Patenting and the Gender Gap: Should Women Be Encouraged to Patent More?

The commercialization of academic science has come to be understood as economically desirable for institutions, individual researchers, and the public. Not surprisingly, commercial activity, particularly that which results from patenting, appears to be producing changes in the standards used to evaluate scientists’ performance and contributions. In this context, concerns about a gender gap in patenting activity have arisen and some have argued for the need to encourage women to seek more patents. They believe that because academic advancement is mainly dependent on productivity (Stuart and Ding in American Journal of Sociology 112:97–144, 2006; Azoulay et al. in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 63:599–623, 2007), differences in research output have the power to negatively impact women’s careers. Moreover, in the case of patenting activity, they claim that the gender gap also has the potential to negatively affect society. This is so because scientific and technological advancement and innovation play a crucial role in contemporary societies. Thus, women’s more limited involvement in the commercialization of science and technology can also be detrimental to innovation itself. Nevertheless, calls to encourage women to patent on grounds that such activity is likely to play a significant role in the betterment of both women’s careers and society seem to be based on two problematic assumptions: (1) that the methods to determine women’s productivity in patenting activities are an appropriate way to measure their research efforts and the impact of their work, and (2) that patenting, particularly in academia, benefits society. The purpose of this paper is to call into question these two assumptions.     

Is there a unique moral status of human DNA that prevents patenting?

The gene patenting debate, which proved to be a focal point for divergent moral concerns about recent developments in genome research and biotechnology, has revealed that the moral status of DNA is not clear. One of the arguments used to stop undesirable developments was that DNA possesses a unique status, which renders it unfit for patenting. This paper investigates the allegedly unique (moral) status of genetic material and the information it holds from different perspectives. Several properties of DNA prove to be unique. We examine the relevance of these for patentability of genes and conclude that only the unique symbolic meaning of DNA is a relevant factor, which should be taken into account but weighed against other interests involved.     

Workplace Democracy,Market Competition and Republican Self-Respect

Is it a requirement of justice to democratize private companies? This question has received renewed attention in the wake of the financial crisis, as part of a larger debate about the role of companies in society. In this article, we discuss three principled arguments for workplace democracy and show that these arguments fail to establish that all workplaces ought to be democratized. We do, however, argue that republican-minded workers must have a fair opportunity to work in a democratic company. Under current conditions, this means that a liberal order must actively promote workplace democracy.     

Patenting humans: Clones,chimeras, and biological artifacts

The momentum of advances in biology is evident in the history of patents on life forms. As we proceed forward with greater understanding and technological control of developmental biology there will be many new and challenging dilemmas related to patenting of human parts and partial trajectories of human development. These dilemmas are already evident in the current conflict over the moral status of the early human embryo. In this essay, recent evidence from embryological studies is considered and the unbroken continuity of organismal development initiated at fertilization is asserted as clear and reasonable grounds for moral standing. Within this frame of analysis, it is proposed that through a technique of Altered Nuclear Transfer, non-organismal entities might be created from which embryonic stem cells could be morally procured. Criteria for patenting of such non-organismal entities are considered. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference, “The Ethics of Intellectual Property Rights and Patents,” held in Warsaw, Poland on 23–24 April, 2004.     

Theological issues in genetics

Theological reflection can contribute a distinctive perspective from which to analyze and evaluate moral debates about issues in modern genetics and reproductive medicine. The author appeals to two hermeneutical themes, human beings as "images of God" and the tendency of humans to "play God," in order to discuss various church statements and theological literature on human gene transfer, somatic cell nuclear transplant cloning of human beings, and patenting of human genes.     

