Making trade-offs: a probabilistic and context-sensitive model of choice behavior

The stochastic difference model assumes that decision makers trade normalized attribute value differences when making choices. The model is stochastic, with choice probabilities depending on the normalized difference variable, d, and a decision threshold, delta. The decision threshold indexes a person's sensitivity to attribute value differences and is a free estimated parameter of the model. Depending on the choice context, a person may be more or less sensitive to attribute value differences, and hence delta may be used to measure context effects. With proportional difference used as the normalization, the proportional difference model (PD) was tested with 9 data sets, including published data (e.g., J. L. Myers, M. M. Suydam, & B. Gambino, 1965; A. Tversky, 1969). The model accounted for individual and group data well and described violations of stochastic dominance, independence, and weak and strong stochastic transitivity.     

Cognitive models of choice: comparing decision field theory to the proportional difference model

People often face preferential decisions under risk. To further our understanding of the cognitive processes underlying these preferential choices, two prominent cognitive models, decision field theory (DFT; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993 ) and the proportional difference model (PD; González-Vallejo, 2002 ), were rigorously tested against each other. In two consecutive experiments, the participants repeatedly had to choose between monetary gambles. The first experiment provided the reference to estimate the models' free parameters. From these estimations, new gamble pairs were generated for the second experiment such that the two models made maximally divergent predictions. In the first experiment, both models explained the data equally well. However, in the second generalization experiment, the participants' choices were much closer to the predictions of DFT. The results indicate that the stochastic process assumed by DFT, in which evidence in favor of or against each option accumulates over time, described people's choice behavior better than the trade-offs between proportional differences assumed by PD.     

Ratio versus difference comparators in choice.

Several theories in the learning literature describe decision rules for performance utilizing ratios and differences. The present paper analyzes rules for choice based on either delays to food, immediacies (the inverse of delays), or rates of food, combined factorially with a ratio or difference comparator. An experiment using the time-left procedure (Gibbon & Church, 1981) is reported with motivational differentials induced by unequal reinforcement durations. The preference results were compatible with a ratio-comparator decision rule, but not with decision rules based on differences. Differential reinforcement amounts were functionally equivalent to changes in delays to food. Under biased reinforcement, overall food rate was increased, but variance in preference was increased or decreased depending on which alternative was favored. This is a Weber law finding that is compatible with multiplicative, scalar sources of variance but incompatible with pacemaker rate changes proportional to food presentation rate.     

Coherent choice functions under uncertainty

We discuss several features of coherent choice functions—where the admissible options in a decision problem are exactly those that maximize expected utility for some probability/utility pair in fixed set S of probability/utility pairs. In this paper we consider, primarily, normal form decision problems under uncertainty—where only the probability component of S is indeterminate and utility for two privileged outcomes is determinate. Coherent choice distinguishes between each pair of sets of probabilities regardless the “shape” or “connectedness” of the sets of probabilities. We axiomatize the theory of choice functions and show these axioms are necessary for coherence. The axioms are sufficient for coherence using a set of probability/almost-state-independent utility pairs. We give sufficient conditions when a choice function satisfying our axioms is represented by a set of probability/state-independent utility pairs with a common utility.     

Effects of income on drug choice in humans.

The effects of income (money available to spend during the experimental session) on human choice were examined in a concurrent-schedule arrangement. Subjects were 7 nicotine-dependent smokers, and reinforcers were puffs on the subject's usual brand of cigarette ("own") and puffs on a less preferred brand of cigarette with equal nicotine content ("other"). Across sessions, income varied and the price of the two reinforcers was held constant, with the other puffs one fifth the price of the own puffs. As income increased, consumption of own puffs increased while consumption of the less expensive other puffs decreased. These effects of income on choice were highly consistent across subjects. For some subjects, however, income had little effect on total puff consumption. Finally, an additional condition examined whether price and income manipulations would have functionally equivalent effects on choice by repeating an income condition in which the price of the other brand was increased. Although the increased price of the other puffs decreased their consumption in 4 subjects, 2 subjects showed increased consumption of the other puffs at the higher price. The results, when defined in economic terms, indicate that the own puffs were a normal good (consumption and income are directly related), the other puffs were an inferior good (consumption and income are inversely related), and the direct relationship between consumption of the other puffs and their price is defined as a Giffengood effect. The latter result also suggests that for these 2 subjects, price and income manipulations had equivalent effects on choice. These results extend findings from previous studies that have examined the effects of income on choice responding to human subjects and drug reinforcers, and provide a framework for further experimental tests of the effects of income on human choice behavior. Methodological and theoretical implications for the study of choice and for behavioral pharmacology are discussed.     

