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Larry May 《The Journal of value inquiry》1992,26(1):7-22
I am grateful to Marcia Baron, Dorothy Leland, Rod Bertolet, Laurence Thomas, Patricia Curd, Lilly Russow and Marilyn Friedman for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 相似文献
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Robert J. Hartman 《Philosophical Studies》2016,173(10):2845-2865
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Ronald N. Giere 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(3):425-427
Hanson claims that moral responsibility should be distributed among both the humans and artifacts comprising complex wholes
that produce morally relevant outcomes in the world. I argue that this claim is not sufficiently supported. In particular,
adopting a consequentialist understanding of morality does not by itself support the view that the existence of a causally
necessary object in such a complex whole is sufficient for assigning moral responsibility to that object. Moreover, there are good reasons, both evolutionary and contemporary,
for not adopting this stance. 相似文献
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In this paper the moral responsibility of a Healthcare Organization (HCO) is conceived as an inextricable aspect of the identity of the HCO. We attempt to show that by exploring this relation a more profound insight in moral responsibility can be gained. Referring to Charles Taylor we explore the meaning of the concept of identity. It consists of three interdependent dimensions: a moral, a dialogical, and a narrative one. In section two we develop some additional arguments to apply his concept of personal identity to organizations. The final section works out the relationship of three dimensions of identity to some actual issues in contemporary HCOs: the tension between care and justice, the importance of dialogues about the diversity of goods, and the relevance of becoming familiar with the life-story of the HCO. Identity of an HCO is established and developed in commitments to and identification with certain goods that are central for a HCO. However, many of these goods are interwoven with everyday practices and policies. Therefore, moral responsibility asks for articulation of goods that often stay implicit and should not be reduced to a merely procedural approach. However difficult this articulation may be, if it is not tried at all HCOs run the risk of drifting away from their very identity as healthcare institutions: to offer care to patients and to do this in accordance with demands of social justice. 相似文献
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F. Allan Hanson 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(3):415-424
Recent social theory has departed from methodological individualism’s explanation of action according to the motives and dispositions
of human individuals in favor of explanation in terms of broader agencies consisting of both human and nonhuman elements described
as cyborgs, actor-networks, extended agencies, or distributed cognition. This paper proposes that moral responsibility for
action also be vested in extended agencies. It advances a consequentialist view of responsibility that takes moral responsibility
to be a species of causal responsibility, and it answers objections that might be raised on the basis of intentions and deserts.
相似文献
F. Allan HansonEmail: |
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Richard M. Glatz 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):257-272
Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible
for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an
agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent
lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an incompatibilist about determinism
and moral responsibility can safely ignore so-called “Frakfurt-style cases” and continue to argue for incompatibilism on the
grounds that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. My argument relies on a simple—indeed, simplistic—weakening
of the principle of alternate possibilities that is explicitly designed to be immune to Frankfurt-style criticism. This alternative
to the principle of alternate possibilities is so simplistic that it will no doubt strike many readers as philosophically
fallow. I argue that it is not. I argue that the addition of one highly plausible premise allows for the modified principle
to be employed in an argument for incompatibilism that begins with the observation that determinism rules out the ability
to do otherwise. On the merits of this argument I conclude that deterministic moral responsibility is impossible and that
Frankfurt’s criticism of the principle of alternate possibilities—even if successful to that end—may be safely ignored.
相似文献
Richard M. GlatzEmail: |
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Bruce N. Waller 《Philosophia》2004,31(3-4):427-447
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Angela M. Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):367-392
Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition
of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, what really matters in determining a person’s responsibility for
some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments.
Such accounts might therefore be understood as updated versions of what Susan Wolf has called “real self views,” insofar as
they attempt to ground an agent’s responsibility for her actions and attitudes in the fact (when it is a fact) that they express
who she is as a moral agent. As such, they seem to be open to some of the same objections Wolf originally raised to such accounts,
and in particular to the objection that they cannot license the sorts of robust moral assessments involved in our current
practices of moral responsibility. My aim in this paper is to try to respond to this challenge, by clarifying the kind of
robust moral assessments I take to be licensed by (at least some) non-volitional accounts of responsibility and by explaining
why these assessments do not in general require the agent to have voluntary control over everything for which she is held
responsible. I also argue that the limited applicability of the distinction between “bad agents” and “blameworthy agents”
on these accounts is in fact a mark in their favor.
相似文献
Angela M. SmithEmail: |
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Jamieson D 《Science and engineering ethics》2000,6(2):265-73; discussion 279-87
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This paper starts from the presupposition that moral codes often do not suffice to make agents understand their moral responsibility.
We will illustrate this statement with a concrete example of engineers who design a truck’s trailer and who do not think traffic
safety is part of their responsibility. This opinion clashes with a common supposition that designers in fact should do all
that is in their power to ensure safety in traffic. In our opinion this shows the need for a moral philosophy that helps engineers
to interpret their responsibility and think more critically about it. For this purpose we will explore the moral philosophy
of Alasdair MacIntyre, which is particularly interesting because he locates the beginning of moral thinking in the daily practice
of a profession. This is consistent with the history of moral codes, for codes are also the product of moral reflection by
professionals. We will use MacIntyre’s philosophy to (1) explain what is wrong with the designers’ understanding of their
responsibility and (2) show a possible way to bring their reflection to a more self-critical level. We will also inspect MacIntyre’s
proposal critically. 相似文献
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Benjamin Matheson 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2019,49(4):458-480
In this paper, I propose and defend a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility. According to the condition I propose, an agent owns a mental item if and only if it is part of or is partly grounded by a coherent set of psychological states. As I discuss, other theorists have proposed or alluded to conditions like psychological coherence, but each proposal is unsatisfactory in some way. My account appeals to narrative explanation to elucidate the relevant sense of psychological coherence. 相似文献
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Wolfendale J 《The American journal of bioethics : AJOB》2008,8(2):28-38
New scientific advances have created previously unheard of possibilities for enhancing combatants' performance. Future war fighters may be smarter, stronger, and braver than ever before. If these technologies are safe, is there any reason to reject their use? In this article, I argue that the use of enhancements is constrained by the importance of maintaining the moral responsibility of military personnel. This is crucial for two reasons: the military's ethical commitments require military personnel to be morally responsible agents, and moral responsibility is necessary for integrity and the moral emotions of guilt and remorse, both of which are important for moral growth and psychological well-being. Enhancements that undermined combatants' moral responsibility would therefore undermine the military's moral standing and would harm combatants' well-being. A genuine commitment to maintaining the military's ethical standards and the well-being of combatants therefore requires a careful analysis of performance-enhancing technologies before they are implemented. 相似文献