Some reflections on the individuation of events

Theories in physics require reference to manifolds of locations and events. Abstract versions of these manifolds, ‘space’, ‘time’ and ‘space‐time’ are frequently used as reference systems. Should they be included in the ontology of physics as well as the material manifolds from which they are abstracted? This problem can be approached through a study of the identity conditions of events. The argument is offered that neither an abstract ‘time’ of moments is viable, nor is the assumption that events are individuated by their locations necessary. Taken together these conclusions would require reinterpretation of relativity as a grammar of histories and of the Einstein—Podolski‐Rosen experiment as displaying the possibility of spatially distributed events.     

Postponing trauma: The dangers of telling

Surviving a major historical trauma has consequences that are difficult to live with. Survivors who remain silent are often condemned to a desiccated existence, a dried‐out life, a death in life. Survivors who speak out run an even greater risk. Telling their ghastly tale may trigger somatic consequences, psychotic episodes, or even suicide. As to the psychoanalytic cure, the free association it requires carries its own danger: negative therapeutic reaction in sometimes extreme forms. Avoidance of horror may turn into avoidance of life itself. Awful as it may seem, this avoidance of life may represent a victory over a menacing chaos. Should we as analysts accept the risk of endangering such a victory, no matter how unsatisfactory? The psychoanalytical injunction to speak out may trigger an upsurge of shame and terror. Is subjectivation always possible? This paper is about what happens when denial and splitting strategies are suspended, when ‘crypts’ are opened. Is there an analytic ‘poros’ allowing for a controlled return of affects? Is there a therapeutic solution to the problem of telling a wreckage without being caught in it? The dangers of ‘telling’ will be discussed in regard to new analytic strategies and new interpretive registers. When the ‘silent psychic sharing’ proves insufficient, some analysts go so far as to take part in the shame, share the grief, ‘lend their own psyche’, become a ‘double’ of the analysand, accept the existence of ‘sanctuaries’. To what effect?     

Brain-Injured Footballers,Voluntary Choice and Social Goods. A Reply to Corlett

ABSTRACT

In this essay, we respond to Angelo Corlett’s criticism of our paper ‘Ethics, Brain Injuries, and Sports: Prohibition, Reform, and Prudence’. To do so, first, we revisit certain assumptions and arguments Corlett makes concerning intercollegiate football and brain injuries in his 2014 paper ‘Should intercollegiate football be eliminated?’. Second, we identify and criticize two key elements in his response regarding (a) ‘luck egalitarianism’, and (b) ‘public goods’. We conclude by reaffirming our critical reading of Corlett’s original 2014 paper and by identifying further elements (i) luck and the nature of individual responsibility; and (ii) the nature of sports as public rather than merely private goods, that he would have to address for his latter 2018 position to hold true.     

Choices and opportunities: another effect of framing on decisions

Many decisions can be framed either as ‘choices’ between alternative courses of action (e.g. Should I move to New York or stay in Chicago?) or as ‘opportunities’ to pursue a particular course of action (i.e. Should I move to New York?). Although there is no logical difference between these two different decision frames, there may be important psychological differences between them. In four studies, we explore the differences between ‘choices’ and ‘opportunities’. The results of Studies 1 and 2 show that college students view many of the decisions they typically face as opportunities, rather than choices. Further, the results of Study 2 suggest that the frame students adopt is systematically related to the preferences they express. The latter finding led to Studies 3 and 4, where we show that preferences can be influenced by encouraging people to adopt one decision frame rather than another. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On Whether B-Theoretic Atheists Should Fear Death

In this paper I revisit a dispute between Mikel Burley and Robin Le Poidevin about whether or not the B-theory of time can give its adherents any reason to be less afraid of death. In ‘Should a B-theoretic atheist fear death?’, Burley argues that even on Le Poidevin’s understanding of the B-theory, atheists shouldn’t be comforted. His reason is that the prevalent B-theoretic account of our attitudes towards the past and future precludes treating our fear of death as unwarranted. I examine his argument and provide a tentative defense of Le Poidevin. I claim that while Burley rightly spots a tension with a non-revisionary approach to our ordinary emotional life, he doesn’t isolate the source of that tension. The real question is how to understand Le Poidevin’s idea that on the B-theory, we and our lives are ‘eternally real’. I then suggest that there is a view of time that does justice to Le Poidevin’s remarks, albeit a strange one. The view takes temporal relations to be quasi-spatial and temporal entities to exist in a totum simul.     

