Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles

A popular distinction in cognitive and social psychology has been between intuitive and deliberate judgments. This juxtaposition has aligned in dual-process theories of reasoning associative, unconscious, effortless, heuristic, and suboptimal processes (assumed to foster intuitive judgments) versus rule-based, conscious, effortful, analytic, and rational processes (assumed to characterize deliberate judgments). In contrast, we provide convergent arguments and evidence for a unified theoretical approach to both intuitive and deliberative judgments. Both are rule-based, and in fact, the very same rules can underlie both intuitive and deliberate judgments. The important open question is that of rule selection, and we propose a 2-step process in which the task itself and the individual's memory constrain the set of applicable rules, whereas the individual's processing potential and the (perceived) ecological rationality of the rule for the task guide the final selection from that set. Deliberate judgments are not generally more accurate than intuitive judgments; in both cases, accuracy depends on the match between rule and environment: the rules' ecological rationality. Heuristics that are less effortful and in which parts of the information are ignored can be more accurate than cognitive strategies that have more information and computation. The proposed framework adumbrates a unified approach that specifies the critical dimensions on which judgmental situations may vary and the environmental conditions under which rules can be expected to be successful.     

Prospective and retrospective duration judgments: A meta-analytic review

A meta-analytic review compared prospective and retrospective judgments of duration, or duration judgment paradigm. Some theorists have concluded that the two paradigms involve similar cognitive processes, whereas others have found that they involve different processes. A review of 20 experiments revealed that prospective judgments are longer and less variable than are retrospective judgments. Several theoretically important variables moderate these effects, especially those concerned with information processing activities. Therefore, somewhat different cognitive processes subserve experienced and remembered duration. Attentional models are needed to explain prospective judgments, and memory-based models are needed to explain retrospective judgments. These findings clarify models of human duration judgment and suggest directions for future research. Evidence on duration judgments may also influence models of attention and memory.     

Intuitive interactionism in person perception: effects of situation--behavior relations on dispositional judgments

To examine the effects of the relationships between behavior and the situation in which it occurs, we manipulated such relations and exposed subjects to them. Impressions were similar when based on the behaviors presented with situations unspecified (e.g., child hits) or when the situations in which they naturally occurred were specified (e.g., child hits when provoked). However, when situations were specified, subjects' impressions more accurately predicted individual differences in the children's actual levels of overall aggressive behavior. When the veridical situation-behavior relations were increasingly altered, the targets were perceived as being less plausible and increasingly maladjusted and odd, and correlations decreased between the perceived level of the children's aggressiveness and their actual aggressive behavior. Thus, both personality impressions and predictive accuracy were influenced by the relations between the target's behaviors and their situational contexts.     

Intuitive (in)coherence judgments are guided by processing fluency, mood and affect

Recently proposed accounts of intuitive judgments of semantic coherence assume that processing fluency results in a positive affective response leading to successful assessment of semantic coherence. The present paper investigates whether processing fluency may indicate semantic incoherence as well. In two studies, we employ a new paradigm in which participants have to detect an incoherent item among semantically coherent words. In Study 1, we show participants accurately indicating an incoherent item despite not being able to provide an accurate solution to coherent words. Further, this effect is modified by affective valence of solution words that are not retrieved from memory. Study 2 replicates those results and extend them by showing that mood moderates incoherence judgments independently of affective valence of solutions. The results support processing fluency account of intuitive semantic coherence judgments and show that it is not fluency per se but fluency variations that drive judgments.     

Sex differences in duration judgments: A meta-analytic review

We quantitatively reviewed human sex differences in the magnitude and variability of duration judgments. Data from 4,794 females and 4,688 males yielded 87 effect size estimates of magnitude and 28 of variability. The overall sex difference in duration judgment magnitude was small but statistically significant. It was moderated by whether study participants knew in advance (prospective paradigm) or only later (retrospective paradigm) that they would be required to judge duration. Although prospective judgments showed no overall sex effect, some levels of moderator variables showed a small but statistically significant effect. Retrospective judgments showed a larger subjective-to-objective duration ratio for females than for males, and several variables moderated this effect. Females' judgments also showed more intersubject variability than did males' judgments. Relative to males, females sustain attention to time more in the prospective paradigm and have better episodic memory in the retrospective paradigm.     

