Neural correlates of adaptive decision making for risky gains and losses

Do decisions about potential gains and potential losses require different neural structures for advantageous choices? In a lesion study, we used a new measure of adaptive decision making under risk to examine whether damage to neural structures subserving emotion affects an individual's ability to make adaptive decisions differentially for gains and losses. We found that individuals with lesions to the amygdala, an area responsible for processing emotional responses, displayed impaired decision making when considering potential gains, but not when considering potential losses. In contrast, patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area responsible for integrating cognitive and emotional information, showed deficits in both domains. We argue that this dissociation provides evidence that adaptive decision making for risks involving potential losses may be more difficult to disrupt than adaptive decision making for risks involving potential gains. This research further demonstrates the role of emotion in decision competence.     

Missed losses loom larger than missed gains: Electrodermal reactivity to decision choices and outcomes in a gambling task

Loss aversion is a defining characteristic of prospect theory, whereby responses are stronger to losses than to equivalently sized gains (Kahneman & Tversky Econometrica, 47, 263–291, 1979). By monitoring electrodermal activity (EDA) during a gambling task, in this study we examined physiological activity during risky decisions, as well as to both obtained (e.g., gains and losses) and counterfactual (e.g., narrowly missed gains and losses) outcomes. During the bet selection phase, EDA increased linearly with bet size, highlighting the role of somatic signals in decision-making under uncertainty in a task without any learning requirement. Outcome-related EDA scaled with the magnitudes of monetary wins and losses, and losses had a stronger impact on EDA than did equivalently sized wins. Narrowly missed wins (i.e., near-wins) and narrowly missed losses (i.e., near-losses) also evoked EDA responses, and the change of EDA as a function of the size of the missed outcome was modestly greater for near-losses than for near-wins, suggesting that near-losses have more impact on subjective value than do near-wins. Across individuals, the slope for choice-related EDA (as a function of bet size) correlated with the slope for outcome-related EDA as a function of both the obtained and counterfactual outcome magnitudes, and these correlations were stronger for loss and near-loss conditions than for win and near-win conditions. Taken together, these asymmetrical EDA patterns to objective wins and losses, as well as to near-wins and near-losses, provide a psychophysiological instantiation of the value function curve in prospect theory, which is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain.     

Linguistic–Numeric Presentation Mode Effects on Risky Option Preferences

In this study, we examine preferences between lotteries with chances presented either numerically or linguistically. Presentation mode is predicted to affect preferences due to the perception of linguistic chance as skewed distributions of risk. Based upon weighting functions incorporating risk/uncertainty aversion from ambiguity theory and cumulative prospect theory, we predict that presentation mode effects on risky choices will be detectable in very small risks and in large risks. In two experiments, subjects chose between both gain and loss lotteries with constant payoffs and equivalent numeric and linguistic chances. Presentation mode affected choices when chances were above 50%, where lotteries with numeric chances were more frequently preferred in gains while lotteries with linguistic chances were more often preferred in losses. The effect of presentation mode for low-chance lotteries (5% and less) also affected choices such that numeric choices were generally preferred more frequently in losses and linguistically expressed choices were generally preferred more often in gains. Overall, these results suggest that theories of the effects of second order uncertainty on risky choice may be used to model decisions involving linguistic risk. They also suggest that the study of the perception of linguistic risk assessments can provide insight into the cognitive processing behind the weighting functions proposed to depict decision under risk and uncertainty. Finally, the results have practical implications since information providers can affect decision makers’ choices by controlling presentation mode in such a way as to alter the relative attractiveness of uncertain events.     

Embracing Chance Tactically: A Different Perspective on Risk Taking

Although they value certainty, people are willing to take risks to avoid losses. Consequently, they are risk‐seeking in the domain of losses but risk‐avoidant in the domain of gains. This behavior, frequently demonstrated in framing experiments, is traditionally explained in terms of prospect theory. We suggest a different account whereby involving chance in one's decisions may serve a strategic impression‐formation function. In the domain of losses actors may embrace chance to distance themselves from the outcomes and deflect possible blame. Given potential gains, however, actors may avoid uncertainty to enhance their association with valued outcomes. We test this idea by manipulating the level of actors' personal responsibility for the decision outcomes. The results of four studies consistently showed that when personal responsibility is high, the original framing effect is replicated (i.e., greater risk‐taking when choices are framed in terms of losses rather than gains). However, when because of assigned role or decision circumstances, actors experience low personal responsibility for the outcomes, and the classic framing effect is eliminated. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

