共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Xianglong Zhang 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(1):60-65
The author examines He Lin’s interpretation of Zhu Xi’s method of intuition from a phenomenological-hermeneutical perspective
and by exposing Zhu’s philosophical presuppositions. In contrast with Lu Xiangshan’s intuitive method, Zhu Xi’s method of
reading classics advocates “emptying your heart and flowing with the text” and, in this spirit, explains the celebrated “exhaustive
investigation on the principles of things (ge wu qiong li).” “Text,” according to Zhu, is therefore not an object in ordinary sense but a “contextual region” or “sensible pattern”
that, when merged with the reader, generates meanings. Furthermore, by discussing the related doctrines of Lao Zi, Zhuang
Zi, Hua-Yan Buddhism, Zhou Dunyi, and Zhu Xi’s own “One principle with many manifestations (li yi fen shu),” the author identifies the philosophical preconditions of Zhu’s method. Based on this analysis, the author goes on to illustrate
Zhu’s understanding of “observing potential yet unapparent pleasure, anger, sorrow and happiness” and “maintaining a serious
attitude (zhu jing).” 相似文献
2.
Felix Mühlh?lzer 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(2):265-292
Charles Parsons’ book “Mathematical Thought and Its Objects” of 2008 (Cambridge University Press, New York) is critically
discussed by concentrating on one of Parsons’ main themes: the role of intuition in our understanding of arithmetic (“intuition”
in the specific sense of Kant and Hilbert). Parsons argues for a version of structuralism which is restricted by the condition
that some paradigmatic structure should be presented that makes clear the actual existence of structures of the necessary
sort. Parsons’ paradigmatic structure is the so-called ‘intuitive model’ of arithmetic realized by Hilbert’s strings of strokes.
This paper argues that Hilbert’s strings, considered as given in intuition, cannot play the role Parsons assigns to them:
the criteria of identity of these strings do not have the sharpness that Parsons wants to see in them, and Parsons inadvertently
projects abstract structures into his ‘intuitive model’. This diagnosis is exemplified with respect to (a) Parsons’ distinction
between addition and multiplication on the one hand and exponentiation on the other and (b) his analysis of arithmetical knowledge
in simple cases like “7 + 5 = 12”. All in all, it is claimed that Parsons book contains many important insights with respect
to, for example, different versions structuralism, the notion of “natural number” and its uniqueness, induction, predicativity
and other things, for which he is rightly famous, but that his way of drawing on the notion of intuition leaves too many questions
unanswered. 相似文献
3.
This review essay on three recent books on John Rawls’s theory of justice, by Catherine Audard, Samuel Freeman, and Thomas
Pogge, describes the great boon they offer serious students of Rawls. They form a united front in firmly and definitively
rebuffing Robert Nozick’s libertarian critique, Michael Sandel’s communitarian critique, and more generally critiques of “neutralist
liberalism,” as well as in affirming the basic unity of Rawls’s position. At a deeper level, however, they diverge, and in
ways that, this essay suggests, go astray on subtle questions of interpretation: Freeman overemphasizes reciprocity, Pogge
miscasts Rawls as a consequentialist, and Audard exaggerates the Kantian aspect of Rawls’s core, continuing commitment to
“doctrinal autonomy.” 相似文献
4.
Daniel Guevara 《Synthese》2008,164(1):45-60
Various formally valid counterexamples have been adduced against the Humean dictum that one cannot derive an “ought” from
an “is.” There are formal rebuttals—some very sophisticated now (e.g., Charles R. Pigden’s and Gerhard Schurz’s)—to such counterexamples.
But what follows is an intuitive and informal argument against them. I maintain that it is better than these sophisticated
formal defenses of the Humean dictum and that it also helps us see why it implausible to think that we can be as decisive
about the truth or falsity of the dictum as both the formal counterexamples or formal barriers to them purport to be. 相似文献
5.
Julie Kuhlken 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(1):17-30
Heidegger’s essays “The Origin of the Work of Art” and “The Question Concerning Technology” provide a revealing insight into
the importance of exemplarity to artworks. Originally the notion that exemplarity is essential to art is Kantian: As Kant
puts it, since originality can produce “original nonsense, [beautiful art’s] products must be models, i.e. exemplary.” However, what Heidegger recognizes is that even if exemplarity allows us to take art seriously in spite of its excesses,
it exposes the artwork to new dangers: on the one hand, to the “world withdrawal of the work” as occurs in consignment to
the museum shelf, and on the other, to the conditions of Enframing as “challenging-forth,” under which art is taken as a means to an end—dangers which point to the division of artworks between
“fine” art and “popular” art. Since Heidegger’s approach favors the former, we will try to gain new critical insight by considering
his arguments in the light of a “popular” work that allows us to formulate an exemplarity of popular art as the necessary
complement to that of traditional art. By means of an understanding of the exemplarities (in the plural) of artworks, we will be able to reconsider the significance of Heidegger’s notions of reliability, Enframing, and poiesis for our current technological conditions.
