共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Jeremy Gwiazda 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):357-363
Richard Swinburne’s argument in The Existence of God discusses many probabilities, ultimately concluding that God probably
exists. Swinburne gives exact values to almost none of these probabilities. I attempted to assign values to the probabilities
that met that weak condition that they could be correct. In this paper, I first present a brief outline of Swinburne’s argument
in The Existence of God. I then present the problems I encountered in Swinburne’s argument, specifically problems that interfered
with my attempt to arrive at values for the probabilities discussed by Swinburne. Finally, I suggest that Swinburne’s argument
would be more persuasive if he assigned exact values to his probabilities. 相似文献
2.
John Ostrowick 《South African Journal of Philosophy》2013,32(2):354-368
AbstractRichard Swinburne, in his The Existence of God (2004), presents a cosmological argument in defence of theism (Swinburne 1991: 119, 135). God, Swinburne argues, is more likely to bring about an ordered universe than other states (ibid.: 144, 299). To defend this view, Swinburne presents the following arguments: (1) That this ordered universe is a priori improbable (2004: 49, 150, 1991: 304 et seq.), given the stringent requirements for life (cf. also Leslie 2000: 12), and the Second Law of Thermodynamics (Giancoli 1990: 396); (2) That it seems as if this ordered universe can be explained by theism; (3) A theistic explanation for the universe is more probable because it is a simple explanation. To this end, Swinburne makes use of Bayes’ Theorem. Symbolically, this claim can be represented as (e) for the evidence of the existence of a complex universe, and (h) for a hypothesis. Swinburne’s argument is that theism has a higher prior probability, P(htheism) > P(hmaterialism), since theism is simpler than materialism. He concludes that P(e|htheism) > P(e|hmaterialism). In this paper I will address only this argument (3) above, and defend the view that it is false: theism is not simpler than materialism, nor it is more probably true. I conclude that theism is less probable than materialism, expressed by P(htheism) < P(hmaterialism) : 2/N(2n+1) < 1/n, where N is the number of possible universes and n the number of entities in existence. 相似文献
3.
Here is a new version of the Evidential Problem of Evil.Theists claim that it is reasonable for atheists to believethat if God did exist, suffering would look just as it does now. I endorse this claim, however it cannot be deployedagainst my argument without the following epistemic principle:what we see makes p likely only if it is reasonable tobelieve it would be discernibly different if p were false. I demonstrate that this principle is mistaken. The paperalso responds to objections from Alvin Plantinga and PeterVan Inwagen that Gods existence is compatible with pointlessnatural evil. In particular, I argue that appeals to vaguenessdo not support the compatibility claim. 相似文献
4.
William Hasker 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2007,61(3):151-160
It is widely held that the logical problem of evil, which alleges an inconsistency between the existence of evil and that
of an omnipotent and morally perfect God, has been solved. D. Z. Phillips thinks this is a mistake. In The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, he argues that, within the generally assumed framework, “neither the proposition ’God is omnipotent’ nor the proposition
‘God is perfectly good’ can get off the ground.” Thus, the problem of evil leads to the problem of God. Phillips goes on to
provide an alternative response to the problem of evil, expounded by means of his Wittgensteinian analyses of various concepts
drawn from the Christian tradition. I argue that his criticisms of the traditional conception of God either fail outright
or are at best inconclusive. I also point out that the religious concepts analyzed by Phillips are not and cannot be the same
concepts as those employed in the Christian tradition from which they are supposedly drawn. For the concepts as traditionally
employed presuppose the actual existence and activity of precisely the sort of being that, according to Phillips, “God cannot
be.” 相似文献
5.