Cognitive slowing in decision tasks in early and advanced Parkinson's disease.

Ten untreated patients with recently diagnosed Parkinson's disease (PD), 9 treated patients with more advanced pathology, and 17 matched normal controls were investigated with three reaction tasks with increasing cognitive load but identical motor requirements: simple reaction, choice reaction with indicative stimuli, and choice reaction with ambiguous stimuli. Times required until a home key was released (= reaction time) and from then until a response key was pressed (= movement time) were recorded. Estimates of pure decision time (overall response time minus movement time in a simple reaction time task) revealed a difference between advanced and early PD patients. Advanced PD patients showed an overall slowing of decision time in the reaction time tasks, but the effect of the cognitive load of the tasks on the decision time was comparable to a control group. The untreated early PD patients performed quite normally in the more simple decision tasks but showed a disproportionate slowing of decision time in tasks with higher cognitive load.     

The influence of decision heuristics and overconfidence on multiattribute choice: A process-tracing study

In the present study it was shown that decision heuristics and confidence judgements play important roles in the building of preferences. Based on a dual-process account of thinking, the study compared people who did well versus poorly on a series of decision heuristics and overconfidence judgement tasks. The two groups were found to differ with regard to their information search behaviour in introduced multiattribute choice tasks. High performers on the judgemental tasks were less influenced in their decision processes by numerical information format (probabilities vs. frequencies) compared to low performers. They also looked at more attributes and spent more time on the multiattribute choice tasks. The results reveal that performance on decision heuristics and overconfidence tasks has a bearing both on heuristic and analytic processes in multiattribute decision making.     

Choice probabilities and choice functions

Choice probabilities are basic to much of the theory of individual choice behavior in mathematical psychology. On the other hand, consumer economics has relied primarily on preference relations and choice functions for its theories of individual choice. Although there are sizable literatures on the connections between choice probabilities and preference relations, and between preference relations and choice functions, little has been done—apart from their common ties to preference relations—to connect choice probabilities and choice functions. The latter connection is studied in this paper. A family of choice functions that depends on a threshold parameter is defined from a choice probability function. It is then shown what must be true of the choice probability function so that the choice functions satisfy three traditional rationality conditions. Conversely, it is shown what must be true of the choice functions so that the choice probability function satisfies a version of Luce's axiom for individual choice probabilities.     

Obsessive compulsive features predict cautious decision strategies

Introduction: Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is occasionally characterized by decision-making deficits. Compared to the isolated analysis of the choice and response times, characterizing decision outputs at the level of latent processes can be a more powerful approach in revealing differences, even in subclinical cases. We hypothesized that participants with higher obsessive compulsive (OC) features would set their decision thresholds higher and thus make more cautious decisions. Method: We used a perceptual two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) task (dot motion discrimination) to test this hypothesis in a non-clinical sample (N?=?74). We fitted the data with the diffusion model and evaluated the optimality of decision outputs. We also conducted exploratory analyses to reveal which subscales best predicted the differences at the level of latent decision processes. Results: Higher OC total scores in Maudsley and Padua scales significantly predicted higher threshold settings (cautiousness). The follow-up exploratory analyses with subscale scores showed that checking and rumination tendencies predicted higher threshold settings whereas washing tendency predicted faster non-decision times. Conclusions: Our primary results showed that participants with higher degrees of OC features exhibit more cautious decision making. Our exploratory analyses also revealed distinctions based on different types of OC features in both controlled (cautiousness in decision making) and automatic (faster non-decision times) elements of the decision process.     

Linking together different measures of preference: A dynamic model of matching derived from decision field theory

Two frequently used tasks for measuring preferences among gambles are choice and selling price tasks. However, the rank orders observed with these tasks do not agree, and these disagreements are called preference reversals. In this article, we propose an extension of decision field theory that was originally designed to account for choice probability and the distribution of choice response times. In this extension, we show how this same theory can be used to derive predictions for the distribution of values produced by selling price tasks. This model not only accounts for the basic preference reversal results but also can explain the effects of various information processing factors on preference reversals including time, effort, and practice. We conclude by summarizing the advantages of the decision field matching model over two earlier models of choice and selling prices—expression theory and the contingent weighting model.     

