两种人本心理学的辩论

该文沿着JohnRowan(1989)提出是否有两种人本心理学这一问题 ,追溯了人本心理学内部分歧的由来 ,即罗洛·梅与罗杰斯在 2 0世纪 80年代初有关人性问题的争论 ,以及 1986年罗洛·梅对超个人心理学的批评。文章着重介绍了维尔伯 (KenWilber)对这一领域的分歧所做的全面分析 ,指出了两种人本心理学在一些基本问题上的不同立场。这两种心理学就是以罗洛·梅为代表的存在主义取向的人本心理学和以马斯洛、罗杰斯、维尔伯为代表的从自我实现走向自我超越的人本心理学     

罗洛·梅的焦虑理论述评

当代著名的人本主义心理学家和心理治疗大师罗洛·梅对心理学最主要的贡献之一是他的焦虑理论。在罗洛·梅存在分析观的基础上,从焦虑的涵义、焦虑的时代根源、焦虑对人的影响及应时三个方面阐述了罗洛·梅的焦虑理论。对罗洛·梅的焦虑理论的梳理和总结,对于关照当前中国的社会文化大有裨益。     

ON TWO ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION: A RESPONSE TO DAVID GRIFFIN

Abstract. In responding to David Griffin's critique of my book, Issues in Science and Religion , I suggest that most of the points which he initially presents as differences between us concerning reduction and emergence are resolved in the second half of his article. I spoke of the emergence of higher-level "properties" and "activities," rather than "entities," but my analysis of whole and parts is similar to his, although it was perhaps not always clearly articulated. We agree also that Alfred North Whitehead's God is involved in every event in ways which avoid the problems of the supernatu-ralist "God of the gaps," but we differ as to whether God's action might be taken into account in a new "post-modern" science.     

A critique of Dennett

This essay is intended to be a systematic exposition and critique of Daniel Dennett's general views. It is divided into three main sections. In section 1 we raise the question of the nature of a plausible scientific psychology, and suggest that the question of whether folk psychology will serve as an adequate scientific psychology is of special relevance in a discussion of Dennett. We then characterize folk psychology briefly. We suggest that Dennett's views have undergone at least one major change, and proceed to discuss both his earlier and his later views.In section 2 we suggest that Dennett is correctly perceived as an instrumentalist in his earlier works. We think that Dennett later abandons this position because of general worries about instrumentalism and, more importantly, because Dennett became convinced that an instrumentalist conception of folk psychology will not enable us to vindicate the notions of personhood, moral agency, and responsibility. This left Dennett with a dilemma. On the one hand, he does not think that beliefs, etc., will turn out to be genuine scientific posits. On the other hand, he thinks that moral agency would be impossible if we could not treat beliefs, etc. as causally efficacious in some suitable sense.In section 3 we discuss Dennett's resolution of this dilemma. The key to his current view, we suggest, is the illata-abstracta distinction. Dennett holds that both illata and abstracta are real and have causal powers, even though only illata are genuine scientific posits. He suggests that beliefs etc. are abstracta, and are the subject matter of what he calls intentional system theory. The subject matter of another theory, what Dennett calls subpersonal cognitive psychology, are illata, which are subpersonal intentional states. The important point is that this distinction lets Dennett have it both ways: (i) Since beliefs are mere abstracta, we need not commit ourselves to the thesis that beliefs will turn out to be posits of an adequate scientific psychology. (ii) Since beliefs have causal power, we are assured of moral and rational agency. We shall argue that Dennett's current view is untenable. If we are right in our arguments, then Dennett's program to produce a scientifically plausible psychology, one that will turn out to vindicate folk psychology (in some suitable sense), is a failure. It fails in the following important ways: (i) What Dennett sketches — intentional system theory cum subpersonal cognitive psychology — is not a plausible scientific psychology. (ii) As a consequence, Dennett also fails to provide a satisfactory foundation for moral and rational agency.     

CREATING IDENTITIES,CREATING VALUES?

A popular view is that we create our own identities and values. An attractive version of this is the thesis that the creation of values follows from the creation of identities. The thesis is best supported by a conception of identity in terms of projects and a conception of values that are internal to projects. The line of thought is: I create my projects; in creating my projects, I create values internal to them; so I create those values. This paper argues that the thesis faces a dilemma: it is either true but uninteresting or interesting but false. The dilemma persists whether the values in question are conceived as purpose‐relative, as moral, or as both purpose‐ relative and moral.     