John M Ostrowick 《South African Journal of Philosophy》2013,32(2):163-172
Given ht as the hypothesis of theism, hm as the hypothesis of materialism, and e as the evidence of a complex life-bearing universe, Richard Swinburne presents these arguments in The Existence of God: (1) that this ordered universe is a priori improbable, given the stringent requirements for life and the Second Law of Thermodynamics; (2) that this universe's structure is evidence for theism, and that theism therefore explains this universe; Swinburne argues that because P(e|ht) > P(e|hm), it follows that P(ht|e)>P(hm|e); and (3) a theistic explanation for the universe is more probable because it is simpler; therefore it is more likely that God exists than not. As I have addressed (3) in a prior paper, this paper will address the Bayesian argument that Swinburne offers in (2), i.e. that P(e|ht)>P(e). In the paper I draw a number of conclusions, most pertinently, that Hacking's Total Probability Rule (TPR) for cases of mutually exclusive hypotheses [ht vs hm] and evidence e entails that ht can only be confirmed if P(e|~ht) is low. I also conclude that if we follow the TPR for Swinburne's argument, we achieve the result that theism is at best slightly improbable, or equiprobable with materialism. 相似文献
6.
Ian Kidd 《Philosophia》2012,40(2):365-377
This paper explores the influence of the fifth-century Christian Neoplatonist Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (Denys) on the
twentieth-century philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend. I argue that the later Feyerabend took from Denys a metaphysical
claim—the ‘doctrine of ineffability’—intended to support epistemic pluralism. The paper has five parts. Part one introduces
Denys and Feyerabend’s common epistemological concern to deny the possibility of human knowledge of ultimate reality. Part
two examines Denys’ arguments for the ‘ineffability’ of God as presented in On the Divine Names. Part three then explores how Feyerabend imported Denys’ account of divine ineffability into his own metaphysics to provide
a novel argument for epistemic pluralism. Part four explains the significance of an appreciation of Dionyius’ influence for
our understanding of Feyerabend. I conclude that Denys was a significant and neglected influence upon the later Feyerabend. 相似文献
7.
Klaas J. Kraay 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2006,59(1):49-68
Many theists hold that for any world x that God has the power to actualize, there is a better world, y, that God had the power to actualize instead of x. Recently, however, it has been suggested that this scenario is incompatible with traditional theism: roughly, it is claimed
that no being can be essentially unsurpassable on this view, since no matter what God does in actualizing a world, it is possible for God (or some other being) to do better, and hence it is possible for God (or some other being) to be better. In reply to an argument of this sort, Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder offer the surprising claim that an essentially
unsurpassable being could – consistently with his goodness and rationality – select a world for actualization at random. In what follows, I respond to the most recent contributions to this discussion. I criticize William Rowe’s new reply to
the Howard-Snyders (but I endorse the spirit of one of his arguments), and I claim that Edward Wierenga’s new defence of the
Howard-Snyders fails. I conclude that the Howard-Snyders’ argument fails to show that an essentially unsurpassable being could
randomly choose a world for actualization. Accordingly, it fails to block an important argument for atheism. 相似文献
8.
J. C. Pinto de Oliveira 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(1):147-157
In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed, particularly regarding Carnap’s work.
In this paper, I argue against the interpretation that Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions having been published in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, co-edited by Carnap, is evidence of the revisionist idea that Carnap “would have found Structure philosophically congenial”. I claim that Kuhn’s book, from Carnap’s point of view, is not in philosophy of science but rather
in history of science (in the context of a sharp discovery–justification distinction). It could also explain the fact that,
despite his sympathetic letters to Kuhn as editor, Carnap never refers to Kuhn’s book in his work in philosophy of science. 相似文献
9.
Antonio Calcagno 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(1):59-72
This article seeks to present for the first time a more systematic account of Edith Stein’s views on death and dying. First,
I will argue that death does not necessarily lead us to an understanding of our earthly existence as aevum, that is, an experience of time between eternity and finite temporality. We always bear the mark of our finitude, including
our finite temporality, even when we exist within the eternal mind of God. To claim otherwise, is to make identical our eternity
with God’s eternity, thereby undermining the traditional Scholastic argument, which Stein holds, that there is no real relation
between the being (and, therefore, (a)temporality) of God and the being of human persons. Second, I will argue that Stein
excludes the category of potentiality from her discussion of death as a relation between the fullness or actuality of being
and nothingness. In fact, death is more a relation between possibility/potentiality and nothingness than a relation between
actual fullness and nothingness. What Stein describes as fullness ought to be read as potential.