相似文献
Julie KuhlkenEmail: |
6.
张世英 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2009,4(1):143-155
Early in Aristotle’s terminology, and ever since, “essence” has been conceived as having two meanings, namely “universality”
and “individuality”. According to the tradition of thought that has dominated throughout the history of Western philosophy,
“essence” unequivocally refers to “universality”. As a matter of fact, however, “universality” cannot cover Aristotle’s definition
and formulation of “essence”: Essence is what makes a thing “happen to be this thing.” “Individuality” should be the deep
meaning of “essence”. By means of an analysis of some relevant Western thoughts and a review of cultural realities, it can
be concluded that the difference between the attitudes toward things of the natural sciences and the humane sciences mainly
lies in the fact that the former focus on the pursuit of universal regularity, whereas the latter go after the value and significance
of human life. The movement from natural things to cultural things is a process in which essence shifts from universality
to individuality. It is the author’s contention that what should be stressed in the fields of human culture and society is
the construction of an ideal society that is “harmonious yet not identical”, on the basis of respecting and developing individual
peculiarity and otherness.
Translated by Zhang Lin from Beijing daxue xuebao 北京大学学报 (Journal of Peking University), 2007, (11): 23–29 相似文献
7.
Damon A. Young 《Sexuality & culture》2005,9(4):58-79
Karl Marx once compared philosophy to masturbation, essentially seeing both as privative, idealistic, and impractical activities.
Indeed, many lay folk see philosophers as “wankers.” While the present state of universities does throw doubt on the liberatory
character of contemporary philosophy, Marx’s jibe nonetheless mischaracterizes masturbation. This paper is a brief attempt
to correct Marx’s characterization of masturbation by drawing on the work of a thinker ofter associated with “intellectual
onanism”: Martin Heidegger. Speaking ontologically, Heidergger’s theories can be developed to show that masturbation it is
not privative, but “stretched” in time and place. Moreover, masturbation plays a practical role in the creative development
of the self, including the self’s essential bodiliness. While not necessarily defending philosophy against Marx’s charges,
this paper does show how even so-called “onanistic” philosophy might be redeemed.
“Only a being which, like man, ‘had’ the word... can and must ‘have’ ‘the hand’” —Martin Heidegger
“I have a dangerously supple wrist.” —Friedrich Nietzsche 相似文献
8.
Igor Primoratz 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(4):371-386
Any plausible position in the ethics of war and political violence in general will include the requirement of protection of
civilians (non-combatants, common citizens) against lethal violence. This requirement is particularly prominent, and particularly
strong, in just war theory. Some adherents of the theory see civilian immunity as absolute, not to be overridden in any circumstances
whatsoever. Others allow that it may be overridden, but only in extremis. The latter position has been advanced by Michael
Walzer under the heading of “supreme emergency.” In this paper, I look into some of the issues of interpretation and application
of Walzer’s “supreme emergency” view and some of the criticisms that have been levelled against it. I argue that Walzer’s
view is vague and unacceptable as it stands, but that the alternatives proposed by critics such as Brian Orend, C.A.J. Coady,
and Stephen Nathanson are also unattractive. I go on to construct a position that is structurally similar to Walzer’s, but
more specific and much less permissive, which I term the “moral disaster” view. According to this view, deliberate killing
of civilians is almost absolutely wrong. 相似文献
9.
Kyung-Man Kim 《Human Studies》2011,34(4):393-406
Although the success of Habermas’s theory of communicative action depends on his dialogical model of understanding in which
a theorist is supposed to participate in the debate with the actors as a ‘virtual participant’ and seek context-transcendent
truth through the exchange of speech acts, current literature on the theory of communicative action rarely touches on the
difficulties it entails. In the first part of this paper, I will examine Habermas’s argument that understanding other cultural
practices requires the interpreter to virtually participate in the “dialogue” with the actors as to the rationality of their
cultural practice and discuss why, according to Habermas,such dialogue leads to the “context-transcendent truth”. In the second
part, by using a concrete historical example, I will reconstruct a “virtual dialogue” between Habermas and Michael Polanyi
as to the rationality of scientific practice and indicate why Habermas’s dialogical model of understanding based on the methodology
of virtual participation cannot achieve what it professes to do. 相似文献
10.
Maureen C. McHugh 《Sex roles》2006,54(5-6):361-369
Recent attempts to medicalize women’s sexual “dysfunction” are critiqued and a “New View” of women’s sexual problems is introduced. The author argues for a female-centered perspective on women’s sexual desires and problems, based on a review of the literature on women’s sexuality and her observations of young women’s sexual experiences from 25 years of teaching Human Sexuality to undergraduate women. The review suggests that a pill or a patch cannot adequately address the sexual problems commonly experienced by US women. 相似文献
11.