Measured Gene-Environment Interactions in Psychopathology

ABSTRACT— There is much curiosity about interactions between genes and environmental risk factors for psychopathology, but this interest is accompanied by uncertainty. This article aims to address this uncertainty. First, we explain what is and is not meant by gene-environment interaction. Second, we discuss reasons why such interactions were thought to be rare in psychopathology, and argue instead that they ought to be common. Third, we summarize emerging evidence about gene-environment interactions in mental disorders. Fourth, we argue that research on gene-environment interactions should be hypothesis driven, and we put forward strategies to guide future studies. Fifth, we describe potential benefits of studying measured gene-environment interactions for basic neuroscience, gene hunting, intervention, and public understanding of genetics. We suggest that information about nurture might be harnessed to make new discoveries about the nature of psychopathology.     

Should we change the human genome?

Should we change the human genome? The most general arguments against changing the human genome are here in focus. Distinctions are made between positive and negative gene therapy, between germ-line and somatic therapy, and between therapy where the intention is to benefit a particular individual (a future child) and where the intention is to benefit the human gene-pool. Some standard arguments against gene-therapy are dismissed. Negative somatic therapy is not controversial. Even negative, germ-line therapy is endorsed, if the intention is to cure a certain individual (a future child). In rare cases, positive therapy on somatic cells may be warranted. Germ-line therapy may become a valuable method of preventing harm, through ‘genetic vaccination’. If safe methods evolve, it is harmless (though vain), to try to achieve more ambitious goals. Prospective parents should not be prevented from exercising this harmless kind of parental authority. The paper concludes: Thereis a moral limit to how much we ought to manipulate the human genome, however. We ought not to jeopardize the continued existence of mankind. We ought not to develop methods of germ-line therapy intended in a radical manner to improve human nature, and we ought to leave to prospective parents to decide in individual cases what kind of intervention shall take place.     

Exploitative,irresistible, and coercive offers: why research participants should be paid well or not at all

This paper begins with the assumption that it is morally problematic when people in need are offered money in exchange for research participation if the amount offered is unfair. Such offers are called ‘coercive’, and the degree of coerciveness is determined by the offer's potential to cause exploitation and its irresistibility. Depending on what view we take on the possibility to compensate for the sacrifices made by research participants, a wish to avoid ‘coercive offers’ leads to policy recommendations concerning payment for participation. For sacrifices considered compensable, we ought to offer either no payment or payment at a level deemed fair, while for sacrifices deemed incompensable, we always ought to offer no payment because as compensation appears and increases, so too does coercion. This article provides a model for thinking of the way in which degrees of exploitativeness, irresistibility, and coerciveness interact with the size of the reward for compensable and incompensable cases. The conclusions are of particular relevance in contexts where potential research participants are poor or in other ways lack reasonably good options, as is often the case when international pharmaceutical companies or researchers based in the Global North place clinical trials in the Global South.     

The history of eugenics and the future of gene therapy

In this commentary, I shall provide an overview of some recent histories of eugenics and suggest some lessons that this history may have for today. This commentary is not an argument against gene therapy. Rather, it is a plea for historical understanding of what has been done,..."in the name of eugenics."...There is a temptation to parody misgivings about gene therapy. I suggest that there are justified reasons to think about the social consequences of gene therapy. I do not hold that we ought to stop the program now, but I do believe that scientists, physicians, and the public ought to be aware of the slippery slope on which we as a society -- and we are all members of society -- have embarked.     

Revising,Correcting, and Transferring Genes

Abstract

The distinction between germline and somatic gene editing is fundamental to the ethics of human gene editing. Multiple conferences of scientists, ethicists, and policymakers, and multiple professional bodies, have called for moratoria on germline gene editing, and editing of human germline cells is considered to be an ethical “red line” that either never should be crossed, or should only be crossed with great caution and care. However, as research on germline gene editing has progressed, it has become clear that not all germline interventions are alike, and that these differences make a significant moral difference, when it comes to ethical questions about research, regulation, clinical application, and medical justification. In this paper, I argue that, rather than lumping all germline interventions together, we should distinguish between revising, correcting, and transferring genes, and I assess the consequences of this move for the ethics of gene editing.     

