How Possessive Relations are Mapped onto Child Language: A View from Mandarin Chinese

The present studies sought to investigate the mapping relations between language and cognition by focusing on how Mandarin-speaking children acquire the mapping between their conceptual knowledge of possession and their linguistic expressions of possession. Two experiments were conducted. Experiment 1 used a comprehension task to explore whether young children are able to map their knowledge of possessive constructions onto their interpretation of possessive relations. Experiment 2 employed a production task to examine whether they are able to map their knowledge of possessive relations onto their linguistic expressions of possession. The findings were that 4-year-olds exhibited correct comprehension and production of possessive DE constructions, indicating that by age 4, Mandarin-speaking children have already established the mapping between their conceptual knowledge of possession and their linguistic expressions of possession. By contrast, 3-year-olds exhibited response patterns that suggest a developmental stage where they use noun–noun compounds to represent possessive relations before they map possessive relations onto possessive constructions.     

Individual differences in children's understanding of inversion and arithmetical skill

Background and aims. In order to develop arithmetic expertise, children must understand arithmetic principles, such as the inverse relationship between addition and subtraction, in addition to learning calculation skills. We report two experiments that investigate children's understanding of the principle of inversion and the relationship between their conceptual understanding and arithmetical skills. Sample. A group of 127 children from primary schools took part in the study. The children were from 2 age groups (6–7 and 8–9 years). Methods. Children's accuracy on inverse and control problems in a variety of presentation formats and in canonical and non‐canonical forms was measured. Tests of general arithmetic ability were also administered. Results. Children consistently performed better on inverse than control problems, which indicates that they could make use of the inverse principle. Presentation format affected performance: picture presentation allowed children to apply their conceptual understanding flexibly regardless of the problem type, while word problems restricted their ability to use their conceptual knowledge. Cluster analyses revealed three subgroups with different profiles of conceptual understanding and arithmetical skill. Children in the ‘high ability’ and ‘low ability’ groups showed conceptual understanding that was in‐line with their arithmetical skill, whilst a 3rd group of children had more advanced conceptual understanding than arithmetical skill. Conclusions. The three subgroups may represent different points along a single developmental path or distinct developmental paths. The discovery of the existence of the three groups has important consequences for education. It demonstrates the importance of considering the pattern of individual children's conceptual understanding and problem‐solving skills.     

Color terms and color concepts

In their lead articles, both Kowalski and Zimiles (2006) and O'Hanlon and Roberson (2006) declare a general relation between color term knowledge and the ability to conceptually represent color. Kowalski and Zimiles, in particular, argue for a priority for the conceptual representation in color term acquisition. The complexities of the interaction are taken up in the current commentary, especially with regard to the neuropsychological evidence. Data from aphasic patients also argue for a priority for abstract thought, but nevertheless it may still be that the use of color terms is the only way in which to form color categories even if both linguistic and attentional factors play an important role.     

Using network science to analyze concept maps of psychology undergraduates

Network science is an emerging area of complexity science that uses mathematical techniques to study complex systems and could represent a new way of quantifying and investigating the internal structure of domain‐specific knowledge as approximated by students' concept maps. Students enrolled in introductory psychology constructed concept maps to represent their understanding of a psychology chapter. Concept networks were constructed based on the concept maps generated by students. Network analysis revealed that the structure of concept networks differed across students (i.e., some networks were better connected than others), and network structure significantly predicted quiz scores, such that concept networks with larger average shortest path lengths (a network metric representing the average of the shortest paths between two nodes in a network) were associated with higher quiz scores, after controlling for network size. This paper illustrates how network science techniques can be used to quantify the conceptual structure of a learner's knowledge.     

Continuity of the conceptual system across species

In a recent neuroimaging study of macaque monkeys, Gil-da-Costa and colleagues reported that a distributed circuit of modality-specific properties represents macaques' conceptual knowledge of social situations. The circuit identified shows striking similarities to analogous circuits in humans that represent conceptual knowledge. This parallel suggests that a common architecture underlies the conceptual systems of different species, although with additional systems extending human conceptual abilities significantly.     

