Rankian Will

Otto Rank (1884–1939) served as Freud's closest partner in the psychoanalytic movement from 1906 to 1926. From 1923 on, Rank, initially with Ferenczi, focused on making analysis more therapeutic, emphasizing current experience in the session over historical exploration and interpretation. Rank settled on will as a missing factor, and wrote extensively about it after the break with Freud in 1926, when he moved to Paris. He emphasized the here-and-now, redefined “resistance” as a positive aspect of counter-will, and suggested a time limit for analysis. Ousted from analytic circles in 1930, he eventually moved to New York, continuing to treat patients and teach until his unexpected death at 55 in 1939. After decades of obscurity, Rank has gained readers and therapists whose orientation is interpersonal, client-centered, relational, humanistic, or existential. His influence on post-Freudian ego-psychology is finally being acknowledged as are his ideas about creativity, will, life-fear and death-fear, guilt, and ethics.     

Weakness of Will

My chief aim is to explain how someone can act freely against her own best judgment. But I also have a second aim: to defend a conception of practical rationality according to which someone cannot do something freely if she believes it would be better to do something else. These aims may appear incompatible. But I argue that practical reason has the capacity to undermine itself in such a way that it produces reasons for behaving irrationally. Weakness of will is possible because it is possible to conclude that one has sufficient reason to reject the verdicts of one's own reason.     

Dispositions of the Will

According to Aquinas (1888–1906), the virtue of justice is a habit, that is to say, a stable disposition of the will. Many commentators have found this claim to be puzzling, since it is difficult to see what this might entail, beyond a simple tendency to choose and act in accordance with precepts of justice. However, this objection does not take account of the fact that for Aquinas, the will is the principle of human freedom, and as such, it is expressed through, but not limited to a capacity for particular choices and actions. It therefore needs stable dispositions, towards characteristic aims, in order to function effectively. This paper sets out a case for the cogency of Aquinas’s overall account of the will and its dispositions, by way of an examination of familiar expressions of human freedom which cannot be reduced to a series of individual choices and acts. It then turns to a closer examination of Aquinas’ analysis of the will, arguing that Aquinas’ claims about the orientation of the will towards some overarching and comprehensive good can fruitfully be understood in terms of this expansive conception of human freedom.     

Indeterminist Free Will

The aim of the paper is to prove the consistency of libertarianism. We examine the example of Jane, who deliberates at length over whether to vacation in Colorado (C) or Hawaii (H), weighing the costs and benefits, consulting travel brochures, etc. Underlying phenomenological deliberation is an indeterministic neural process in which nonactual motor neural states n(C) and n(H) corresponding to alternatives C and H remain physically possible up until the moment of decision. The neurophysiological probabilities pr(n(C)) and pr(n(H)) evolve continuously according to the different weights Jane's judgement attaches to C and H at different times during the deliberation. The overall process is indeterministic, since Jane's exact judgemental weighting would vary slightly were the process to be repeated from the same initial conditions. The weighting is however rational, and entirely under Jane's control. This controlled, rational, indeterministic process shows that libertarianism is a consistent philosophical thesis.     

Imagination and Will

1. Evoked potentials generated by cerebral self-stimulation were studied in white rats. Stimulus trains of 30 biphasic rectangular waves of various repetition rates (30, 50, 100, 150, 200 pps) were employed. The pulses were always 4 msec in width and of fixed intensity at all repetition rates for a given animal. Potential changes during a 2-second interval after the termination of a stimulus train were recorded from various points in the cerebral mass and averaged electronically.

2. The early portion of the 2-second interval was characterized by rhythmic oscillations in the alpha range whose number and amplitude were related to repetition rate of the rectangular waves within the stimulus train. The periodicity of the oscillations when they occurred was not so affected and remained practically constant over subjects, intensity of stimulus, and repetition rate.

3. The number of oscillations was greatest at 200 and 150 pps and diminished with diminishing stimulus repetition rates, the drop being greatest below 100 pps.

4. There was a positive covariation between the rate of lever pressing for self-stimulation and the phenomenon of rhythmic after oscillations in the evoked potential. Animals who refused to press the lever for cerebral self-stimulation showed no rhythmic potentials when the stimulus was delivered by E; animals who had become pressers gave good after-discharges when so stimulated.     

Aquinas and Weakness of Will

Aquinas's admirers, reacting against Donald Davidson's criticisms of him, commonly argue (a) that the will does play a role in Aquinas's account of incontinence, and (b) that his explanation of incontinent action turns on the weakness of the will. The first part of this paper argues that they are correct about (a) but wholly mistaken about (b). Aquinas rarely even mentions the weakness of the will, and he never invokes it to explain why someone acts counter to her own better judgment. In his view, such a person has the capacity for self-control but fails to exercise it.
  The second part of the paper considers Gary Watson's account of incontinence, including and especially his objections to analyzing it as the failure to exercise one's capacity for self-control. Here I argue that Aquinas's account better serves the purposes of moral discourse and that it should not be expected to provide the kind of causal explanation Watson seeks.     

Free Will and Contextualism

This paper proposes a contextualist solution to the puzzle about free will. It argues that the context-sensitivity of statements about freedom of the will follows from the correct analysis of these statements. Because the analysis is independently plausible, the contextualism is warranted not merely in virtue of its capacity to solve the puzzle.     

人类会继续进化吗

从猿到人的进化经历了漫长的过程,但是今天的人类是青少年,还是已迈入老年？未来的命运将怎样？至今仍无答案。一个关于人类生命历程的假说回答了上述问题,并探讨发展进程中人类的生物学变化。结论：目前的人类正处在成熟（青少年）期,可能经较长的时间发展后进入稳定期,最终逐渐衰老     

Edwards on the Will

Jonathan Edwards' The Freedom of the Will advances an ethical argument concerning the nature of the freedom that a person must have to be considered morally culpable. The view he opposes, that free decisions must be uncaused, is shown to be now common in Western culture, and the results he predicted of that are displayed. His own view, whereby a free decision is one constrained only by moral causes, is shown to be theologically grounded and consistent with ethical responsibility. Mention is made of the virtue ethic he relied upon, and of the predestinarian nature of the account.     

Luck and Free Will

This essay sketches a problem about luck for typical incompatibilist views of free will posed in Alfred Mele, Free Will and Luck (2006), and examines recent reactions to that problem. Reactions featuring appeals to agent causation receive special attention. Because the problem is focused on decision making, the control that agents have over what they decide is a central topic. Other topics discussed include the nature of lucky action and differences between directly and indirectly free actions.     

Free Will and Scientiphicalism

John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars's arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the Given is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars's arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument—the “inconsistent triad” argument—addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there are several ways of escaping its conclusion. Invocations of Sellars's refutation of the Myth of the Given are empty.