An Adaptive Logic Based on Jaśkowskiˈs Approach to Paraconsistency

In this paper, I present the modal adaptive logic AJ ^r (based on S5) as well as the discussive logic D ^r ₂ that is defined from it. D ^r ₂ is a (non-monotonic) alternative for Jaśkowski’s paraconsistent system D ₂ . Like D ₂ , D ^r ₂ validates all single-premise rules of Classical Logic. However, for formulas that behave consistently, D ^r ₂ moreover validates all multiple-premise rules of Classical Logic. Importantly, and unlike in the case of D ₂ , this does not require the introduction of discussive connectives. It is argued that this has clear advantages with respect to one of the main application contexts of discussive logics, namely the interpretation of discussions.*Research for this paper was indirectly supported by the Flemish Minister responsible for Science and Technology (contract BIL1/8). The author is indebted to Leon Horsten, Jo?o Marcos, Jerzy Perzanowski, Liza Verhoeven, and especially to the referee and to Diderik Batens for comments and suggestions.     

Constructive Logic with Strong Negation is a Substructural Logic. I

The goal of this two-part series of papers is to show that constructive logic with strong negation N is definitionally equivalent to a certain axiomatic extension NFL _ew of the substructural logic FL _ew . In this paper, it is shown that the equivalent variety semantics of N (namely, the variety of Nelson algebras) and the equivalent variety semantics of NFL _ew (namely, a certain variety of FL _ew -algebras) are term equivalent. This answers a longstanding question of Nelson [30]. Extensive use is made of the automated theorem-prover Prover9 in order to establish the result. The main result of this paper is exploited in Part II of this series [40] to show that the deductive systems N and NFL _ew are definitionally equivalent, and hence that constructive logic with strong negation is a substructural logic over FL _ew . Presented by Heinrich Wansing     

The Method of Socratic Proofs for Modal Propositional Logics: K5, S4.2, S4.3, S4F,S4R,S4M and G

The aim of this paper is to present the method of Socratic proofs for seven modal propositional logics: K5, S4.2, S4.3, S4M, S4F, S4R and G. This work is an extension of [10] where the method was presented for the most common modal propositional logics: K, D, T, KB, K4, S4 and S5. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

Constructive Logic with Strong Negation is a Substructural Logic. II

The goal of this two-part series of papers is to show that constructive logic with strong negation N is definitionally equivalent to a certain axiomatic extension NFL _ew of the substructural logic FL _ew . The main result of Part I of this series [41] shows that the equivalent variety semantics of N (namely, the variety of Nelson algebras) and the equivalent variety semantics of NFL _ew (namely, a certain variety of FL _ew -algebras) are term equivalent. In this paper, the term equivalence result of Part I [41] is lifted to the setting of deductive systems to establish the definitional equivalence of the logics N and NFL _ew . It follows from the definitional equivalence of these systems that constructive logic with strong negation is a substructural logic. Presented by Heinrich Wansing     

Statement of Removal

The Journal, Publisher and Author have agreed to remove this article having received expressions of concern regarding the representation of certain clinical data.

For more information, please contact the Publisher or Editor of this Journal.

Article title: Thinking Developmentally: A Contemporary Psychoanalytic Perspective

Authors: Sally Bloom-Feshbach

Journal: Journal of Infant, Child, and Adolescent Psychotherapy

Citation information: Volume 17, Number 2, pages 91–95

Version of Record Published Online: 31 May 2018

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15289168.2018.1456122     

An Incomplete Relevant Modal Logic

The relevant modal logic G is a simple extension of the logic RT, the relevant counterpart of the familiar classically based system T. Using the Routley–Meyer semantics for relevant modal logics, this paper proves three main results regarding G: (i) G is semantically complete, but only with a non-standard interpretation of necessity. From this, however, other nice properties follow. (ii) With a standard interpretation of necessity, G is semantically incomplete; there is no class of frames that characterizes G. (iii) The class of frames for G characterizes the classically based logic T.     

