Prediction with single event versus aggregate data

The impact of statistical information on predictive judgment was studied in a cue probability learning (CPL) task. Two kinds of aggregate information about criterion events were used: the conditional mean (Z_M) and the conditional interquartile range (Z_R). The single event information was the exact criterion value for one randomly selected past case (Z_O). Results showed that Z_Mand Z_R increased prediction consistency and accuracy and reduced bias while Z_O led to more appropriate cue weighting but lower consistency and accuracy. When Z_M, Z_R, and Z_O were all provided, the unique benefits of single-event and aggregate data were combined. This was true even for subjects without any prior task experience. When able to select only one of Z_M, Z_R, and Z_O, judges most often chose aggregate information, particularly Z_R. However, the statistical information was underutilized. Recommendations for aiding predictive judgment are made.     

Pseudodiagnosticity

Subjects selected data in order to decide from which of two ‘islands’ an ‘archeological find’ had come. The results replicated two established phenomena in cognitive psychology: (1) the tendency to ignore base rate data given individuating information, and (2) the tendency to seek confirmatory evidence.The major outcome of the study was, however, to reveal a new phenomenon in information search. Subjects displayed a surprising and strong tendency to seek diagnostically worthless information. They then altered their conclusion based on that information. For example, subjects who had already obtained P(D₁/H₁) selected P(D₂/H₁) when P(D₁/H₂) was equally easily available, and when they had no relevant experience to bring to bear on the estimation of P(D₁/H₂). This phenomenon, which appears to be a wholly dysfunctional cognitive tendency, was labeled pseudodiagnosticity.     

Further test of a subjective probability model of social inference

Subjects read paragraphs suggesting that a fictitious person (O) either did or did not possess an attribute X. Then, they reported their beliefs that they would like O (P_L), that O possessed X (P_X), that O was intelligent (P_I) and that O was sarcastic (P_s). Other beliefs necessary to test the predictive accuracy of Wyer's subjective probability model of cognitive organization were also reported. The model accurately predicted P_L on the basis of beliefs about X (the attribute to which information about O directly pertained); this accuracy was greater than that obtained in an earlier study in which real persons were evaluated, and did not depend upon the favorableness of X. However, predictions of P_L based upon beliefs about O's intelligence overestimated obtained values, while predictions based upon beliefs about O's sarcasm underestimated these values; moreover, P_I and P_S were underestimated and overestimated, respectively, by beliefs about X. It was speculated that these discrepancies were due to temporary inconsistencies among beliefs resulting from the information presented which did not have time to be resolved before beliefs were reported. Changes in P_L, P_I, and P_S resulting from additional information about X were accurately predicted in all cases. Implications of the model for other formulations of social evaluation processes are noted.     

The basic parameters of human information processing: Their role in the determination of intelligence

Information psychology deals with information processing in humans which is measured in terms of time units (sec) and information units (bits) and is described by relatively simple models. The model of psychostructure is crucial. It adequately refers to information processing which runs as sequential dichotomous decisions on a ‘yes-no’ or an ‘on-off’ basis. The information unit 1 bit is allocated to each decision.Three basic parameters are important in central information processing: (1) The information flow to the short term storage C_K (15.0 ± 3.1 bit/sec in adults). (2) The duration of presence (retention in primary memory) = T_R (5.4 ± 0.8 sec in adults). (3) The basic speed of learning C_V (depending on the time to retrieval: 0.01 to 1.00 bit/sec in adults). These capacities increase continuously from childhood to adulthood. Within each age group there are remarkable individual differences which exceed variations of biological variables such as body length or brain weight by far.The prerequisite of information psychological measurement is to determine the information content of the stimuli and the reactions and to measure the time between the stimulus and the response. Based on this it is shown that the basic parameters are unspecific, because the type of information, the sensory modalities and the repertory of signs do not alter the results. Besides, the parameters are independent of each other and reach the level of a ratio scale. According to other concepts and other empirical findings, C_K and T_R determine the intelligence quotient including the vocabulary while C_V corresponds to mechanical learning. Tests for these parameters are given.     

