COGNET: A national network for cognitive science

A planning committee funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation has agreed in principle on a draft proposal for the establishment of a national network of computers for research in cognitive science. The main ideas of the proposal are discussed in this paper.     

A dilemma for Heideggerian cognitive science

‘Naturalizing phenomenology’ by limiting it to the ontology of the sciences is problematic on both metaphysical and phenomenological grounds. While most assessments of the prospects for a ‘naturalized phenomenology’ have focused on approaches based in Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, problems also arise for non-reductive approaches based in Heideggerian existential phenomenology. ‘Heideggerian cognitive science’ faces a dilemma. On the one hand, (i) if it is directly concerned with the nature of subjectivity, and this subjectivity is assumed to be ontologically irreducible to its physical enablers yet still metaphysically dependent on them, then Heideggerian cognitive science will either leave that metaphysical dependence an unexplained instance of supervenience, or ground it in speculation about brute metaphysical laws that have an unclear relationship to the ontology of the sciences. On the other hand, (ii) if Heideggerian cognitive science is not directly concerned with the nature of subjectivity, but is instead merely aimed at the development of a Heideggerian phenomenological psychology, then it doesn’t fully address the ontological implications of phenomenology’s transcendental approach, and so, while it might succeed in explaining the realization of psychological phenomena scientifically, the existence of subjectivity will remain inexplicable based on the ontology of the sciences. Neither strategy succeeds in ‘naturalizing phenomenology’: (i) either rejects scientific naturalism, or makes its requirements trivial, while (ii) either rejects the transcendental dimension of phenomenology, or fails to address its ontological implications.     

Expert systems: A cognitive science perspective

The theory and technology of knowledge-based systems are intrinsically interdisciplinary and are closely related to the formalisms of cognitive psychology. In this paper, strategies of incorporating intelligence into a computer program are described along with a common architecture for expert systems, including choices of representation and inferential methods. The history of the field is traced from its origins in metamathematics and Newell and Simon’s (1961) GENERAL PROBLEM SOLVER to the Stanford Heuristic Programming Project that produced DENDRAL and MYCIN (Buchanan & Shortliffe, 1984). MYCIN gave rise to EMYCIN and a shell technology that has radically reduced the development time and cost of expert systems. Methodology and concepts are illustrated by transactions with a shell developed for graduate education and a demonstration knowledge base for the diagnosis of senile dementia. Knowledge-based systems and conventional programs are compared with respect to formalisms employed, applications, program characteristics, procedures supplied by the development environment, consistency, certainty, flexibility, and programmer’s viewpoint. The technology raises basic questions for cognitive psychology concerning knowledge and expertise.     

A Web site in cognitive science

A Web site (http://web2-pc.uncc.edu/cogsci) has been established to support an interdisciplinary course in cognitive science. The modules include introductory reading material, interactive exercises/virtual laboratory, and pointers to existing material on the Web. Our approach to using the Web in support of instruction differs from distance learning initiatives because it is centered on an instructor and classroom experiences. The Web-based modules are used to supplement classroom lectures and provide an interdisciplinary perspective.     

A lexicon of attention: from cognitive science to phenomenology

This article tries to create a bridge of understanding between cognitive scientists and phenomenologists who work on attention. In light of a phenomenology of attention and current psychological and neuropsychological literature on attention, I translate and interpret into phenomenological terms 20 key cognitive science concepts as examined in the laboratory and used in leading journals. As a preface to the lexicon, I outline a phenomenology of attention, especially as a dynamic three-part structure, which I have freely amended from the work of phenomenologist and Gestalt philosopher Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973). As a conclusion, I discuss the nature of subjectivity in attention and attention research, and whether attention might be the same as consciousness.     

Gratitude for small and large favors: A behavioral test

The effect of large and small favors on gratitude was tested using a behavioral measure. Participants were 149 undergraduates (120 female, 29 male). Half received raffle tickets for a US$100 prize, and half received tickets for a US$10 prize. Some received tickets from another (fictitious) student, and others received tickets by chance. Participants receiving a favor subsequently distributed more tickets to the other student; participants receiving a more valuable favor also distributed more (ps?<?0.05). Self-reported grateful motivation predicted distribution better than did indebtedness. Grateful motivation mediated the relationship between favor and distribution (p?<?0.05). Results provide validity for a behavioral measure of gratitude, tentatively support favor value as a determinant of gratitude, and further differentiate between gratitude and indebtedness.     

Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science

Dispositionalism about belief has had a recent resurgence. In this paper we critically evaluate a popular dispositionalist program pursued by Eric Schwitzgebel. Then we present an alternative: a psychofunctional, representational theory of belief. This theory of belief has two main pillars: that beliefs are relations to structured mental representations, and that the relations are determined by the generalizations under which beliefs are acquired, stored, and changed. We end by describing some of the generalizations regarding belief acquisition, storage, and change.     

Behavioural science at work for Canada: National Research Council laboratories.

The National Research Council is Canada's principal research and development agency. Its 20 institutes are structured to address interdisciplinary problems for industrial sectors, and to provide the necessary scientific infrastructure, such as the national science library. Behavioural scientists are active in five institutes: Biological Sciences, Biodiagnostics, Aerospace, Information Technology, and Construction. Research topics include basic cellular neuroscience, brain function, human factors in the cockpit, human-computer interaction, emergency evacuation, and indoor environment effects on occupants. Working in collaboration with NRC colleagues and with researchers from universities and industry, NRC behavioural scientists develop knowledge, designs, and applications that put technology to work for people, designed with people in mind.     

Online webcam-based eye tracking in cognitive science: A first look

Online experimentation is emerging in many areas of cognitive psychology as a viable alternative or supplement to classical in-lab experimentation. While performance- and reaction-time-based paradigms are covered in recent studies, one instrument of cognitive psychology has not received much attention up to now: eye tracking. In this study, we used JavaScript-based eye tracking algorithms recently made available by Papoutsaki et al. (International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016) together with consumer-grade webcams to investigate the potential of online eye tracking to benefit from the common advantages of online data conduction. We compared three in-lab conducted tasks (fixation, pursuit, and free viewing) with online-acquired data to analyze the spatial precision in the first two, and replicability of well-known gazing patterns in the third task. Our results indicate that in-lab data exhibit an offset of about 172 px (15% of screen size, 3.94° visual angle) in the fixation task, while online data is slightly less accurate (18% of screen size, 207 px), and shows higher variance. The same results were found for the pursuit task with a constant offset during the stimulus movement (211 px in-lab, 216 px online). In the free-viewing task, we were able to replicate the high attention attribution to eyes (28.25%) compared to other key regions like the nose (9.71%) and mouth (4.00%). Overall, we found web technology-based eye tracking to be suitable for all three tasks and are confident that the required hard- and software will be improved continuously for even more sophisticated experimental paradigms in all of cognitive psychology.     

A Japanese logographic character frequency list for cognitive science research

This paper describes a Japanese logographic character (kanji) frequency list, which is based on an analysis of the largest recently available corpus of Japanese words and characters. This corpus comprised a full year of morning and evening editions of a major newspaper, containing more than 23 million kanji characters and more than 4,000 different kanji characters. This paper lists the 3,000 most frequent kanji characters, as well as an analysis of kanji usage and correlations between the present list and previous Japanese frequency lists. The authors believe that the present list will help researchers more accurately and efficiently control the selection of kanji characters in cognitive science research and interpret related psycholinguistic data.     

Multiple levels of inquiry in cognitive science

Summary Gibsonian ecological psychology, symbolic information processing, and connectionist information processing are frequently construed as three competing paradigms or research traditions, each seeking dominance in experimental psychology and in cognitive science generally. There is an important element of truth in this perspective, and any adequate account of the development of experimental psychology over the past 30 years would have to examine seriously how the various conceptual frameworks, experimental endeavors, and social institutions have figured in this conflict. But the goal of this paper is not to characterize the historical dynamics within experimental psychology and cognitive science; rather, it is to consider what sorts of rapprochement is possible. Rapprochement, however, is not sought simply for its own sake or out of an a priori conviction that scientific enterprises should be unified. Spirited controversy between competing traditions is often an important component of progess (Laudan, 1977). Rapprochement has a purpose when alternative theoretical traditions have reached a point when each confronts serious shortcomings that can best be overcome by incorporating alternative perspectives. In this paper I try to show that this is the situation that exists in experimental psychology and cognitve science generally with respect to the three traditions enumerated above. I first explore how cognitive inquiry directed at internal procedures for processing information could benefit from a detailed study of the context of cognition, including insights provided by the Gibsonian tradition. Second, I examine the current controversy between symbolic and connectionist approaches and address the question of what contributions each offers to the other. Finally, I offer a framework in which multiple levels of inquiry in cognitve science can be related.     

