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1.
Nam-In Lee 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,42(4):465-481
In Speech and Phenomena and other works, Derrida criticizes Husserl’s phenomenology and attempts to pave the way to his deconstructive philosophy.
The starting point of his criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology is his assessment of the latter’s phenomenology of language
developed in the Logical Investigations. Derrida claims that Husserl’s phenomenology of language in the Logical Investigations and the subsequent works is guided by the premise of the metaphysics of presence. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the
one hand, it aims to show that Derrida’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of language is off the mark and, on the other
hand, it aims to reveal that the phenomenology of language goes far beyond the scope of the Derridian deconstructive philosophy
of language. 相似文献
2.
Robin Durie 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(1):73-88
The essay on Husserl’s phenomenology of touch in Derrida’s recent On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy represents his only substantial re-engagement with Husserlian phenomenology to be published following the series of texts
dating from the period marked by his Mémoire of 1955 through to the essay ‘Form and Meaning’ included in Margins (1972). The essay, devoted to some key sections of Husserl’s Ideas II, appears to break new ground in Derrida’s readings
of Husserl, but in fact demonstrates a profound continuity with his earlier readings. In fact, I argue that this continuity
is in a part an effect of Derrida’s ongoing commitment to the ‘methodology’ of deconstruction. I show how this commitment
leads Derrida to conflate three separate distinctions within Husserl’s discussion, a conflation that obliges Derrida to misread
the letter of Husserl’s text, and which, in turn, blinds him to a certain radical potentiality within Husserl’s phenomenology
of sensibility.
相似文献
Robin DurieEmail: |
3.
4.
David Roden 《Continental Philosophy Review》2005,38(1-2):71-88
Most contemporary readings of Derrida’s work situate it within a transcendental tradition of philosophical enquiry explicitly
critical of naturalistic accounts of knowledge and mind. I argue that Derrida provides the naturalist with some of the philosophical
resources needed to rebut transcendental critiques of naturalism, in particular the phenomenological critiques which derive
from Husserl’s philosophy. I do this by showing: a) that Derrida’s account of temporality as differance undermines phenomenological
accounts of the meaning of naturalistic theories and assumptions; and b) that it is itself both usable and interpretable within
the naturalistic framework of current cognitive science. 相似文献
5.
Nam-In Lee 《Husserl Studies》2007,23(3):229-246
It is the aim of this paper to assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence. In Sect. 1, I will summarize Levinas’s
criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence. In Sect. 2, I will delineate Husserl’s concept of experience and in Sect. 3, I
will try to define the concept of evidence in Husserl. In Sect. 4–6, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concepts
of evidence and show that Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence is out of the mark, since it is based on a
total misunderstanding of Husserl’s concepts of evidence. 相似文献
6.
Qingxiong Zhang 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2008,3(1):123-138
The transcendental problem that obsessed the great Western philosophers such as Kant and Husserl should be, according to Wittgenstein,
conceived as a matter of understanding a process of reasoning in which a conclusion follows necessarily from stated rules.
Once these rules, regarded as a priori categories by Kant and as eidos and eidetic relations by Husserl, are demonstrated
to be no more than the language usages or rules of language-games related to our forms of life, Kant’s transcendental idealism
and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology no longer have a leg to stand on.
Translated by Chen Xin and Zhang Qingxiong from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Research), 2006, (10): 68–76 相似文献
7.