On the Closure Properties of the Class of Full G-models of a Deductive System

In this paper we consider the structure of the class FGModS of full generalized models of a deductive system S from a universal-algebraic point of view, and the structure of the set of all the full generalized models of S on a fixed algebra A from the lattice-theoretical point of view; this set is represented by the lattice FACS_s A of all algebraic closed-set systems C on A such that (A, C) ε FGModS. We relate some properties of these structures with tipically logical properties of the sentential logic S. The main algebraic properties we consider are the closure of FGModS under substructures and under reduced products, and the property that for any A the lattice FACS_s A is a complete sublattice of the lattice of all algebraic closed-set systems over A. The logical properties are the existence of a fully adequate Gentzen system for S, the Local Deduction Theorem and the Deduction Theorem for S. Some of the results are established for arbitrary deductive systems, while some are found to hold only for deductive systems in more restricted classes like the protoalgebraic or the weakly algebraizable ones. The paper ends with a section on examples and counterexamples. Dedicated to the memory of Willem Johannes Blok     

On an Intuitionistic Modal Logic

In this paper we consider an intuitionistic variant of the modal logic S4 (which we call IS4). The novelty of this paper is that we place particular importance on the natural deduction formulation of IS4— our formulation has several important metatheoretic properties. In addition, we study models of IS4— not in the framework of Kirpke semantics, but in the more general framework of category theory. This allows not only a more abstract definition of a whole class of models but also a means of modelling proofs as well as provability.     

Algebraic logic for classical conjunction and disjunction

In this paper we study the relations between the fragment L of classical logic having just conjunction and disjunction and the variety D of distributive lattices, within the context of Algebraic Logic. We prove that these relations cannot be fully expressed either with the tools of Blok and Pigozzi's theory of algebraizable logics or with the use of reduced matrices for L. However, these relations can be naturally formulated when we introduce a new notion of model of a sequent calculus. When applied to a certain natural calculus for L, the resulting models are equivalent to a class of abstract logics (in the sense of Brown and Suszko) which we call distributive. Among other results, we prove that D is exactly the class of the algebraic reducts of the reduced models of L, that there is an embedding of the theories of L into the theories of the equational consequence (in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi) relative to D, and that for any algebra A of type (2,2) there is an isomorphism between the D-congruences of A and the models of L over A. In the second part of this paper (which will be published separately) we will also apply some results to give proofs with a logical flavour for several new or well-known lattice-theoretical properties.Dedicated to our master, Francesc d'A. Sales, on his 75th birthday     

A Negationless Interpretation of Intuitionistic Theories. I

The present work contains an axiomatic treatment of some parts of the restricted version of intuitionistic mathematics advocated by G. F. C. Griss, also known as negationless intuitionistic mathematics. Formal systems NPC, NA, and FIM ^N for negationless predicate logic, arithmetic, and analysis are proposed. Our Theorem 4 in Section 2 asserts the translatability of Heyting's arithmetic HAinto NA. The result can in fact be extended to a large class of intuitionistic theories based on HAand their negationless counterparts. For instance, in Section 3 this is shown for Kleene's system of intuitionistic analysis FIMand our FIM ^N . This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Truth,Predication and a Family of Contingent Paradoxes

In truth theory one aims at general formal laws governing the attribution of truth to statements. Gupta’s and Belnap’s revision-theoretic approach provides various well-motivated theories of truth, in particular T* and T#, which tame the Liar and related paradoxes without a Tarskian hierarchy of languages. In property theory, one similarly aims at general formal laws governing the predication of properties. To avoid Russell’s paradox in this area a recourse to type theory is still popular, as testified by recent work in formal metaphysics by Williamson and Hale. There is a contingent Liar that has been taken to be a problem for type theory. But this is because this Liar has been presented without an explicit recourse to a truth predicate. Thus, type theory could avoid this paradox by incorporating such a predicate and accepting an appropriate theory of truth. There is however a contingent paradox of predication that more clearly undermines the viability of type theory. It is then suggested that a type-free property theory is a better option. One can pursue it, by generalizing the revision-theoretic approach to predication, as it has been done by Orilia with his system P*, based on T*. Although Gupta and Belnap do not explicitly declare a preference for T# over T*, they show that the latter has some advantages, such as the recovery of intuitively acceptable principles concerning truth and a better reconstruction of informal arguments involving this notion. A type-free system based on T# rather than T* extends these advantages to predication and thus fares better than P* in the intended applications of property theory.

