The role of logical and nonlogical factors in making inferences about category membership

Three postulates are proposed concerning the manner in which persons infer the validity of propositions that do not necessarily follow logically from the information available. These postulates assume that subjects first attempt to identify the propositions that are most and least likely to follow from the information given. They then use their beliefs in these propositions as anchors, relative to which the validity of other propositions is evaluated on the basis of both logical and nonlogical criteria. Two experiments are reported in which these postulates are used successfully to diagnose the logical and nonlogical factors that underlie inferences based upon both single statements and sets of syllogistically related propositions. The implications of the proposed postulates for existing formulations of social inference and cognitive organization are discussed.     

An informational analysis of actors' and observers' belief attributions in a role-playing situation

An actor's belief in a proposition was inferred by both the actor himself and an observer on the basis of information concerning (a) the actor's preparation and delivery of a speech on the proposition to an unseen audience, and (b) the audience's belief in the proposition. The availability of this information to judges was systematically varied. The position advocated by the actor in his speech and the audience's opinion affected both the actor's belief in the test proposition and the belief attributed to the actor by a disinterested observer. However, neither effect depended upon whether or not other belief-relevant information was also available. These results were interpreted as more consistent with a summative model of information integration than with an averaging model. Actors' behavior had similar effects upon both actors' estimates of how the audience would judge their beliefs and observers' actual estimates of these beliefs. However, these effects were both greater than the effect of their behavior on their own estimates of their beliefs. The apparent strength of the audience's belief in the target proposition had a positive influence upon both actors' beliefs in the proposition and observers' estimates of actors' beliefs, but had a negative, or contrast effect upon actors' expectancies for how the audience would judge their beliefs. Results were more consistent with the differential perspective hypothesis of actor-observer differences proposed by Jones and Nisbett than with the hypothesis that actors and observers differentially weight the implications of their past experience in formulating their judgments. Results had additional implications for the assumptions that persons make when using their behaviors as indications of their beliefs.     

Forgetting of conditioned fear inhibition

Three experiments assessed retention of conditioned fear and of fear inhibition over long-term retention intervals (35 days in two experiments, 25 days in the third). Although excitatory conditioning was retained well, conditioned inhibition was not. This effect occurred when inhibition was assessed by compounding stimuli on an appetitive baseline and when it was assessed by testing cues on a baseline of unsignalled avoidance responding. Inhibition was also forgotten when the initial conditioning treatment was designed to reduce the role of possible proactive interference processes.     

The recall and use of belief statements as bases for judgments: Some determinants and implications

When people are asked to report their beliefs in a (target) statement, they may search memory for other, “informational” propositions that bear on its validity, and may use their beliefs in these propositions as bases for their judgments. Several factors were hypothesized to affect the particular propositions that subjects are likely to recall under such conditions. Subjects first familiarized themselves with a list of informational and target propositions. Then, they reported either their beliefs in these propositions or their attitudes toward them. In a second session 1 week later, they recalled as many of the propositions as they could. Both informational and target statements were better recalled when the informational propositions were unlikely to be true. In addition, the target statements were better recalled when the informational propositions associated with them had unclear implications for their validity. Recall of one proposition was more likely to cue the recall of the other when subjects had previously reported belief in the target proposition (rather than attitudes toward it). However, it was more likely to occur when subjects had reported attitudes toward the informational proposition (rather than beliefs in it). The effects of these variables were interpreted in terms of their mediating influence on the strength of association between the informational proposition and both (a) the target proposition and (b) contextual and environmental cues in the situation where target beliefs are reported.     

The cognitive representation of persons and groups and its effect on recall and recognition memory

A conceptualization of the manner in which trait and behavioral information is organized in memory is proposed and applied in predicting both the recall and recognition of information about persons and groups. Three information presentation conditions were considered: (1) Subjects are told to form an impression of a target (person or group) on the basis of the target's behaviors, and are given a trait-based concept of what the target is like before learning about these behaviors. (2) Subjects are told to form an impression of the target, but a general traitbased concept of the target is not induced until after they learn about the target's behaviors. (3) Subjects receive information about the target's behaviors with instructions to remember the information, and only subsequently are told to form an impression and are given more general information about the target's traits. The proposed model accounted for between-condition differences in both the recall and recognition of behaviors that were consistent and inconsistent with a general trait-based concept of the target, and for contingencies of these differences on whether the target was a single person or a group.     

