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1.
Paul Weirich 《Synthese》2001,126(3):427-441
To handle epistemic and pragmatic risks, Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982, 1988) design a decision procedure for cases in which probabilities are indeterminate. Their procedure steps outside the traditional expected utility framework. Must it do this? Can the traditional framework handle risk? This paper argues that it can. The key is a comprehensive interpretation of an option's possible outcomes. Taking possible outcomes more broadly than Gärdenfors and Sahlin do, expected utility can give risk its due. In particular, Good's (1952) decision procedure adequately handles indeterminate probabilities and the risks they generate. 相似文献
2.
This essay considers some major questions raised by civil and other forms of conscientious disobedience. What distinguishes that form of dissent? Can we recognise the legitimacy of a political system yet defy its laws? Is disobeying a democratic decision especially or entirely unacceptable, or can disobedience be an instrument of democracy? If a regime recognises rights, how should we regard disobedience that appeals to those rights in challenging the regime’s laws? How should reasons for obedience figure in our thinking about justified disobedience? The essay locates the contributions that make up this special issue of Res Publica within these debates about disobedience. It questions whether any general theory of justified disobedience can command agreement: the conditions that give rise to conscientious disobedience -- conflicting values and judgements -- seem to preclude consensus on when its use is justified. 相似文献
3.
Patrick Bateson 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2010,44(4):351-359
Most biologists are struck by the many close fits between organisms’ characteristics and the environments which they inhabit.
The adaptations look as they have been designed, but their origins are explained in terms of Charles Darwin’s natural selection.
Nick Thompson, to whom this essay is dedicated, frequently wrote about design and insisted that the concept should not treated
in the same way as the notion of current utility, the idea that an organism’s trait increases its chances of survival and
reproductive success. He was right, but sadly the whole idea of design has been appropriated by the creationists seeking scientific
respectability for their extremist nonsense. As a result biologists are now shy about using the term. 相似文献
4.
Michael T. McFall 《Philosophia》2011,39(4):657-672
The decision to get married, as well as choosing whom to marry, is of the utmost importance to most people. This decision
consists of many amoral considerations, but an ethical relationship arises when a promise is made, especially a vow that binds
for a lifetime and affects oneself, one’s spouse, one’s children, and society. This essay provides an account of ideal romantic
marriage, arguing that John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty provides an excellent foundation for constructing such an account. Neither dead dogma nor living truth is a healthy model
for marriage, so a hybrid model of marriage, living dogma, is developed. The importance of the marital vow becomes apparent
as the living dogma account is revealed, and this examination yields a model for how to decide when and whom to marry. 相似文献
5.
P. Bartha 《Synthese》2007,154(1):5-52
Among recent objections to Pascal’s Wager, two are especially compelling. The first is that decision theory, and specifically
the requirement of maximizing expected utility, is incompatible with infinite utility values. The second is that even if infinite
utility values are admitted, the argument of the Wager is invalid provided that we allow mixed strategies. Furthermore, Hájek
(Philosophical Review 112, 2003) has shown that reformulations of Pascal’s Wager that address these criticisms inevitably
lead to arguments that are philosophically unsatisfying and historically unfaithful. Both the objections and Hájek’s philosophical
worries disappear, however, if we represent our preferences using relative utilities (generalized utility ratios) rather than
a one-place utility function. Relative utilities provide a conservative way to make sense of infinite value that preserves
the familiar equation of rationality with the maximization of expected utility. They also provide a means of investigating
a broader class of problems related to the Wager. 相似文献
6.
Kurtis Hagen 《Dao》2011,10(1):53-70
Xunzi is often interpreted as offering a method for transforming our desires. This essay argues that, strictly speaking, he
does not. Rather, Xunzi offers a method of developing an auxiliary motivational structure capable of overpowering our original
desires, when there is a conflict. When one succeeds in transforming one’s overall character, original desires nevertheless
remain and are largely satisfied. This explains why one may be motivated to follow the way even before one has developed noble
intentions. On Xunzi’s view, following dao provides the best chance of satisfying one’s original desires, as well as fulfilling the more noble aspirations that arise
from the process. 相似文献
7.
Daniel Ellsberg presented in Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75:643–669, 1961) various examples questioning the
thesis that decision making under uncertainty can be reduced to decision making under risk. These examples constitute one
of the main challenges to the received view on the foundations of decision theory offered by Leonard Savage in Savage (1972).
