Technological Delegation: Responsibility for the Unintended

This article defends three interconnected premises that together demand for a new way of dealing with moral responsibility in developing and using technological artifacts. The first premise is that humans increasingly make use of dissociated technological delegation. Second, because technologies do not simply fulfill our actions, but rather mediate them, the initial aims alter and outcomes are often different from those intended. Third, since the outcomes are often unforeseen and unintended, we can no longer simply apply the traditional (modernist) models for discussing moral responsibility. We need to reinterpret moral responsibility. A schematic layout of a model on Social Role-Responsibility that incorporates these three premises is presented to allow discussion of a new way of interpreting moral responsibility.

The anachronism of moral individualism and the responsibility of extended agency

Recent social theory has departed from methodological individualism’s explanation of action according to the motives and dispositions of human individuals in favor of explanation in terms of broader agencies consisting of both human and nonhuman elements described as cyborgs, actor-networks, extended agencies, or distributed cognition. This paper proposes that moral responsibility for action also be vested in extended agencies. It advances a consequentialist view of responsibility that takes moral responsibility to be a species of causal responsibility, and it answers objections that might be raised on the basis of intentions and deserts.

Values,preferences, needs,work ethics,and orientations to work: Toward a conceptual and empirical integration

There have been comparatively few attempts on either the conceptual or empirical level to integrate values, preferences, needs, work ethics, and orientations to work. A rationale outlining the way these concepts can be related to each other, is presented. It is maintained that these concepts are categories of relations between humans and work. These categories are qualitatively similar and differ principally in the level of generality of the characteristics of work considered. Complete-link cluster analysis is suggested as a method of analysis compatible with the proffered rationale. Two studies are presented with data gathered during the development of two versions of Work Aspect Preference Scale (WAPS). The samples for the two studies both comprised senior high school students, controlled for sex and age, who were administered the WAPS. Study 1 had a sample of 532 while Study 2 had a sample size of 482. Both sets of data were cluster analyzed. Results indicated a very substantial amount of agreement between the two samples, particularly at the more general levels of clustering. The bipartite and tripartite groupings of vocational needs suggested by L. H. Lofquist and R. V. Dawis (Journal of Vocational Behavior, 1978, 12, 12–19) were confirmed as were the findings of J. Mortimer (Sociology of Work and Occupations, 1975, 2, 29–53). Other clusters were also identified with findings from previous research. It is concluded that the investigation of preferences at different levels of generality and the interrelation between these levels shows great promise for both the researcher and the counselor and therefore merits more research effort.     

Expiation,Substitution and Surrender: Levinasian Implications for Psychotherapy

This essay will build on Emmanuel Levinas’s rejection of ontology as foundational and draw out the implications for psychotherapy. We will explore Levinas’s concept of substitution (in both his more Jewish writings and his philosophical treatises) and consider its meaning in relationship to the role of a psychotherapist. Levinas understands the Other as a calling for substitution of the self and of a taking on of responsibility. We explore the notion of surrender in the work of the psychoanalyst Emmanuel Ghent and argue that his position is ultimately lacking in ethical injunction; requiring nothing of the self in relationship to the Other. It remains within the confines of the conventional, self-reflexive models that Levinas critiques. Following Levinas, we suggest that the therapist bear the burden of ethical responsibility by being exposed to the client’s ethical call and by responding out of a kenotic self-emptying.

Developmental aspects of the generation effect

Children from Grades 2, 3, 5, and 7 (7.6, 9, 11, and 13 years of age, respectively) were required to generate or study exemplars of semantic categories (semantic orientation) or rhymes to stimulus words (phonetic orientation). Each child then participated in one of three retention tests: free recall, standard recognition, and rhyme recognition. The results indicated that the developmental emergence of the “generation effect” (C. E. McFarland, Jr., T. J. Frey, & D. D. Rhodes, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1980, 19, 210–225; N. J. Slamecka & P. Graf, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 1978, 4, 592–604) was dependent on both encoding orientation and the type of retention task employed. A substantial generation effect first emerged (7-year-olds) for standard recognition in the semantic condition. A similar effect for recall was evident for 9-year olds, but not for younger children. Internal stimulus generation became a strong memory facilitator for phonetically encoded items at age 11 for standard recognition, but not until age 13 for recall. The results of the rhyme recognition test indicated that internal generation facilitated “transfer-appropriate processing” (C. D. Morris, J. D. Bransford, & J. J. Franks, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1977, 16, 519–533) only for seventh graders (age 13). The processes underlying this developmental pattern were discussed.     

Putting the lie on the control condition for moral responsibility

In “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment” Angela Smith defends her nonvoluntarist theory of moral responsibility against the charge that any such view is shallow because it cannot capture the depth of judgments of responsibility. Only voluntarist positions can do this since only voluntarist positions allow for control. I argue that Smith is able to deflect the voluntarists’ criticism, but only with further resources. As a voluntarist, I also concede that Smith’s thesis has force, and I close with a compromise position, one that allows for direct moral responsibility for the nonvoluntary, but also incorporates a reasonable control condition.

