The Self System: Toward a New Understanding of the Whole Person (Part 2)

Abstract

Of all psychology concepts, perhaps none has a more lengthy history or engendered more controversy and ambiguity than that of the self. Indeed, the self has come to mean so many things that it hardly means anything at all. Consequently, there is currently no single theory integrating all the various meanings of the self concept. Therefore, the primary purpose of this article is to develop an overarching metapsychology by which all aspects of the self can be understood.

To accomplish this purpose, this article engages in a hermeneutic analysis of the self as it appears in cognitive-behavior psychology, the psychoanalytic theories of ego and self psychology, and humanistic–existential theories of the self. In so doing, it is possible to identify three principle concepts by which the various aspects of the self can be compared and classified: the Conflation Frame, the collapsing of entity, intellect, and identity into a single rendering of the self; the Integral Interface, the overriding theoretical framework within which each of these aspects of self can be differentiated and subsumed; and the Integral Axes, the two fundamental tracks by which the individual grows and develops, which consist of self-actualization and self-emancipation.     

The self as a central tenet of our psychology: New perspectives on the self

Abstract

The self is fundamental to psychology and yet it is as broad as it is foundational. Numerous concepts fall into the examination of the self and has resulted in many reviews of those individual aspects but few of the self as a whole. In this special issue, we offer an avenue for authors to engage in reviews of those such individual aspects to try to draw attention to new and novel approaches to what is an integral component of our psychology.     

The alternate schools and the self

While Adler, Jung, Horney, and Sullivan varied in their definitions of the self played a central role in their theories. The alternate schools all refer to the subjective, creative, experiencing aspects of the psyche in their concepts of self. The thinking of scientists is intimately connected with their personality. The shape their theories take often can be shown to have connections with their early life. An attempt is made to illuminate the contributions made to Jung's theories by the circumstances of his early life.     

Health and Illness from an Islamic Perspective

The Islamic understanding of the human self, its purpose and functions has a great effect on Muslims' understanding of themselves and on Islamic culture. Islamic psychology is a field that examines the Islamic perspective on health and illness and compares it to the Western perspective. The purpose of this paper is to introduce readers to the Islamic understanding of the self, its functions, and purpose, and to contrast it with Western theories about the self. It also aims at understanding Islamic definitions of health and illness and Islamic understanding of treatment.     

特质、动机和叙事:人格研究的三种范式及其整合

人格心理学以整体的个人为研究对象,以人性问题为核心关切。在对人性的研究过程中,先后出现了三种研究范式:特质、动机和叙事。特质研究考察的是人格的静态结构,即人格由哪些因素构成,回答的是人格的"所有"问题;动机研究考察人格的动力机制,回答的是人格的"所为"问题;叙事研究考察人格的发展过程,回答的是人格的"所成"问题。近年来,研究者们提出,人格叙事研究范式能够将人格特质范式和人格动机范式整合起来一同去理解人格。但叙事研究刚刚兴起,还面临着许多困难和局限,有待进一步完善。     

The plurality of concepts

Traditionally, theories of concepts in psychology assume that concepts are a single, uniform kind of mental representation. But no single kind of representation can explain all of the empirical data for which concepts are responsible. I argue that the assumption that concepts are uniformly the same kind of mental structure is responsible for these theories’ shortcomings, and outline a pluralist theory of concepts that rejects this assumption. On pluralism, concepts should be thought of as being constituted by multiple representational kinds, with the particular kind of concept used on an occasion being determined by the context. I argue that endorsing pluralism does not lead to eliminativism about concepts as an object of scientific interest.     

The Role of the Group in Individual Functioning: School Identification and the Psychological Well-Being of Staff and Students

Many studies have demonstrated that organisations exert a powerful impact on their members, but the mechanisms through which this occurs are not well understood. In the present paper, using social identity and self-categorisation theories as theoretical frameworks, we explore the role that social identity plays in affecting individual well-being of staff ( N = 113) and students ( N = 693) in two Australian high schools. Well-being includes positive aspects of personal functioning, such as self-esteem, positive affect, and job involvement, but also negative aspects, such as depression, anxiety, loss of emotional control, aggressive and disruptive behaviour. In line with predictions, social identification was significantly related to, and mediated the relationship between, organisational factors and individual psychological well-being. This work provides a bridge between social psychological concepts and the clinical and educational domains. It reinforces the need to integrate the role of the social self and social identity processes in understanding the (individual) psychology of the person.     