Craig Fox and Amos Tversky have, nevertheless, offered an indirect defense of Savage. They provided in Fox and Tversky (1995)
an explanation of Ellsberg’s two-color problem in terms of a psychological effect: ambiguity aversion. The ‘comparative ignorance’ hypothesis articulates how this effect works and explains why it is important to an understanding
of the typical pattern of responses associated with Ellsberg’s two-color problem. In the first part of this article we challenge
Fox and Tversky’s explanation. We present first an experiment that extends Ellsberg’s two-color problem where certain predictions
of the comparative ignorance hypothesis are not confirmed. In addition the hypothesis seems unable to explain how the subjects
resolve trade-offs between security and expected pay-off when vagueness is present. Ellsberg offered an explanation of the
typical behavior elicited by his examples in terms of these trade-offs and in section three we offer a model of Ellsberg’s
trade-offs. The model takes seriously the role of imprecise probabilities in explaining Ellsberg’s phenomenon. The so-called
three-color problem was also considered in Fox and Tversky (1995). We argue that Fox and Tversky’s analysis of this case breaks
a symmetry with their analysis of the two-color problem. We propose a unified treatment of both problems and we present a
experiment that confirms our hypothesis. 相似文献
8.
This essay examines Jacques Derrida’s contribution to recent debates in animal philosophy in order to explore the critical
promise of his work for contemporary discourses on animal ethics and vegetarianism. The essay is divided into two sections,
both of which have as their focus Derrida’s interview with Jean-Luc Nancy entitled “‘Eating Well’, or the Calculation of the
Subject.” My task in the initial section is to assess the claim made by Derrida in this interview that Levinas’s work is dogmatically
anthropocentric, and to determine whether Levinas’s conception of ethics leaves a place for animals. In the second half of
the essay I turn to an analysis of Derrida’s discussion of vegetarianism and its critical relation to the humanism and anthropocentrism
that he is calling into question. The main argument that I seek to advance here is that deconstruction should not be strictly
identified with vegetarianism (as certain of Derrida’s readers have suggested), but rather that what is needed is a thorough
deconstruction of existing discourses on vegetarianism, a project that remains largely to be developed. 相似文献
9.
Christopher Lepock 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(2):377-391
Ernest Sosa’s virtue perspectivism goes beyond standard reliabilism by requiring that agents with justified beliefs not only
derive their beliefs from virtuous cognitive faculties but have an epistemic perspective that explains the origin of the beliefs
and makes their belief-set coherent. I argue that Sosa’s account of the epistemic perspective does not ensure that the perspective
will confer justification. An adequate epistemic perspective must establish a non-accidental connection between an agent’s
use of a faculty in certain circumstances and its reliability in those circumstances. An agent who is capable of judging the
reliability of her faculties in different situations will have a perspective that meets this requirement. Revising virtue
perspectivism in this way also permits a stronger response to doxastic ascent arguments against the theory. 相似文献
10.
Henry SG 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2006,27(3):187-213
The evidence-based medicine movement advocates basing all medical decisions on certain types of quantitative research data and has stimulated protracted controversy and debate since its inception. Evidence-based medicine presupposes an inaccurate and deficient view of medical knowledge. Michael Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge both explains this deficiency and suggests remedies for it. Polanyi shows how all explicit human knowledge depends on a wealth of tacit knowledge which accrues from experience and is essential for problem solving. Edmund Pellegrino’s classic treatment of clinical judgment is examined, and a Polanyian critique of this position demonstrates that tacit knowledge is necessary for understanding how clinical judgment and medical decisions involve persons. An adequate medical epistemology requires much more qualitative research relevant to the clinical encounter and medical decision making than is currently being done. This research is necessary for preventing an uncritical application of evidence-based medicine by health care managers that erodes good clinical practice. Polanyi’s epistemology shows the need for this work and provides the structural core for building an adequate and robust medical epistemology that moves beyond evidence-based medicine.An erratum to this article can be found at 相似文献
11.
Paul Weirich 《Philosophical Studies》2010,148(3):467-475
Agents face serious obstacles to making optimal decisions. For instance, their cognitive limits stand in the way. John Pollock’s
book, Thinking about Acting, suggests many ways of revising decision principles to accommodate human limits and to direct limited, artificial agents.
The book’s main proposal is to replace optimization, or expected-utility maximization, with locally global planning. This
essay describes optimization and locally global planning, and then argues that optimization among salient options has the
virtues of locally global planning without certain drawbacks. Although it does not endorse locally global planning, it recommends
that decision theory incorporate some of the book’s ideas about settling for improvements when optimization among all options
is unrealistic. 相似文献
12.
It is sometimes argued that the fact that possession of perfect knowledge about the future is impossible, means that it is
impossible for decisions to be rational. This reasoning is fallacious. If rationality is given a new interpretation, then
decisions can be considered rational. A theory of decision that has as its basis Peirce’s theory of abduction can provide
a new way of understanding decisions as rational processes. The Peircean theory of decision (i) considers decisions as part
of a complete strategy, and (ii) shows that decision making is governed by the same rules as scientific abduction. These rules
are neither permissive rules like rules of deductive inference nor predictive like laws of nature, but rather genuine laws
of conduct that determine what step should be made, if a given end is to be reached.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
13.