Mapping and/or Discovering Meaning in Family Therapy: An E-Mail Conversation

Editor's Note: Because of the provocative and stimulating nature of the study reported on by Steven Kogan and Jerry Gale in their article "Decentering Therapy," I have invited one of our Advisory Editors, Chris Beels, to provide some comments about the study and its implications. However, rather than use the standard for mat of a formal "Commentary," followed by an "Authors' Response," Beels, Kogan, and Gale have instead carried out a series of e-mail exchanges, with reactions and responses going back and forth in the form of a dialogue. What follows is a slightly edited version of their conversation. As you will see, this exchange has afforded Beels, Kogan, and Gale the opportunity not only to critique each other's ideas, but also to raise questions and to puzzle together about the linkages that might be forged between the Kogan and Gale study and earlier therapy process research carried out by Beels using Scheflen's context analysis techniques. The use of a conversation format seemed more consonant with the research being discussed, research that urges a stance of openness and curiosity rather than formal hypothesis testing and closure. Hence my decision to endorse this experiment in "commentary as conversation," rather than "commentary as debate." What follows is the first three rounds of this "conversation," with the "roughess" of ordinary e-mail communications retained, but with some minor editing in order to facilitate clarity and narrative flow .     

Avowals and First-Person Privilege

When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called "first-person privilege." If I now said: "I have a headache," or "I'm thinking about Venice," I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We reject both approaches. On our proposed account, a full explanation of the privilege must recognize avowals as expressive performances, which can be taken to reveal directly the subject's present mental condition. We are able to improve on special access accounts and deflationary accounts, as well as familiar expressive accounts, by explaining both the asymmetries and the continuities between avowals and other pronouncements, and by locating a genuine though non-epistemic source for first-person privilege.     

In search and proof of human beings, not machines

My intentions are twofold in this autobiographical account. On one hand, I hope to present empirical and theoretical evidence for a freely willing human being. On the other, I carefully record the developing stages I lived through to cement my confidence in the image of humanity I would like my readers to accept. I have, in my career development, worked hard to redefine psychological terminology, defend traditional scientific practices, and provide support for all those colleagues who can no longer stand the mechanistic characterization that so many psychology departments insist on. I have spent over 40 years pursuing such goals. It is not likely that I will ever give up my quest for what I take to be a genuine humanity.     

THE SPECIAL COMPOSITION QUESTION IN ACTION

Abstract:  Just as we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of objects composes a single object, we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of actions composes a single action. In the material objects literature, this question is known as the "special composition question," and I take it that there is a similar question to be asked of collections of actions. I will call that question the "special composition question in action," and argue that the correct answer to this question depends on a particular kind of consequence produced by the individual constituent actions.     

Integrating justice and care in animal ethics

In this paper I argue that the standoff between justice and care approaches to animal ethics presents us with a false dilemma. We should take justice's focus on reasoning from principles, and care's use of sympathetic awareness, as two integrated deliberative capacities necessary for the consideration of arguments for extending moral concern to animals. Such an integrated approach rests on a plausible account of the psychology of moral deliberation. I develop my argument as follows. Section I summarizes the nature of the debate between justice and care approaches to animal ethics, focusing on Brian Luke's arguments against justice approaches. Section II provides pro-justice rebuttals to Luke's objections. These rebuttals, while largely successful against Luke's objections, do not account for the intuition that sympathy does play a central epistemological role in animal ethics. Section III explains how sympathy cognitively simulates the perspective of the other, and thus can play an epistemological role in animal ethics. I argue that the abilities to simulate the perspective of the other and to reason from moral principles can complement each other. In section IV, I argue that though it may not be desirable to use both sympathy and reasoning from principles in all moral deliberation, it is a desirable aim when offering, and considering, moral arguments for what I will term the "extensionist project" of extending over moral concern to animals. I make this idea plausible by elucidating the claim that arguments for this project are best thought of as second-order deliberations about our first-order deliberative life.     

论自然律与因果知识的知觉经验基础

<正>一、引论自休谟以来,特别是在科学哲学的演进中,自然律理论与因果理论从来是不可分离的。相比而言,自然律理论具有某种优先地位。因为按照休谟的广为接受的论证,人类的知觉经验并不能直接辩     

Risk standards for pediatric research: rethinking the Grimes ruling

In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute (KKI), the Maryland Court of Appeals, while noting that U.S. federal regulations include risk standards for pediatric research, endorses its own risk standards. The Grimes case has implications for the debate over whether the minimal risk standard should be interpreted based on the risks in the daily lives of most children (the objective interpretation) or the risks in the daily lives of the children who will be enrolled in a given study (the subjective interpretation). The court's use of the objective interpretation to block studies like the KKI study protects individual children who are worse off than the average child. Unfortunately, this approach also may block research intended to improve the lives of these same individuals. A similar dilemma arises in the context of multinational research, suggesting that a "modified objective standard," proposed to address this dilemma in the multinational setting, may offer a framework for addressing the dilemma in the context of pediatric research as well.     