Responsibility as a Virtue

Philosophers usually discuss responsibility in terms of responsibility for past actions or as a question about the nature of moral agency. Yet the word responsibility is fairly modern, whereas these topics arguably represent timeless concerns about human agency. This paper investigates another use of responsibility, that is particularly important to modern liberal societies: responsibility as a virtue that can be demonstrated by individuals and organisations. The paper notes its initial importance in political contexts, and seeks to explain why we now demand responsibility in all spheres of life. In reply, I highlight the distinctively institutional character of modern liberal societies: institutions specify many of the particular responsibilities each of us must fulfil, but also require responsibility to sustain them and address their failings. My overall argument is that the virtue of responsibility occupies a distinctive place in the moral needs, and moral achievements, of liberal societies; and this, in turn, explains why it now occupies such a prominent place in our moral discourse.

Control,responsibility, and moral assessment

Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, what really matters in determining a person’s responsibility for some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments. Such accounts might therefore be understood as updated versions of what Susan Wolf has called “real self views,” insofar as they attempt to ground an agent’s responsibility for her actions and attitudes in the fact (when it is a fact) that they express who she is as a moral agent. As such, they seem to be open to some of the same objections Wolf originally raised to such accounts, and in particular to the objection that they cannot license the sorts of robust moral assessments involved in our current practices of moral responsibility. My aim in this paper is to try to respond to this challenge, by clarifying the kind of robust moral assessments I take to be licensed by (at least some) non-volitional accounts of responsibility and by explaining why these assessments do not in general require the agent to have voluntary control over everything for which she is held responsible. I also argue that the limited applicability of the distinction between “bad agents” and “blameworthy agents” on these accounts is in fact a mark in their favor.

Igniting the Flicker of Freedom: Revisiting the Frankfurt Scenario

This paper aims to challenge the view that the sign present in many Frankfurt-style scenarios is insufficiently robust to constitute evidence for the possibility of an alternate decision, and therefore inadequate as a means of determining moral responsibility. I have amended Frankfurt’s original scenario, so as to allow Jones, as well as Black, the opportunity to monitor his (Jones’s) own inclination towards a particular decision (the sign). Different outcome possibilities are presented, to the effect that Jones’s awareness of his own inclinations leads to the conclusion that the sign must be either (a) a prior determinate of the decision about to be made, (b) prior and indeterminate (therefore allowing for a contra-inclination decision to be made), or (c) constitutive of a decision that Jones has made but is not yet aware of. In effect, this means that, prior to the intervention of Black, Jones must have decided to do otherwise or could have so decided. Either way, although Frankfurt’s conclusion, that Jones could not have done other than he did, is upheld, the idea that he could not have decided otherwise must be rejected, and with it the view that the sign is nothing more than a flicker of freedom insufficient for assigning morally responsibility.

Flickers of Freedom and Modes of Action: A Reply to Timpe

In recent years, many incompatibilists have come to reject the traditional association of moral responsibility with alternative possibilities. Kevin Timpe argues that one such incompatibilist, Eleonore Stump, ultimately fails in her bid to sever this link. While she may have succeeded in dissociating responsibility from the freedom to perform a different action, he argues, she ends up reinforcing a related link, between responsibility and the freedom to act under a different mode. In this paper, I argue that Timpe’s response to Stump exploits concessions she need not have made. The upshot is that, contrary to what Timpe maintains, there is no reason to doubt that Stump's brand of incompatibilism is a genuine alternative to the traditional variety.

Measured interests versus expressed interests as predictors of long-term occupational membership

This study compared the predictive accuracy of measured versus expressed interests over a 21-year period using as a criterion occupational membership at age 36. Subjects were 83 males whose measured and expressed interests were elicited at ages 15, 18, and 25. The Strong Vocational Interest Blank was used to determine measured interests while expressed interests were determined through a combination of questionnaires and interviews. C. McArthur's (Journal of Applied Psychology, 1954, 38, 346–353) method was employed to determine the predictive validity of subjects' measured interests. The predictive validity of expressed interests was determined by using A. Roe's (The psychology of occupations. New York: Wiley, 1956; Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1957, 4, 212–217) scheme for occupational classification to code occupational preferences and compare them to age 36 occupations. Results indicated that at each point in the study expressed interests were slightly better predictors of age 36 occupational membership than measured interests. Supplementary analyses revealed no relationship between the extent to which subjects' measured or expressed interests corresponded to age 36 occupations and either overall job or career satisfaction.     