Cognitive neuroimaging: cognitive science out of the armchair

Cognitive scientists were not quick to embrace the functional neuroimaging technologies that emerged during the late 20th century. In this new century, cognitive scientists continue to question, not unreasonably, the relevance of functional neuroimaging investigations that fail to address questions of interest to cognitive science. However, some ultra-cognitive scientists assert that these experiments can never be of relevance to the study of cognition. Their reasoning reflects an adherence to a functionalist philosophy that arbitrarily and purposefully distinguishes mental information-processing systems from brain or brain-like operations. This article addresses whether data from properly conducted functional neuroimaging studies can inform and subsequently constrain the assumptions of theoretical cognitive models. The article commences with a focus upon the functionalist philosophy espoused by the ultra-cognitive scientists, contrasting it with the materialist philosophy that motivates both cognitive neuroimaging investigations and connectionist modelling of cognitive systems. Connectionism and cognitive neuroimaging share many features, including an emphasis on unified cognitive and neural models of systems that combine localist and distributed representations. The utility of designing cognitive neuroimaging studies to test (primarily) connectionist models of cognitive phenomena is illustrated using data from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigations of language production and episodic memory.     

APCOL: A programming system for computer-controlled psychology laboratories

The development of on-line computer systems can be facilitated by higher-level programming languages that are more powerful and easier to learn than machine-level Assembly languages. In general, it is not possible to speak ofa programming language without also describing the operating system and functional problem domain of the small computer system for which it is intended. This is because of the great variety in the architecture and configuration of small computers. However, it is possible to state more general requirements and design criteria for on-line computer languages in psychology. APCOL is an example of an integrated programming system. One of the important distinguishing features of the system is that it is implemented both on the small-scale laboratory computer and on a large general-purpose computer linked to the smaller machine via a high-speed communications network. This arrangement permits firsthand access to interactive program construction with immediate test of program function by using the on-line implementation as well as access to the text-editing and mass storage facilities of the large-scale machine.     

The role of robotic modelling in cognitive science

From the perspective of cognitive robotics, this paper presents a modern interpretation of Newell’s (1973) reasoning and suggestions for why and how cognitive psychologists should develop models of cognitive phenomena. We argue that the shortcomings of current cognitive modelling approaches are due in significant part to a lack of exactly the kind of integration required for the development of embodied autonomous robotics. Moreover we suggest that considerations of embodiment, situatedness, and autonomy, intrinsic to cognitive robotics, provide an appropriate basis for the integration and theoretic cumulation that Newell argued was necessary for psychology to mature. From this perspective we analyse the role of embodiment and modes of situatedness in terms of integration, cognition, emotion, and autonomy. Four complementary perspectives on embodied and situated cognitive science are considered in terms of their potential to contribute to cognitive robotics, cognitive science, and psychological theorizing: minimal cognition and organization, enactive perception and sensorimotor contingency, homeostasis and emotion, and social embedding. In combination these perspectives provide a framework for cognitive robotics, not only wholly compatible with the original aims of cognitive modelling, but as a more appropriate methodology than those currently in common use within psychology.     

Getting too close: A problem and possible solution in social science PhD supervision

The duties of PhD supervisor involve combining the dimensions of intellectual critic and guide to doctoral students, whilst at the same time offering the latter pastoral care, tasks which occur under conditions of increasing difficulty. The combination of these duties is depicted, and the pastoral dimension of supervision is portrayed as harbouring the potential, unless skilfully handled, for supervisors to become too emotionally involved with their students. The costs of this over-involvement are subsequently identified and a solution is proposed, namely that training programmes for PhD supervisors should contain a pastoral skills component.