Evolution and atheism: Has Griffin reconciled science and religion?

The distinguished theologian, David Ray Griffin, has advanced a set of thirteen theses intended to characterize (what he calls) “Neo-Darwinism” and which he contrasts with “Intelligent Design”. Griffin maintains that Neo-Darwinism is “atheistic” in forgoing a creator but suggests that, by adopting a more modest scientific naturalism and embracing a more naturalistic theology, it is possible to find “a third way” that reconciles religion and science. The considerations adduced here suggest that Griffin has promised more than he can deliver. On his account, God is in laws of nature; therefore, any influence He exerts is natural rather than supernatural. But if the differences God makes are not empirically detectable, then Griffin’s account is just as objectionable as a theory of supernatural intervention. And Griffin has not shown that evolution as distinct from his idiosyncratic sense of Neo-Darwinism is incompatible with theism.     

Gender roles in animated cartoons: Has the picture changed in 20 years?

This study is an update of research done primarily in the 1970s on gender representation in children's cartoons. In the present study, 175 episodes of 41 different cartoons were coded for numbers and demographic characteristics of male, female, and androgynous characters. Behaviors, communication characteristics, and total talk time of male and female characters were coded, along with copyright year and country of origin. Results indicated notable discrepancies between prominence and portrayal of male and female characters. Both male and female characters were portrayed stereotypically. Compared to female characters, male characters were given much more prominence, appeared more frequently, engaged in more of almost all of the noted behaviors, and talked significantly more. When male or female behavior and communication variables were divided by number of male or female characters or by total talk time, results indicated consistency with gender role stereotypes. Comparisons of pre- and post-1980 cartoons, however, indicated significant change toward a less stereotypical portrayal of the characters, particularly female characters.     

Has foundationalism been refuted?

Conclusion It is no part of my purpose in this paper to advocate Minimal Foundationalism. In fact I believe there to be strong objections to any form of foundationalism, and I feel that some kind of coherence or contextualist theory will provide a more adequate general orientation in epistemology. Will and Lehrer are to be commended for providing, in their different ways, important insights into some possible ways of developing a nonfoundationalist epistemology. Nevertheless if foundationalism is to be successfully disposed of it must be attacked in its most defensible, not in its most vulnerable, form. Although Will and Lehrer reveal weaknesses in historically important forms of foundationalism, it has been my aim in this paper to show that their arguments leave untouched the more modest and less vulnerable form I have called Minimal Foundationalism, a form approximated to by the most prominent contemporary versions of the position. It is to be hoped that those who are interested in clearing the decks for an epistemology without foundations will turn their critical weapons against such modest and careful foundationalists as Chisholm, Danto, and Quinton     

Who Has the Power?

SUMMARY

“Who Has the Power” describes the impact of a wife's change in role on her husband. Despite the seemingly harmonious nature of traditional gender behavior, uni-dimensional roles cannot sustain a dynamic marriage. In order for a lively marriage to be sustained, both partners must alter their style of relating when either one changes. When this is achieved, the couple moves from an illusion of themselves and the coupling and can begin to deal with the reality of who they are.     

Do gender–science stereotypes predict science identification and science career aspirations among undergraduate science majors?

The present research examined whether gender–science stereotypes were associated with science identification and, in turn, science career aspirations among women and men undergraduate science majors. More than 1,700 students enrolled in introductory science courses completed measures of gender–science stereotypes (implicit associations and endorsement of male superiority in science), science identification, and science career aspirations. Results were consistent with theoretically based predictions. Among women, stronger gender–science stereotypes were associated with weaker science identification and, in turn, weaker science career aspirations. By contrast, among men stronger gender–science stereotypes were associated with stronger science identification and, in turn, stronger science career aspirations, particularly among men who were highly gender identified. These two sets of modest but significant findings can accumulate over large populations and across critical time points within a leaky pipeline to meaningfully contribute to gender disparities in STEM domains.     

Technical filmmaking and scientific narratives: Has science overtaken fiction in recent science fiction? An analysis of Gravity,Interstellar, and The Martian

One can view the recent science fiction films Gravity, Interstellar, and The Martian as a three-part dialogue concerning the existential relationship between humanity, technology, and the science employed to create said technologies. Pitched into the deep of space, each film’s protagonist must seek to find technological answers to save their own existence. Each film’s exploration of these themes essentially questions the importance of technology as a product of scientific-calculative thinking and the validity of this thinking as the primary mode of understanding the world. In this article, I explore the existential dialogue crafted between these films through Walter Benjamin and Martin Heidegger. Through Benjamin, we will see how the medium of film is completely dependent upon technology to present its art and how this transforms the stories it tells, while also transforming the audience and the audience’s reality. Consequently, understanding the popular reception of these films becomes just as important as the films themselves for our present study. Through Heidegger, we will see how technology provides a space where we can find a truth about ourselves and our reality. However, modern technology’s increasing scientific complexity, created by scientists who in turn employ modern technology to further science, also conceals just as much as it reveals. These films provide us with an opportunity to explore a truth about our dependence upon technology even though, as technologically dependent works of art, they may also conceal how dependent upon science we have become when constructing our reality.     

