More and more and more about more

Three experiments explored the development of three linguistic aspects of more in children's speech. Subjects were 56 children between the ages of 2;6 and 6;0. Experiment 1 addressed the nature of the early semantic content of more. Experiment 2 examined the child's differentiation of mass more from count more. Experiment 3 explored the child's use of more as a comparative marker on adjectives. The results suggest, first, that the child initially stores the meaning of more with a prototype, rather than with some more systematic, featural representation. In addition, children's linguistic understanding of the dual use of more as a quantifier of mass amounts and count amounts does not appear to develop until long after they have been using more appropriately in unambiguous contexts. Finally, children learn to use more as a marker on comparatives only after they have acquired -er as a comparative marker, and some time after they have been using more successfully in nonadjectival constructions.     

Once more the Logos asarkos

Does confession of Christ's pre‐existence involve positing a Logos who ‘before’ Christ's conception was simply ‘not yet’ incarnate? The author confesses inadequacies of his previous attempts on this disputed question, and offers improvements.     

A more democratic and therefore more peaceful world

Democracies, while not more peaceful than other kinds of states in most respects, nevertheless almost never fight each other. The apparent reason is a recognition by the people of such states that other democratically‐governed states share a commitment to individual rights and peaceful conflict resolution within their systems, and the consequent assumption that similar norms can make possible the peaceful settlement of conflicts of interests between such states. Movement toward greater democracy has been occurring in most of the third world and many communist countries; this movement has important implications for the prospect of peace between at least somewhat democratized states, and especially important implications for U.S.‐Soviet relations. Democratization can be assisted by a combination of diplomacy, promotion of international communication, and normative concern for human rights.     

On the development of more and less

More and less were analyzed into two meaning dimensions, “occurrence” (derived from children's early language) and “quantity,” which were hypothesized to be developmentally related to acts of addition and subtraction. Two experiments tested 2- and 3-yr-old's comprehension of these concepts when initially equal or unequal rows were added to, subtracted from or left static. Addition and subtraction had little effect on Ss′ comprehension of either term. Two-year-old Ss understood more when differences in the number of objects in the array were relatively large, suggesting “many” as an intermediate stage of meaning for more. Three-year-olds understood less first as “smaller in amount,” not as more as others have found. Less was acquired later than more, a difference possibly due to its relatively restricted meaning and use or to its converse perceptual and logical relation to more.     

Why some are perceived as more confident and more insecure, more reckless and more cautious, more trusting and more suspicious, than others: Enriched and impoverished options in social judgment

In line with the principle of compatibility, when making social judgments, people tend to focus on personality attributes compatible with the trait under consideration. Better known, orenriched, personages are more likely to present attributes that are compatible with a particular trait than are personages about whom little is known. As a result, enriched personages are more likely to have various, sometimes even conflicting, traits attributed to them. This hypothesis is supported by a number of studies that compare the frequency with which some people are chosen as being better described by opposite trait adjectives than are others. Celebrities more often have both of a pair of opposing adjectives ascribed to them than do less well known figures. Similarly, subjects judge themselves to be better described by either of a pair of opposite adjectives than is a person who is relatively unknown in their lives. The implications for social judgment and for everyday decisions are discussed.     

Once more to dissolve the ravens

W. E. Johnson argued that by taking into account both the epistemic and constitutive conditions for using arguments in inferences one could dissolve the paradoxes of material implication. This essay argues that the same sort of consideration can be used to dissolve the paradox of ravens in confirmation theory. It is argued in particular, and in agreement with certain points raised by the Popperians, that those instances of a generalization which are verifying but apparently not confirming cannot raise the posterior of that generalization.     

Safety is more than the antonym of risk

abstract   Even though much research has been devoted to studies of safety, the concept of safety is in itself under-theorised, especially concerning its relation to epistemic uncertainty. In this paper we propose a conceptual analysis of safety. The paper explores the distinc-tion between absolute and relative safety, as well as that between objective and subjective safety. Four potential dimensions of safety are discussed, viz. harm, probability, epistemic uncertainty, and control. The first three of these are used in the proposed definition of safety, whereas it is argued that control should not be included in a reasonable definition of safety. It is shown that strictly speaking, an objective safety concept is not attainable. Instead, an intersubjective concept is proposed that brings us as close as possible to an objective concept.     

When less is more and when more is more: The mediating roles of capacity and speed in brain-behavior efficiency

An enduring enterprise of experimental psychology has been to account for individual differences in human performance. Recent advances in neuroimaging have permitted testing of hypotheses regarding the neural bases of individual differences but this burgeoning literature has been characterized by inconsistent results. We argue that careful design and analysis of neuroimaging studies is required to separate individual differences in processing capacity from individual differences in processing speed to account for these differences in the literature. We utilized task designs which permitted separation of processing capacity influences on brain-behavior relationships from those related to processing speed. In one set of studies, participants performed verbal delayed-recognition tasks during blocked and event-related fMRI scanning. The results indicated that those participants with greater working memory (WM) capacity showed greater prefrontal cortical activity, strategically capitalized on the additional processing time available in the delay period, and evinced faster WM-retrieval rates than low-capacity participants. In another study, participants performed a digit-symbol substitution task (DSST) designed to minimize WM storage capacity requirements and maximize processing speed requirements during fMRI scanning. In some prefrontal cortical (PFC) brain regions, participants with faster processing speed showed less PFC activity than slower performers while in other PFC and parietal regions they showed greater activity. Regional-causality analysis indicated that PFC exerted more influence over other brain regions for slower than for faster individuals. These results support a model of neural efficiency in which individuals differ in the extent of direct processing links between neural nodes. One benefit of direct processing links may be a surplus of resources that maximize available capacity permitting fast and accurate performance.     