The effects of feedback about self and others on the recall and judgments of feedback-relevant information

After people have received feedback about the outcome of their behavior, their responses to information bearing on the validity of this feedback may be influenced by their desire to maintain a favorable self-image. This experiment investigated the cognitive mediators of these responses. Subjects who received negative feedback about their performance on an intelligence test disparaged intelligence tests in general and judged a report they had read to be unfavorable to intelligence tests. Nevertheless, they recalled more arguments in the report that were favorable to intelligence tests than did positive feedback recipients. These results contradicted the hypothesis that subjects selectively attend to information that helps them to maintain a positive self-concept in light of negative information about themselves. Rather, they may attempt to refute arguments that support the validity of the negative feedback they receive, and this relatively greater processing may facilitate the recall of these arguments later on. In contrast, there was no evidence that subjects try to refute information that calls the validity of positive feedback into question. Results had implications for two additional issues: first, whether the effect of performance feedback depends on whether it is received before or after information bearing on its validity; second, whether feedback has similar effects on recall and judgments by persons to whom it does not directly pertain.     

Acquisition and retention of control of instrumental behavior by a cue-signaling airblast: How specific are conditioned anticipations?

The conditioned state evoked by a CS that had been paired with an aversive airblast was assessed by superimposing the CS on baselines of instrumental responding. The first experiment used a shock avoidance baseline; CS-airblast pairings were administered on the baseline, with the shock avoidance schedule in effect. The CS that signaled airblast came, over trails, to accelerate shock avoidance responding. As further CS-airblast trials were administered, however, the acceleratory effect of the CS decreased, producing an inverted-U-shaped acquisition curve. A second experiment used off-baseline CS-airblast conditioning, and the CS was tested on both shock avoidance and water reinforcement baselines. After 20 CS-airblast pairings the CS accelerated shock avoidance and suppressed water-reinforced responding. After 10o pairings, however, the acceleratory effect on shock avoidance was much attenuated, although the suppressions of the water-reinforced behavior did not differ between 20- and 100-trial groups. Two further experiments examined retention, over a 45-day interval, of the attenuation of the CS's effects on shock avoidance. Over the retention interval, this attenuation disappeared. It was, however, reinstated by giving the animals “reminder” presentations of the airblast. These results are interpreted as representing systematic changes in the specificity of the conditioned state evoked by a Pavlovian CS.     

Misconceptions about the Fishbein model: Reflections on a study by Songer-Nocks

Songer-Nocks has questioned the generality and sufficiency of Fishbein's model of intentions. It is shown that her conclusions reflect a basic misunderstanding of the model and its implications. Several misconceptions are identified and an attempt is made to clarify some of the theoretical and methodological issues involved.     

Predicting social behavior from personality traits

The classic view of traits as dispositions was examined and a number of ambiguities noted. When clarified, implications for predicting social behaviors from personality variables were derived. Two types of behavioral criterion were delineated, and it was argued that personality measures should be systematically related to multiple act criteria, but not necessarily to single act criteria. It was suggested that behaviors could be treated as items on a behavioral measure of personality and that standard scaling criteria be applied in identifying behaviors that should be related to a given trait dimension. In attempting to identify behaviors which are linearly related to a personality trait, the application of Bayes theorem was shown to be of theoretical interest. Two indices, a validity index and a linearity index, were derived from Bayes theorem and it was shown that validity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for linearity.     

Some implications of temporal drift in social parameters

Social and political factors often have an effect on the way we perceive and think about particular events. While it is generally acknowledged that these factors are likely to change over time, the implications of such temporal changes for empirical research are not often considered. In this paper, some of these are illustrated by examining data collected from a sequence of studies conducted over a 3-year period (1973–1976). Subjects viewed the same videotaped mock (rape) trial and, prior to experimental manipulations, gave their own personal verdict. An examination of the proportion of mock jurors preferring guilty in each of the studies revealed a drift of 16% (.53 to .69) from 1973–1976. This trend toward harsher judgments was observed for both sexes, with females uniformly more likely than males to favor conviction. Ancillary evidence suggests that the upward drift reflected changes in the perception of rape during that period. The implications of temporal drift in parameter values for empirical research were illustrated by simulating jury size effects using social decision scheme theory (J. H. Davis, Psychological Review, 1973,80, 97–125). The results indicate that the magnitude of theoretical differences due to jury size must have decreased as the probability of an individual guilty vote increased over time. Thus, failures to replicate findings may not be due entirely to sampling error, methodological imprecision, or the like, but to temporal changes in the social phenomenon under investigation.     

