Distorsions cognitives et pratique de jeu de hasard et d’argent : état de la question

Cognitive distorsions are inherent to any gambling situation whatever the level of commitment of the gambler. Irrational beliefs lead the subject to overestimate his share of control over the game's outcome to the detriment of chance. Knowing the objective probability to win and having good numeric capacities of reasoning does not prevent the gamblers from developing these false beliefs. According to the concept of double switching proposed by Ladouceur and Sévigny (2005), irrational beliefs would coexist with objective knowledges on the game and would bustle in situation of gambling. The progress and the outcome of the game influence the development and the maintenance of cognitive distorsions, which influences the subject's practice of gambling. Pathological gambling, repeated and persistent gambling behavior, is characterized in particular by the presence of cognitive distortions, leading the subject to maintain, even to increase his gambling practice. Indeed, if cognitive distorsions are present in any situation of gambling, it seems nevertheless that it is more frequent and more intense in problem and pathological gamblers. Cognitive distorsions, in particular illusion of control, thus lead to a more important practice of gambling and a financial risk-taking, favoring the installation and the preservation of problem gambling. Certain factors seem to influence cognitive distorsions. There is a gender effect: women would present fewer irrational beliefs than men. Depression, anxiety and stress would also favor the development of these beliefs in situation of gambling. Several methods exist to estimate cognitive distorsions in gamblers. The first researches are based on assessment made by others (observation and analysis of gambler's verbalizations). Afterward, several self-report scales were created. At the moment, none of these scales has been validated in French language. The identification of gambling related cognitive distortions permit to elaborate adapted modes of treatment. So, the cognitive therapy suggests identifying and restructuring the beliefs to bring the subject to change his gambling behavior. In spite of the current knowledge on cognitive distorsions, certain questions remain open, in particular about the implication of theses beliefs in games implying a part of strategy, in which the subject has effectively a certain control over the game.     

Underlying Cognitions in Gambling Behavior Among University Students1

Differences in underlying cognitions across gambling tasks were examined. The South Oaks Gambling Screen, a measure of pathological gambling, was completed by 60 undergraduate students. They also played computer‐simulated games of roulette, slots, and blackjack in a laboratory setting. The “think‐aloud” procedure was used to reveal subjects' cognitions, which were subsequently categorized into cognitive heuristics. Individuals were classified as social gamblers with and without problems and probable pathological gamblers. Results reveal that certain heuristics, including references to an explanation of their losses, hindsight bias, personification of the dealer/machine, chasing behavior, and past experiences were most frequently endorsed by probable pathological gamblers. Empirical evidence supports that probable pathological gamblers are qualitatively different from social gamblers in their emitted verbalized cognitive heuristics.     

Cognitive biases in aggressive drivers: Does illusion of control drive us off the road?

Anger has been shown to be a motivating factor in aggression and it is widely accepted that driving anger may lead to aggressive driving. However, the link between anger and aggressive driving is likely to be mediated by drivers’ pre-existing cognitive biases and the subsequent situational evaluations made. This study investigated the extent to which optimism bias, illusion of control beliefs and driver anger predict self-reported hostile driving behaviours. A total of 220 licensed drivers (106 men; 114 women) completed a self-report questionnaire measuring trait driving anger, optimism bias, illusion of control and driving behaviour. Structural Equation Modelling showed that trait driving anger and illusion of control beliefs account for 37% of the variance in hostile driving behaviour scores. Optimism biases were unrelated to hostile driving behaviours. Thus, driving anger propensities and feelings of control over the situation, but not a general tendency to underestimate the likelihood of adverse outcomes, predict aggressive driving.     