Why scientists valuep values

According to almost any approach to statistical inference, attained significance levels, orp values, have little value. Despite this consensus among statistical experts,p values are usually reported extensively in research articles in a manner that invites misinterpretation. In the present article, I suggest that the reasonp values are so heavily used is because they provide information concerning the strength of the evidence provided by the experiment. In some typical hypothesis testing situations, researchers may be interested in the relative adequacy of two different theoretical accounts: one that predicts no difference across conditions, and another that predicts some difference. The appropriate statistic for this kind of comparison is the likelihood ratio,P(D|M ₀)/P(D|M ₁), whereM ₀ andM ₁ are the two theoretical accounts. Large values of the likelihood ratio provide evidence thatM ₀ is a better account, whereas small values indicate thatM1 is better. I demonstrate that, under some circumstances, thep value can be interpreted in the same manner as the likelihood ratio. In particular, forZ,t, and sign tests, the likelihood ratio is an approximately linear function of thep value, with a slope between 2 and 3. Thus, researchers may reportp values in scientific communications because they are a proxy for the likelihood ratio and provide the readers with information about the strength of the evidence that is not otherwise available.     

Causal inferences as perceptual judgments

We analyze how subjects make causal judgments based on contingency information in two paradigms. In the discrete paradigm, subjects are given specific information about the frequency a, with which a purported cause occurs with the effect; the frequency b, with which it occurs without the effect; the frequency c, with which the effect occurs when the cause is absent; and the frequency d, with which both cause and effect are absent. Subjects respond toP ₁ =a/(a+b) andP ₂ =c/(c+d). Some subjects’ ratings are just a function ofP ₁, while others are a function of ΔP =P ₁ -P ₂. Subjects’ postexperiment reports are accurate reflections of which model they use. Combining these two types of subjects results in data well fit by the weighted ΔP model (Allan, 1993). In the continuous paradigm, subjects control the purported causes (by clicking a mouse) and observe whether an effect occurs. Because causes and effects occur continuously in time, it is not possible to explicitly pair causes and effects. Rather, subjects report that they are responding to the rate at which the effects occur when they click versus when they do not click. Their ratings are a function of rates and not probabilities. In general, we argue that subjects’ causal ratings are judgments of the magnitude of perceptually salient variables in the experiment.     

study of taste perception

Taste stimulus identification was studied in order to more thoroughly examine human taste perception. Ten replicates of an array of 10 taste stimuli—NaCl, KCl, Na glutamate, quinine.HCl, citric acid, sucrose, aspartame, and NaCl-sucrose, acid-sucrose, and quinine-sucrose mixtures—were presented to normal subjects for identification from a list of corresponding stimulus names. Because perceptually similar substances are confused in identification tasks, the result was ataste confusion matrix. Consistency of identification for the 10 stimuli (T ₁₀) and for each stimulus pair (T ₂) was quantified with measures derived from information theory. Forty-two untrained subjects made an average of 57.4% correct identifications. An averageT ₁₀ of 2.25 of the maximum 3.32 bits and an averageT ₂ of 0.84 of a maximum 1.0 bit of information were transmitted. In a second experiment, 40 trained subjects per-formed better than 20 untrained subjects. The results suggested that the identification procedure may best be used to assess taste function following 1–2 training replicates. The patterns of taste confusion indicate that the 10 stimuli resemble one another to varying extents, yet each can be considered perceptually unique.     

A discrete time model for detection of randomly presented stimuli

Considered in this paper is a discrete-time Markov decision process with unobservable states, which occurs in equipment checking, medical diagnosis, signal detection, and reaction time studies. The process is characterized by (i) a state S₀ that at some unknown time t, which is determined probabilistically, turns into an absorbing state S₁; (ii) observations that provide fallible information about the true state and which are taken sequentially to determine whether or not the change from S₀ to S₁ has occurred; and (iii) losses for a false alarm and for delays in detecting the change. A response model is proposed, prescribing a terminal decision as soon as the posterior probability that S₁ obtains reaches or exceeds a fixed probability boundary. Predictions are derived concerning the probability of false alarm and several conditional distributions of the number of observations taken.     

Pseudocontingencies derived from categorically organized memory representations

Pseudocontingencies (PCs) allow for inferences about the contingency between two variables X and Y when the conditions for genuine contingency assessment are not met. Even when joint observations X _i and Y _i about the same reference objects i are not available or are detached in time or space, the correlation r(X _i ,Y _i ) is readily inferred from base rates. Inferred correlations are positive (negative) if X and Y base rates are skewed in the same (different) directions. Such PC inferences afford useful proxies for actually existing contingencies. While previous studies have focused on PCs due to environmental base rates, the present research highlights memory organization as a natural source of PC effects. When information about two attributes X and Y is represented in a hierarchically organized categorical memory code, as category-wise base rates p(X) and p(Y), the reconstruction of item-level information from category base rates will naturally produce PC effects. Three experiments support this contention. When the yes base rates of two respondents in four questionnaire subscales (categories) were correlated, recalled and predicted item-level responses were correlated in the same direction, even when the original responses to specific items within categories were correlated in the opposite direction.     