Compounds of conditioned fear stimuli

A differential conditioning procedure was used with rats to establish different levels of suppression to two different stimuli. One stimulus was paired with shock every time it was presented, while the other stimulus cued shock on only 25% of its presentations. When these two component stimuli were subsequently tested as a simultaneous compound, two different types of component-compound relationships were observed. Some subjects showed greater suppression to the compound than they did to either component stimulus, while other subjects showed an intermediate level of suppression to the compound. The difference in type of component-compound relationship appeared to be related to the degree of stability (over trials) of each subject's reaction to the probabilistic (25%) cue.When a similar discrimination was established based on the intensity of the shock, rather than its probability of occurrence, all subjects showed more suppression to the compound than to its individual component stimuli. These results are discussed in terms of their implications for choice of model for characterizing the interaction of conditioned states.     

Analysis of variances and covariances is misleading as a guide to a common factor model

The “factor” analyses published by Schultz, Kaye, and Hoyer (1980) confused component and factor analysis and led in this case as in many others to unwarranted conclusions. They used component analysis to develop factor models that were subjected to restricted (confirmatory) maximum likelihood analysis, but the final models for which good fits with the observed correlations were obtained were not common factor models. They were, however, discussed as such and conclusions drawn accordingly. When their correlation matrices are analyzed by the principal factors method, two factors are sufficient to account for the intercorrelations. These two factors generally support the a priori expectation of a difference between intelligence tasks and spontaneous flexibility tasks. They are also quite similar in younger and older subjects, when similarity is judged in terms of factor pattern. Factor loadings for the younger subjects, however, are much smaller than expectations based on the respective ranges of talent in the two groups of subjects or on past experience with similar tests in undergraduate student populations.     

A model of fixed activation time scheduling

A model for the fixed activation time scheduling of events is presented. Activation time is defined as the time needed for an event to regain dominance in the stream of events measured from the point in time at which it lost dominance. The fixed activation time scheduling rule states that some event must be ongoing at all times, that an ongoing event will continue until interrupted by another event, that every event has a predetermined activation time and that fulfilling the activation time requirement is the necessary and sufficient condition for an event to interrupt an ongoing event. The last condition sets this rule apart from those employed in quequeing theory since it does not allow events to be completed or queues to form. Derivations from the model concerning the dynamic organization of the stream of events, written in terms of the frequency and duration of events and the transitions between pairs of events, are given. Special attention is paid to issues that arise in deciding on the coding of events. It is suggested that the fixed activation time scheduling rule will apply to a wide variety of settings, environmental and behavioral, and this is illustrated by a detailed application of the model to observations on the stream of free behavior.     

The role of control processes and structural constraints in models of memory and social judgment

Six experiments examining a recent model of memory and social judgment are reported. In particular, the theoretical concept of a Work Space is examined in terms of both its structural properties and a variety of control processes that govern its operation. In Experiment 1, subjects were given information about a stimulus person and told that they would later be asked to recall it as well as possible. The length of the actual delay before recall and the length of the anticipated delay were factorially varied. Under short delay conditions, subjects anticipating a short delay recalled more of the information than those anticipating a long delay. The reverse was true under actual long delay conditions. Other results suggest that the anticipated length of the delay has an effect on processes related to both encoding and storage/retrieval. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that, relative to no delay conditions, a long actual delay or a long anticipated delay produces polarization in social judgments. Both of these results are predicted by the model. Experiments 4–6 examine the effect of interpolated cognitive activity on memory and social judgment. As predicted by the model, relatively complicated cognitive activity leads to lower levels of recall and a greater polarization of judgments than less complicated intervening cognitive activity. It is argued that all of these results can be accounted for by the concept of a Work Space as a temporary repository devoted to the current information processing activities of the subject. It is thought that such a concept must be kept theoretically distinct from long-term memory. Implications of the results for models of memory and social judgment are discussed.     

Attribution of responsibility: A theoretical note

Research on factors influencing attribution of responsibility has resulted in inconsistent and inconclusive findings. A theoretical analysis suggests that Heider's levels of causality represent two dimensions underlying attribution of responsibility. It is suggested that conflicting findings result from failures to control at least one of these two dimensions.