调节模式对选择超载的影响及其机制：一个有中介的调节模型

当前,选择超载领域研究的焦点已从验证其是否存在,转向至其何时存在,即边界条件的探讨。本研究基于调节模式理论,分别以决策后悔和延迟选择作为选择超载的指标,开展两个实验探查选择超载存在的调节模式条件及所涉及的内在机制。实验1以决策后悔作指标,运用量表测试法操纵调节模式,初步探讨调节模式对选择超载的影响,结果发现调节模式调节了选项集与决策后悔的关系,即对评估模式的个体来说,面对大选项集比小选项集时体验到更强的后悔情绪,出现了选择超载,而对运动模式的个体而言,两种条件下的决策后悔无显著差异;实验2以延迟选择作指标,通过任务启动法操纵调节模式,进一步探讨调节模式对选择超载的影响及其机制,结果发现调节模式调节了选项集与延迟选择的关系,即对评估模式的个体来说,面对大选项集比小选项集时更倾向于延迟选择,出现了选择超载,而对运动模式的个体而言,两种条件下的延迟选择偏好无显著差异,进一步有中介的调节模型分析表明选择难度可以部分解释这种效应。总之,通过采用不同方法操纵调节模式,选取不同的选择超载指标,数据结果都一致支持：评估模式的个体比运动模式的个体更容易出现选择超载,选择难度在其中发挥着一定的中介作用。     

Some conditions affecting the choice to cooperate or compete

Three experiments investigated conditions affecting the choice to cooperate or compete. Experiment I compared the effects first of an individual activity, then of a competitive task as an alternative to cooperation. For both comparisons, subjects could earn more by cooperating. Choice of competition, but not individual activity, was found to depend on the task choice contingencies. Competition predominated when both subjects could compete if either or both chose competition. Previously competitive pairs cooperated when both subjects could cooperate if either or both chose cooperation. Experiment II investigated the effects of differences in magnitude of the reinforcers for cooperating or competing. Choice between the two alternatives was manipulated in all pairs by varying reinforcer difference. Competition was chosen over cooperation only within the limits within which competition was potentially profitable. Experiment III replicated the findings of Experiment II using triads. Subjects in triads, however, were more likely to withdraw from the experiment. Thus, the data for pairs and triads suggest an orderly relation between reinforcer difference for cooperating or competing and task choice. Motivation of subjects to maximize relative gain by competing can be overridden by moderate reinforcer differences favoring cooperation.     

Reconsidering the Relation between Regret and Responsibility

Recently Connolly, Ordóñez, and Coughlan challenged the view that regret is partly determined by perceived responsibility for the regretted outcome [Connolly, T. Ordóñez, L. D., & Coughlan, R. (1997). Regret and responsibility in the evaluation of decision outcomes.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 70, 73–85]. In a series of experiments they manipulated whether actors arrived at an outcome through their own decision or through a “computer assignment” over which they had no influence. This decision agency manipulation did not affect their “regret measure.” We show in two experiments that this null-effect is due to the fact that regret was measured by means of a general happiness assessment. In the present research we replicated the basic design of their experiments and also found no effects of decision agency on the happiness assessment. However, the results showed the predicted effects of decision agency when regret was directly measured. Moreover, a measure of disappointment seemed to indicate the opposite effect: People are more disappointed when a negative outcome is caused by a computer assignment than when caused by their own choice. The role of regret and disappointment in decision making is discussed.     

Quantified choice of root-mean-square errors of approximation for evaluation and power analysis of small differences between structural equation models

MacCallum, Browne, and Cai (2006) proposed a new framework for evaluation and power analysis of small differences between nested structural equation models (SEMs). In their framework, the null and alternative hypotheses for testing a small difference in fit and its related power analyses were defined by some chosen root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) pairs. In this article, we develop a new method that quantifies those chosen RMSEA pairs and allows a quantitative comparison of them. Our method proposes the use of single RMSEA values to replace the choice of RMSEA pairs for model comparison and power analysis, thus avoiding the differential meaning of the chosen RMSEA pairs inherent in the approach of MacCallum et al. (2006). With this choice, the conventional cutoff values in model overall evaluation can directly be transferred and applied to the evaluation and power analysis of model differences.     