消极偏差还是积极缺乏:抑郁的积极心理学解释

抑郁的认知理论被认为是当代最具影响的抑郁理论之一,其中贝克抑郁理论与无望抑郁理论是两大主要的认知理论。认知理论主张消极认知偏差是导致抑郁的易感因素。然而,"抑郁现实主义"及"积极错觉"等研究却证实抑郁个体并不存在消极认知偏差。以往研究的矛盾实际上反映了当代心理学过分关注消极的病理化倾向。新兴的积极心理学则试图从全新视角解释抑郁,导致抑郁的原因不是个体身上积极因素的缺位,而是积极力量未被充分发挥。     

The cognitive substrate of subjective probability

The prominent cognitive theories of probability judgment were primarily developed to explain cognitive biases rather than to account for the cognitive processes in probability judgment. In this article the authors compare 3 major theories of the processes and representations in probability judgment: the representativeness heuristic, implemented as prototype similarity, relative likelihood, or evidential support accumulation (ESAM; D. J. Koehler, C. M. White, & R. Grondin, 2003); cue-based relative frequency; and exemplar memory, implemented by probabilities from exemplars (PROBEX; P. Juslin & M. Persson, 2002). Three experiments with different task structures consistently demonstrate that exemplar memory is the best account of the data whereas the results are inconsistent with extant formulations of the representativeness heuristic and cue-based relative frequency.     

High working memory load leads to more Ebbinghaus illusion

The evidence that distractor processing increases with greater load on working memory has come mainly from Stroop-type interference tasks, making it difficult to establish whether cognitive load affects distractor processing at the perceptual level or during response selection. We measured the Ebbinghaus illusion under varying levels of working memory load to test whether cognitive control is also relevant for preventing processing of distractors that do not produce any response conflict, and instead affect target processing at the perceptual level. The Ebbinghaus illusion was greater under high working memory load, suggesting that availability of cognitive control functions is critical to reduce distractor processing even for distractors that are not associated with a response. We conclude that the effect of loading working memory during selective attention leads to greater distractor perception.     

Bias in the Counseling Process: How to Recognize and Avoid It

Counselors' vulnerability to inferential bias during the counseling process may result in misdiagnosis and improper interventions. This article provides readers with information regarding inferential bias. The inferential biases discussed include (a) availability and representativeness heuristics; (b) fundamental attribution error; (c) anchoring, prior knowledge, and labeling; (d) confirmatory hypothesis testing; and (e) reconstructive memory. Each bias is described and illustrated through fictitious case vignettes, and suggestions concerning what precautions counselors may do to avoid each type of bias are presented.     

Self-efficacy and Strategy on Complex Tasks

The mediational role of strategy in the relationship between self-efficacy and performance on complex tasks is analysed. Within an individual's multidimensional self-efficacy belief system, perceived capabilities for conducting searches in different modalities and for the processing of information, including the use of tools to overcome cognitive limits, are predicted to have differential impacts on the use of judgmental heuristics and biases and the choice of strategies. Search efficacy is predicted to differ across search modalities, such as experimentation, interpersonal questioning, electronic search and passive study, as a function of differences in personal and situational determinants. Processing efficacy is predicted to generalise across a much wider range of cognitive tasks, depending upon perceived similarities in the content of tasks (e.g. verbal versus quantitative) and the tools used. Low search efficacy is predicted to lead to greater use of the availability heuristic, while low processing efficacy is predicted to lead to greater use of the anchoring and adjustment and representativeness heuristics. Choices of specific strategies are predicted from different combinations of weak and strong efficacy beliefs for exploratory search and deliberative processing.     

赌博游戏中的near-miss效应

near-miss效应是指在赌博中, 与一般的输钱和赢钱相比, “几乎赢(near-miss)”的输钱会诱发个体更高的生理唤醒和更强的赌博动机, 从而导致个体持续赌博的一种现象, 是导致赌博成瘾的主要诱因之一。针对这种现象的研究范式大致有三种：老虎机/类老虎机任务、轮盘任务和刮刮乐彩票任务。这种现象的理论解释目前主要有认知曲解假说、控制幻觉理论和受挫假说。near-miss效应的脑机制和病理研究才刚刚起步, 所涉及到的脑功能区域主要包括脑岛、腹侧纹状体等。未来的研究应在near-miss效应发生机制的理论模型建构、研究范式多样化、研究技术多模态化、病理机制和临床干预等方面进一步展开。     

Stimulation cognitive chez les personnes âgées : effets d’une méthode de stimulation cognitive par les jeux sur les fonctions cognitives et l’estime de soi

