Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality

Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). Some people believe this problem is a reason to prefer a realist or error theoretic semantics of morals. I argue two things: first, that plausible versions of all these theories are afflicted by the problem equally, and second, that any solution available to the realist and error theorist is also available to the contextualist. So the problem of triviality does not favour noncontextualist views of moral language.     

The notion of happiness in early Wittgenstein: towards a non-contentful account of happiness

This paper examines the notion of ‘happiness’ in the writings of the early Wittgenstein as a notion that does not involve any particular content or states of mind. The main question that the paper addresses is how we can retain a non-contentful account of happiness without turning happiness into an abstract notion, isolated from our concrete lives in language. The paper examines two pivotal components of the Wittgensteinian account of happiness: the ‘good exercise of the will’ and the ‘artistic way of seeing’. In both cases, I try to stress their non-contentful dimension, while simultaneously trying to understand them through language. The central concept for such a non-contentful aspect of language is the notion of ‘meaningfulness’. Thus the paper examines the pivotal components of the Wittgensteinian account of happiness in relation to the notion of ‘meaningfulness’: happiness is then explained as seeing a world against the background of possibilities of meaning.     

Wittgenstein Studies and Contemporary Pyrrhonism

Interpretation of Wittgenstein’s statement ‘whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’ and consequences of rule-following paradox is the topic of this article. The revision of Wittgensteinian approach to the relations between speech and mind, and approaches to the speech by Vygotsky and Austin allow approving the disagreement with Wittgenstein and exhibit the cases when is necessary ‘to break silence and speak’. Argument is based on the hermeneutical approach to the skeptical image of Wittgenstein studies that disclose the meaning of hypothetic relevance between performative utterances and impulses generated by inner speech. Wittgenstein’s ideas are demonstrated as the contemporary version of a Pyrrhonism. Classical skepticism intensifies procedures for justification of philosophical knowledge, because philosophy tries to disprove skeptical claims. Wittgenstein studies play approximately the same role. Interpretation of the proposition ‘whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’ in a view of performative utterance allow coordinating the inner philosophical speech made by Wittgenstein, and the speech made by his commentators and critics.     

A serious misunderstanding: synchronicity and the generation of meaning

Abstract: This paper points to the problem caused by the fact that numerous academic ‘Jung studies’ are conducted on the basis of the English translation of Jung's works without any knowledge of his original texts and illustrates it with the misconstrual that Jung's concept of synchronicity suffered in the studies of many recent authors, as exemplified by two articles in the September 2011 issue of the JAP. The translation of ‘sinngemäße Koinzidenz’ as ‘meaningful coincidence’ seduced those writers to take synchronistic ‘meaning’ as meaning the meaningfulness of life or even as ‘transcendent meaning’, which is incompatible with Jung's synchronicity concept, and to replace Jung's strictly intellectual project of establishing an explanatory principle for synchronistic events (in addition to the principle of causality for all other events) by the fundamentally different project of focusing on the impact that such events may have for the experiencing subjective mind, on ‘human meaning‐making’, and, with a decidedly anti‐intellectual bias, of hoping for ‘shifts into non‐rational states of mind’.     

Knowing How to Talk About What Cannot Be Said: Objectivity and Epistemic Locatedness

I take it that A. W. Moore is right when he said that ‘Wittgenstein was right: some things cannot be put into words. Moreover, some things that cannot be put into words are of the utmost philosophical importance’. There is, however, a constant threat of self-stultification whenever an attempt is made to put the ineffable into words. As Pamela Sue Anderson notes in Re-visioning gender in philosophy of religion: reason, love, and epistemic locatedness, certain recent approaches to ineffability—including Moore’s approach—attempt to find a ‘third way’ of engaging with it, which displaces the traditional dichotomy between the effable and the ineffable, that is, between what can be said and what cannot be said. In this way, they seek to overcome the threat of self-stultification mentioned above. Still, one important challenge to this kind of approach, which Moore addresses, is, as he puts it, ‘to show how it is possible’ to talk about the ineffable ‘without belying its very ineffability’. His solution to the problem of the ineffable takes the notion of ‘knowing how’ to play a central role, and is formulated in accordance with his commitments to truth and objectivity. A further important challenge to the kind of approach to the ineffable Moore proposes concerns the issue of objectivity. In Re-visioning gender in philosophy of religion, Anderson draws attention to our epistemic locatedness, which brings in questions concerning, for example, gender and culture. Pursuing this view, the challenge is to show ineffable insight without ignoring our epistemic locatedness and, in particular, the role of gender in the conceptualisation and imagery through which we seek to come to terms with the ineffable. My paper deals with these challenges. By engaging with Moore’s and Anderson’s discussions of the ineffable, I examine how it is possible to talk philosophically about the ineffable, without breaking a commitment to enlarged or objective thinking, and without ignoring the epistemic locatedness of thinking.     