NONDOMINATION AND NORMATIVITY

Abstract:  In an earlier paper, "The Indeterminacy of Republican Policy," I argued that in an important class of cases, republican political theory, as formulated by Philip Pettit, does not have determinate implications for policy. Pettit has replied that my argument was based on a conception of freedom as nondomination that is not his own. In the present paper, I explore the two ways of understanding republican freedom. I first suggest that they may not, in the end, be very different. I then note that if a sharp difference is restored, my conception may have some desirable features.     

From the heart

Abstract

Rollo May and the author constructed an alternative psychology licensing exam putting more focus on the humanities and their relevance for psychology. Colleagues are invited to take the exam, and if they fail, to turn in their licenses.     

Ministry and mental retardation

Conclusion This has been an attempt to show how the parents of the mentally retarded inspired me to take a second look at my theological views, to show the method I used, and to give a few instances out of many in which my theological views have been affected. If space had allowed, it would have been good to show how this human predicament can cast new light on our theological thinking about grace, redemption, and many other categories. On the other hand, each of us has a chance to pursue in depth any single doctrine, using the added perspective of this particular crisis situation.Each of us has the original theological perspective which we had before beginning our pastoral involvements with the mentally retarded and their families. Then, as we focus on this human situation we become aware of an added theological perspective that helps us to take a second look from a different viewpoint. We then find our original view has been reinforced, modified, or enlarged. It is my feeling that a pastor who becomes involved with these particular persons-who need his services very much—will find a golden opportunity to grow theologically.If any of us feel we know all we need to know about God and life and man, this would be a good time to become involved in a pastoral way with a mentally retarded person and his family and get to know them well.     

Sin and suffering in a Catholic understanding of medical ethics.

Drawing chiefly on recent sources, in Part One I sketch an untraditional way of articulating what I claim to be central elements of traditional Catholic morality, treating it as based in virtues, focused on the recipients ("patients") of our attention and concern, and centered in certain person-to-person role-relationships. I show the limited and derivative places of "natural law," and therefore of sin, within that framework. I also sketch out some possible implications for medical ethics of this approach to moral theory, and briefly contrast these with the influential alternative offered by the "principlism" of Beauchamp and Childress. In Part Two, I turn to a Catholic understanding of the nature and meaning of human suffering, drawing especially on writings and addresses of the late Pope John Paul II. He reminds us that physical and mental suffering can provide an opportunity to share in Christ's salvific sacrifice, better to see the nature of our earthly vocation, and to reflect on the dependence that inheres in human existence. At various places, and especially in my conclusion, I suggest a few ways in which this can inform bioethical reflection on morally appropriate responses to those afflicted by physical or mental pain, disability, mental impairment, disease, illness, and poor health prospects. My general point is that mercy must be informed by appreciation of the person's dignity and status. Throughout, my approach is philosophical rather than theological.     

Epistemic issues in the free will debate: can we know when we are free?

In this paper, I argue that the views of Robert Kane on the one hand and John Fischer and Mark Ravizza on the other both lead to the following conclusion: we should have very low confidence in our ability to judge that someone is acting freely or in a way for which they can be held responsible. This in turn means, I claim, that these views, in practice, collapse into a sort of hard incompatibilist position, or the position of a free will denier. That would at least be an unintended consequence, and it might be regarded as a virtual reductio. Versions of the objection could likely be made against a number of other accounts of free will, but I will limit my focus to Kane and Fischer. Along the way, by way of response to some possible objections to my argument, I make some comments about epistemic closure principles.     

Deception of parents during adolescence

Two hundred eighty-one undergraduates at a large university in the southeastern United States anonymously completed a 26-item questionnaire about the degree to which they deceived their parents during high school. Only five percent of the respondents reported that they had never lied to their parents about "where I was." "Who I was with," "my alcohol use," and "my sexual behavior" were additional topics about which they lied the most. It was also found that (1) females lied more than males about sexual behavior, (2) the opposite-sex parent was deceived more often, and (3) intact homes were associated with more lying. Respondents also reported more lies when they lived with their parents than when they left for college. The implications of the findings are discussed.     

Theoretical Hubris and the Willingness To Be Radical: An Open Letter to James J. Gibson

J.J. Gibson's direct perception thesis is the cornerstone of ecological psychology. Not to understand this is not to understand ecological psychology. Beginning in the summer of 1968, when I first met Gibson, and after working with him for the next year at Cornell, I underwent a conversion crisis. I came to appreciate his thesis through a few philosophical insights that I here share with the reader through an open letter to Gibson, where I seek to illuminate the reasons for my conversion from being a Miller-Chomsky psycholinguist and a Piaget devotee to a radical Gibsonian. This conversion has influenced my work even until the present. Indeed, I am still working through its implications in all that I attempt. I share this intimate portrait of my relationship to Gibson and his profound ideas in hope that others who have struggled with his thesis might be helped along their way as I was.