     

The countable homogeneous universal model of B 2

We give a detailed account of the Algebraically Closed and Existentially Closed members of the second Lee class B ₂ of distributive p-algebras, culminating in an explicit construction of the countable homogeneous universal model of B ₂. The axioms of Schmid [7], [8] for the AC and EC members of B ₂ are reduced to what we prove to be an irredundant set of axioms. The central tools used in this study are the strong duality of Clark and Davey [3] for B ₂ and the method of Clark [2] for constructing AC and EC algebras using a strong duality. Applied to B ₂, this method transfers the entire discussion into an equivalent dual category X ₂ of Boolean spaces which carry a pair of tightly interacting orderings. The doubly ordered spaces of X ₂ prove to be much more readily constructed and analyzed than the corresponding algebras in B ₂.     

Refutations,Proofs, and Models in the Modal Logic K4

In this paper we study the method of refutation rules in the modal logic K4. We introduce refutation rules with certain normal forms that provide a new syntactic decision procedure for this logic. As corollaries we obtain such results for the following important extensions: S4, the provability logic G, and Grzegorczyk's logic. We also show that tree-type models can be constructed from syntactic refutations of this kind.     

Gleason's Theorem Has a Constructive Proof

Gleason's theorem for R ³ says that if f is a nonnegative function on the unit sphere with the property that f(x) + f(y) + f(z) is a fixed constant for each triple x,y,z of mutually orthogonal unit vectors, then f is a quadratic form. We examine the issues raised by discussions in this journal regarding the possibility of a constructive proof of Gleason"s theorem in light of the recent publication of such a proof.     

The Incompleteness of RGL

RGLis a version of the modal logic GLbased on the relevant logic R. It is shown that the class of RKframes that verify all theorems of RGLalso verify a scheme that we call (!). If RGLhas (!) as a theorem, however, it is not a relevant logic. I go on to show that not all instances of (!) are theorems of RGL, hence this logic is not complete over any class of RKframes.     

Effects of workaholism on volunteer firefighters’ performance: a moderated mediation model including supervisor recognition and emotional exhaustion

ABSTRACT

Background and Objectives: Although workaholism has been associated with job performance, the mechanisms that explain this relationship remain unclear. In this study, we investigated the conditional indirect effects of workaholism on performance via emotional exhaustion, across low and high levels of supervisor recognition.

Methods: We conducted an empirical cross-sectional study using a sample of 1028 volunteer firefighters who completed a self-report questionnaire assessing workaholism, emotional exhaustion, work performance, and supervisor recognition.

Results: Tests of latent interactions were performed using the latent moderated structural equation modeling approach. Consistent with our predictions, results revealed that the negative indirect effects of workaholism on performance, through emotional exhaustion, were stronger when supervisor recognition was low.

Conclusions: Theorical contributions and perspectives, as well as implications for practice are discussed.     

Priestley Duality for Paraconsistent Nelson’s Logic

The variety of N4^{^}{{\bf N4}^\perp}-lattices provides an algebraic semantics for the logic N4^{^}{{\bf N4}^\perp} , a version of Nelson’s logic combining paraconsistent strong negation and explosive intuitionistic negation. In this paper we construct the Priestley duality for the category of N4^{^}{{\bf N4}^\perp}-lattices and their homomorphisms. The obtained duality naturally extends the Priestley duality for Nelson algebras constructed by R. Cignoli and A. Sendlewski.     

Minimally Abnormal Models In Some Adaptive Logics

In an adaptive logic APL, based on a (monotonic) non-standardlogic PL the consequences of can be defined in terms ofa selection of the PL-models of . An important property ofthe adaptive logics ACLuN1, ACLuN2, ACLuNs1, andACLuNs2 logics is proved: whenever a model is not selected, this isjustified in terms of a selected model (Strong Reassurance). Theproperty fails for Priest's LP ^m because its way of measuring thedegree of abnormality of a model is incoherent – correcting thisdelivers the property.     

A Loop-Free Decision Procedure for Modal Propositional Logics K4, S4 and S5

The aim of this paper is to present a loop-free decision procedure for modal propositional logics K4, S4 and S5. We prove that the procedure terminates and that it is sound and complete. The procedure is based on the method of Socratic proofs for modal logics, which is grounded in the logic of questions IEL.