A Different Rationale for Redistribution: Pursuit of Happiness in the European Union

This paper considers the role of redistribution in the light of recent research findings on self reported happiness. The analysis and empirical work reported here tries to relate this to a representative actor ‘homo realitus’ and the ‘pursuit of happiness’ rather than the traditional ‘homo economicus’. Econometrically estimating the determinants of happiness in the European Union (EU) using Eurobarometer data and the construction of an ‘Index of Happiness’ facilitates policy simulations. Such simulations find that in terms of average happiness there is little advantage to redistributing income within a country, but more from redistributing income between countries. The importance for happiness of relative income, average standard of living, marital status and age are confirmed. The theoretical rationale for redistribution is also examined.     

Theorizing lived religion: introduction

ABSTRACT

The introduction to this special issue describes the emergence of the lived religion approach in relation to other approaches within the study of religion and sociology of religion as a way of going beyond the emphasis on texts and institutions, on the one hand, and the focus on the fate of religion in modern times, on the other hand. It also introduces the aim of this special issue, namely ‘theorizing’ lived religion. To do this, the authors summarize how the founders of this approach have conceptualized the topic of ‘lived religion’, adjacent approaches, and the theoretical underpinnings of their work. The authors propose three directions to develop the contribution a lived religion approach might make to theorizing: 1) explicating what is meant by ‘religion’ by drawing on work that studies religion as a category; 2) explicating how concepts and theories are developed based on lived religion research, with particular emphasis on the way tensions between modernist, disenchanting epistemologies and the enchanted, supernatural worlds of practitioners may inform theory and methodological reflection; 3) anchoring the doing of research, emphasizing the full research cycle in religious studies programs so that students have a solid basis for learning how to move back and forth between carrying out original research and conceptual/theoretical work.     

Bridging the representational gap in the dynamic systems approach to development

We describe the relationship between the dynamic systems approach to development and a recent approach to the dynamics of representational states – the dynamic field approach. Both approaches share an emphasis on the concepts of stability (attractor states), instability (especially bifurcations), soft-assembly and flexibility. But the dynamic field approach adds the concept of ‘activation’ to capture the strength with which behaviorally relevant information is specified. By explicitly linking these dynamic systems approaches, we allow for more direct comparisons between dynamic systems theory and connectionism. We note three current differences between these two approaches to development: (1) the notion of stability is central to how representational states are conceptualized in the dynamic field approach; (2) the dynamic field approach is more directly concerned with the sensorimotor origins of cognition; and (3) the dynamic approach is less advanced with regard to learning. We conclude that proponents of the two approaches can learn from the respective strengths of each approach. We suspect these differences will largely disappear in the next 20 years.     

The Phenomenological Life-World Analysis and the Methodology of the Social Sciences

This Alfred Schutz Memorial Lecture discusses the relationship between the phenomenological life-world analysis and the methodology of the social sciences, which was the central motive of Schutz’s work. I have set two major goals in this lecture. The first is to scrutinize the postulate of adequacy, as this postulate is the most crucial of Schutz’s methodological postulates. Max Weber devised the postulate ‘adequacy of meaning’ in analogy to the postulate of ‘causal adequacy’ (a concept used in jurisprudence) and regarded both as complementary and, in the context of sociological analysis, critical. Schutz extracted the two postulates from the Neokantian epistemology, dismissed the concept of causality, and reduced Weber’s two postulates of adequacy into one, namely, the adequacy of meaning. I discuss the benefits and shortcomings of this reduction. A major problem, in my view, is that Schutz’s reformulation lost the empirical concern that was inherent in Weber’s ‘causal adequacy’. As a result, the models of economics (which shaped Schutz’s conception of social science) are considered to be adequate if they are ‘understandable’ to an everyday actor, even when they are based on the most unrealistic assumptions. To recapture Weber’s empirical orientation I recommend a more restrictive interpretation of the postulate of adequacy that links it to qualitative research and unfolds the critical potential of Schutz’s phenomenological life-world analysis. My second goal is to report on some current developments in German sociology in which a number of approaches explicitly refer to Schutz’s analysis of the life-world and attempt to pursue ‘adequate’ empirical research. This lecture focuses on three approaches: ethnophenomenology, life-world analytic ethnography, and social scientific hermeneutics.     

