Adolescents' perceptions of and feelings about control and responsibility in their lives

This paper describes a hypothesis-generating study which merges a review of past conceptualizations and research (done mainly with children) with the results of a semistructured interview designed to distinguish between perceptions of control and responsibility in adolescents. Eight female and eight male freshmen and seniors from a middle-class high school in suburban Virginia were interviewed concerning their views and feelings of control and responsibility. They also rated themselves on a scale of 0 to 10 in eight areas of their lives on how much in control and how responsible they felt for things that happened in those areas and, in general, how satisfied they were with their lives. Pearson product-moment correlations showed that feelings of responsibility and control were highly correlated for this group, as were feelings of control and life satisfaction. Although the relationship between responsibility and life satisfaction was not significant for the total group, it was significant for the eight seniors. Students were further questioned concerning recent decisions they had made and who they felt had control over them and were responsible for them. In general, adolescents ascribed control and responsibility to the same source, but they seldom described shared control or responsibility. Implications for the development of social responsibility as well as future research are discussed.     

Bodily feelings and felt inclinations

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - The paper defends a version of the perceptual account of bodily feelings, according to which having a feeling is feeling something about one’s body....     

Emotions,feelings and intentionality

Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an event; such emotional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion, and I draw an analogy with Frank Jackson's well-known knowledge argument to show this. Finally, I try to show that, even if materialism is true, the phenomenology of emotional feelings, as described from a personal perspective, cannot be captured using only the theoretical concepts available for the impersonal stance of the sciences.     

Feedback environment and well-being at work: The mediating role of personal control and feelings of helplessness

This study examines employees' personal control and feelings of helplessness at work as partial mediators of the relationship between the supervisor–employee feedback environment and well-being (job satisfaction, job depression, job anxiety, turnover intentions) at work. Findings are reported from a cross-sectional field study with 345 participants from three different industries. Hierarchical regression analyses showed that feedback environment was positively related to job satisfaction, personal control over information and decisions, and was negatively related to helplessness, job depression, and turnover intentions. Furthermore, personal control partially mediated the relationships between feedback environment and job satisfaction as well as job depression. Helplessness partially mediated the relationships between feedback environment and job depression, job satisfaction, and turnover intentions. This study adds to the literature on feedback environment in highlighting the importance of the supervisor–employee feedback environment for well-being at work and introducing personal control and helplessness as mediating variables.     

The language of feelings

The acquisition of a language of feelings is similar to the acquisition of other language and can be conceptualized within a Piagetian framework. The acquisition of this language of feelings is subject to certain pitfalls that are reflective of various emotional problems. The linguistic poverty for affect that is concomitant with being unable to label feelings points to the need for parents and therapists to be involved in helping the child or patient develop an affective schema. The development of a differentiated, accurate, and flexible language of emotion to both express personal feelings and evoke responses in others is a schematic gift which parents provide. We find that when parents have not provided this, a reparative language developmental task is part of a psychotherapy. A grasp of the interplay of the concepts ofassimilation andaccommodation in Piaget (1952) appears essential to encouraging a healthy language of feelings. Related concepts drawn from Schacter (1965), Laing (1967), Krystal (1979), Kelly (1955) and Malerstein and Ahern (1979) are interwoven in a Piagetian structure for a language of feelings.     

Risk as feelings

Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.     

Attending to feelings and cognitive performance

The effect on cognitive performance of attending to internally generated stimuli was examined. Specifically, the effect of examining feelings and sensations upon performance in the Stroop test and upon the performance of mental addition was measured. In two initial experiments subjects more quickly named, in the Stroop test, the color of the ink (“red”) in which a color word (“green”) was printed following instructions to attend to their feelings. It was found that this facilitation was due in part to the slowing of the automatic, interfering habit of reading for word meanings. In a third experiment, the effect of attending to physical sensations on the back of the hand was found to have a similar facilitating effect and was seen as resulting from the allocation of attention to internally generated stimuli. In a final experiment, attending to feelings and to the physical sensations on the back of the hand was found to increase speed of mental addition. This effect was attributed to increased attention to internally generated stimuli (here knowledge about the arithmetic performance at the moment).     

A dictionary of rational-emotive feelings and behaviors

Rational-emotive therapy (RET) hypothesizes that people mainly make themselves emotionally disturbed and dysfunctional in their behavior by starting with rational Beliefs (rBs) about their Goals (G) and then by consciously or unconsciously converting these into irrational Beliefs (iBs) or dogmatic, absolutistic musts and commands. To help clients and others to clearly see the differences between their rational Beliefs and their irrational Beliefs, to understand the disordered feelings and behaviors to which the latter lead, and to help them become more rational, less disturbed, and less dysfunctional in their activities, the authors have constructed and herewith present a dictionary of rational-emotive equivalents.Ted Crawford is a Consultant on Communication and Group Processes in Santa Barbara, California. Albert Ellis, Ph.D., is the Executive Director of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy in New York City.     

Fictions,feelings, and emotions

Many philosophers suggest (1) that our emotional engagement with fiction involves participation in a game of make-believe, and (2) that what distinguishes an emotional game from a dispassionate game is the fact that the former activity alone involves sensations of physiological and visceral disturbances caused by our participation in the game. In this paper I argue that philosophers who accept (1) should reject (2). I then illustrate how this conclusion illuminates various puzzles in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind.     

Toward a phenomenology of feelings

Our understanding of emotion cannot be complete without an understanding of feelings, the experiential aspect of emotion. Despite their importance, little effort has been devoted to the careful apprehension of feelings. Based on our apprehension of many randomly selected moments of pristine inner experience, we present a preliminary phenomenology of feelings. We begin by observing that often feelings occur as directly experienced phenomena of awareness; however, often no feelings are present in experience, or if they are present, they are too faint to be observed by a process intended to observe them. Feelings range from vague to distinct and sometimes do, but other times do not, include bodily sensations. When bodily sensations are present, there is a wide range of clarity and location of these sensations. Sometimes people experience multiple distinct feelings and sometimes people experience one feeling that is a mix or blend of different feelings. We also discuss what feelings are not, including instances when feelings do not appear to be present, despite evidence suggesting the presence of underlying emotional processes (e.g., behavioral evidence of emotion). These instances of emotion but not feeling lead us to speculate that experiencing feelings is a skill developed over time through an interaction of interpersonal and intrapersonal events.     

The nature of epistemic feelings

Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called “epistemic feelings.” This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and mechanisms of epistemic feelings: the doxastic account; the mental scanner account; and the heuristic mechanism account. The paper will argue in favor of the heuristic mechanism account.