Is psychological science a-cultural?

The history of psychological science, as it has intersected with ethnoracial, cultural, and other marginalized domains of group difference, is replete with disinterest, dismissal, or denigration of these diverse forms of psychological experience. This has led some to wonder whether psychological science is a-cultural, or even anti-cultural in orientation. Assessment of this provocative proposition first requires exploration of three composite questions: (1) What is culture?, (2) What is science?, and (3) What is psychological science? Based on brief consideration of these composite questions--which are remarkably complex in their own right--I argue that psychological science is not, has never been, and indeed cannot in principle be a-cultural. Instead, like all forms of knowing, psychological science emerges at particular historical moments to achieve particular goals that are motivated by particular interests. Throughout much of the history of psychological science, these goals and interests were tied to ideologically suspect agendas that contemporary psychologists are right to repudiate. The interesting question becomes whether psychology's knowledge practices can be disentangled from this earlier ideological contamination to furnish the discipline with viable methods. I propose that psychological science can in fact be so disentangled; nevertheless, the resulting methods are never adopted or deployed outside of culturally constituted interests, objectives, and motivations, thereby requiring ongoing critical engagement with the subtexts of disciplinary knowledge production. In fact, there seem to be important ways in which psychology's scientific aspirations hobble disciplinary inquiry into the human condition that has motivated multicultural psychologists to consider alternative paradigms of inquiry.     

Universal or culture-bound science?

Es wird die Frage untersucht, ob die Annahme der Existenz von universellen Normen für die Annäherung der Wissenschaft an die Wahrheit nicht in praxi lediglich Gegenwartszentrismus (die Annahme, daß die gegenwärtige Wissenschaft in jeder Hinsicht besser als die Wissenschaft der Vergangenheit ist) und Ethnozentrismus (die Annahme, daß die westliche Wissenschaft immer der nichtwestlichen Wissenschaft überlegen gewesen ist) heißt. Die griechisch-römische Zivilisation förderte die Wissenschaft durch ihre Demokratie, aber andere Zivilisationen haben sehr wertvolle Datensammlungen geliefert. Die Universalität der Wissenschaft impliziert u. a. daß, wo verschiedene Zivilisationen mit ihren Wissenschaften einander begegnen, sie von einander lernen können.

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I am grateful to Dr. F. Geyer for correcting my English.     

An embodied cognitive science?

The last ten years have seen an increasing interest, within cognitive science, in issues concerning the physical body, the local environment, and the complex interplay between neural systems and the wider world in which they function. Yet many unanswered questions remain, and the shape of a genuinely physically embodied, environmentally embedded science of the mind is still unclear. In this article I will raise a number of critical questions concerning the nature and scope of this approach, drawing a distinction between two kinds of appeal to embodiment: (1) ‘Simple’ cases, in which bodily and environmental properties merely constrain accounts that retain the focus on inner organization and processing; and (2) More radical appeals, in which attention to bodily and environmental features is meant to transform both the subject matter and the theoretical framework of cognitive science.     

Primary-school stutterers: Have attitudes changed?

How concerned are primary-school-aged stuttering children about their communication problem? What are the clinical implications of this concern?Fifteen years ago, Silverman (1970) suggested that primary-school-aged children who stuttered were not concerned about their disfluencies. A clinical implication of that report was that the interpreted lack of concern might negatively affect the children's motivation and desire for change in therapy. Scant research exists to support or refute this implication. While research is available on reactions to stuttering, pretherapeutic attitudes—especially those of children—have not been systematically reported. Guitar (1976) measured the pre-treatment attitudes of 38 adult stutterers and reported that, “those stutterers with more negative attitudes measured just prior to treatment, were most likely to have high levels of stuttering a year later, even though all subjects left therapy entirely fluent.” In related areas, research by Kolb, Winter, and Berlen (1968), McFall (1970), and McFall and Hammen (1971) has indicated that clients who are more motivated do better in behavior modification programs.Whether or not these findings may be generalized to children, in the midst of a developmental process, is purely speculative.     

Is psychoanalysis a science?

Freud Among the Philosophers: the Psychoanalytic Unconscious and its Philosophical Critics, by Donald Levy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, 189 pages.