On the binary quality of recognition and the inconsequentiality of further knowledge: two critical tests of the recognition heuristic

The recognition heuristic is claimed to be distinguished from notions of availability and fluency through its categorical or “binary” treatment of information and the “inconsequentiality” of further knowledge to inferences based on recognition. Using the city‐size task of Goldstein and Gigerenzer ( 2002 ) we demonstrate that: (1) increasing the validity of other information in the environment decreases the reliance on recognition; (2) cities that are both recognized and have other information known about them (e.g. they have a soccer team) are chosen more often than those which are simply recognized; and (3) there is a negative correlation between the time taken to identify a city and the proportion of times it is selected as the larger of a pair. None of these results is predicted by the process model of the recognition heuristic. The implication of the results for the distinction between the recognition, availability and fluency heuristics is discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

研究人类使用启发式之五原则(英文)

快速节俭启发式框架假定人们使用一套简捷的决策策略——启发式——进行推理、选择、评价及其他决策。这些启发式策略能顺应任务情境结构中的规律, 利用人类的基本认知能力。正基于此, 启发式成就了适应性行为。本文拟对启发式框架进行回顾, 并简要陈述引导研究者研究人类适应性工具箱的五条原则。我们强调, 启发式模型应(ⅰ)精确界定(ⅱ)对照检验(ⅲ)与策略选择理论相符(ⅳ)能评估其对新资料的预测力(ⅴ)能既在实验室又在现实世界中得以检验。     

Training fast and frugal heuristics in military decision making

Fast and frugal heuristics have been used to model decision making in applied domains very effectively, suggesting that they could be used to improve applied decision making. We developed a fast and frugal heuristic for infantry decisions using experts from the British Army. This was able to predict around 80% of their decisions using three cues. Next, we examined the benefits of learning to use the fast and frugal heuristic by training junior officers in the British Army to apply the heuristic and assessing their accuracy and mental workload when making decisions. Their performance was compared to a control condition of junior officers who applied standard military decision methods. Participants using the fast and frugal heuristic made decisions as accurately as participants in the control condition, but with reduced mental demand. This demonstrates that fast and frugal heuristics can be learnt and are as effective as analytic decision methods.     

Classifying simulated air threats with fast and frugal heuristics

In three experiments, subjects learned to classify simulated aircraft using four probabilistic cues then classified test sets designed to contrast predictions of several compensatory and non-compensatory heuristics. Results indicated that a proportion of subjects appeared to use a non-compensatory fast and frugal heuristic but that significant proportions used less frugal compensatory decision rules. The relative proportions of subjects exhibiting responses consistent with the fast and frugal heuristic versus other decision rules was largely unaffected by manipulations of time pressure and perceived cue uncertainty. An extreme time constraint, however, did result in significant differences in the proportions of subjects who preferred non-compensatory to compensatory decision rules. These results suggest that it is possible to model multi-attribute decision tasks like threat assessment with a fast and frugal heuristic although no single heuristic is a general model for the simulated threat assessment task. Copyright © 2006 Crown in the right of Canada. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effort heuristic

The research presented here suggests that effort is used as a heuristic for quality. Participants rating a poem (Experiment 1), a painting (Experiment 2), or a suit of armor (Experiment 3) provided higher ratings of quality, value, and liking for the work the more time and effort they thought it took to produce. Experiment 3 showed that the use of the effort heuristic, as with all heuristics, is moderated by ambiguity: Participants were more influenced by effort when the quality of the object being evaluated was difficult to ascertain. Discussion centers on the implications of the effort heuristic for everyday judgment and decision-making.     

Criterion knowledge: A moderator of using the recognition heuristic?