What Do Happiness Studies Study?

What do, or should, happiness studies study? Everything to which we refer with the word ‘‘happiness’’ is worth some study. But the study of subjective states covers only part of the ground covered by the word ‘‘happiness’’ and by no means all the ground central to understanding happiness. On the central use of ‘‘happiness,’’ to be happy is to be glad or satisfied or content, which suggests subjectivity, with having a good measure of what is important in life, which suggests objectivity. We find the same suggestion of both subjectivity and objectivity in the list of what enhances the quality of life. There are strong arguments in favour both of the subjectivity of what enhances life and of its objectivity. I argue that neither is right, that the story is more complicated. The conclusion of the story is that there is a list of several non-reducible features that contribute to the quality of a characteristic human life, and that anything that contributes to the quality of any human life will be one or other of these features. But there is a problem. When we speak of the quality of a human life, there may be no one thing we have in mind. Perhaps some of us are not disagreeing with one another over the nature of a ‘‘happy’’ life but speaking of different things.     

Does Government Make People Happy?: Exploring New Research Directions for Government’s Roles in Happiness

Our study aims to explore new directions for researches on government’s role in enhancing quality of life (QOL). Although government can influence, to the greatest extent, people’s happiness, very few studies have systemically examined the quantitative or qualitative attributes of government in happiness enhancement, compared with the large volume of studies on economic, political, and cultural factors’ impact on QOL. Related to government’s role in happiness, we suggest ‘nine new research directions,’ all of which can generally be related with its’ quantitative and qualitative attributes. Even though much existing researches have focused on a part of quantitative sides of government, there are still many remaining attributes to be highlighted. Moreover, we expect that new, composite and nonlinear quality attributes of government will provide bountiful research topics in the future. Also, cross-boundary comparisons and mixtures between quality and quantity, as well as the conditional macro-context for government’s role, suggest new ideas for QOL studies.     

Between Platonic Love and Internet Pornography

The article sets out to show how an holistic approach in matters of sexuality is always more helpful than one-sided approaches. On the issue of internet pornography, the authors suggest that the recent anti-masturbation online movement ‘no fapping’ is based on wrong conclusions from insufficient evidence. We suggest that a holistic approach is called for, with emphasis on the embodied human. Abstinence or what is understood by ‘Platonic love’ is not a solution, according to Plato himself. From a phenomenological perspective, we suggest owning up to our strange bodies and habitualising sexual activity.     

Schopenhauer on the aimlessness of the will

Schopenhauer asserts that ‘the will, which is objectified in human life as it is in every appearance, is a striving without aim and without end’. The article rejects some recent readings of this claim, and offers the following positive interpretation: however many specific aims of my specific desires I manage to attain, none is a final aim, in the sense that none terminates my ‘willing as a whole’, none turns me into a non-willing being. To understand Schopenhauer’s claim we must recognize his central contrast between happiness and will-lessness. Happiness is the satisfaction of individual desire, but no act of will that succeeds in satisfying individual desire is the attainment of a final aim, in that none brings about a conscious state in which the subject experiences no more unfulfilled desires. Such a state is the ultimate goal of existence, in Schopenhauer’s view, but happiness does not provide a route along which it can be attained.     

Child protection investigations: Discourse analysis and the management of incommensurability

This paper asks whether discourse analytic approaches in social psychology have yet produced methodologies adequate to the investigation of institutional ‘gaze’. Institutional language has been explored to the extent that state agencies construct members of the public by speaking about them in particular ways. This has often provided insight into the co-existence and competition of incommensurable discourses. However, studies of representation in the sense of speaking for have been notably absent from social psychology. It is argued that this aspect of discourse is a vital component in the study of contemporary governmental multi-agency strategy in the area of child protection, where recent legislation and policy aims at the coordination of incommensurable discourses. A methodology for studying this strategy is outlined through an account of the actor network approach in science studies, accounts of the State under the post-modern condition, and analyses of sections of interviews with social workers.     

Wittgenstein and Internal Relations

Abstract: Interpretations of the Tractatus divide into what might be called a metaphysical and an anti‐metaphysical approach to the work. The central issue between the two interpretative approaches has generally been characterised in terms of the question whether the Tractatus is committed to the idea of ‘things’ that cannot be said in language, and thus to the idea of a distinctive kind of nonsense: nonsense that is an attempt to say what can only be shown. In this paper, I look at this dispute from a different perspective, by focusing on the treatment of the concept of internal relations. By reference to the work of Peter Hacker, Hidé Ishiguro and Cora Diamond, I show how this concept is understood quite differently in each of the two interpretative traditions. I focus particularly on how Wittgenstein's idea of the ‘internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world’ (Tractatus 4.014) might be understood within the two interpretative approaches. I offer some reasons in support of the anti‐metaphysical treatment of the concept.     

