Truth Values and the Value of Truth

This paper explores the ways in which truth is better than falsehood, and suggests that, among other things, it depends on the kinds of proposition to which these values are attached. Ordinary singular propositions like "It is raining" seem to fit best the bivalent "scheme" of classical logic, the general proposition "It is always raining" is more appropriately rated according to how often it rains, and a "practically vague" proposition like "The lecture will start at 1" is appropriately rated according to its nearness to exactness. Implications for logic of this "rating system" are commented on.     

Philosophy between science and the humanities

Philosophy should avoid isolation, and should return to being curious and enthusiastic about explanation: about why- and how possibly-questions. The analytic and continental philosophical cultures should establish a dialogue, where each side brings out the distinctive qualities of its work while widening the scope of its concerns.     

Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth

This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress the point that since the hypothesis that Tarski's definitions are extensionally correct is deeply entrenched, the burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Deflationary Truth and the Liar

Journal of Philosophical Logic -     

Coherence and the Truth Connection

There is an objection to coherence theories of knowledge to the effect that coherence is not connected with truth, so that when coherence leads to truth this is just a matter of luck. Coherence theories embrace falliblism, to be sure, but that does not sustain the objection. Coherence is connected with truth by principles of justified acceptance that explain the connection between coherence and truth. Coherence is connected with truth by explanatory principle, not just luck.     

Being skeptical about the medical humanities

In this paper the author challenges the prevailing view that contemporary writing in the medical humanities is serving the needs of the various health care disciplines. The current medical humanities literature assumes that physicians are the appropriate target group. This is most notably the case within health care ethics literature. There appears to be an unexamined assumption that physician-centric approaches to clinical ethical decision-making are the standard by which appropriate ethical practice is judged. The author challenges this assumption and addresses the problems that this approach engenders. The medical humanities literature appears to reinforce hierarchical, patriarchal arrangements which are themselves not morally neutral.     

Instructional issues in the medical humanities

This paper examines instructional issues such as how, when, and where the medical humanities are taught in medical school settings. The author interviewed seven humanities scholars teaching in medical schools using open-ended questions which elicited data illustrating 1) informants' teaching styles; 2) where/how their teaching currently fits in the medical curriculum; 3) their suggestions on ideal curricular integration of the medical humanities; and 4) informants' teaching successes.     

Truth and reflection

Conclusion Many topics have not been covered, in most cases because I don't know quite what to say about them. Would it be possible to add a decidability predicate to the language? What about stronger connectives, like exclusion negation or Lukasiewicz implication? Would an expanded language do better at expressing its own semantics? Would it contain new and more terrible paradoxes? Can the account be supplemented with a workable notion of inherent truth (see note 36)? In what sense does stage semantics lie between fixed point and stability semantics? In what sense, exactly, are our semantical rules inconsistent? In what sense, if any, does their inconsistency resolve the problem of the paradoxes?The ideals of strength, grounding, and closure together define an intuitively appealing conception of truth. Nothing would be gained by insisting that it was the intuitive conception of truth, and in fact recent developments make me wonder whether such a thing exists. However that may be, until the alternatives are better understood it would be foolish to attempt to decide between them. Truth gives up her secrets slowly and grudgingly, and loves to confound our presumptions.     

Truth and Reduction

The proof-theoretic results on axiomatic theories oftruth obtained by different authors in recent years are surveyed.In particular, the theories of truth are related to subsystems ofsecond-order analysis. On the basis of these results, thesuitability of axiomatic theories of truth for ontologicalreduction is evaluated.