How impressions of other drivers affect one’s behavior when merging lanes

In recent years, systems have been developed to realize automatic driving based on objective information such as the relative distance and relative speed between vehicles. However, humans still must drive in complex situations, for instance, when merging lanes. In such driving situations, it is possible that people make decisions based not only on objective information, but also on subjective information. This study examined how subjective information, specifically, a driver’s impression of the other vehicle, affects the decision to merge in front of or behind the other vehicle when merging lanes on a highway. Twenty participants (n_male = 10; n_female = 10; M_age = 43.92 [SD_age = 11.40]) joined two experiments, Days 1E and 2E, using a driving simulator. Two months after participating in Day 1E the participants joined Day 2E. In the Day 1E, they drove either on the merging lane or the main lane and merged lanes while considering the other vehicle driving along the adjacent lane. This experiment measured the probability that the participants drove in front of another vehicle upon merging, which is defined as “lead probability.” The Day 2E was similar to 1E, except for the manipulation of the participants’ impression of the other vehicle as being aggressive/cautious via acceleration/deceleration of the other vehicle, and through the contents of the instructions regarding the other vehicle’s driving characteristics. In the Day 2E, the participants were randomly assigned to two: Aggressive or Cautious conditions. As the result of comparing the lead probabilities, it was found that only when the participants were driving on the merging lane and had the impression that the other vehicle is aggressive, the impression lowered the lead probability. The result indicates that people make decisions based not only on objective information but also on subjective information for specific driving situations, such as merging lanes. These findings can help in the development of automated driving systems that allow safer merging.     

Is it or isn’t it: Listeners make rapid use of prosody to infer speaker meanings

A visual world experiment examined the time course for pragmatic inferences derived from visual context and contrastive intonation contours. We used the construction It looks like an X pronounced with either (a) a H^* pitch accent on the final noun and a low boundary tone, or (b) a contrastive L + H^* pitch accent and a rising boundary tone, a contour that can support contrastive inference (e.g., It LOOKS_L+H*like a zebra_L-H%… (but it is not)). When the visual display contained a single related set of contrasting pictures (e.g. a zebra vs. a zebra-like animal), effects of LOOKS_L+H* emerged prior to the processing of phonemic information from the target noun. The results indicate that the prosodic processing is incremental and guided by contextually-supported expectations. Additional analyses ruled out explanations based on context-independent heuristics that might substitute for online computation of contrast.     

Low-Level Phenomenal Vision Despite Unilateral Destruction of Primary Visual Cortex

GY, an extensively studied human hemianope, is aware of salient visual events in his cortically blind field but does not call this “vision.” To learn whether he has low-level conscious visual sensations or whether instead he has gained conscious knowledge about, or access to, visual information that does not produce a conscious phenomenal sensation, we attempted to image process a stimulus s presented to the impaired field so that when the transformed stimulus T(s) was presented to the normal hemifield it would cause a sensation similar to that caused by s in the impaired field. While degradation of contrast, spatio-temporal filtering, contrast reversal, and addition of smear and random blobs all failed to match the response to a flashed bar s_f, moving textures of low contrast were accepted to match the response to a moving contrast-defined bar, s_m. Orientation and motion direction discrimination of the perceptually matched stimuli [s_m and T(s_m)] was closely similar. We suggest that the existence of a satisfactory match indicates that GY has phenomenal vision.     

The center and range of the probability interval as factors affecting ambiguity preferences

Ambiguous decision situations are characterized as having probabilities that are uncertain. The uncertainty is due to the common, real-world deficiency of information about the process by which the outcomes are determined. Thirty lotteries having uncertain probabilities were constructed by varying the centers and the ranges of the intervals within which the imprecise probabilities of winning could lie. Pairs of the lotteries were presented as choice alternatives to subjects, with each pair having lotteries with the same interval center but differing interval ranges. Ambiguity avoidance, the selection of the less ambiguous option, was found to increase with the interval center C, with ambiguity indifference occurring for values of C ? 0.40. No evidence of ambiguity seeking as the prevalent behavior was obtained. Ambiguity avoidance did not significantly increase with the interval range R, but an interaction effect between C and the ranges R₁ and R₂ of the choice pair was obtained. This effect of the ranges could not be described simply by knowledge of the difference R₁ ? R₂; knowledge of both individual values was necessary. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

A kinematic approach to the conceptual representations of this and that

The Italian demonstrative pronouns questo/a (‘this_[mas/fem]’) and quello/a (‘that_[mas/fem]’) implicitly convey information about objects’ distance with respect to the speaker. Our study investigated the referents of questo/a (‘this_[mas/fem]’) and quello/a (‘that_[mas/fem]’) by analysing their influence on reach-to-grasp actions towards objects located near to (12 cm) or far from (30 cm) the participant. Upon acoustic instruction containing one or the other pronoun, participants had to reach for and grasp a target object. Results showed an effect of pronoun on movement planning. When the object was in the far position, reaction times were faster for the congruent pronoun quello/a, whereas when it was in the near position they were faster for the congruent pronoun questo/a. Interactions between implied and real target distance suggest that the conceptual spaces of questo/a and quello/a do not map onto a strict distinction between peripersonal and extrapersonal space.     