TPL—KATS-card sort: A tool for assessing structural knowledge

The study of how individuals organize knowledge has been a popular endeavor for several decades. As a result, techniques have been developed to assess how individuals represent and organize knowledge internally. Although several conceptual knowledge elicitation methods have been developed and used to assess the organization of knowledge, their use is often labor intensive and time consuming. Presented here is a software tool that was developed to reduce the problems associated with manually administering the conceptual knowledge elicitation technique, or card sorting. The TPL—KATS-card sort software not only simplifies the administration of the task, but also adds features to the card-sorting task such as media insertion, time stamping, and instructorless administration. In the present article, an introduction to the card-sorting technique is provided, the new software tool is described, and the advantages of the software are detailed.     

The relation between children's conceptual functioning with color and color term acquisition

Young children experience considerable difficulty in learning their first few color terms. One explanation for this difficulty is that initially they lack a conceptual representation of color sufficiently abstract to support word meaning. This hypothesis, that prior to learning color terms children do not represent color as an abstraction, was tested in two experiments using samples of 25- to 39-month-olds and 20- to 32-month-olds. Children's ability to conceptually represent color and their knowledge of color terms were assessed, and a strong association was found between the ability to make inferences based on color and the comprehension of color words. Children who did not comprehend color terms were unsuccessful at a conceptual task that required them to represent color as a property independent of the particular objects that displayed it. The results suggest that the initial absence of an abstract representation of color contributes to the difficulty that young children encounter when first learning color words.     

Conceptual integration and metaphor: an event-related potential study

Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded from 18 normal adults as they read sentences that ended with words used literally, metaphorically, or in an intermediate literal mapping condition. In the latter condition, the literal sense of the word was used in a way that prompted readers to map conceptual structure from a different domain. ERPs measured from 300 to 500 msec after the onset of the sentence-final words differed as a function of metaphoricity: Literal endings elicited the smallest N400, metaphors the largest N400, whereas literal mappings elicited an N400 of intermediate amplitude. Metaphoric endings also elicited a larger posterior positivity than did either literal or literal mapping words. Consistent with conceptual blending theory, the results suggest that the demands of conceptual integration affect the difficulty of both literal and metaphorical language.     

Infants' reasoning about opaque and transparent occluders in an individuation task

Two experiments document that conceptual knowledge influences 3-year-olds' extension of novel words. In Experiment 1, when objects were described as having conceptual properties typical of artifacts, children extended novel labels for these objects on the basis of shape alone. When the very same objects were described as having conceptual properties typical of animate kinds, children extended novel labels for these objects on the basis of both shape and texture. Moreover, providing a salient perceptual cue (Experiment 2) did not interfere with children's reliance on conceptual information in extending novel words: when an object with eyes was labeled with a novel word in the context of a story describing the object as an artifact, children extended the label on the basis of shape alone (i.e. as though the object were an artifact). These results, which challenge directly the position that 'dumb attentional mechanisms' can account for word learning, stand as evidence for the central role of conceptual information in mapping words to meaning.     

Patterns of strengths and weaknesses in children's knowledge about fractions

The purpose of this study was to explore individual patterns of strengths and weaknesses in children's mathematical knowledge about common fractions. Tasks that primarily measure either conceptual or procedural aspects of mathematical knowledge were assessed with the same children in their fourth- and fifth-grade years (N=181, 56% female and 44% male). Procedural knowledge was regressed on levels of conceptual knowledge, and vice versa, to obtain residual scores. Residual scores capture variability in each kind of math knowledge that is not shared with the other type of knowledge. Cluster analysis using residuals indicated four distinct knowledge profiles in fourth graders: (a) higher than expected conceptual knowledge and relatively lower procedural knowledge, (b) relatively lower conceptual knowledge and higher procedural knowledge, (c) lower concepts but expected levels of procedural knowledge, and (d) relatively higher than expected levels of both procedural and conceptual knowledge. In fifth grade, another cluster emerged that showed lower procedures but expected levels of conceptual knowledge. In general, students with relatively lower than expected conceptual knowledge showed poorer accuracy on measures used to form the clusters and also word problem setups and estimation of sums. Implications for explaining seemingly conflicting results from prior work across studies are discussed.     

