Hare on Possible People

abstract    R. M. Hare claims that we have duties to take the preferences of possible people into consideration in moral thinking and that it can harm a merely possible person to have been denied existence. This essay has three parts. First, I attempt to show how Hare's universalizability argument for our obligations to possible people may fail to challenge the consistent proponent of the actuality restriction on moral consideration, regardless of whether this proponent is construed as an amoralist or a fanatic. Second, I raise some objections to Hare's claim that a merely possible person can be harmed. Even if Hare could successfully overcome the objection that a possible person cannot be the recipient of harm, he would still need to show that this harm is morally significant. Third, whether or not Hare is able to answer these objections, I indicate how his moral theory still supports his general position on possible people — namely, that we are ceteris paribus morally bound to bring happy people (and avoid bringing miserable people) into existence.     

Hare on utilitarianism and intuitive morality

InMoral Thinking R. M. Hare offers a very influential defense of utilitarianism against intuitive objections. Hare's argument is roughly that utilitarianism conflicts with defensible moral intuitions only in unusual cases and that, in such cases, even defensible moral intuitions are unreliable. This paper reconstructs Hare's arguments and argues that they presuppose the success of his problematic proof of utilitarianism. Contrary to what many have thought, Hare's negative defense of utilitarianism against intuitive objections is not separable from his proof. In the second part of the paper I argue that Hare does not succeed in defending utilitarianism against the objection that it is too demanding. The final section of the paper sketches a substantially revised version of Hare's reply to intuitive objections. So revised, the argument is independent of Hare's proof and affords a plausible answer to the objection that utilitarianism is too demanding.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Loyola University and Saint Olaf College. I am greatly indebted to my colleague Harry Gensler for helpful comments on numerous drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank Michael Gorr, Brad Hooker, Shelly Kagan, Heidi Malm, Richard Hare, Peter Singer, Onora O'Neill, George Trey, Joe Sullivan, and an anonymous referee. This paper developed out of a series of discussions with Mark Overvold. I dedicate the paper to his memory. I would also like to thank Loyola University for a paid leave of absence which enabled me to write the paper.     

Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised

The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) is among the most frequently used instruments for the assessment of psychopathic traits. In the scope of the German adaptation of the PCL-R, normative data were collected from a sample of adult male offenders. Based on these data the factor structure and reliability of the German language version of the PCL-R are discussed in the first section of the article. The assessment of a model with four facets and two superordinate factors showed a very good agreement with the empirical data. In addition, examination of interrater agreement and internal consistency indicated that the PCL-R is a reliable measure. In the second part of the paper recommendations are provided for the correct application of the PCL-R. The focus lies on the correct performance, evaluation and interpretation of PCL-R test results with respect to key indices and the dimensional structure of the psychopathy construct.     

康德、黑尔与普遍主义

康德和黑尔都是伦理学的杰出代表人物,尽管一个是规范伦理学家,一个是元伦理学家,但是双方都把目光聚集在道德的形式主义研究上,并且着力于普遍主义的落脚点.两者在理论上存在诸多不同,却依然可以发现两者在理论上的先行后继的关系.     

Reasons and ideals

This paper contributes to the debate on whether we can have reason to do what we are unable to do. I take as my starting point two papers recently published in Philosophical Studies, by Bart Streumer and Ulrike Heuer, which defend the two dominant opposing positions on this issue. Briefly, whereas Streumer argues that we cannot have reason to do what we are unable to do, Heuer argues that we can have reason to do what we are unable to do when we can get closer to success but cannot have reason to try to do what we are unable to do when we cannot get closer to success. In this paper, I reject both positions as they are presented, on the grounds that neither can accommodate an important category of reasons, which are the reasons to realise and to try to realise dimensions of value that lie at the boundary of what is realisable, specifically, genuinely valuable ideals. I defend a third view that we can have reason to do and to try to do what we are unable to do even when we cannot, in Heuer’s sense, get closer to success. Moreover, I argue that we can have reason to realise and to try to realise genuinely valuable ideals for their own sake and not simply for the sake of achieving mundane, realisable ends.     

Personality characteristics of Hare Krishnas

Personality characteristics of 132 males and 94 females of the Hare Krishna movement were assessed using the Comrey Personality Scales (CPS). Subjects were sampled from eight U.S. sites. Their age averaged about 30 years, and their time in the movement averaged 8.6 years. The most prominent and surprising finding is the hallmark characteristic of the Hare Krishna personality, a strong compulsivity trait common to both genders, which is slightly stronger in males. Reduced trust in society was exhibited by both gender averages, with slightly less trust among females. Both these averages, however, were within the normal range for individuals. With the exception of compulsivity, average male CPS scores were within the normal psychological range but differed significantly from the normative male group indicating idiosyncratic traits. Average female CPS scores did not differ significantly from the normative female group except for compulsivity and trust. Study of CPS score distributions about group means supported these findings.     

Personality Characteristics of Hare Krishnas

Personality characteristics of 132 males and 94 females of the Hare Krishna movement were assessed using the Comrey Personality Scales (CPS). Subjects were sampled from eight U.S. sites. Their age averaged about 30 years, and their time in the movement averaged 8.6 years. The most prominent and surprising finding is the hallmark characteristic of the Hare Krishna personality, a strong compulsivity trait common to both genders, which is slightly stronger in males. Reduced trust in society was exhibited by both gender averages, with slightly less trust among females. Both these averages, however, were within the normal range for individuals. With the exception of compulsivity, average male CPS scores were within the normal psychological range but differed significantly from the normative male group indicating idiosyncratic traits. Average female CPS scores did not differ significantly from the normative female group except for compulsivity and trust. Study of CPS score distributions about group means supported these findings.     

Luck and interests

Recent work on the nature of luck widely endorses the thesis that an event is good or bad luck for an individual only if it is significant for that individual. In this paper, I explore this thesis, showing that it raises questions about interests, well-being, and the philosophical uses of luck. In Sect. 1, I examine several accounts of significance, due to Pritchard (2005), Coffman (2007), and Rescher (1995). Then in Sect. 2 I consider what some theorists want to ‘do’ with luck, taking important examples from epistemology (explaining Gettier-style examples) and political philosophy (offering a rationale for the just distribution of resources in society), while suggesting implications for significance. Drawing together lessons from Sects. 1 and 2, I develop a new account of significance in Sect. 3 before concluding with reflections on the debate in Sect. 4.     

Rationality ideals and mentality

Mackenzie, this journal, this issue, convincingly shows that in certain dialogue games (commitment games) there are procedural restrictions similar to those that I impose on rationality idealizations. But, whereas my rationality analysis is set in the context of belief games, commitment games do not postulate beliefs. Is this significant? I suggest that mackenzie thinks that it is. There follow discussions of Psychologism and Behaviourism.