Negotiation, Persuasion and Argument

Argument is often taken to deal with conflicting opinion or belief, while negotiation deals with conflicting goals or interests. It is widely accepted that argument ought to comply with some principles or norms. On the other hand, negotiation and bargaining involve concession exchange and tactical use of power, which may be contrasted with attempts to convince others through argument. However, there are cases where it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between bargaining and argument: notably cases where negotiators persuade others through `framing' and cases where the aims of negotiation have to do with public assertion and acceptance. Those cases suggest that the distinction between negotiation and argument is not absolute, and this raises the question whether rules about what is acceptable in argument and rules about what is acceptable in negotiation can all be viewed as instances of more general common norms about human interaction.     

Patenting and Licensing of University Research: Promoting Innovation or Undermining Academic Values?

Since the 1980s in the US and the 1990s in Europe, patenting and licensing activities by universities have massively increased. This is strongly encouraged by governments throughout the Western world. Many regard academic patenting as essential to achieve ‘knowledge transfer’ from academia to industry. This trend has far-reaching consequences for access to the fruits of academic research and so the question arises whether the current policies are indeed promoting innovation or whether they are instead a symptom of a pro-intellectual property (IP) culture which is blind to adverse effects. Addressing this question requires both empirical analysis (how real is the link between academic patenting and licensing and ‘development’ of academic research by industry?) and normative assessment (which justifications are given for the current policies and to what extent do they threaten important academic values?). After illustrating the major rise of academic patenting and licensing in the US and Europe and commenting on the increasing trend of ‘upstream’ patenting and the focus on exclusive as opposed to non-exclusive licences, this paper will discuss five negative effects of these trends. Subsequently, the question as to why policymakers seem to ignore these adverse effects will be addressed. Finally, a number of proposals for improving university policies will be made.     

‘Ought’ and Control

Ethical theorists often assume that the verb ‘ought’ means roughly ‘has an obligation’; however, this assumption is belied by the diversity of ‘flavours’ of ought-sentences in English. A natural response is that ‘ought’ is ambiguous. However, this response is incompatible with the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by theoretical semanticists, who classify ‘ought’ as a member of the family of modal verbs, which are treated uniformly as operators. To many ethical theorists, however, this popular treatment in linguistics seems to elide an important distinction between agential and non-agential ought-statements. The thought is that ‘ought’ must have at least two senses, one implicating agency and connected to obligations, and another covering other uses. In this paper, I pursue some resolution of this tension between semantic theory and ethical theory with respect to the meaning of ‘ought’. To this end, I consider what I believe to be the most linguistically sophisticated argument for the view that the word ‘ought’ is ambiguous between agential and non-agential senses. This argument, due to Mark Schroeder, is instructive but based on a false claim about the syntax of agential ought-sentences—or so I attempt to show by first situating Schroeder's argument in its proper linguistic background and then discussing some syntactic evidence that he fails to appreciate. Then, I use the failure of this argument to motivate some more general reflections on how the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by theoretical semanticists might be refined in the light of the distinction important to ethical theory between agential and non-agential ought-statements, but also on how ethical theory might benefit from more careful study of the dominant treatment of modals as operators in theoretical semantics.     

Rights: Foundations, Contents, Hierarchy

It would seem that we in the West are suffering from an increasing glut of rights. To the sixty-odd human rights that the Universal Declaration and its Covenants have long given us, must now be added the particular rights claims of an increasing number of ‘oppressed’ minorities, claims to compensation rights for just about every conceivable harm done and claims to ever more trivial things. This tendency is harmful insofar as it trivialises rights and devalues the coverage of rights. Human rights are fundamental and ought to be protected from these tendencies. Using an analysis of the foundations of human rights, and their function in maintaining autonomy in particular, this article analyses the content of rights – what must be fulfilled in order for a right to be protected – as a means of demonstrating the possibility of reducing the volume of rights without reducing rights coverage and of creating a defensible hierarchy.     