Michael R. Kelly 《Husserl Studies》2008,24(1):15-30
Those familiar with contemporary continental philosophy know well the defenses Husserlians have offered of Husserl’s theory
of inner time-consciousness against post-modernism’s deconstructive criticisms. As post-modernism gives way to Deleuzean post-structuralism,
Deleuze’s Le bergsonisme has grown into the movement of Bergsonism. This movement, designed to present an alternative to phenomenology, challenges
Husserlian phenomenology by criticizing the most “important… of all phenomenological problems.” Arguing that Husserl’s theory
of time-consciousness detailed a linear succession of iterable instants in which the now internal to consciousness receives
prejudicial favor, Bergsonism concludes that Husserl derived the past from the present and cannot account for the sense of
the past, which differs in kind from the present. Consequently, everything on Husserl’s account remains present and his theory
cannot accommodate for time’s passage. In this paper, I renew the Husserlian defense of Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness
in response to the recent movement of Deleuzean Bergsonism. Section one presents Bergsonism’s notion of the past in general
and its critique of Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness. Section two presents a rejoinder to Bergsonism’s critique of Husserl,
questioning (1) its understanding of the living-present as linearly extended, (2) its conflation of the living-present with
Husserl’s early schema-apprehension interpretation, and (3) its failure to grasp Husserl’s revised understanding of primary
memory as a result of (2). In conclusion, I suggest that Husserl’s theory of retention might articulate a notion of the past
more consistent with Bergson than Bergsonism itself.
相似文献
Michael R. KellyEmail: |
8.
Dan Zahavi 《Synthese》2008,160(3):355-374
The analyses of the mind–world relation offered by transcendental idealists such as Husserl have often been dismissed with
the argument that they remain committed to an outdated form of internalism. The first move in this paper will be to argue
that there is a tight link between Husserl’s transcendental idealism and what has been called phenomenological externalism,
and that Husserl’s endorsement of the former commits him to a version of the latter. Secondly, it will be shown that key elements
in Husserl’s transcendental idealism, including his rejection of representationalism and metaphysical realism, is shared with
a number of prominent contemporary defenders of an externalist view on the mind. Ultimately, however, it will be suggested
that the very alternative between internalism and externalism—an alternative based on the division between inner and outer—might
be inapplicable when it comes to phenomenological conceptions of the mind–world relation. 相似文献
9.
Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock 《Husserl Studies》2008,24(2):131-140
Quine’s criticism of the notion of analyticity applies, at best, to Carnap’s notion, not to those of Frege or Husserl. The
failure of logicism is also the failure of Frege’s definition of analyticity, but it does not even touch Husserl’s views,
which are based on logical form. However, some relatively concrete number-theoretic statements do not admit such a formalization
salva veritate. A new definition of analyticity based not on syntactical but on semantical logical form is proposed and argued for.
相似文献
Guillermo E. Rosado HaddockEmail: |
10.
Mirja Helena Hartimo 《Synthese》2008,162(2):225-233
Richard Tieszen [Tieszen, R. (2005). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXX(1), 153–173.] has argued that the group-theoretical approach to modern geometry can be seen as a realization of Edmund Husserl’s
view of eidetic intuition. In support of Tieszen’s claim, the present article discusses Husserl’s approach to geometry in
1886–1902. Husserl’s first detailed discussion of the concept of group and invariants under transformations takes place in
his notes on Hilbert’s Memoir Ueber die Grundlagen der Geometrie that Hilbert wrote during the winter 1901–1902. Husserl’s interest in the Memoir is a continuation of his long-standing concern
about analytic geometry and in particular Riemann and Helmholtz’s approach to geometry. Husserl favored a non-metrical approach
to geometry; thus the topological nature of Hilbert’s Memoir must have been intriguing to him. The task of phenomenology is
to describe the givenness of this logos, hence Husserl needed to develop the notion of eidetic intuition.
The author wishes to thank Academy of Finland for financial assistance that enabled her to work on this article. 相似文献
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12.