On the speed of intuition: Intuitive judgments of semantic coherence under different response deadlines

Intuition is the ability to judge stimulus properties on the basis of information that is activated in memory but not consciously retrieved. We investigated one central feature of intuitive judgments--namely, their speed. Participants judged whether or not three clue words were coherent in the sense that they were weakly associated with a common fourth concept. To restrict the time available for conscious deliberation of possible solution words, participants had to synchronize their judgments with a response signal appearing at different lags after the clue words. In two experiments, participants discriminated coherent and incoherent triads reliably better than chance, even when they did not consciously retrieve the solution word and the lag between clue words and response signal was as short as 1.5 sec. Results indicate that intuitive judgments can indeed be made very fast and without extended conscious deliberation. Possible mechanisms underlying intuitive judgments are discussed.     

How cognitive load affects duration judgments: A meta-analytic review

A meta-analysis of 117 experiments evaluated the effects of cognitive load on duration judgments. Cognitive load refers to information-processing (attentional or working-memory) demands. Six types of cognitive load were analyzed to resolve ongoing controversies and to test current duration judgment theories. Duration judgments depend on whether or not participants are informed in advance that they are needed: prospective paradigm (informed) versus retrospective paradigm (not informed). With higher cognitive load, the prospective duration judgment ratio (subjective duration to objective duration) decreases but the retrospective ratio increases. Thus, the duration judgment ratio differs depending on the paradigm and the specific type of cognitive load. As assessed by the coefficient of variation, relative variability of prospective, but not retrospective, judgments increases with cognitive load. The prospective findings support models emphasizing attentional resources, especially executive control. The retrospective findings support models emphasizing memory changes. Alternative theories do not fit with the meta-analytic findings and are rejected.     

The role of diagnosticity in stereotype formation: perceiving group means and variances.

Three experiments tested the hypotheses that while forming stereotypes of social groups, people abstract the central tendency and variability of different attribute dimensions to determine which ones best differentiate the groups and that more differentiating dimensions are more likely to become stereotypical in the sense of becoming strongly associated with the groups in memory. Supporting these hypotheses. Experiment 1 found that, after viewing behaviors performed by members of 2 groups, Ss characterized the groups more in terms of attribute dimensions indicating larger differences between the central tendencies of the groups, and Experiment 2 showed that this effect did not occur when Ss formed impressions of only 1 group. Experiment 3 found that Ss also characterized groups more in terms of attribute dimensions indicating lower within-group variability.     

When knowing more means less: the effect of fan on metamemory judgments

The authors used a "fan" paradigm (J. R. Anderson, 1974) to test the accessibility and competition models of metamemory using judgments of learning (JOLs). JOLs in this study reflect one's confidence level in subsequently recognizing newly learned material. The number of facts, or "fan," associated with JOL-queried concepts varied from 1 to 3 associates. Results of 3 experiments indicated that as the level of fan increased, the magnitude of JOLs decreased. This finding was observed even when the fan effect (i.e., slower recognition as number of facts increase) was attenuated on a verification task in 2 of the experiments by manipulating the organization of the multiple concepts. The results supported the competition hypothesis (T. A. Schreiber, 1998; T. A. Schreiber & D. L. Nelson, 1998) as an important determinant of JOLs.     

Extreme judgments depend on the expectation of following judgments: A calibration analysis

Objectives

Judges avoid extreme judgments in the beginning of evaluation sequences. The calibration hypothesis attributes this bias to judges’ need to preserve their judgmental degrees of freedom. It follows that the expectation of a sequence leads to avoiding extreme judgments in the beginning. Thus, judges may make extreme judgments if they expect only one performance but should avoid extreme judgments if they expect a sequence.

Design

A between-group design was used.

Method

One experimental group (n = 21) expected to judge only one gymnastics performance whereas the other group (n = 20) expected to judge a sequence of performances. Both groups then judged only one identical performance.

Results

Groups differed significantly in the frequency of extreme judgments. Participants expecting one performance used extreme judgment categories more often; participants expecting a series avoided extreme judgments.

Conclusion

The results support calibration processes in sequential judgments. The specification of the underlying process will allow testing possible interventions to avoid serial position biases in serial evaluations in the future.     