相似文献
Antonio CalcagnoEmail: |
10.
Nancy Kendrick 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,69(2):73-89
This paper considers Anselm’s Proslogion argument against a background of historical events that include philosophical disputes between Christian and Jewish polemicists.
I argue that the Proslogion argument was addressed, in part, to non-Christian theists and that it offered a response to Jewish polemicists who had argued
that the Christian conception of God as an instantiated unity was irrational. Anselm is not trying to convince atheists that
there really is a God. He is arguing that the Christian conception of God is logically coherent. 相似文献
11.
Mitchell O. Stokes 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):439-453
In this paper I do two things: (1) I support the claim that there is still some confusion about just what the Quine-Putnam
indispensability argument is and the way it employs Quinean meta-ontology and (2) I try to dispel some of this confusion by presenting the argument in
a way which reveals its important meta-ontological features, and include these features explicitly as premises. As a means
to these ends, I compare Peter van Inwagen’s argument for the existence of properties with Putnam’s presentation of the indispensability
argument. Van Inwagen’s argument is a classic exercise in Quinean meta-ontology and yet he claims – despite his argument’s
conspicuous similarities to the Quine-Putnam argument – that his own has a substantially different form. I argue, however,
that there is no such difference between these two arguments even at a very high level of specificity; I show that there is
a detailed generic indispensability argument that captures the single form of both. The arguments are identical in every way
except for the kind of objects they argue for – an irrelevant difference for my purposes. Furthermore, Putnam’s and van Inwagen’s
presentations make an assumption that is often mistakenly taken to be an important feature of the Quine-Putnam argument. Yet
this assumption is only the implicit backdrop against which the argument is typically presented. This last point is brought
into sharper relief by the fact that van Inwagen’s list of the four nominalistic responses to his argument is too short. His
list is missing an important – and historically popular – fifth option.
相似文献
Mitchell O. StokesEmail: |
12.
Graham Oppy 《Sophia》2010,49(4):591-601
Bruce Langtry's ‘God, the Best and Evil’ is a fine contribution to the literature. Here, I review the contents of the book,
and then provide some critical remarks that, as fas as I know, have not been made elsewhere. In particular, I argue that his
criticism of my formulations of logical arguments from evil (in my Arguing about Gods) is unsuccessful. 相似文献
13.
T. J. Mawson 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2010,67(3):173-186
In this paper, I argue that atheists who think that the issue of God’s existence or non-existence is an important one; assign
a greater than negligible probability to God’s existence; and are not in possession of a plausible argument for scepticism
about the truth-directedness of uttering such prayers in their own cases, are under a prima facie epistemic obligation to pray to God that He stop them being atheists. 相似文献
14.
Aaron Rizzieri 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,70(3):217-229
It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument
against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of
epistemic support that is required for knowledge. Finally, I generalize my results to include other religiously significant
propositions such as “God exists” and “God does not exist.” 相似文献
15.
Andrew Pessin 《Philosophia》2010,38(1):69-105
Descartes famously endorsed the view that (CD) God freely created the eternal truths, such that He could have done otherwise
than He did. This controversial doctrine is much discussed in recent secondary literature, yet Descartes’s actual arguments for CD have received very little attention. In this paper I focus on what many take to be a key Cartesian argument for CD:
that divine simplicity entails the dependence of the eternal truths on the divine will. What makes this argument both important
and interesting is that Descartes’s scholastic predecessors share the premise of divine simplicity but reject the CD conclusion.
To properly understand Descartes, then, we must determine precisely where he diverges from his predecessors on the path from
simplicity to CD. And when we do so we obtain a very surprising result: that despite many dramatic prima facie differences, there is no substantive difference between the relevant doctrines of Descartes and the scholastics. Or so I argue. 相似文献
16.