社会价值取向对自我-他人风险决策的影响及其机制

以往关于为自己和代他人决策的冒险行为研究结果不一致, 这可能是因为以往的研究没有考虑决策情境和决策者人际特质等因素对于决策行为的影响。社会价值取向(social value orientation, SVO)是一种典型的人际特质, 是个体在对自我和他人资源分配时所表现出的社会偏好, 通常分为亲社会者和亲自我者。为探究SVO对自我-他人风险决策的影响及其机制, 采用为自己和陌生人分别完成多轮混合赌博游戏的任务。结果发现亲自我比亲社会者代他人决策更冒险。用模型量化的损失厌恶和对潜在损失的敏感度部分中介了自我-他人风险决策差异, 但只有对他人潜在损失的敏感度部分中介自我-他人决策的SVO效应。说明SVO会影响自我-他人风险决策, 且该效应可以通过对他人利益的关心程度起作用, 所以在自我-他人风险决策的研究中应将SVO这一决策者的人际特质因素考虑在内。     

Autonomic functioning in reactive versus proactive aggression: The influential role of inconsistent parenting

Research has consistently supported autonomic nervous system (ANS) functioning as a predictor of aggressive behavior in youth. Several studies have further examined how the functioning of the sympathetic (SNS) and parasympathetic (PNS) branches of the ANS interact with environmental factors to predict behavioral outcomes. One factor that has yet to be studied in this context however, is parenting practices. Given that many interventions for externalizing behavior target parenting practices, such as increasing consistent discipline, it may be particularly important to assess whether parenting practices interact with SNS and PNS functioning in the child to influence risk for aggressive behavior. Therefore, the current study addressed this question by examining inconsistent discipline as a moderator of the relationship between baseline SNS versus PNS activity and reactive versus proactive aggression. Data were collected from a sample of fourth graders identified as at‐risk for aggression (N = 188). Results indicated that baseline SNS activity was positively related to proactive aggression under high levels of inconsistent discipline, but negatively related to proactive aggression under very low levels of inconsistent discipline. Baseline PNS activity was negatively associated with reactive aggression under low levels of inconsistent discipline. No main effects were found for SNS or PNS functioning and either form of aggression, emphasizing the importance of taking a biosocial approach to examining the predictors of aggressive behavior in at‐risk youth. Results from this study help to better understand the circumstances under which children are most likely to exhibit reactive versus proactive aggression, better informing targeted prevention and treatment.

     

A Range-Frequency Explanation of Shifting Reference Points in Risky Decision Making

An integration of range-frequency theory, a theory of psychophysical judgment, and prospect theory, a theory of choice behavior under risk, is proposed. A critical assumption of prospect theory is that the reference point, which helps govern the riskiness of choice behavior, is modeled after Helson′s (1964) adaptation level notion. It is proposed that range-frequency theory provides a better representation of the reference point and, thus, can be used to understand with greater precision the judgment of outcomes as gains or losses and the perceived riskiness of subsequent decisions. A computer-based decision task was performed using 199 graduate and undergraduate students. Hypotheses concerning range and frequency effects on the reference point were fully supported. The judgment hypotheses were generally supported under gains, but received inconsistent support under losses. Range and frequency effects on choice were consistent with predictions under both gains and losses with one exception. Implications of this work for previous and future research involving prospect theory are discussed.     

Central and autonomic nervous system integration in emotion

Emotions involve physiological responses that are regulated by the brain. The present paper reviews the empirical literature on central nervous system (CNS) and autonomic nervous system (ANS) concomitants of emotional states, with a focus on studies that simultaneously assessed CNS and ANS activity. The reviewed data support two primary conclusions: (1) numerous cortical and subcortical regions show co-occurring activity with ANS responses in emotion, and (2) there may be reversed asymmetries on cortical and subcortical levels with respect to CNS/ANS interrelations. These observations are interpreted in terms of a model of neurovisceral integration in emotion, and directions for future research are presented.     

Trajectory of risky decision making for potential gains and losses from ages 5 to 85

The ability to make advantageous decisions in the face of uncertainty is an essential human skill, yet the development of such abilities over the lifespan is still not well understood. In the current study, from childhood through older adulthood, we tracked the developmental trajectory of risk taking for gains and losses, and expected value (EV) sensitivity in risky choices. In the gain domain, risk‐taking decreased consistently across the lifespan. In the loss domain, risk‐taking was relatively constant across ages, a result we attribute to the pervasiveness of loss aversion. EV sensitivity showed an inverted‐U‐shaped function, increasing from childhood to adulthood but then decreasing for the elderly, which occurred for both risky gains and risky losses. This finding is consistent with neuropsychological and neuroanatomical evidence concerning the role of the frontal lobe in decision making, which is relatively late to develop during childhood but may degrade earlier in the later years. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Observation of action and autonomic nervous system responses