The recognition heuristic (RH) claims that people base inferences on recognition only. This has been questioned by several studies which found that additional knowledge was influential. However, in some of these studies, participants' additional knowledge might have encompassed criterion knowledge thus rendering any inferential strategy superfluous. The present study was therefore designed to test the effect of criterion knowledge on use or non‐use of the RH. Eighty‐one participants made pair‐wise comparisons with respect to the size of Belgian cities and also provided estimates of the cities' actual size. We found that relative criterion knowledge (i.e., knowledge about the relative position of an object on the criterion dimension) did indeed play some role, but its exclusion left the main critical findings intact, nonetheless. We thus conclude that previous studies conducted in the paradigm of natural recognition should not be generally refuted by the argument of participants possessing criterion knowledge. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

进化认知心理学的模块说

该文介绍了进化认知心理学中的一个主流观点———模块说。模块说认为心理由各相互独立的、解决特定任务的模块组成。进化认知心理学的研究历史悠久,很多著名研究者都对此做出了巨大的贡献。该文结合各种例子,阐述了进化心理学的模块说以及其迅速、高效但并非精确无误等特点,同时也结合例子阐明了社会认知领域的心理模块。     

贝叶斯推理研究综述

Kahneman 和Tversky在70年代初期发现人们在概率推理中并不遵循数学上的贝叶斯定理,常常由于忽略问题中的基础概率而对稀少事件的条件概率作出夸大的反应。此后心理学家采用文本范式和经验范式对此问题进行了大量的研究,并涌现了一些不同的理论观点,主要有启发法策略论(代表性启发法和可得性启发法)、自然抽样空间假说、频率效应论和抽样加工理论。     

快速节俭启发式——相关争议与简短评论

在有限理性和生态理性假设基础上,Gigerenzer教授和在他指导下的“ABC研究组”发现并提出了再认启发式、采纳最佳启发式、优先启发式、道德启发式等一系列“快速节俭启发式”。大量研究表明这些简单决策规则是节省信息的合理而高效的认知策略,但也有一些研究者对它们表示怀疑。在本文中,作者对近期关于快速节俭启发式的一般争议及围绕采纳最佳启发式、优先启发式、道德启发式展开的具体争议进行了回顾与总结,给出了简短的评论。快速节俭启发式是一个富有前景、却又布满荆棘的研究领域。要想实现宏伟的研究目标,ABC研究组尚需做出更多、更大的努力。     

Editorial: The role of reasoning in mathematical thinking

ABSTRACT

Research into mathematics often focuses on basic numerical and spatial intuitions, and one key property of numbers: their magnitude. The fact that mathematics is a system of complex relationships that invokes reasoning usually receives less attention. The purpose of this special issue is to highlight the intricate connections between reasoning and mathematics, and to use insights from the reasoning literature to obtain a more complete understanding of the processes that underlie mathematical cognition. The topics that are discussed range from the basic heuristics and biases to the various ways in which complex, effortful reasoning contributes to mathematical cognition, while also considering the role of individual differences in mathematics performance. These investigations are not only important at a theoretical level, but they also have broad and important practical implications, including the possibility to improve classroom practices and educational outcomes, to facilitate people's decision-making, as well as the clear and accessible communication of numerical information.     

快速节俭启发式--基于有限理性和生态理性的简单决策规则

本文阐述了德国“马克斯．普朗克人类发展研究所”以Gerd Gigerenzer教授为代表的“适应行为与认知中心”简称“ABC研究中心(组)”关于判断、推理和决策制定简单启发式研究的理论背景、研究思路和技术路线,着重介绍了该研究中心在有限理性和生态理性假设基础上提出的一系列极富创意的快速节俭启发式规则,并对围绕这些简单决策规则开展的研究活动作了简要介绍。     

The cognitive reflection test revisited: exploring the ways individuals solve the test

Individuals’ propensity not to override the first answer that comes to mind is thought to be a crucial cause behind many failures in reasoning. In the present study, we aimed to explore the strategies used and the abilities employed when individuals solve the cognitive reflection test (CRT), the most widely used measure of this tendency. Alongside individual differences measures, protocol analysis was employed to unfold the steps of the reasoning process in solving the CRT. This exploration revealed that there are several ways people solve or fail the test. Importantly, 77% of the cases in which reasoners gave the correct final answer in our protocol analysis, they started their response with the correct answer or with a line of thought which led to the correct answer. We also found that 39% of the incorrect responders reflected on their first response. The findings indicate that the suppression of the first answer may not be the only crucial feature of reflectivity in the CRT and that the lack of relevant knowledge is a prominent cause of the reasoning errors. Additionally, we confirmed that the CRT is a multi-faceted construct: both numeracy and reflectivity account for performance. The results can help to better apprehend the “whys and whens” of the decision errors in heuristics and biases tasks and to further refine existing explanatory models.     