Paranoia and narcissism in psychoanalytic theory. Contributions of self psychology to the theory and therapy of the paranoid disorders

Many factors go into a choice of a therapeutic focus: the patient's psychopathology; the therapist's training, countertransference reactions, and ideological beliefs; and, importantly, a decision about what seems most amenable to treatment and change. As a theory, self psychology describes one aspect of the paranoid process; as such, it is an incomplete theory that complements rather than invalidates more classical theories. As a technique, however, it suggests a style and focus conducive to working with paranoid patients, one that is markedly supportive, nonconfrontational, yet also interpretive. In this context, it must be remembered how difficult it is to treat paranoid patients psychotherapeutically, much less to keep them in treatment. The strategies discussed above do not wholly replace other dynamic approaches (e.g., counterprojective techniques), nor are they universally applicable. Some patients may be more amenable than others. However, the techniques provide a very supportive framework that may help the therapist to be more available to and in contact with the paranoid patient. More broadly, this paper's application of self psychology to the theory and therapy of the paranoid disorders further illustrates the practical utility of this approach. Attention to the narcissistic developmental line, interpersonal selfobject relationships, intrapsychic conflicts and deficits, and empathic immersion in the patients's world are important adjuncts to the psychotherapy of paranoid patients. Rather than an either/or dichotomy, the principle of overdetermination suggests a both/and relationship between self psychology and traditional theory, such that the self psychological approach complements rather than contradicts the classical psychoanalytic theory. The vicissitudes of the self simply add another perspective or vantage point from which to understand and respond to the patient, one which has perhaps more applicability for preoedipally disordered patients.     

The evolution and psychology of self-deception

In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. The question then arises of how the self can be both deceiver and deceived. We propose that this is achieved through dissociations of mental processes, including conscious versus unconscious memories, conscious versus unconscious attitudes, and automatic versus controlled processes. Given the variety of methods for deceiving others, it should come as no surprise that self-deception manifests itself in a number of different psychological processes, and we discuss various types of self-deception. We then discuss the interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of self-deception before considering the levels of consciousness at which the self can be deceived. Finally, we contrast our evolutionary approach to self-deception with current theories and debates in psychology and consider some of the costs associated with self-deception.     

Self psychology and projective identification—whither shall they meet? a reply to the editors (1995)

The concept of projective identification continues to be viewed as alien, even dangerous, by self psychologists. Six aspects of self‐psychology/intersubjectivity theory are explored in an attempt to understand the presumed incompatibility of self psychology and projective identification: 1) the empathic vantage point; 2) the focus on subjective reality; 3) the emphasis on the analyst's personal contribution; 4) the focus on selfobject experience; 5) the disruption—restoration process; and 6) the defining of transference and countertransference as “organizing activity.”; The self‐psychological/intersubjective concepts that come closest to describing the phenomenon of projective identification—that is, empathic immersion, affect resonance, and reciprocal mutual influence—fail to capture at least three of its essential elements 1) the patient's persistent, unconscious intent to communicate certain unformulated aspects of self through the other; 2) the analyst's sense of being “taken over”; by the patient's experience; and 3) the intensely visceral quality of the analyst's experience. It is argued that self psychology ignores this important form of patient communication to its own detriment and that the concept of projective identification needs to be reformulated in terms that are more experience near to self psychologists. It is suggested that there exists a normal, developmental need, a selfobject need, to communicate intolerable, unsymbolized affective experience through the other's experience—a need that remains more pervasive and intense in some of us than in others—and that the longed‐for selfobject response is to have one's communication received, contained, and given back in such a way that one knows the other has “gotten”; it from the inside out.     

Sortal concepts and causal continuity: comment of Rips, Blok, and Newman (2006)

L. J. Rips, S. Blok, and G. Newman (2006) proposed that singular concepts, which support the tracing of individual objects across their existence, are governed by a principle of causal continuity. They purported to show that causal continuity is better than existing theories at explaining judgments of the persistence of individual objects. This article makes 3 points. First, the construct of causal connectedness entails a wide variety of different explanatory factors; calling them all causal has questionable explanatory value. There is little evidence that the ultimate basis for identity judgments in many cases is causal. Second, the authors suggest that causal knowledge is indeed important to identity, but that it is important in the context of sortal concepts; different causal information matters for different kinds of things. Finally, the authors consider whether causal knowledge or sortal concepts are more fundamental to tracing individual identity, that is, whether causal knowledge is necessary for identity judgments. The authors appeal to research in developmental psychology that has begun to address this debate, supporting the primacy of sortal concepts. Although there continues to be shortcomings of all theories of object persistence, it is not clear that the causal continuer theory brings new clarity to the puzzle.     

Gestalt in social psychology

Summary Citations superficially suggest that the relationship between Gestalt theory and contemporary social psychology is hardly recognizable if we disregard the occasional homage to Kurt Lewin. Neither Gestalt nor field theory belongs to the present pool of social-psychological theories. On the other hand, it can be shown that basic concepts of Gestalt theory have survived under various names and are still of central importance. The author outlines a model of theory sedimentation according to which Gestalt theory, after a brief period of impact on mainstream social psychology has, by sedimentation, become an implicit theory which still feeds explicit models and theories in contemporary social psychology.     