Observing somebody performing an action has been shown to elicit neuronal activity in the premotor cortex. This paper investigated physiological effect of observing an effortful action at the peripheral level. As Autonomic Nervous System responses reflect central nervous system processes such as movement planning and programming, it was expected that observing an action would elicit a pattern of ANS responses matching those recorded during actual movement. 12 male subjects, ages 23 to 28 years (M = 25.5, SD = 1.9), were selected as they were experienced in weight lifting. They were asked to observe a squat movement followed by returning to the upright position under 3 different conditions: (i) observation of actual movement performed by somebody else, (ii) observation of a video of the subject himself (first-person video), and (iii) observation of a video of somebody else performing the same movement (third-person video). Moreover, each movement was observed when performed at 50% and 90% of each participant's personal best mark (% of the highest weight which could be lifted). Three ANS parameters were continuously recorded: skin resistance, temperature and heart rate. ANS responses varied as a function of movement intensity: autonomic responses recorded during movement observation at 90% were significantly higher and longer than those recorded during movement observation at 50%. Thus, autonomic responses were linked to the amount of observed effort. Conversely, no difference was found among the three conditions of observation. ANS responses from observation of actual movement were shown to resemble those recorded under the two conditions of video observation.     

Riskier for me or for others? The role of domain and probability in self-other differences,in risky decision-making

Abstract

In social and economic interactions, people often decide differently for others, as against for themselves, under situations involving risks. This sometimes leads to conflicts or contradictions. Although previous studies have explored such contradictions, the findings have been inconsistent. To reconcile these inconsistencies, this paper investigates the role played by the different domains and probabilities in the self-other differences under risk. Two groups of participants completed a gambling task combining different domains (gain vs. loss) and probabilities (small vs. large). One group made decisions for others and the other group made decisions for themselves. The results revealed a four pattern of discrepancy: the ones who made decisions for others were less risk-seeking than those who made decisions for themselves over the small probability gains. This was reversed over the large probability gains. Conversely, the participants who made decisions for others were more risk-seeking than those who made decisions for themselves over the small probability losses. The results were reversed over the large probability losses. These results reconcile the contradictory findings of the previous studies and suggest the significant role played by contextual factors in such discrepancies.     

Autonomic arousal and relational aggression in heterosexual dating couples

This study investigated the association between romantic relational aggression and autonomic nervous system (ANS) arousal in the context of heterosexual dating couples (N = 115 couples). Results indicated that romantic relational aggression was associated with low resting sympathetic arousal, high resting parasympathetic arousal, and exaggerated fight or flight responses to a conflict discussion (sympathetic activation and parasympathetic withdrawal). However, ANS activity was more strongly associated with romantic relational aggression in the context of low‐quality romantic relationships, and sympathetic activity was more strongly associated with aggression among females, whereas parasympathetic activity was more strongly associated with aggression among males. Results indicate that psychophysiological functioning may serve as a risk factor for the perpetration of relational aggression against romantic partners.     

Uncertainty-dependent activity within the ventral striatum predicts task-related changes in response strategy

Recent neuroimaging work has demonstrated that the ventral striatum (VS) encodes confidence in perceptual decisions. However, it remains unclear whether perceptual uncertainty can signal the need to adapt behavior (such as by responding more cautiously) and whether such behavioral changes are related to uncertainty-dependent activity within the VS. Changes in response strategy have previously been observed following errors and are associated with both medial frontal cortex (MFC) and VS, two components of the performance-monitoring network. If uncertainty can elicit changes in response strategy (slowing), then one might hypothesize that these changes rely on the performance-monitoring network. In the present study, we investigated the link between perceptual uncertainty and task-related behavioral adaptations (response slowing and accuracy increases), as well as how such behavioral changes relate to uncertainty-dependent activity within MFC and VS. Our participants performed a two-choice perceptual decision-making task in which perceptual uncertainty was reported on each trial while behavioral and event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging data were collected. Analysis of the behavioral data revealed that uncertain (but correct) responses led to slowing on subsequent trials, a phenomenon that was positively correlated with increased accuracy. Critically, post-uncertainty slowing was negatively correlated with the VS activity elicited by uncertain responses. In agreement with previous reports, increases in MFC activation were observed for uncertain responses, although MFC activity was not correlated with post-uncertainty slowing. These results suggest that perceptual uncertainty can serve as a signal to adapt one’s response strategy and that such behavioral changes are closely tied to the VS, a key node in the performance-monitoring network.     