The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of a cognitive stimulation program with games on scores to cognitive tests (processing speed, mental flexibility, working memory, inhibition) and how this program can benefit to a psycho-affective measure, self-esteem in older adults. Forty-eight participants over 60 years old took part in the experiment. They were divided into two groups: 1 group followed a program of cognitive stimulation using leisure activities with games and 1 control group in which people gathered every week. There were 8 sessions of cognitive stimulation using leisure activities like games, one-hour session a week. Measures have focused on speed of processing and executive functions (shifting, updating and inhibition). They have been evaluated before and after the training program. Results show that the cognitive stimulation program using leisure activities with games is effective on speed of processing, memory span, inhibition and self-esteem but shows no benefits on shifting and updating. These results indicate that it seems to be possible to enhance cognitive resources, inhibition and self-esteem using leisure activities with games as a tool for cognitive stimulation.     

Varieties of Pictorial Illusion

This article focuses on a potentially perplexing aspect of our interactions with pictorial representations (including film, paintings, pictures, drawings, photographs, even video games): in some cases, it seems that visual representations can play tricks on our cognitive faculties. We may either come to believe that objects represented in pictures are real or perhaps perceive them as such. The possibility of widespread pictorial illusions has been oft discussed, and discarded, in the aesthetics literature. I support this stance. However, the nature of the illusion is more complicated than is usually considered. I argue that there are five different types of potential illusions and present reasons for rejecting each. I also explore in detail the most persistent illusion: the “object recognition perceptual illusion thesis,” which states that we undergo a perceptual illusion while viewing pictorial representations simply in virtue of seeing objects in the representation. I contend that a rejection of this thesis depends on the nature of perceptual content, an issue with far‐reaching consequences in aesthetics.     

Social Deviancy and Suicidal Behavior

Abstract

In this study lottery gambling behavior of 288 American college students was examined. Although most students were infrequent gamblers, we found that student lottery gambling was related to having parents and friends who were lottery gamblers. Students who were frequent lottery gamblers were more likely to participate in other forms of gambling and to have begun gambling at younger ages than less frequent gamblers. Locus of control was related to more frequent gambling among parents and only marginally related to more frequent lottery play among students. Discriminant analysis using parental gambling, peer gambling, games played, sex, and locus of control could predict frequency of lottery playing for 72% of gamblers and nongamblers.     

Cognitive processing of body and appearance words as a function of thin-ideal internalization and schematic activation

To better understand how women at risk of body image disturbance respond when their body concerns are activated, we examined attentional and memory biases in undergraduate women with high thin-ideal internalization, an identified risk factor for eating disorders, following priming of body and appearance concerns. Female undergraduates (N = 186) viewed photos of either sports cars or attractive swimsuit models, then completed the Lexical Decision Test, a word recall test, and questionnaires assessing thin-ideal internalization and eating disorder symptomatology. High thin-ideal internalizers did not exhibit cognitive biases predicted by cognitive models of eating disorders, even when their body and appearance concerns were primed by exposure to attractive models. Converging evidence suggests that high-risk non-clinical samples rarely exhibit cognitive biases characteristic of individuals with eating disorders, and, in fact, may actually incorporate ideal appearance into their schemas and preferentially attend to attractive stimuli.     

Impulsivity facets and cognitive distortions associated with problem gambling: Differences between ADHD and non-ADHD gamblers

ObjectiveTo compare the association between (1) impulsivity facets or cognitive distortions, and (2) problem gambling between male gamblers with versus without self-reported Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).MethodIn 287 male gamblers recruited online, we assessed problem gambling (South Oaks Gambling Screen; cut-off ≥ 3), Adult ADHD Self-report Scale-V1.1 (ADHD), impulsivity facets (UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale-short version) and gambling-related cognitions (Gambling-Related Cognitions Scale).ResultsThe prevalence of self-reported ADHD was 21.6%. In both ADHD and non-ADHD groups, problem gambling was associated with negative urgency, positive urgency and the same cognitive distortions. Sensation seeking and lack of premeditation were associated with problem gambling, but only in non-ADHD gamblers (significant interaction effect).ConclusionDifferent impulsivity facets, but not different cognitive distortions, are associated with problem gambling in male gamblers with or without ADHD. Emotion dysregulation (positive and negative urgency) and cognitive distortions are involved in both groups, but sensation seeking and lack of premeditation may be specific to non-ADHD problem gamblers.     