Robert Eamon Briscoe 《Synthese》2006,152(1):95-128
Semantic externalism in contemporary philosophy of language typically – and often tacitly – combines two supervenience claims
about idiolectical meaning (i.e., meaning in the language system of an individual speaker). The first claim is that the meaning
of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her intrinsic, physical properties. The second is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her understanding of it. I here show that a conception of idiolectical meaning is possible that accepts the “anti-internalism” of the first
claim while rejecting (what I shall refer to as) the “anti-individualism” of the second. According to this conception, externally
constituted idiolectical meaning supervenes on idiolectical understanding. I begin by trying to show that it is possible to
disentangle anti-internalist and anti-individualist strands of argument in Hilary Putnam’s well-known and widely influential
“The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Having once argued that the latter strand of argument is not cogent, I then try to show that individualism
(in the sense above) can be reconciled with perhaps the most plausible reconstruction of Putnam’s well-known and widely accepted
“indexical” theory of natural kind terms. Integral to my defense of the possibility of an individualist externalism about
idiolectical meaning are my efforts to demonstrate that, pace Putnam, there is no “division of linguistic labor” when it comes to the fixing the meanings of such terms in a speaker’s
idiolect. The fact that average speakers sometimes need defer to experts shows that not reference, but only reliable recognition of what belongs in the extension of a natural kind term is a “social phenomenon.”
相似文献Wittgenstein (1958, 14).
12.
Sirkku Ikonen 《Synthese》2011,179(1):187-202
My purpose in this paper is to look at Cassirer’s relation to critical philosophy from a new perspective. Most discussions
concerning Cassirer’s Kantianism have so far centered on his relation to neo-Kantianism and the Marburg school. My focus will
not be on neo-Kantianism but on Cassirer’s notion of a “critique of culture.” In an often cited paragraph from the introduction
to The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer says that his aim is to broaden Kant’s critical approach to all various forms of culture, to language as well as
myth and art, and thus to transform the “critique of reason” into the “critique of culture.” I will explore Cassirer’s concept
of the “critique of culture” and suggest that it can best be understood by placing it in the context of early twentieth century
German philosophy. More precisely, I will aim to show that Cassirer’s critique can be seen as an effort to find a middle path
between Lebensphilosophie and the positivism of the Vienna Circle. 相似文献
13.
John Dewey and Bertrand Russell visited China at around the same time in 1920. Both profoundly influenced China during the
great transition period of this country. This article will focus on the differences between the two great figures that influenced
China in the 1920s. This comparison will examine the following five aspects: 1. Deweyanization vs. Russellization; 2. Dewey’s
“Populism” vs. Russell’s “Aristocraticism”; 3. Dewey’s “Syntheticalism” vs. Russell’s “Analyticalism”; 4. Dewey’s “Realism”
vs. Russell’s “Romanticism”; 5. Dewey’s “Conservatism” vs. Russell’s “Radicalism”. This examination will highlight that, although
their visit left indelible impressions among Chinese intellecturals, for the radical Marx–Leninists, any Western philosophy
and socio-political theories, including Dewey’s and Russell’s, were prejudicial, outworn, and even counterrevolutionary. Soon
“Marxi–Leninization” was gradually substituted for “Deweyanization” and “Russellization.” 相似文献
14.
Heikki Kirjavainen 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,64(2):75-88
In this paper I want to argue for the optimal way to characterise the logical and semantical behaviour of the singular term
‘God’ used in religious language. The relevance of this enterprise to logical theory is the main focus as well. Doing this
presupposes to outline the two rivaling approaches of well-definition of singular terms: Kripke’s (“rigid designators”) and
Hintikka’s (“world-lines”). ‘God’ as a “rigid designator” is purified from all real-life-language-games of identification
and only spells out a metaphysical tag, which favours the view of “anything goes”. Instead, ‘God’ as a “world-line,” plus
two ways of quantification, is much more flexible to theological traditions, teachings of the church, religious practices
and personal feelings. Thus, it provides a sufficiently well-defined singular term for the purposes of logical theory.
The whole sketch is based on Jaakko Hintikka’s logical ideas, mainly on his responses to different authors in PJH. I have systematically omitted direct references to his texts because I have modified considerably his ideas for my own purposes. 相似文献
15.
Michael Friedman 《Synthese》2008,164(3):385-400
Carl Hempel introduced what he called “Craig’s theorem” into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the “problem
of theoretical terms.” Beginning with Hempel’s use of ‘Craig’s theorem,” I shall bring out some of the key differences between
Hempel’s treatment of the “problem of theoretical terms” and Carnap’s in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap’s mature philosophy. Carnap’s treatment, in particular, is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools
of mathematical logic to dissolve rather solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed
by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine. 相似文献
16.