Coherence shifts in probabilistic inference tasks

The fast‐and‐frugal heuristics approach to probabilistic inference assumes that individuals often employ simple heuristics to integrate cue information that commonly function in a non‐reciprocal fashion. Specifically, the subjective validity of a certain cue remains stable during the application of a heuristic and is not changed by the presence or absence of another cue. The parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) model, in contrast, predicts that information is processed in a reciprocal fashion. Specifically, it assumes that subjective cue validities interactively affect each other and are modified to coherently support the favored choice. Corresponding to the model's simulation, we predicted the direction and the size of such coherence shifts. Cue validities were measured before, after (Experiment 1), and during judgment (Experiments 2 and 3). Coherence shifts were found in environments involving real‐world cue knowledge (weather forecasts) and in a domain for which the application of fast‐and‐frugal heuristics has been demonstrated (city‐size tasks). The results indicate that subjective cue validities are not fixed parameters, but that they are interactively changed to form coherent representations of the task. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preadolescent Decision‐Making Competence Predicts Interpersonal Strengths and Difficulties: A 2‐Year Prospective Study

Recent research has demonstrated that decision‐making competence (DMC), a latent construct reflecting individual differences in rational thought, is predictive of real‐world decision outcomes at various stages of life. This construct has been shown to be associated with concurrent and retrospective accounts of health‐risking behavior, but its predictive validity has yet to be demonstrated. In the present study, we examine this issue using a 2‐year prospective, multiple‐informant design. Specifically, we tested the degree to which preadolescent DMC (PA‐DMC) obtained at ages 10–11 years (Time 1; N = 101) predicted both self‐reports and caregiver reports of emotional, behavioral, and peer‐related difficulties obtained 2 years later (Time 2; N = 76). Holding variables such as numeracy and inhibitory control constant, lower Time 1 PA‐DMC scores predicted greater reported Time 2 psychosocial difficulties (i.e. peer, conduct, emotional, and hyperactivity/inattention problems). Additionally, higher PA‐DMC scores were associated with greater self‐reported prosocial behaviors at Time 2. These results highlight the utility of testing individual differences in rational responding. We discuss the potential for improving children's decision‐making processes. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

贝叶斯推理中的“自击中率参照抑制”

本文旨在研究贝叶斯推理中基础比率、击中率起作用的机制。通过设置肝炎情境、中彩情境的贝叶斯推理问题,同时操作基础比率和击中率的水平,考察449名大学生被试的概率估计情况。结果表明,总体上,贝叶斯推理中的基础比率和击中率均起作用,表现为后验概率估计值随基础比率水平的提高而增加,随击中率水平的提高而增加。然而,在低基础比率的中彩情境中,后验概率估计值先随击中率的增加而增加;之后却随击中率水平的继续提高而显著降低,出现自击中率参照抑制。这似乎说明,击中率在贝叶斯推理中并非一致地起作用,而可能与推理者的知识经验对击中率加工的调节有关。     

判断与决策中的基线比例忽略

基线比例忽略是指在事件的判断中忽略相关事件统计学上的信息, 而只关注当前呈现的案例信息, 从而造成判断和决策偏差的一种现象。目前对这一现象的解释主要包括双加工理论和线性整合理论, 而影响基线比例忽略的因素有许多方面, 如信息特征、认知能力等等。在未来研究中, 应该深入分析双加工理论的作用机制以及依据模糊痕迹理论提出新的研究视角, 同时拓展在团体和公共领域中的应用性研究。