Can Architecture be Barbaric?

The title of this article is adapted from Theodor W. Adorno’s famous dictum: ‘To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.’ After the catastrophic earthquake in Kocaeli, Turkey on the 17th of August 1999, in which more than 40,000 people died or were lost, Necdet Teymur, who was then the dean of the Faculty of Architecture of the Middle East Technical University, referred to Adorno in one of his ‘earthquake poems’ and asked: ‘Is architecture possible after 17th of August?’ The main objective of this article is to interpret Teymur’s question in respect of its connection to Adorno’s philosophy with a view to make a contribution to the politics and ethics of architecture in Turkey. Teymur’s question helps in providing a new interpretation of a critical approach to architecture and architectural technology through Adorno’s philosophy. The paper also presents a discussion of Adorno`s dictum, which serves for a better understanding of its universality/particularity.     

THE LIMITS TO PARTICIPATION IN DIS‐EQUILIBRIUM ECOLOGY: Maori involvement in habitat restoration within Te Urewera National Park

In this paper, we explore conceptualizations of ‘ordinary’ citizens common in public engagement forums on emerging technologies and assumptions from deliberative theory that ordinary people are more likely to be appropriately ‘changed’ through deliberative processes facilitated by experts. Looking at a large US public forum event [the National Citizens Technology Forum (NCTF)], we asked: What were the goals for this exercise and how did they shape conceptualizations of ordinariness and representativeness? Whose goals and conceptualizations were they? Were the engaged citizens ordinary and representative—and were they changed by the exercise? Our exploration revealed that exercise organizers conceived of ordinary citizens as people lacking science and technology backgrounds, without advocacy or business connections to the technologies at hand, and demographically reflecting the US population. Exercise materials also implied that ideal ordinary participants would lack strong opinions and emotions about these technologies. Actual NCTF participants, however, tended to be more educated, have higher incomes, and to be more liberal than the US public, and participants from all backgrounds had a range of relevant knowledge, experiences and opinions about science and technology. They were changed by the exercise in complex and conflicting ways—based as much on their own knowledge and reflections on relational dynamics as on exercise processes, interactions with experts, and information provided in the exercise. We argue that inadequately explored ideas about ordinary citizens are highly problematic. Further, invisible assumptions about what is ‘normal’ among experts and status quo institutions serve to reify the lay–expert divide that engagement exercises are intended to counteract.     

Making Common Sense of Vaccines: An Example of Discussing the Recombinant Attenuated Salmonella Vaccine with the Public

Researchers have iterated that the future of synthetic biology and biotechnology lies in novel consumer applications of crossing biology with engineering. However, if the new biology’s future is to be sustainable, early and serious efforts must be made towards social sustainability. Therefore, the crux of new applications of synthetic biology and biotechnology is public understanding and acceptance. The RASVaccine is a novel recombinant design not found in nature that re-engineers a common bacteria (Salmonella) to produce a strong immune response in humans. Synthesis of the RASVaccine has the potential to improve public health as an inexpensive, non-injectable product. But how can scientists move forward to create a dialogue of creating a ‘common sense’ of this new technology in order to promote social sustainability? This paper delves into public issues raised around these novel technologies and uses the RASVaccine as an example of meeting the public with a common sense of its possibilities and limitations.     