Thomas J. Nenon 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(4):427-439
This article compares the differences between Kant’s and Husserl’s conceptions of the “transcendental.” It argues that, for
Kant, the term “transcendental” stands for what is otherwise called “metaphysical,” i.e. non-empirical knowledge. As opposed
to his predecessors, who had believed that such non-empirical knowledge was possible for meta-physical, i.e. transcendent
objects, Kant’s contribution was to show how there can be non-empirical (a priori) knowledge not about transcendent objects,
but about the necessary conditions for the experience of natural, non-transcendent objects. Hence the transcendental for Kant
ends up connoting a philosophy that claims to show how subjective forms of intuition and thinking have objective validity
for all objects as appearances. By contrast, Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy takes a different set of problems for its
starting point. His quest is to avoid the uncertainty of empirical knowledge about all kinds of objects that present themselves
to us as something other than, something transcendent to, consciousness. Transcendental or reliable knowledge is made possible
through the phenomenological reduction that focuses strictly on consciousness as immediately self-given to itself—reflection
upon “pure” consciousness. The contents of such consciousness are not the same for everyone and at every time, so they are
not necessary and invariant in the way that Kant’s pure forms of subjectivity are. Since Husserl however also claims that
the all objects, as intentional objects, are constituted in and for consciousness, an investigation into the structures of
pure subjectivity can also be called “transcendental” in a further sense of showing the genesis of our knowledge of objects
that are transcendent to consciousness. Moreover, since Husserl’s philosophical interest is precisely upon the structures
of that consciousness, he also concentrates on necessary conditions for the constitution of these objects in his philosophical
work. Hence, there ends up being a great deal of overlap between his own transcendental project and Kant’s in spite of the
differences in what each of them means by the term “transcendental.”
相似文献
Thomas J. NenonEmail: |
13.
Richard Tieszen 《Axiomathes》2012,22(1):31-52
In 1928 Edmund Husserl wrote that “The ideal of the future is essentially that of phenomenologically based (“philosophical”)
sciences, in unitary relation to an absolute theory of monads” (“Phenomenology”, Encyclopedia Britannica draft) There are references to phenomenological monadology in various writings of Husserl. Kurt G?del began to study Husserl’s
work in 1959. On the basis of his later discussions with G?del, Hao Wang tells us that “G?del’s own main aim in philosophy
was to develop metaphysics—specifically, something like the monadology of Leibniz transformed into exact theory—with the help
of phenomenology.” (A Logical Journey: From G?del to Philosophy, p. 166) In the Cartesian Meditations and other works Husserl identifies ‘monads’ (in his sense) with ‘transcendental egos in their full concreteness’. In this
paper I explore some prospects for a G?delian monadology that result from this identification, with reference to texts of
G?del and to aspects of Leibniz’s original monadology. 相似文献
14.
Steven Crowell 《Synthese》2008,160(3):335-354
This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of
semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how
the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that
is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail at referring.
The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic
inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the
representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that
does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by
rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of
‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological
immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for
it. 相似文献
15.
Felix O’Murchadha 《Synthese》2008,160(3):375-395
This paper argues that the Husserl–Heidegger relationship is systematically misunderstood when framed in terms of a distinction
between internalism and externalism. Both philosophers, it is argued, employ the phenomenological reduction to immanence as
a fundamental methodological instrument. After first outlining the assumptions regarding inner and outer and the individual
and the social from which recent epistemological interpretations of phenomenology begin, I turn to the question of Husserl’s
internalism. I argue that Husserl can only be understood as an internalist on the assumption that immanence equates with internal.
This, however, is not the case as can be seen once the reduction is understood not as setting aside the existence of the world,
but rather a reflection on its meaning. Turning to Heidegger, I argue that his commitment to a form of the phenomenological
reduction precludes him from being either a semantic or a social externalist. The place of authenticity and the first person
perspective in his work derive from his phenomenological commitments, which can be seen in his accounts of discourse and language
and of falling (Verfallen). I then go on to briefly outline a more plausible basis for understanding the difference between Husserl’s and Heidegger’s
phenomenologies in terms of their respective emphases on logic and on poetics. 相似文献
16.
Molly Brigid Flynn 《Husserl Studies》2009,25(1):57-79
Husserl’s philosophy of culture relies upon a person’s body being expressive of the person’s spirit, but Husserl’s analysis
of expression in Logical Investigations is inadequate to explain this bodily expressiveness. This paper explains how Husserl’s use of “expression” shifts from LI to Ideas II and argues that this shift is explained by Husserl’s increased understanding of the pervasiveness of sense in subjective
life and his increased appreciation for the unity of the person. I show how these two developments allow Husserl to better
describe the bodily expressiveness that is the source of culture. Husserl’s account of culture is thoroughly intentionalistic,
but it does not emphasize thought at the expense of embodiment. Culture originates not in an abstract subjectivity, but by
persons’ expressing themselves physically in the world. By seeing how Husserl develops his mature position on bodily expressiveness,
we can better appreciate the meaningfulness and the bodily concreteness of cultural objects.