Idiosyncratic matching and choice: When less is more

In three studies, reliance on “goodness-of-fit” criteria exerted an influence on assessments of pay-TV packages that challenged normative standards relating to the principle of dominance. Studies 1 and 2 showed that the addition of one or more non-favored channels to a package of favored ones resulted in lower consumer interest, and the subtraction of one or more non-favored channels from a mixed package resulted in greater consumer interest, even when the relevant offering price remained unchanged. Study 3 demonstrated the specific relevance of perceived idiosyncrasy to this phenomenon. Thus, participants responded more positively to a given price reduction for relinquishing a channel they did not like when they believed that their preference ordering was idiosyncratic rather than one shared by their peers. These findings, buttressed by additional data collection to rule out some alternative interpretations and permit within-subject as well as between-subject comparisons, extend the theoretical and practical implications of previous research on the non-normative use of personal “goodness-of-fit” criteria in evaluating the attractiveness of products and programs.     

Emotion regulation and risk taking: Predicting risky choice in deliberative decision making

Only very recently has research demonstrated that experimentally induced emotion regulation strategies (cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression) affect risky choice (e.g., Heilman et al., 2010). However, it is unknown whether this effect also operates via habitual use of emotion regulation strategies in risky choice involving deliberative decision making. We investigated the role of habitual use of emotion regulation strategies in risky choice using the “cold” deliberative version of the Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner et al., 2009). Fifty-three participants completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) and—one month later—the CCT and the PANAS. Greater habitual cognitive reappraisal use was related to increased risk taking, accompanied by decreased sensitivity to changes in probability and loss amount. Greater habitual expressive suppression use was related to decreased risk taking. The results show that habitual use of reappraisal and suppression strategies predict risk taking when decisions involve predominantly cognitive-deliberative processes.     

权力对延迟选择的影响

本研究旨在考察权力对延迟选择的影响, 并探讨决策难度在其中的调节作用以及决策过程的中介作用。两个实验均先操纵个体的权力状态, 然后再请被试完成随后的延迟选择任务。结果发现, 决策难度可调节权力对延迟选择的影响, 当决策困难时, 高权力者具有更低的延迟倾向, 当决策容易时, 权力的影响消失。决策过程的加工变异性可中介权力对延迟选择的影响。结果表明, 低权力者比高权力者具有更高的延迟倾向(尤其当决策困难时), 不同权力水平者在决策过程上的差异或可部分解释此种现象。     

Distinguishing familiarity from fluency for the compound word pair effect in associative recognition

We examined whether processing fluency contributes to associative recognition of unitized pre-experimental associations. In Experiments 1A and 1B, we minimized perceptual fluency by presenting each word of pairs on separate screens at both study and test, yet the compound word (CW) effect (i.e., hit and false-alarm rates greater for CW pairs with no difference in discrimination) did not reduce. In Experiments 2A and 2B, conceptual fluency was examined by comparing transparent (e.g., hand bag) and opaque (e.g., rag time) CW pairs in lexical decision and associative recognition tasks. Lexical decision was faster for transparent CWs (Experiment 2A) but in associative recognition, the CW effect did not differ by CW pair type (Experiment 2B). In Experiments 3A and 3B, we examined whether priming that increases processing fluency would influence the CW effect. In Experiment 3A, CW and non-compound word pairs were preceded with matched and mismatched primes at test in an associative recognition task. In Experiment 3B, only transparent and opaque CW pairs were presented. Results showed that presenting matched versus mismatched primes at test did not influence the CW effect. The CW effect in yes-no associative recognition is due to reliance on enhanced familiarity of unitized CW pairs.     

The relationship between the motive to avoid success and vocational choice

This study examined, for 221 black and white male and female college students, the relationship between the Motive to Avoid Success (M_−s) and: (a) sex and race; (b) congruency, consistency, and differentiation of occupational choice; and (c) occupational aspirations. M_−s was assessed by a recent scoring system for verbal TAT cues and occupational choice patterns were analyzed by the Self-Directed Search. The results showed a significant sex difference on M_−s. High M_−s, in white females predicted well defined, sex-role stereotyped, and low occupational aspirations, but for white males it predicted high aspirations. No significant results were found for black males, and M_−s in black females seemed to be related to economic well-being.