Tacit knowledge management

How can we identify and estimate workers’ tacit knowledge? How can we design a personnel mix aimed at improving and speeding up its transfer and development? How is it possible to implement tacit knowledge sustainable projects in remote areas? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to distinguish between types of tacit knowledge, to establish what they allow for and to consider their sources. It is also essential to find a way of managing the tacit knowledge ‘stock’ and distribution within the workforce. In short, a conceptual framework is needed to manage tacit knowledge. Based on previous works and 2 years of action research, this paper introduces such a framework and describes its partial application to support the pre-operational training and hiring in a large industrial plant in Brazil. Two contributions emerge from the research. First, the concept of ‘levels of similarity’ is introduced as a means to qualify the experience of workers and estimate the associated tacit knowledge. Second, the capability of carrying out three types of judgement properly and speedily is put forward as being a core ability of those who possess what has been called ‘collective tacit knowledge’ (Collins in Organ Stud 28(2):257–262, 2007). In practical terms, the results indicate the opportunity for companies to capitalize on the experience and tacit knowledge of their workers in a systematic way and with due recognition. Ultimately, positive impacts are expected in their absorptive capacity as well as in their management and human resources systems, accident prevention, productivity and the development of sustainable projects in remote areas.     

Review of True Competition: A Guide to Pursuing Excellence in Sport and Society

Stephens and Feezell argue, in ‘The Ideal of the Stoic Sportsman’ (2004), that ‘one need not be a scholar of ancient Greek philosophy to refer to “stoic” conduct or a “stoic” approach to certain matters, because the vocabulary related to this apparently antiquarian view of life has seeped into our common language’. Nonetheless, Stephens and Feezell go on to give a scholarly account of Stoicism as it relates to athletic participation. Their account, in part, takes the form of a distinction between ‘simple Stoicism’ and ‘sophisticated Stoicism’– the former being a common, contemporary grasp of Stoic moral psychology; the latter being a more sophisticated and historically accurate grasp of Stoic moral psychology. In fleshing out their more sophisticated account, they disclose a paradox. Given the Stoic sufficiency thesis – i.e., that the sole (Stoic) good is virtue – the Stoic sportsman must be indifferent to failure or winning. Yet the Stoic sportsman must be sufficiently attached to the athletic experience to use it as a means of developing virtuous states of character. That they dub the paradox the ‘paradox of Stoic detachment’. ‘Curiosity? Paradox? Or psychological incoherence?’ they ask. The aim of the present undertaking is a ‘soft’ critique of Stephens and Feezell – soft, because the critique is not so much a critical rejection of the authors' view tout court. Instead, I aim to point out deficiencies with their account and expand on other points not fully elucidated in it. The most salient point I make is that what they deem paradoxical is not really paradoxical, once there is a more thorough account and clearer grasp of Stoic ‘detachment’.     

What Is Terrorism?

ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is not to try to formulate the meaning the word ‘terrorism’has in ordinary use; the word is used in so many different, even incompatible ways, that such an enterprise would quickly prove futile. My aim is rather to try for a definition that captures the trait, or traits, of terrorism which cause most of us to view it with moral repugnance. I discuss the following questions: Is the historical connection of terrorism with terror to be preserved on the conceptual level, or relegated to the psychology and sociology of terrorism? Does mere infliction of terror qualify as terrorism, so that we can speak of non-violent terrorism? If terrorism is a type of violence, does it have to be against persons, or should violence against property also count? In what sense can terrorism be described as indiscriminate violence? Should we use the word only in a political context? In such a context, can we speak of ‘state terrorism’, or should the word be restricted to actions not sanctioned by law? Is the terrorist necessarily oblivious to moral considerations, as those who define terrorism in terms of antinomianism imply? My answers to these questions lead up to the following definition: terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take.     

Subversive rationalization: Technology,power, and democracy 1

This paper argues, against technological and economic determinism, that the dominant model of industrial society is politically contingent. The idea that technical decisions are significantly constrained by ‘rationality’ ‐ either technical or economic ‐ is shown to be groundless. Constructivist and hermeneutic approaches to technology show that modern societies are inherently available for a different type of development in a different cultural framework. It is possible that, in the future, those who today are subordinated to technology's rhythms and demands will be able to control it and to determine its evolution. I call the process of creating such a society ‘subversive rationalization’ because it requires technological advances that can only be made in opposition to the dominant hegemony.     