A psychophysical theory of intensity proportions,joint presentations,and matches

Empirically testable assumptions relate 3 psychophysical primitives: presentations of pairs of physical intensities (e.g., pure tones of the same frequency and phase to the 2 ears or 2 successive tones to both ears); a respondent's ordering of such signal pairs by perceived intensity (e.g., loudness); and judgments about 2 pairs of stimuli being related as some proportion (numerical factor, as in magnitude production). Explicit behavioral assumptions lead to 2 families of psychophysical functions, one corresponding to unbiased joint presentations and the other to biased ones. Under an invariance assumption, the psychophysical functions in the unbiased case are approximate power functions, and those in the biased case are exact power functions. A number of testable predictions are made. The mathematics involved draws from publications in utility theory and mathematics but with a reinterpretation of the primitives.     

Power and Type I errors for pairwise comparisons of means in the unequal variances case

A Monte Carlo simulation was conducted to compare pairwise multiple comparison procedures. The number of means varied from 4 to 8 and the sample sizes varied from 2 to 500. Procedures were evaluated on the basis of Type I errors, any‐pair power and all‐pairs power. Two modifications of the Games and Howell procedure were shown to make it conservative. No procedure was found to be uniformly most powerful. For any pair power the Games and Howell procedure was found to be generally most powerful even when applied at more stringent levels to control Type I errors. For all pairs power the Peritz procedure applied with modified Brown–Forsythe tests was found to be most powerful in most conditions.     

Perceived numerosity: A comparison of magnitude production,magnitude estimation,and discrimination judgments

In previous studies, modalities with a higher Weber fraction have tended to have a lower power-function exponent. Within a modality, however, the Weber fraction and power-function exponent for individual subjects were unrelated, and the present study largely confirms this finding for the numerosity dimension. More important than discriminability in the judgment of numerosity were cognitive factors. A single feedback trial considerably reduced intersubject variability on the magnitude-estimation exponent, although it failed to eliminate individual differences completely (precue and postcue exponents correlated signigicantly, r=+.50). Intrasubject variability, by contrast, seemingly did not involve the underlying exponent. As in previous studies, numerosity generally was underestimated and the power-function exponent was 1.08 for magnitude production and .80 for precue magnitude estimation. Contrary to previous results, however, males and females did not differ in exponent, perhaps because the present procedure allowed self-selection of individuals more interested in numerosity tasks.     

Credibility judgments of narratives: language, plausibility, and absorption

Two experiments were conducted in order to find out whether textual features of narratives differentially affect credibility judgments made by judges having different levels of absorption (a disposition associated with rich visual imagination). Participants in both experiments were exposed to a textual narrative and requested to judge whether the narrator actually experienced the event he described in his story. In Experiment 1, the narrative varied in terms of language (literal, figurative) and plausibility (ordinary, anomalous). In Experiment 2, the narrative varied in terms of language only. The participants' perceptions of the plausibility of the story described and the extent to which they were absorbed in reading were measured. The data from both experiments together suggest that the groups applied entirely different criteria in credibility judgments. For high-absorption individuals, their credibility judgment depends on the degree to which the text can be assimilated into their own vivid imagination, whereas for low-absorption individuals it depends mainly on plausibility. That is, high-absorption individuals applied an experiential mental set while judging the credibility of the narrator, whereas low-absorption individuals applied an instrumental mental set. Possible cognitive mechanisms and implications for credibility judgments are discussed.     

Temporal contiguity and contingency judgments: A Pavlovian analogue

The two experiments reported examine the role of temporal contiguity on judgments of contingency in a human analogue of the Pavlovian task. The data show that the effect of the actual delay on contingency judgment depends on the observer’s expectation regarding the delay. for a fixed contingency between the cue and the outcome, ratings of the contingency are higher when the actual delay is congruent with the observer’s expectation than when it is incongruent. We argue that our data can be understood within the context of the temporal coding hypothesis.     

Elaborating Expressivism: Moral judgments,Desires and Motivation

According to expressivism, moral judgments are desire-like states of mind. It is often argued that this view is made implausible because it isn’t consistent with the conceivability of amoralists, i.e., agents who make moral judgments yet lack motivation. In response, expressivists can invoke the distinction between dispositional and occurrent desires. Strandberg (Am Philos Quart 49:81–91, 2012) has recently argued that this distinction does not save expressivism. Indeed, it can be used to argue that expressivism is false. In this paper I argue that expressivism is a much more complex thesis than Strandberg assumes. Once these complexities are acknowledged, Strandberg’s arguments are rendered ineffective and expressivism rendered more plausible.