World Poverty as a Problem of Justice? A Critical Comparison of Three Approaches

With regard to the problem of world poverty, libertarian theories of corrective justice emphasize negative duties and the idea of responsibility whereas utilitarian theories of help concentrate on positive duties based on the capacity of the helper. Thomas Pogge has developed a revised model of compensation that entails positive obligations that are generated by negative duties. He intends to show that the affluent are violating their negative duties to ensure that their conduct will not harm others: They are contributing to and profiting from an unjust global order. But the claim that negative duty generated positive obligations are more acceptable than positive duties is contestable. I examine whether Henry Shue’s model that is integrating negative duties and positive duties is more convincing concerning the foundation of positive duties to protect others. I defend the idea that there are positive duties of justice. This approach can integrate an allocation of positive duties via responsibility and maintain the advantage of an independent foundation of positive duties.

Masculinity-femininity perceptions of job requirements and their relationship to job-sex stereotypes

Perceived sex appropriateness of the work situation is believed to constrain work opportunities, particularly for women. However, sex appropriateness may be defined either with respect to the entire job or with respect to the tasks which comprise the job. In this study sex appropriateness of job tasks was examined by obtaining subjective estimates of the masculinity-femininity of the job requirement dimensions defined by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). Results indicate that interacting with things is perceived as masculine, interacting with people is perceived as feminine, and interacting with data is perceived as falling between the other two. There is less agreement on the masculinity-femininity of specific types of interactions with data, people, and things. Sex appropriateness of specific requirements was found to be only moderately associated with the DOT's assessment of the complexity of those requirements. Further, sex appropriateness of job requirements was not highly related to the job sextypes established by Shinar (Shinar, E. H. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 1975, 7, 99–110) and Krefting et al. (Krefting, L. A., Berger, P. K., and Wallace, M. J. Jr. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 1978, 13, 181–191). This suggests that sex appropriateness of a job and sex appropriateness of the tasks which comprise the job are distinct, separate concepts.     

Duties and Responsibilities Towards the Poor

Thomas Pogge has argued that we have strong negative duties to assist the global poor because we harm them through our contribution to the global economic order. I argue that Pogge’s concept of harm is indeterminate. The resources of any group will typically be affected by at least two economic schemes. Pogge suggests that the responsibility for any affected group’s shortfall from a minimum standard ought to be shared between the contributing schemes. I argue that shared responsibility can be interpreted in two different ways. Unfortunately, both interpretations are problematic. Lastly, I suggest a strategy for amending this problem.

Dissonance theory revised again: Comment on the paper by Fazio,Zanna, and Cooper

Fazio, Zanna, and Cooper (Dissonance and self-perception: An integrative view on each theory's proper domain of application. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1977, 13, 464–479) specified mutually exclusive domains of application for dissonance and self-perception theory and used a misattribution-of-arousal procedure to distinguish between dissonance reduction and self-perception processes. Because their proposed limitations of the domains of the two theories and their use of the misattribution procedure are not directly derivable from earlier statements of either theory, it may be best to regard their analysis as a new theory, rather than as a conciliation of the parent theories. New analyses based on the Fazio et al. results indicate that their data provide an insufficient basis for preferring their theory to earlier versions of dissonance and self-perception theories. Dissonance and self-perception: An integrative view of each theory's proper domain of application. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1977, 13, 464–479.     

Locus of control,choice, and satisfaction with an assigned task

P. E. Spector's (1982, Psychological Bulletin, 91, 482–497) hypothesis that under conditions of freedom of choice persons characterized by an internal locus of control will experience greater satisfaction with an undesirable task than persons characterized by an external locus of control is considered in light of distinctions between perceived control and perceived choice. Perceived choice is proposed as an intervening variable implicit in Spector's argument. This reasoning was tested with 46 male and female college student participants in a 2 (Choice) × 2 (Locus of Control) factorial design experiment. An interaction of Choice × Locus of Control on task satisfaction was obtained such that internals tended to be more satisfied when given a choice while externals experienced greater satisfaction when not given a choice. The implications of this result for Spector' hypothesis and for the manner in which undesirable work is assigned are discussed.     

Hard incompatibilism and its rivals

In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his criticism of my version of this argument is sound. In reply to John Fischer, I argue that the reasons-responsiveness central to his account of moral responsibility is not best characterized counterfactually, and I provide a suggestion for revision.

Information availability,goodness of outcome,and attributions of causality

H. H. Kelley's (American Psychologist, 1973, 28, 107–128) framework for studying attribution processes is introduced as a means of accounting for characteristic asymmetries in success/failure attributions. It is argued that while success/failure asymmetries should occur in the presence of single-observation information, asymmetries should be eliminated when individuals are allowed to observe the covariation between their own actions and outcomes. Subjects participated in a 15-trial stock market simulation in which type of information (single-observation or covariation) and goodness of outcome (relative success or failure) were manipulated. The obtained results supported the experimental hypotheses. Given single-observation information, subjects were more likely to accept personal responsibility for good than for poor outcomes. However, subjects' attributions were not affected by goodness of outcome when they were provided with covariation information. The implications of these findings are discussed in terms of the current debate between motivational and information-processing explanations of asymmetries in success/failure attributions.