Cheating more when the spoils are split

Four experiments demonstrated that people are more likely to cheat when the benefits of doing so are split with another person, even an anonymous stranger, than when the actor alone captures all of the benefits. In three of the studies, splitting the benefits of over-reporting one’s performance on a task made such over-reporting seem less unethical in the eyes of participants. Mitigated perceptions of the immorality of over-reporting performance mediated the relationship between split spoils and increased over-reporting of performance in Study 3. The studies thus showed that people may be more likely to behave dishonestly for their own benefit if they can point to benefiting others as a mitigating factor for their unethical behavior.     

Titration in the treatment of the more troubled patient.

This article defines and discusses a modification of technique recommended by the authors in the psychoanalytic treatment of more troubled patients--a modification they call titration. Titration is defined as a conscious decision by the analyst to increase or decrease assistance (or gratification) gradually, in order to facilitate the analytic process. The authors emphasize the complexity of decisions in treatment by focusing on the decision-making processes that titration requires. Guidelines and a case vignette are presented. The authors conclude by considering some of the politics involved in the introduction of technique modifications, the salience of the titration concept, and directions for further exploration.     

On the problems of being more or less the same

Sixty children aged 2–3 to 5-2 were given four quantity tasks which tested their understanding of more and same. Two tasks involved addition, two involved judgment of static quantities. One of each type of task required a manipulative response, and one of each required a yes/no judgment. The tasks involved judgments of equality and inequality. Tasks involving a manipulative response were significantly easier than those involving a yes/no judgment, indicating that the nature of the response required of the child is crucial. All other differences were negligible, indicating that the other task variables investigated do not affect the child's ability to respond correctly. The ability to make accurate responses was not strongly associated with counting ability. There was a significant difference in the children's counting responses depending on the method used to elicit it.     

Private-sector care for chronically mentally ill individuals. The more things change, the more they stay the same

Two profit-making industries, nursing homes and board-and-care homes, care for about one million chronic mental patients. This care is primarily custodial and probably not very different from the care patients received in the public sector prior to deinstitutionalization. Moreover, certain characteristics of privately owned facilities encourage poor patient care so as to maximize profit. The problem could be ameliorated if chronic mental patients were strong and informed consumers or if the public sector strongly regulated proprietary care. However, neither of these two conditions now hold. Perhaps the apparent difficulties in significantly improving care for chronically mentally ill individuals despite seemingly major changes in policy reflect a fundamental problem in overall social policy--a reluctance to care for chronically indigent individuals of all kinds.     

Harming is more intentional than helping because it is more probable: the underlying influence of probability on the Knobe effect

Knobe [2003. Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language. Analysis, 63, 190–194] demonstrated that people’s intentionality judgments in side effects depend on the outcome of the side-effect, indicating that people’s judgments of intentionality of action depend on not only the intention of the actor but also on the result of the action. However, on the basis of findings in judgment and decision making, the current study proposes another hypothesis to Knobe’s (2003) results: the participants’ intentionality judgments are related to not only the outcomes themselves but also the probabilities of outcomes predicted from the action. To test this hypothesis, the present study employed an identical experimental procedure to Knobe (2003), except that it required not only intentionality but also probability judgments for outcomes that resulted from the actions of a company president. The results replicated the findings of Knobe (2003) and showed a relationship between probability and intentionality judgment.     

People are more likely to be insincere when they are more likely to accidentally tell the truth

Although people lie often, and mostly for self-serving reasons, they do not lie as much as they could. The “fudge factor” hypothesis suggests that one reason for people not to lie is that they do not wish to self-identify as liars. Accordingly, self-serving lies should be more likely when they are less obvious to the liars themselves. Here we show that the likelihood of self-serving lies increases with the probability of accidentally telling the truth. Players in our game could transmit sincere or insincere recommendations to their competitors. In line with the fudge factor hypothesis, players lied when their beliefs were based on flimsy evidence and did not lie when their beliefs were based on solid evidence. This is the first demonstration of a new moral hypocrisy paradox: People are more likely to be insincere when they are more likely to accidentally tell the truth.     

Something more than the 'Something more than interpretation' is needed: A comment on the paper by the Process of Change Study Group

A critique is offered of the paper on non-interpretive mechanisms in psychoanalytic therapy by the Process of Change Study Group (Stern et al., 1998a). The attention paid to procedural learning and to the need to attend to implicit relational knowledge is welcomed but a number of the group's assumptions are questioned. In particular, it is argued that the differences between mother-infant and therapist-patient relationships are inadequately considered, that the polarisation of non-symbolic and verbal memory is unhelpful and that the separation of the therapy relationship into three strands is problematic. The assumption that pursuing the goal of intersubjective understanding is in itself therapeutic is questioned. It is suggested that the recognition of the importance of implicit relational knowledge calls for a wider reappraisal of important aspects of theory and practice and that direct means of making such knowledge explicit should be considered.