The ‘Compositional Rigidity’ of Recognitionality

Abstract

Empiricist philosophers of mind have long maintained that the possession conditions of many concepts include recognitional abilities. One of Jerry Fodor's recent attacks on empiricist semantics proceeds by attempting to demonstrate that there are no such, ‘recognitional’ concepts. His argument is built on the claim that if there were such concepts, they would not compose: i.e., they would exhibit properties which are not in general ‘inherited’ by complex concepts of which they are components. Debate between Fodor and his critics on this issue has focused on his construal of compositionality, the critics in effect advocating a weaker conception than that assumed by Fodor. I argue that the critics' contention is under-motivated, and in the current context ad hoc. But there is something else wrong with Fodor's argument. He misidentifies the notion of recognitionality in which the empiricist should trade. A proper understanding of recognitionality allows us to disarm Fodor's argument without resolving the question about compositionality that divides Fodor and his critics. I end with two very general remarks. First a contention about the motivation for empiricist semantics, and second, a suggestion that my proposal about recognitionality may be extended to disarm a more familiar and influential type of concern about their viability.     

In search of the ‘Aha!’ experience: Elucidating the emotionality of insight problem‐solving

Although the experience of insight has long been noted, the essence of the ‘Aha!’ experience, reflecting a sudden change in the brain that accompanies an insight solution, remains largely unknown. This work aimed to uncover the mystery of the ‘Aha!’ experience through three studies. In Study 1, participants were required to solve a set of verbal insight problems and then subjectively report their affective experience when solving the problem. The participants were found to have experienced many types of emotions, with happiness the most frequently reported one. Multidimensional scaling was employed in Study 2 to simplify the dimensions of these reported emotions. The results showed that these different types of emotions could be clearly placed in two‐dimensional space and that components constituting the ‘Aha!’ experience mainly reflected positive emotion and approached cognition. To validate previous findings, in Study 3, participants were asked to select the most appropriate emotional item describing their feelings at the time the problem was solved. The results of this study replicated the multidimensional construct consisting of approached cognition and positive affect. These three studies provide the first direct evidence of the essence of the ‘Aha!’ experience. The potential significance of the findings was discussed.     

For your Eyes Only: A Q-Methodology on the Ontology of Happiness Among Chronically Ill Filipino Elderly in a Penal Institution

Happiness is a positive phenomenon that is universal in nature and is therefore, pertinent to all human beings. However, the definition of happiness differs from person to person, and varies among cultures, economic status, social connectedness, spiritual upbringing and daily situations. An individual’s contextual perception of happiness can change when subjected to bleak conditions such as incarceration wherein inmates, especially those who are old and are experiencing health impairments are stripped off with their customary source of happiness. Since Filipinos are known to be as “happy people,” this study purports to surface the different facets of what constitute happiness in the context of a penal institution in the Philippine setting. The Q-methodology is the primary design used in the study. It combines the objectivity of quantitative approach with the essence of human experiences as explored in qualitative studies. The participants (P-sample) were twenty elderly inmates suffering from chronic ailments. They were asked to arrange 32 statements (Q-sample), derived from the initial interview, in the Q-sort table based on their degree of agreement, which were then further explicated in the post-sort interviews. The results were then subjected to by-person factor analysis with varimax rotation using the PQ Method version 2.11. Five profiles emerged from the by-person factor analysis, namely: (1) ‘Sense of Affinity’, (2) ‘Sense of Opportunity’, (3) ‘Sense of Indemnity’, (4) ‘Sense of Positivity’ and (5) ‘Sense of Resiliency’. The discussion focused on similarities and differences among profiles regarding the four principal themes (familial, social, internal and spiritual components of happiness) derived from the statements used as the Q-sample. The perception of happiness varies from profile to profile. The differences in views on what constitutes happiness among profiles are more prominent than their said similarities. Most leanings are directed toward the familial and spiritual aspects of happiness however, happiness can also be internally motivated and cognitively construed. While happiness has a direct relationship to an individual’s overall perception of well-being, the nurse, being the primary provider of holistic care, plays a pivotal role in promoting optimum health through awareness, knowledge, and appreciation of vis-a vis an unwavering involvement with the unique and distinct psychological and emotional needs of the elderly inmates characterized by respect, openness, authenticity and inter-subjectivity.