Illusions of causality at the heart of pseudoscience

Pseudoscience, superstitions, and quackery are serious problems that threaten public health and in which many variables are involved. Psychology, however, has much to say about them, as it is the illusory perceptions of causality of so many people that needs to be understood. The proposal we put forward is that these illusions arise from the normal functioning of the cognitive system when trying to associate causes and effects. Thus, we propose to apply basic research and theories on causal learning to reduce the impact of pseudoscience. We review the literature on the illusion of control and the causal learning traditions, and then present an experiment as an illustration of how this approach can provide fruitful ideas to reduce pseudoscientific thinking. The experiment first illustrates the development of a quackery illusion through the testimony of fictitious patients who report feeling better. Two different predictions arising from the integration of the causal learning and illusion of control domains are then proven effective in reducing this illusion. One is showing the testimony of people who feel better without having followed the treatment. The other is asking participants to think in causal terms rather than in terms of effectiveness.     

Exemplars in the mist: the cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic

The idea that people often make probability judgments by a heuristic short-cut, the representativeness heuristic, has been widely influential, but also criticized for being vague. The empirical trademark of the heuristic is characteristic deviations between normative probabilities and judgments (e.g., the conjunction fallacy, base-rate neglect). In this article the authors contrast two hypotheses concerning the cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic, the prototype hypothesis (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) and the exemplar hypothesis (Juslin & Persson, 2002), in a task especially designed to elicit representativeness effects. Computational modelling and an experiment reveal that representativeness effects are evident early in training and persist longer in a more complex task environment and that the data are best accounted for by a model implementing the exemplar hypothesis.     

Subjective randomization in one-and two-person games

Following the study by Rapoport and Budescu (1992), two experiments are reported whose main purpose is to compare the generation of random sequences in one- and two-person games. The first experiment addresses the generation of trinary series in two-person zerosum games with asymmetric players. The second examines the generation of binary series using a between-subjects design, and compares the cognitive processes operating in one- and two-person games. Although both types of games result in similar deviations from randomness, they seem to induce qualitatively different cognitive processes.     

The illusion of clarity: Image segmentation and edge attribution without filling-in

It comes as no surprise that viewing a high-resolution photograph through a screen reduces its clarity. Yet when a coarsely quantized (i.e., pixelated) version of the same photo is seen through a screen its clarity is increased. Six experiments investigated this illusion of clarity. First, the illusion was quantified by having participants rate the clarity of quantized images with and without a screen (Experiment 1). Interestingly, the illusion occurs both when the wires of the screen are aligned with the blocks of the quantized image and when they are shifted horizontally and vertically (Experiments 2 and 3), casting doubt on the hypothesis that a local filling-in process is involved. The finding that no illusion occurs when the photo is blurred rather than quantized (Experiment 4) and that the illusion is sharply reduced when visual attention is divided (Experiment 5) argue for an image segmentation process that falsely attributes the edges of the quantized blocks to the screen. Finally, the illusion is larger when participants adopt an active rather than a passive cognitive strategy (Experiment 6), pointing to the importance of cognitive control in the illusion.     

Internet‐based CBT intervention for gamblers in Finland: Experiences from the field

From September 2007 to May 2011 a total of 471 participants (325 males and 146 females) signed up for an 8‐week Internet‐based cognitive behavioral therapy offered for gamblers in Finland. Sixty‐four percent of the participants were pathological gamblers (PGs) (NODS 5> points), 14% were problem gamblers (NODS 3–4 points) and 10% were at risk of gambling problems (NODS 1–2 points). Two hundred and twenty four participants completed the treatment and after the treatment period significant changes were found in the following variables: gambling related problems (NODS), gambling urge, impaired control of gambling, alcohol consumption (AUDIT‐C), social consequences, gambling‐related cognitive erroneous thoughts and depression (MARD‐S). In this sample co‐morbid alcohol consumption was stronger among males. The main finding of this study was that the onset age of gambling was associated with a greater amount of gambling‐related cognitive erroneous thoughts.