Wei Xiong 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2011,6(2):334-344
The Dutch Book Argument shows that an agent will lose surely in a gamble (a Dutch Book is made) if his degrees of belief do
not satisfy the laws of the probability. Yet a question arises here: What does the Dutch Book imply? This paper firstly argues
that there exists a utility function following Ramsey’s axioms. And then, it explicates the properties of the utility function
and degree of belief respectively. The properties show that coherence in partial beliefs for Subjective Bayesianism means
that the degree of belief, representing a belief ordering, satisfies the laws of probability, and that coherence in preferences
means that the preferences are represented by expected utilities. A coherent belief ordering and a utility scale induce a
coherent preference ordering; a coherent preference ordering induces a coherent belief ordering which can be uniquely represented
by a degree-of-belief function. The preferences (values) and beliefs are both incoherent or disordered if a Dutch Book is
made. 相似文献
14.
Dan W. Forsyth 《International Journal of Hindu Studies》1997,1(1):141-164
Conclusion Thus, we can see that Obeyesekere’s notion and usage of some psychoanalytic concepts is at variance with Freud’s formulations
and with those of standard psychoanalytic theory. This divergence is also evident in Obeyesekere’s formulation of the concept
of disconnection, which is arguably the most important construct in the first chapter of The work of culture. Space constraints prevent us taking-up this concept here. So let me now conclude this first part of the essay, and begin
part 2 with an examination of ‘disconnection’ in the context of a discussion of Obeyesekere’s accounts of two South Asian
ecstatics. 相似文献
15.
Alan Richardson 《Synthese》2011,178(1):143-154
This essay examines the perspective from which Bas van Fraassen, in his book, The Empirical Stance, explains the project of empiricism. I argue that this perspective is a robustly transcendental perspective, which suggests
that the tradition of empiricism lacks the resources to explain itself. I offer an alternative history of epistemic voluntarism
in twentieth-century philosophy to the history van Fraassen himself provides, one that finds the novelty in van Fraassen’s
own views to be precisely his reintroduction of the knowing mind into the tradition of analytic philosophy of science. 相似文献
16.
Recently, several theories of decision making and probability judgment have been proposed that take into account ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985; Gardenfors and Sahlin, 1982). However, none of these theories explains exactly what the psychological causes of ambiguity are or addresses the issue of whether ambiguity effects are rational. In this paper, we define ambiguity as the subjective experience of missing information relevant to a prediction. We show how this definition can explain why ambiguity affects decisions in the ways it does. We argue that there are a variety of rational reasons ambiguity affects probability judgments and choices in the ways it does. However, we argue that the ambiguity effect does not cast doubt on the claim that utility theory is a standard of rational choice. Rather, we suggest that the effect of ambiguity on decisions highlights the fact that utility theory, like any normative model of decision making only prescribes the optimal decision, given what one knows. 相似文献
17.
Christoph Lumer 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2010,13(5):561-584
Being a formal and general as well as the most widely accepted approach to practical rationality, rational decision theory
should be crucial for justifying rational morals. In particular, acting morally should also (nearly always) be rational in
decision theoretic terms. After defending this thesis, in the critical part of the paper two strategies to develop morals
following this insight are criticized: game theoretical ethics of cooperation and ethical intuitionism. The central structural
objections to ethics of cooperation are that they too directly aim at the rationality of moral action and that they to do
not encompass moral values or a moral desirability function. The constructive half of the paper takes up these criticisms
by developing a two-part strategy to bring rationality and morals in line. The first part is to define ‘moral desirability’.
This is done, using multi-attribute utility theory, by equating several adequate components of an individual’s comprehensive
(rational) utility function with the moral desirability function. The second part is to introduce mechanisms, institutions,
in particular socially valid moral norms, that provide further motivation for acting in accordance with morals. 相似文献
18.
Stefano Predelli 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2010,39(1):5-21
In this essay, I propose an analysis of Quine’s example ’Giorgione was so-called because of his size’, grounded on the idea
of an obstinate demonstrative. In the first sections, I discuss the advantages and drawbacks of the demonstrative and logophoric
treatments of ‘so called’, I highlight certain parallelisms with Davidson’s paratactic view of quotation, and I introduce
independent considerations in favor of the idea of an obstinate demonstrative. In the second half of my essay, I apply this
notion to Quine’s example, and I discuss its consequences with respect to the principle of substitutivity of coreferential
singular terms. 相似文献
19.
William Hasker 《Sophia》2010,49(3):433-445
Andrew H. Gleeson has written an essay commenting on an exchange between Dewi Z. Phillips and me, arguing that I was mistaken
to dismiss Phillips’ criticism of the standard definition of omnipotence as unsuccessful. Furthermore, he charges Swinburne,
me, and analytic theists in general, with an excessive anthropomorphism that obliterates the distinction between Creator and
creature. In response, I contend that all of Gleeson’s criticisms are unsound. 相似文献
20.
Patrick Toner 《Philosophical Studies》2011,155(1):65-81
Roughly, animalism is the doctrine that each of us is identical with an organism. This paper explains and defends a hylemorphic
version of animalism. I show how hylemorphic animalism handles standard objections to animalism in compelling ways. I also
show what the costs of endorsing hylemorphic animalism are. The paper’s contention is that despite the costs, the view is
worth taking seriously. 相似文献