'Thank Goodness That's Over': The Evolutionary Story

If, as the new tenseless theory of time maintains, there are no tensed facts, then why do our emotional lives seem to suggest that there are? This question originates with Prior’s ‘Thank Goodness That’s Over’ problem, and still presents a significant challenge to the new B–theory of time. We argue that this challenge has more dimensions to it than has been appreciated by those involved in the debate so far. We present an analysis of the challenge, showing the different questions that a B–theorist must answer in order to meet it. The debate has focused on the question of what is the object of my relief when an unpleasant experience is past. We outline the prevailing response to this question. The additional, and neglected, questions are, firstly –‘Why does the same event elicit different emotional responses from us depending on whether it is in the past, present, or future?’ And secondly –‘Why do we care more about proximate future pain than about distant future pain?’ We give B–theory answers to these questions, which appeal to evolutionary considerations.     

Four types of fare evasion: A qualitative study from Melbourne,Australia

Fare evasion on public transport can reduce revenue by millions of dollars, undermining the financial viability of transit. However little research examines how public transport users think about fare evasion or attempts to understand why people fare evade. This paper presents the results of a program of qualitative research conducted in Melbourne, Australia to understand the attitudes toward and motivations behind fare evasion. A total of 67 people participated in face-to-face or online focus groups.Results established a spectrum of perceived circumstances where someone might travel without a valid ticket. ‘Fare evasion’ was considered to be at only one end of that spectrum. The degree of intent to evade was a critical factor explaining the severity of fare evasion from user perspectives. People’s attitudes toward fare evasion differed significantly; four key attitude segments were uncovered based on the attitudes and behaviours that group members tended to share. These included 1. ‘Fare evasion is wrong – the accidental evader’ who held strong views against fare evasion, 2. The ‘it’s not my fault’ evader who meant to pay but sometimes find themselves fare evading due to barriers to payment, 3. The ‘calculated risk-taker’ evader who deliberately fare evade if they think the reward outweighs risk and 4. ‘Career evaders’ who always fare evade. Attitudes, feelings and motivations for these segments are described and implications for revenue protection policy are discussed.     

The countertransference dream1

Can the analyst's night‐dream about his patient be considered as a manifestation of countertransference‐and, if so, under what conditions? In what way can such a dream represent more than just the disguised fulfillment of a repressed wish of the analyst? Is there not a risk of the analyst unconsciously taking up and ‘using’ the content of a session or other elements coming from the analytic situation for his own psychic reasons? The author, closely following Freud's dream theory, shows the mechanisms which can allow us to use the dream content in the analytical situation: preserved from the secondary processes of conscious thinking, other fantasies and affects than in the waking state can emerge in dream thought, following an ‘unconscious perception’. After examining the countertransference elements of Freud's dream, ‘Irma's injection’, which leads off The interpretation of dreams, the author presents a dream of her own about a patient and its value for understanding affects and representations which had hitherto remained unrepresented.     

What Role for Parental Attributions in Parenting Interventions for Child Conduct Problems? Advances from Research into Practice

The role of parental attributions in parenting interventions has been the subject of intense interest from clinicians and researchers attempting to optimise outcomes in treatments for children with conduct problems. Despite research articulating the many ways parental attributions can influence behavioural parent training (BPT) outcomes, and recognition that addressing parental attributions in treatment is one of the great challenges faced by BPT practitioners, parenting interventions generally do not provide components that explicitly target or focus on changing problematic parental attributions. In this paper, we ask ‘Should parental attributions be included into best practice interventions? If so, how can this be done in a way that improves outcomes without cluttering and complicating the parent training model?’ We review the theoretical and empirical status of our understanding of the role of parental attributions in BPT with reference to three questions: ‘do pre-treatment parental attributions uniquely predict treatment outcomes’; ‘do changes in parental attributions uniquely predict treatment outcomes’; and ‘does targeting parental attributions in BPT affect treatment outcomes’. Our review indicates that existing research supports the importance of focussing on parental attributions for some families in order to maximise treatment outcomes. However, clinical processes for doing this are yet to be identified and specified in a way that would allow for manualised replication and scrutiny in research designs. We finish with a discussion of how these clinical and research challenges could be approached.     