基因的专利问题

基因专利是现代生物技术产业以及人类基因计划的产物,在发现基因的方法中,ｃＤＮＡ测序由于其投资少,见效快的特点而受到世界各大制药公司的青睐,竞相投入资金进行ｃＤＮＡ测序,并对其产生的ＥＳＴｓ,ＳＮＰｓ和全长基因等申请专利保护,本文介绍了美国的基因相关的专科法,以及关于基因专利的争论,以期为我国此领域的内知产权保护的立法提供了一些借鉴。     

Governing sporting brains: concussion,neuroscience, and the biopolitical regulation of sport

Abstract

Drawing on the recent concussion litigation from the United States’ National Football League (NFL), the paper examines the emergence of neuroscience knowledge as part of a defining rationale for the justification and rationalization of the lawsuit. The paper argues that neuroscience knowledge is best understood as a regulatory discourse that is attached to larger social, political, and economic realities that bring it into being as a legitimate type of knowledge. This larger socio-political governance logic is one that scholars call ‘biopolitical’ which emphasizes the protection of individual life over and above other ways of being. Risk discourses that frame risk-taking practices as immoral thus emerge within this biopolitical regime of governance that frame morality in terms of public health that individual citizens ought to pursue. With this in mind neuroscience knowledge plays an important role in concussion litigation. It emerges as a technology of biopolitical governance in that it is used to justify legal decisions on concussion. This is despite the fact that neuroscience knowledge remains nascent and even scientifically uncertain. Because of this, the paper argues that scholars ought to not only consider neuroscience research skeptically, but also ought to be aware of the dangers of neuroscience’s emergence as an ‘anticipatory discourse’ that has the potential to reduce human behavior to matters of the brain that thus transforms our very ontology of ourselves and the practices we perceive as ‘good’.     

Evidence of deontic reasoning in 3- and 4-year-old children

Deontic reasoning is reasoning about what one may, ought, or ought not do in a given set of circumstances. Virtually all of our social institutions and child-rearing practices presume the capacity to reason about deontic concepts, such as what is permitted, obligated, or prohibited. Despite this, very little is known about the development of deontic reasoning. Two experiments were conducted that contrasted children’s reasoning performance on deontic and indicative reasoning tasks (i.e., the reduced array selection version of the Wason card selection task). Like adults, children as young as 3 years of age were found to adopt a violation-detecting strategy more often when reasoning about the deontic case than when reasoning about the indicative case. These results indicate that violation detection emerges as an effective deontic reasoning very early in human development.     

Self-guide framing and persuasion: responsibly increasing message processing to ideal levels

The current research examines the effect that framing persuasive messages in terms of self-guides (ideal vs. ought) has on the attitudes and cognitive responses of individuals with chronic ideal versus ought self-guides. The strength of participants' ideal and ought self-guides and the magnitude of participants' ideal and ought self-discrepancies were measured using a computerized reaction time program. One week later, participants read a persuasive message about a fictional breakfast product, framed in terms of either ideals or oughts. Matching framing to stronger self-guide led to enhanced message processing activity, especially among individuals who were low in need for cognition. Individuals who read messages framed to match their stronger self-guides paid more attention to argument quality, as reflected in their attitudes and cognitive responses. Messages with self-guide framing that matched individuals' stronger self-discrepancies did not have this effect on processing.     

Desperately seeking perfection: Christian discipleship and medical genetics.

The question of what, if anything, Christian theology as theology might contribute to ethical debates about appropriate uses of medical genetics has often been ignored. The answer is complex, and the author argues it is best characterized by an explanation of the analogous aspirations of the two: both have as their goal the perfection of the human being, both assert that the present disposition of the human body is on a fundamental level more often than not other than it ought to be, and both aspire to transform the present state of the body toward a future state in which present imperfections no longer exist. Given these analogous concerns, it would seem that one of the primary moral contributions that Christianity can make to debates about medical genetics is to ask whether and to what extent the Christian vision of embodied human perfection is compatible with the vision of perfection offered by the sciences pertaining to medical genetics. The author pursues a discussion of this analogy and its implications in this essay.