Common and distinct factors in decision making under ambiguity and risk: A psychometric study of individual differences

The relation between decision making under ambiguity and risky decision making was examined. In Studies 1 and 2, choices under ambiguity were measured for a large sample receiving an Ellsberg-type Ambiguity-Probability Tradeoff Task. Participants with extreme scores were recruited for Part 2 of each study which consisted of a risky decision making task (Study 1) or a series of decisions under ambiguity in “real life” scenarios (Study 2). Despite a time gap of up to 2 months, individual differences in scores on Part 1 predicted scores on Part 2. In Study 3 participants received in a single session several risky decision making tasks, several measures of decision making under ambiguity, and several personality scales related to uncertainty and decision making style. Taken together, the findings support the existence of a stable dispositional trait to reduce uncertainty in decision making but also task-specific differences related to gains and losses.     

Extreme Outcomes Sway Risky Decisions from Experience

Whether buying stocks or playing the slots, people making real‐world risky decisions often rely on their experiences with the risks and rewards. These decisions, however, do not occur in isolation but are embedded in a rich context of other decisions, outcomes, and experiences. In this paper, we systematically evaluate how the local context of other rewarding outcomes alters risk preferences. Through a series of four experiments on decisions from experience, we provide evidence for an extreme‐outcome rule, whereby people overweight the most extreme outcomes (highest and lowest) in a given context. As a result, people should be more risk seeking for gains than losses, even with equally likely outcomes. Across the experiments, the decision context was varied so that the same outcomes served as the high extreme, low extreme, or neither. As predicted, people were more risk seeking for relative gains, but only when the risky option potentially led to the high‐extreme outcome. Similarly, people were more risk averse for relative losses, but only when the risky option potentially led to the low‐extreme outcome. We conclude that in risky decisions from experience, the biggest wins and the biggest losses seem to matter more than they should. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Good or Bad,We Want it Now: Fixed‐cost Present Bias for Gains and Losses Explains Magnitude Asymmetries in Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal tradeoffs are ubiquitous in decision making, yet preferences for current versus future losses are rarely explored in empirical research. Whereas rational‐economic theory posits that neither outcome sign (gains vs. losses) nor outcome magnitude (small vs. large) should affect delay discount rates, both do, and moreover, they interact: in three studies, we show that whereas large gains are discounted less than small gains, large losses are discounted more than small losses. This interaction can be understood through a reconceptualization of fixed‐cost present bias, which has traditionally described a psychological preference for immediate rewards. First, our results establish present bias for losses—a psychological preference to have losses over with now. Present bias thus predicts increased discounting of future gains but decreased (or even negative) discounting of future losses. Second, because present bias preferences do not scale with the magnitude of possible gains or losses, they play a larger role, relative to other motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for large magnitude intertemporal decisions. Present bias thus predicts less discounting of large gains than small gains but more discounting of large losses than small losses. The present research is the first to demonstrate that the effect of outcome magnitude on discount rates may be opposite for gains and losses and also the first to offer a theory (an extension of present bias) and process data to explain this interaction. The results suggest that policy efforts to encourage future‐oriented choices should frame outcomes as large gains or small losses. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individual differences in need for cognition and decision making in the Iowa Gambling Task

Differences in decision making between individuals differing in Need for Cognition (NFC) are examined using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Previous work using normative one time decisions suggests that individual low in NFC process gains and losses differently than those high in NFC and are more susceptible to decision biases. The IGT is a popular laboratory task that involves making risky decisions from experience involving both gains and losses. In the first experiment, low NFC participants performed significantly worse than the high NFC participants. A second experiment designed to examine the nature of these differences provides evidence that low NFC participants place more importance on gains as opposed to losses when performing the IGT. Results are discussed in light of previous work suggesting that low NFC participants place more importance on losses in mixed outcome decisions.     

Uncertainty Avoidance Influences Choices for Potential Gains but not Losses

Uncertainty of outcomes is a primary dimension underlying human judgment and decision making, and is a defining feature of risk. Even though uncertainty almost always exists in decision making contexts, individuals and cultures vary in their preference for avoiding uncertainty. This study examines how uncertainty avoidance influences judgments involving uncertain and risky alternatives. Participants were presented with problems that involve potential gains or losses and contain options reflecting uncertain or certain outcomes. Greater uncertainty avoidance predicted choices for uncertain outcomes that involved gains, which tend to promote risk aversion, but not for uncertain outcomes that led to losses, which tend to promote risk seeking. These results demonstrate that culturally-relevant dispositions such as uncertain avoidance can have complex effects on judgment.