Perceptions of and Attitudes toward Plagiarism and Factors Contributing to Plagiarism: a Review of Studies

The abundance of information technology and electronic resources for academic materials has contributed to the attention given to research on plagiarism from various perspectives. Among the issues that have attracted researchers’ attention are perceptions of plagiarism and attitudes toward plagiarism. This article presents a critical review of studies that have been conducted to examine staff’s and students’ perceptions of and attitudes toward plagiarism. It also presents a review of studies that have focused on factors contributing to plagiarism. Our review of studies reveals that most of the studies on perceptions of plagiarism and attitudes toward plagiarism lack an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the perceptions of plagiarism and other contextual, sociocultural and institutional variables, or the relationship between attitudes toward plagiarism and students’ perceptions of various forms of plagiarism. Although our review shows that various factors can contribute to plagiarism, there is no taxonomy that can account for all these factors. Some suggestions for future research are provided in this review article.     

‘When Difference Gets in the Way’: Young People,Whiteness and Sexualisation

Scholars of young people and sexualisation have noted an omission of studies that attend to race and whiteness. In the main, a white-Anglo middle-class child is placed at the centre of media, policy and academic debates about the effects, production and consumption of sexualised media. In light of this, it is important to ask: how can research in this area disrupt the tendency to place normative white subjects at the centre of debates, and position ‘raced others’ at the sidelines? Drawing on postcolonial and critical race and whiteness theory, this paper presents the findings from a study undertaken in South Australia with young people and young adults from a broad variety of cultural backgrounds. Through a series of focus groups designed to explore participant views of sexualised media, a powerful set of resistant narratives emerged. Firstly, participants discussed how their views on sex and sexuality are often read ‘through difference’. They revealed how ‘difference gets in the way’, frustrating conversations they want to have about sexy media, along with moments when they felt stereo-typed and type-cased. Secondly, by presenting perspectives of sexualised media on their own terms, participant narratives were not constrained or bounded by fixed cultural viewpoints. Through a series of ‘transitional moves’, participants employed notions of freedom, individual choice and rights, expressing an urgent desire to speak ‘outside of difference’.     

Validity generalization: Some critical remarks on the Schmidt-Hunter procedure*

This article presents some critical comments on the validity generalization procedure which has been presented by Schmidt, Hunter and others. They have put forward a method for testing the hypothesis that the variance in validity coefficients across situations for job-test combinations is due to what they consider to be statistical artifacts. The Schmidt-Hunter approach is criticized on the following points: the compilation of validity data, the use of criterion measures, and the test of the hypothesis of no situational specificity. Further, the relation between the concepts ‘situational specificity’ and ‘validity generalization’ is considered. In addition, it is noted that Schmidt, Hunter and others have defined the concept ‘situation’ in a different way than classical writers. It is concluded that the Schmidt-Hunter approach to validity generalization shows fundamental shortcomings. As a consequence their far-reaching conclusions for the practice of personnel selection should be considered premature.     

Scientific Facts and Methods in Public Reason

Should scientific facts and methods have an epistemically privileged status in public reason? In Rawls’s public reason account he asserts what we will label the Scientific Standard Stricture: citizens engaged in public reason must be guided by non-controversial scientific methods, and public reason must be in line with non-controversial scientific conclusions. The Scientific Standard Stricture is meant to fulfill important tasks such as enabling the determinateness and publicity of the public reason framework. However, Rawls leaves us without elucidation with regard to when science is and is not ‘non-controversial’ and more importantly, we are left without a justification for a stricture which excludes certain controversial beliefs and methods of inquiry from the realm of political justification. In this article, we offer what we deem to be the most plausible interpretation of Rawls’s Scientific Standards Stricture. We then use Rawls’s general theoretical framework to examine various potential justifications for privileging these ‘non-controversial’ scientific methods and conclusions. We conclude that no viable justification is available to Rawls.