecting their beliefs. Second, I show that while we can imagine lies that target knowledge without targeting beliefs, they cannot alter people's behavior. In other words, knowledge‐lies actually work (i.e., manipulate behavior) by targeting beliefs or they do not work at all.     

Collective Reasoning and the Discursive Dilemma

Abstract

The paper begins with a discussion of Philip Pettit's distinction between individualistic and collectivistic reasoning strategies. I argue that many of his examples, when correctly analysed, do not give rise to what he calls the discursive dilemma. I argue for a collectivistic strategy, which is a holistic premise-driven strategy. I will concentrate on three aspects of collective reasoning, which I call the publicity aspect, the collective acceptance aspect, and the historical constraint aspect: First, the premises of collective reasoning, unlike the premises of a private individual, have to be public in some sense. Second, the group members collectively accept the public premises, and thereby commit themselves to following them in their collective practical reasoning.Third, a person need not be consistent with his earlier private judgements, he is free to change his mind, but prior collective judgements, if not collectively abandoned, constrain the member's future judgements and decisions. I conclude that collective practical reasoning can be accounted for without collectivist ontological commitments.     

Clinical Application of the Model of Human Occupation in Dementia of the Alzheimer's Type

Dementia of the Alzheimer's type (DAT), termed the disease of the century (Braly, 1986), has affected over two million Americans (Katzman, 1986). As the population ages, this figure will rise, presenting a continued challenge to health care systems and to occupational therapists who will increasingly confront people with DAT In their various clinical settines. The Model of Human occupation is suggested as a framework Kr guiding assessment and treatment for the person with DAT. A brief review of the symptoms and potential disturbances affecting occu ational function within the framework of the model is presented, followed by a case study illustrating clinical application bf the model.     

Motivated to Forgive? Partisan Scandals and Party Supporters

In this study, we investigate how partisan motivations shape voters' reactions to a political scandal by drawing on a unique survey experiment fielded immediately after Justin Trudeau's brownface/blackface scandal broke during the 2019 Canadian election. We thus explore motivated reasoning in real time in a competitive and highly partisan election context. Are voters more willing to forgive politicians for past behavior when their own party leader's impropriety is cued? To what extent do personal interests, such as cross-pressures or electoral concerns, affect the motivation to forgive? Our findings show that partisan-motivated reasoning is overwhelmingly powerful, producing politically biased judgments of politicians implicated in scandals. Furthermore, voters' willingness to forgive scandals is also influenced by “strategic” considerations, in that preferences over which political party wins or loses in the election affect opinions about whether someone should be forgiven or whether the scandal is considered important at all. However, we find no evidence that personal involvement in the issue raised by the scandal conditions partisan motivations. We posit that the environment—in this case, a competitive election—is an important consideration for understanding the extent and limits of partisan-motivated reasoning.     

Practical reasoning and practical knowledge

The judgement that provides the content of intention and coincides with the conclusion of practical reasoning is a normative judgement about what to do, and not, as Anscombe and McDowell argue, a factual judgement about what one is doing. Treating the conclusion of practical reasoning as expressing a recommendation rather than a verdict undermines McDowell’s argument; the special nature of practical reasoning does not preclude its conclusions being normative. Anscombe’s and McDowell’s claim that practical self-knowledge is productive of action may be accommodated by identifying the content of practical knowledge not with the conclusion but with a premise of practical reasoning – a kind of practical reasoning that occurs within rather than before action.     

Playing the Odds: A New Response to Lucretius's Symmetry Argument

Abstract: Most commentators have assumed that Lucretius's symmetry argument against the fear of death is flawed. There remains, however, dispute as to what the flaw is. After establishing what I understand the target of Lucretius's argument to be (a desire for a longer life as such), I argue for a novel interpretation of what the flaw is, namely, that extending one's life into the time before one was actually born would be an uncertain bet for one who wanted to extend his life, whereas extending one's life beyond the time one actually dies is a sure bet. This account of what the flaw is has the particular merit of relying only on simple concepts used in everyday reasoning and thus can explain why Lucretius's argument gains no traction even in the absence of sophisticated philosophical analysis.     

Student Inquiry in a Physics Class Discussion

There is a long, rich history of arguments for the importance of involving students in a process of inquiry. For many instructors, however, promoting student inquiry is a difficult agenda to pursue for two reasons. First, there is often tension for instructors between concerns for this agenda and more traditional concerns for the correctness and completeness of students' understanding. Second, it is not easy to recognize when productive student inquiry is taking place. For a teacher in class, what is valuable about the students' participation at any given moment may not be as obvious as what is flawed and ambiguous in their arguments. For this article, I analyze a short excerpt from a high school physics class discussion to consider the value of the students' work as inquiry and to illustrate a teacher's negotiation of the tension between inquiry and traditional content-oriented concerns. In this way, I try to discover the beginnings of science in what the students say and do, rather than to apply criteria from a particular model of scientific reasoning. This exploration for students' knowledge and abilities is offered both as an approach to research on student inquiry and as a mode of instructional practice to support that inquiry.     

Prediction,Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity

Shared activity is often simply willed into existence by individuals. This poses a problem. Philosophical reflection suggests that shared activity involves a distinctive, interlocking structure of intentions. But it is not obvious how one can form the intention necessary for shared activity without settling what fellow participants will do and thereby compromising their agency and autonomy. One response to this problem suggests that an individual can have the requisite intention if she makes the appropriate predictions about fellow participants. I argue that implementing this predictive strategy risks derailing practical reasoning and preventing one from forming the intention. My alternative proposal for reconciling shared activity with autonomy appeals to the idea of acting directly on another's intention. In particular, I appeal to the entitlement one sometimes has to another's practical judgment, and the corresponding authority the other sometimes has to settle what one is to do.     

Moral Reasoning and Rhetoric: The Acceptability of Arguments About AIDS-Related Dilemmas1

The disease AIDS has given rise to a host of social dilemmas. Here we explore the rhetoric that affects people's reasoning about actions taken in the face of such dilemmas. We presented a group of 514 undergraduates with vignettes depicting dilemmas having to do with the distribution of sexually explicit educational material to high school students and with the forced HIV blood testing of factory workers. Subjects rated the acceptability of arguments for and against courses of action taken by persons in the vignettes. The arguments embodied concerns typical of moral reasoning at each of Kohlberg's six stages. We found that the acceptability of stage-typical moral arguments about AIDS-related dilemmas depends on both the dilemma at hand and the course of action being argued for. We argue that knowledge of how people respond to different kinds of moral arguments concerning AIDS-related dilemmas is valuable for informing efforts to advocate humane and lifesaving policies to particular audiences.     

How do investors make predictions? Insights from analogical reasoning research

Previous work on investor decision making has focused almost exclusively on information specific to the company being judged. Consequently, every decision is viewed as a novel event, disconnected from the investor's existing knowledge. In this study, the analogical reasoning literature provides the theoretical support for arguing that investors frequently utilize existing knowledge as a basis for generating predictions about a company's future. The specific proposal is that investors transfer their existing knowledge via two different forms of analogical reasoning. The first, relational reasoning, is based primarily on structural correspondence between a novel company and an existing schema. The second, literal similarity reasoning, is based primarily on surface correspondence of a novel company and a previously encountered company. Our theoretical framework is tested in a study in which experienced investors predict the outcome of a novel company's strategy after reading about the experiences of other companies who implemented a similar strategy. The results are consistent with the occurrence of both relational and literal similarity reasoning, with relational reasoning emerging as the dominant approach to generating investors' predictions. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.