相似文献
Molly Brigid FlynnEmail: |
17.
Dermot Moran 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(4):401-425
Throughout his career, Husserl identifies naturalism as the greatest threat to both the sciences and philosophy. In this paper, I explicate Husserl’s overall diagnosis and critique
of naturalism and then examine the specific transcendental aspect of his critique. Husserl agreed with the Neo-Kantians in rejecting naturalism. He has three major critiques of naturalism:
First, it (like psychologism and for the same reasons) is ‘countersensical’ in that it denies the very ideal laws that it needs for its own justification.
Second, naturalism essentially misconstrues consciousness by treating it as a part of the world. Third, naturalism is the
inevitable consequence of a certain rigidification of the ‘natural attitude’ into what Husserl calls the ‘naturalistic attitude’.
This naturalistic attitude ‘reifies’ and it ‘absolutizes’ the world such that it is treated as taken-for-granted and ‘obvious’.
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological analysis, however, discloses that the natural attitude is, despite its omnipresence
in everyday life, not primary, but in fact is relative to the ‘absolute’ transcendental attitude. The mature Husserl’s critique
of naturalism is therefore based on his acceptance of the absolute priority of the transcendental attitude. The paradox remains that we must start from and, in a sense, return to the natural attitude, while, at the same time, restricting
this attitude through the on-going transcendental vigilance of the universal epoché.
相似文献
Dermot MoranEmail: |
18.
A. David Smith 《Synthese》2008,160(3):313-333
It is argued that Husserl was an “externalist” in at least one sense. For it is argued that Husserl held that genuinely perceptual
experiences—that is to say, experiences that are of some real object in the world—differ intrinsically, essentially and as
a kind from any hallucinatory experiences. There is, therefore, no neutral “content” that such perceptual experiences share
with hallucinations, differing from them only over whether some additional non-psychological condition holds or not. In short,
it is argued that Husserl was a “disjunctivist”. In addition, it is argued that Husserl held that the individual object of
any experience, perceptual or hallucinatory, is essential to and partly constitutive of that experience. The argument focuses
on three aspects of Husserl’s thought: his account of intentional objects, his notion of horizon, and his account of reality. 相似文献
19.
Mirja Hartimo 《Axiomathes》2012,22(1):121-133
In his 1896 lecture course on logic–reportedly a blueprint for the Prolegomena to Pure Logic–Husserl develops an explicit account of logic as an independent and purely theoretical discipline. According to Husserl,
such a theory is needed for the foundations of logic (in a more general sense) to avoid psychologism in logic. The present
paper shows that Husserl’s conception of logic (in a strict sense) belongs to the algebra of logic tradition. Husserl’s conception
is modeled after arithmetic, and respectively logical inferences are viewed as analogical to arithmetical calculation. The
paper ends with an examination of Husserl’s involvement with the key characters of the algebra of logic tradition. It is concluded
that Ernst Schr?der, but presumably also Hermann and Robert Grassmann influenced Husserl most in his turn away from psychologism. 相似文献
20.
Lisa Guenther 《Human Studies》2011,34(3):257-276
Psychiatrist Stuart Grassian has proposed the term “SHU syndrome” to name the cluster of cognitive, perceptual and affective
symptoms that commonly arise for inmates held in the Special Housing Units (SHU) of supermax prisons. In this paper, I analyze
the harm of solitary confinement from a phenomenological perspective by drawing on Husserl’s account of the essential relation
between consciousness, the experience of an alter ego and the sense of a real, Objective world. While Husserl’s prioritization
of transcendental subjectivity over transcendental intersubjectivity underestimates the degree to which first-person consciousness
is constitutively intertwined with the embodied consciousness of others, Husserl’s phenomenology nevertheless provides a fruitful
starting-point for a philosophical engagement with the psychiatric research on solitary confinement. 相似文献