Cognitive and Neural Contributions to Understanding the Conceptual System

ABSTRACT— The conceptual system contains categorical knowledge about experience that supports the spectrum of cognitive processes. Cognitive science theories assume that categorical knowledge resides in a modular and amodal semantic memory, whereas neuroscience theories assume that categorical knowledge is grounded in the brain's modal systems for perception, action, and affect. Neuroscience has influenced theories of the conceptual system by stressing principles of neural processing in neural networks and by motivating grounded theories of cognition, which propose that simulations of experience represent knowledge. Cognitive science has influenced theories of the conceptual system by documenting conceptual phenomena and symbolic operations that must be grounded in the brain. Significant progress in understanding the conceptual system is most likely to occur if cognitive and neural approaches achieve successful integration.     

跨学科概念图创作能力与科学创造力的关系

采用科学领域的跨学科概念图创作任务, 探讨了跨学科概念图创作能力与科学创造力的关系。研究发现：（1）跨学科概念图创作能力与科学创造力显著正相关;（2）概念图创作的命题、交叉连接与创造力的流畅性、独创性、灵活性显著相关;交叉连接与独创性显著相关;（3）跨学科概念图创作能力的个体差异表现在科学创造力的各个方面。研究表明,跨学科概念图创作任务与科学创造力测验考察了学习者相似的心理能力;跨学科概念图创作不仅可以用于促进跨学科信息整合和知识建构,还可以作为理解学习者创造性思维能力的有效工具     

Conceptual Knowledge,Procedural Knowledge,and Metacognition in Routine and Nonroutine Problem Solving

When, how, and why students use conceptual knowledge during math problem solving is not well understood. We propose that when solving routine problems, students are more likely to recruit conceptual knowledge if their procedural knowledge is weak than if it is strong, and that in this context, metacognitive processes, specifically feelings of doubt, mediate interactions between procedural and conceptual knowledge. To test these hypotheses, in two studies (Ns = 64 and 138), university students solved fraction and decimal arithmetic problems while thinking aloud; verbal protocols and written work were coded for overt uses of conceptual knowledge and displays of doubt. Consistent with the hypotheses, use of conceptual knowledge during calculation was not significantly positively associated with accuracy, but was positively associated with displays of doubt, which were negatively associated with accuracy. In Study 1, participants also explained solutions to rational arithmetic problems; using conceptual knowledge in this context was positively correlated with calculation accuracy, but only among participants who did not use conceptual knowledge during calculation, suggesting that the correlation did not reflect “online” effects of using conceptual knowledge. In Study 2, participants also completed a nonroutine problem-solving task; displays of doubt on this task were positively associated with accuracy, suggesting that metacognitive processes play different roles when solving routine and nonroutine problems. We discuss implications of the results regarding interactions between procedural knowledge, conceptual knowledge, and metacognitive processes in math problem solving.     

What counts as knowing? The development of conceptual and procedural knowledge of counting from kindergarten through Grade 2

The development of conceptual and procedural knowledge about counting was explored for children in kindergarten, Grade 1, and Grade 2 (N = 255). Conceptual knowledge was assessed by asking children to make judgments about three types of counts modeled by an animated frog: standard (correct) left-to-right counts, incorrect counts, and unusual counts. On incorrect counts, the frog violated the word-object correspondence principle. On unusual counts, the frog violated a conventional but inessential feature of counting, for example, starting in the middle of the array of objects. Procedural knowledge was assessed using speed and accuracy in counting objects. The patterns of change for procedural knowledge and conceptual knowledge were different. Counting speed and accuracy (procedural knowledge) improved with grade. In contrast, there was a curvilinear relation between conceptual knowledge and grade that was further moderated by children's numeration skills (as measured by a standardized test); the most skilled children gradually increased their acceptance of unusual counts over grade, whereas the least skilled children decreased their acceptance of these counts. These results have implications for studying conceptual and procedural knowledge about mathematics.     