Judgments of happiness during trail running: Pleasure,engagement, and meaning

ObjectivesIt has been theorized that happiness is derived from three major, unique sets of life experience: pleasure, engagement, and meaning. The present study examined the mental processes by which individuals combined five information cues (relatedness, autonomy, competence, mental vitality and physical vitality) when judging the degree of happiness felt by a trail runner during a run.Design/methodThe participants (104 adult male athletes; M_age = 32.70; SD = 10.86) rated pleasure, engagement, and meaning in 32 scenarios built from combinations of these cues.ResultsThe results of multivariate and univariate analyses of variance indicated that all five cues had a positive effect on judgments of pleasure, engagement, and meaning. The participants used three different information integration rules, depending on the pathway to happiness being probed.ConclusionsThe information integration and the integration rules highlighted the different contributions of pleasure, engagement, and meaning in cognitive building of happiness.     

Epistemic closure and commutative, nonassociative residuated structures

K-axiom-based epistemic closure for explicit knowledge is rejected for even the most trivial cases of deductive inferential reasoning on account of the fact that the closure axiom does not extend beyond a raw consequence relation. The recognition that deductive inference concerns interaction as much as it concerns consequence allows for perspectives from logics of multi-agent information flow to be refocused onto mono-agent deductive reasoning. Instead of modeling the information flow between different agents in a communicative or announcement setting, we model the information flow between different states of a single agent as that agent reasons deductively. The resource management of the database of agent states for the deductive reasoning fragment in question is covered by the residuated structure that encodes the nonassociative Lambek Calculus with permutation, bottom, and identity: NLP ₀₁ .     

An axiomatization of the ratio/difference representation

If ≥_r and ≥_d are two quaternary relations on an arbitrary set A, a ratio/difference representation for ≥_r and ≥_d is defined to be a function f that represents ≥_r as an ordering of numerical ratios and ≥_d as an ordering of numerical differences. Krantz, Luce, Suppes and Tversky (1971, Foundations of Measurement. New York, Academic Press) proposed an axiomatization of the ratio/difference representation, but their axiomatization contains an error. After describing a counterexample to their axiomatization, Theorem 1 of the present article shows that it actually implies a weaker result: if ≥_r and ≥_d are two quaternary retations satisfying the axiomatization proposed by Krantz et al. (1971), and if ≥_r′ and ≥_d′ are the relations that are inverse to ≥_r and ≥_d, respectively, then either there exists a ratio/difference representation for ≥_r and ≥_d, or there exists a ratio/difference representation for ≥_r′ and ≥_d′, but not both. Theorem 2 identifies a new condition which, when added to the axioms of Krantz et al. (1971), yields the existence of a ratio/difference representation for relations ≥_r and ≥_d.     

The use of a mental imagery intervention to enhance integrated regulation for exercise among women commencing an exercise program

The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of a mental imagery intervention designed to enhance integrated regulation for exercise among women commencing an exercise program. Healthy women who previously did not exercise regularly (N?=?102; M _age ?=?29.54, SD?=?8.34) participated in an 8-week cardiovascular exercise program in which they exercised 3 times each week at a moderate intensity. The intervention group (n?=?51) received weekly guided imagery sessions which were administered in person via audio recording. A comparison group (i.e., attention control; n?=?51) received health information delivered in the same manner. Despite substantial dropout of participants from both groups, the analysis revealed that participants in the imagery group experienced greater changes in integration than participants in the comparison group. These findings support the utility of imagery interventions for influencing exercise-related cognitions, and more specifically integrated regulation.     

Multilinear representations for ordinal utility functions

An ordinal utility function u over two attributes X₁, X₂ is additive if there exists a strictly monotonic function ϕ such that ϕ(u) = v₁(x₂) + v₂(x₂) for some functions v₁, v₂. Here we consider the class of ordinal utility functions over n attributes for which each pair of attributes is additive, but not necessarily separable, for any fixed levels of the remaining attributes. We show that while this class is more general than those that are ordinally additive, the assessment task is of the same order of difficulty, and involves a hierarchy of multilinear rather than additive decompositions.