K. H. A. Esmail 《Sophia》2002,41(2):19-29
Alvin Plantinga, in the ninth chapter ofThe Nature of Necessity, sets out a defence of the Free Will Defence (FWD)2. In what follows, I shall set out, to begin with, a statement of the main line of his argument3. I shall, then, set out a number of minor criticisms of the ninth chapter. Finally, I shall set out a criticism of Plantinga’s
argument.
I have benefited from the written comments of Professor R. G. Swinburne, Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. 相似文献
17.
Sandra Lapointe 《Synthese》2010,174(2):263-281
This paper is aimed at understanding one central aspect of Bolzano’s views on deductive knowledge: what it means for a proposition
and for a term to be known a priori. I argue that, for Bolzano, a priori knowledge is knowledge by virtue of meaning and that Bolzano has substantial views about meaning and what it is to know the
latter. In particular, Bolzano believes that meaning is determined by implicit definition, i.e. the fundamental propositions
in a deductive system. I go into some detail in presenting and discussing Bolzano’s views on grounding, a priori knowledge and implicit definition. I explain why other aspects of Bolzano’s theory and, in particular, his peculiar understanding
of analyticity and the related notion of Ableitbarkeit might, as it has invariably in the past, mislead one to believe that Bolzano lacks a significant account of a priori knowledge. Throughout the paper, I point out to the ways in which, in this respect, Bolzano’s antagonistic relationship to
Kant directly shaped his own views. 相似文献
18.
Nick Trakakis 《Sophia》2006,45(1):57-77
This paper examines an evidential argument from evil recently defended by William Rowe, one that differs significantly from
the kind of evidential argument Rowe has become renowned for defending. After providing a brief outline of Rowe’s new argument,
I contest its seemingly uncontestable premise that our world is not the best world God could have created. I then engage in
a lengthier discussion of the other key premise in Rowe’s argument, viz., the Leibnizian premise that any world created by
God must be the best world God can create. In particular, I discuss the criticisms raised against this premise by William
Wainwright as well as Rowe’s attempt to meet these criticisms. The Wainwright-Rowe exchange, I argue, highlights some insuperable
difficulties in Rowe’s challenge to theism. 相似文献
19.
Steven Gross 《Synthese》2007,156(1):97-117
Michael Tye responds to the problem of higher-order vagueness for his trivalent semantics by maintaining that truth-value
predicates are “vaguely vague”: it’s indeterminate, on his view, whether they have borderline cases and therefore indeterminate
whether every sentence is true, false, or indefinite. Rosanna Keefe objects (1) that Tye’s argument for this claim tacitly
assumes that every sentence is true, false, or indefinite, and (2) that the conclusion is any case not viable. I argue – contra (1) – that Tye’s argument needn’t make that assumption. A version of her objection is in fact better directed against other arguments Tye advances, though Tye can absorb this criticism without abandoning his position’s core. On the other hand, Keefe’s
second objection does hit the mark: embracing ‘vaguely vague’ truth-value predicates undermines Tye’s ability to support validity
claims needed to defend his position. To see this, however, we must develop Keefe’s remarks further than she does. 相似文献
20.
Scott Sehon 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2010,67(2):67-80
Natural disasters would seem to constitute evidence against the existence of God, for, on the face of things, it is mysterious
why a completely good and all-powerful God would allow the sort of suffering we see from earthquakes, diseases, and the like.
The skeptical theist replies that we should not expect to be able to understand God’s ways, and thus we should not regard it as surprising or
mysterious that God would allow natural evil. I argue that skeptical theism leads to moral paralysis: accepting skeptical theism would undermine our ability to make any moral judgments whatsoever. Second, and more briefly,
I argue that skeptical theism would undercut our ability to accept any form of the argument from design, including recent
approaches based on fine-tuning. 相似文献