Daniela Steila 《Studies in East European Thought》2011,63(4):315-327
At the end of 1907 within a couple of months Lunačarskij met both Gor’kij and Brzozowski in Italy and found many important
points of contact with each. To compare Lunačarskij’s thought at that time with Brzozowski’s “philosophical program” of 1907
casts some new light on the great variety of interpretations that enlivened Easter European Marxism at the beginning of the
twentieth century. On the one hand, it explains Lunačarskij’s “economism” as distinct both from Brzozowski’s extreme anthropologism
and Gor’kij’s “cosmism”; on the other, it shows that Lunačarskij’s “philosophy of labour” promoted a violent attitude of conquest
and humankind’s domination of nature. Although he criticized Brzozowski’s sympathies with German Idealism, Lunačarskij shared
with him a deep appreciation of human creative power, which is evident in his peculiar form of collectivism as well. 相似文献
17.
Claude Romano 《Continental Philosophy Review》2011,44(1):1-21
Taking the problem of perception and illusion as a leading clue, this article presents a new phenomenological approach to
perception and the world: “holism of experience.” It challenges not only Husserl’s transcendentalism, but also what remains
of it in Heidegger’s early thought, on the grounds that it is committed to the skeptical inference: “Since we can always doubt
any perception, we can always doubt perception as a whole.” The rejection of such an implicit inference leads to a relational
paradigm of Being-in-the-World that differs from Heidegger’s on many points. 相似文献
18.
CHEN Lisheng 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2010,5(1):1
The different meanings of “courage” in The Analects were expressed in Confucius’ remark on Zilu’s bravery. The typological analysis of courage in Mencius and Xunzi focused on the shaping of the personalities of brave persons. “Great courage” and “superior courage”, as the virtues of “great men” or “shi junzi 士君子 (intellectuals with noble characters)”, exhibit not only the uprightness of the “internal sagacity”, but also the rich implications of the “external kingship”. The prototype of these brave persons could be said to be between Zengzi’s courage and King Wen’s courage. The discussion entered a new stage of Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties, when admiration for “Yanzi’s great valor” became the key of various arguments. The order of “the three cardinal virtues” was also discussed because it concerned the relationship between “finished virtue” and “novice virtue”; hence, the virtue of courage became internalized as an essence of the internal virtuous life. At the turn of the 20th century, when China was trembling under the threat of foreign powers, intellectuals remodeled the tradition of courage by redefining “Confucius’ great valor”, as Liang Qichao did in representative fashion in his book Chinese Bushido. Hu Shi’s Lun Ru 论儒 (On Ru) was no more than a repetition of Liang’s opinion. In the theoretical structures of the modern Confucians, courage is hardly given a place. As one of the three cardinal virtues, bravery is but a concept. In a contemporary society where heroes and sages exist only in history books, do we need to talk about courage? How should it be discussed? These are questions which deserve our consideration. 相似文献
19.
Jacqueline A. Sullivan 《Synthese》2010,177(2):151-164
The Morris water maze has been put forward in the philosophy of neuroscience as an example of an experimental arrangement
that may be used to delineate the cognitive faculty of spatial memory (e.g., Craver and Darden, Theory and method in the neurosciences,
University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2001; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). However, in the experimental and review literature on the water maze throughout the history of its use, we encounter numerous
responses to the question of “what” phenomenon it circumscribes ranging from cognitive functions (e.g., “spatial learning”,
“spatial navigation”), to representational changes (e.g., “cognitive map formation”) to terms that appear to refer exclusively
to observable changes in behavior (e.g., “water maze performance”). To date philosophical analyses of the water maze have
not been directed at sorting out what phenomenon the device delineates nor the sources of the different answers to the question
of what. I undertake both of these tasks in this paper. I begin with an analysis of Morris’s first published research study
using the water maze and demonstrate that he emerged from it with an experimental learning paradigm that at best circumscribed
a discrete set of observable changes in behavior. However, it delineated neither a discrete set of representational changes
nor a discrete cognitive function. I cite this in combination with a reductionist-oriented research agenda in cellular and
molecular neurobiology dating back to the 1980s as two sources of the lack of consistency across the history of the experimental
and review literature as to what is under study in the water maze. 相似文献
20.
Stewart Shapiro 《Philosophical Studies》2010,147(3):445-455
The article is part of a symposium on Hartry Field’s “Saving truth from paradox”. The book is one of the most significant
intellectual achievements of the past decades, but it is not clear what, exactly, it accomplishes. I explore some alternatives,
relating the developed view to the intuitive, pre-theoretic notion of truth. 相似文献