Conceptual preference for thematic or taxonomic relations: A nonmonotonic age trend from preschool to old age

Two experiments examined the development of conceptual preference for either thematic (functional) or taxonomic relationships in a match-to sample task. In Experiment 1 twenty subjects from each of five age groups—preschool to old age—completed a method of triads preference test where they were forced to choose a thematic or taxonomic match. Young and old individuals preferred the thematic parings while school age and college adults preferred the taxonomic matches. Although the Age × Preference relation was pronounced, the majority of subjects at all ages could provide adequate justification of both the preferred and nonpreferred relationship. In addition, kindergarten subjects in Experiment 2 could readily be trained to respond on the basis of the nonpreferred mode. These data suggest that the pervasive shift in conceptual responding from syntagmatic to paradigmatic, thematic to taxonomic, etc., represents a change in preference rather than a shift to a fundamentally new way of organizing knowledge.     

Expertise-related differences in conceptual and ontological knowledge in the legal domain

Little research has been conducted on expertise-related differences in conceptual and ontological knowledge in law, even though this type of knowledge is prerequisite for correctly interpreting and reasoning about legal cases, and differences in conceptual and ontological knowledge structures between students and between students and teachers, might lead to miscommunication. This study investigated the extent and organisation of conceptual and ontological knowledge of novices, advanced students, and experts in law, using a card-sorting task and a concept-elaboration task. The results showed that novices used more everyday examples and were less accurate in their elaborations of concepts than advanced students and experts, on top of that, the organisation of their knowledge did not overlap within their group (i.e., no “shared” ontology). Experts gave more judicial examples based on the lawbook and were more accurate in their elaborations than advanced students, and their knowledge was strongly overlapping within their group (i.e., strong ontology). Incorrect conceptual knowledge seems to impede the correct understanding of cases and the correct application of precise and formal rules in law.     

Quantitative and qualitative analyses of clock drawings in Alzheimer's and Huntington's disease.

Although visuoconstructive impairment has been reported in both Alzheimer's (DAT) and Huntington's (HD) disease, there is little knowledge concerning how this cognitive deficit differs quantitatively and qualitatively in these two progressive dementias. To address this issue, the present study compared performances on the Clock Drawing Test (CDT: command and copy) of 25 DAT patients, 25 equally demented HD patients, and 25 elderly normal controls (NC). In the command condition, both patients groups were significantly impaired compared to the NC group. Although there was no significant difference between DAT and HD patients' total quantitative scores, a qualitative error analysis revealed a number of dissociations between the two patient groups. Graphic difficulties, very common in HD patients, were virtually absent in DAT patients; in contrast, conceptual errors were almost exclusively seen in DAT patients and were related to the severity of their dementia. Perseveration and "stimulus-bound" responses were also more frequent in DAT patients, and both groups made visuospatial errors. In the copy condition, the DAT, but not the HD, patients evidenced a marked improvement in performance. These results indicate that while both DAT and HD patients have significant visuoconstructive difficulties even in the early stages of their disorders, the specific cognitive processes underlying their quantitative impairments are quite different. It is possible that the DAT patients' conceptual errors are yet another indicator of the deterioration of their semantic knowledge.     

Low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation of the anterior temporal lobes does not dissociate social versus nonsocial semantic knowledge

Social conceptual knowledge is imperative to communicate with, interact with, and interpret human society; however, little is known about the neural basis of social concepts. Previous research has predominantly suggested that the right anterior temporal lobe (ATL) may specifically represent social conceptual knowledge, whereas the left ATL is necessary for general semantic processing. However, this view has not always been supported by empirical studies. Employing a lateralized design and two different semantic tasks and a nonsemantic control task, we aimed to clarify some of these ambiguities by potentially dissociating left from right functionality and social from nonsocial concepts, using inhibitory repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) coupled with a sham and control site stimulation (N = 56). The results showed that stimulation of the left ATL led to overall faster processing times without affecting accuracy, whilst the right ATL and control groups did not significantly change in reaction times or accuracy. No difference occurred between social and nonsocial concepts after stimulation. This study is the first to show that inhibition of the left temporal lobe may improve performance on a semantic task and provides evidence that the ATLs may be lateralized in conceptual processing. The results do not confirm that the right temporal lobe is crucial for social conceptual processing, as inhibition did not significantly affect performance for social concepts.