生态心理学之界说

生态心理学目前还没有形成一种统一的范式,把它称为一种取向比把它称为一种学科更为合适,更能反映它内部复杂的现状,也更具包容性。生态心理学有广义和狭义之分,我们通常所说的是指狭义生态心理学。狭义生态心理学的两大理论核心是以巴克为代表和以吉布森为代表的理论范式,其他人的思想都基本上在整合和延伸他们的思想的基础上展开的。作为一种研究取向,可以把狭义生态心理学初步界定为：生态心理学是一种强调研究动物(人)-环境交互体的动态交互过程,尤其倾向于研究生态环境中的具有功能意义的心理现象的取向。     

On the so-called ‘superior conformity of the self’ behavior: Twenty experimental investigations

In comparison processes between the self and others within a given social set, a marked tendency has been frequently observed for each person to present himself as more in conformity with the social norms prevailing in the set under consideration than others participating in this set generally are. This type of behavior has been designated here as ‘superior conformity of the self behavior’ (also called ‘PIP effect’). This article sets out to synthesize twenty experimental investigations in which it was attempted to delimit and explain this behavior. A first set of experiments deals with the observed scope of the superior conformity of the self behavior. For this purpose, variations are systematically introduced in the characteristics of comparative situations: Types of sets of individuals (for instance, real groups or abstract sets — social categories); types of norms under consideration (for instance, norms dealing with the concrete execution of a task, norms relating to forms of behavior — personality characteristics, etc.); manners of comparing oneself with others (for instance, a specifically defined other or generalized others; comparisons on past, present or future behavior, etc.). Having tested the scope of the superior conformity of the self behavior in various ways, we proceed to explain it theoretically and experimentally. Our explanation here is based on the existence of a fundamental conflict between two simultaneous processes that are both complementary and contradictory: The individual's need, on the one hand, for social conformity, which tends toward standardization and de-individualization; on the other hand, his simultaneous search for social differentiation and individualization. This explanation is tested in a second set of experiments. Our final purpose is to show the practical and theoretical importance of the study of the superior conformity of the self behavior in social psychology. In this connection we have shown, in a third set of experiments, how such a behavior can play a role in many phenomena studied by social psychology.     

西方心理学理论分类体系的反思与建构

当代心理学不仅在研究对象上存在着分歧, 而且在理论和方法论取向上也是四分五裂, 以至于很难用一种逻辑标准将各种理论体系进行归类。西方心理学大多数采用的是时间逻辑分类标准, 将理论体系的发展变化通过时间线索呈现, 这样的理论分类虽然能帮助我们理顺理论流派的发展脉络, 但我们往往因无法比较而抓不住各理论流派的主要特征。近年西方理论心理学界提出以因果关系逻辑为标准的理论分类体系, 将心理学理论分为机体中心论、环境中心论、社会中心论和关系中心论, 这种标准容易混淆某些相近的理论, 出现理论的多向归属和无归属现象。文章提出以内容特征为指向的分类体系, 包括意识中心倾向、行为中心倾向、机制中心倾向和意义中心倾向。这种分类标准能部分弥补因果关系分类体系和时间逻辑分类的不足。而进一步开发出能够适应理论快速发展变化的理论分类体系将成为未来理论心理学的研究领域之一。     

自尊研究的现状与问题

自尊概念从诞生以来一直受到不同领域研究者的广泛关注。但在诸多研究和理论的推进之下, 对于其概念内涵与外延的界定并没有达成统一, 与相关概念之间也存在一定程度的混淆与误用。研究以历史为线索, 对自尊概念发展进程中最具影响力的几种观点进行了总结与评述, 并对相关概念进行了比较与辨析。在此基础上, 研究还对现阶段自尊研究的热点话题--真实自尊的概念进行了梳理, 明确了其与虚假自尊或过分追求的自尊之间的本质差异, 即自尊的权变性与条件性, 以期为后续实证研究的展开提供依据。     

自我表现理论概述

人们把自觉的印象控制过程称作自我表现,它是人与人之间相互作用的一个方面。从Goffman1959年提出自我表现的概念以来,有关问题一直为研究者所关注。因为大部分社会交往活动可以基于自我表现的分析,只有少部分行为可以被认为是没有自我表现的意图。但已有研究主要集中于分析自我表现的类型、自我表现的影响因素、自我表现的策略等问题。而自我表现问题的研究,对于丰富社会心理学的理论,推动相关问题的进一步研究都将具有重要的价值。     

Perception,Expression, and the Continuity of Being: Some Intersections between Nishida and Gadamer

This article draws on Nishida’s ontology to shed light on some problems with Gadamer’s concept of dialogical truth. This form of truth relies on the claim that self and world ‘belong together’ as aspects of a single, unitary phenomenon, one which is made manifest in language. This view has difficulty, however, accounting for the expression in language of that which is distorted, mistaken, or untruthful. To get past these difficulties, I suggest that we turn to the more dynamic and developmental vision of the continuity of being found in Nishida’s work. One can cultivate or neglect this relational continuity, and so achieve or fail to achieve it in its fullest forms. I argue that we can cultivate our perceptual capacity along similar lines, bringing the self and world together into a kind of harmony so that the expression of such perceptions comes to be the expression of truth.     

On the devalued self and implications for treatment

A survey of the self theories of several illustrious clinicians suggests that—despite its increasing interest for contemporary dynamic psychotherapists —a holistic self psychology has little practical utility. Rather, it is a variant of structural theory, involving a component of a nontraditional structure of the self, that appears to be of the most practical use. Therapy in this mode combines both steadfast positive regard and planful functioning of the therapist as a beneficial model or ideal image.