Proving the non‐existence of God

Using Rawls's theory as illustration, I argue that any conception of justice which includes a commitment to equality of opportunity eventually must collide with a commitment to the family. I then contend that the link between justice and equality of opportunity cannot be severed by showing that one powerful attempt to do so founders. Borrowing from Martin Buber, I try to show that the perspective required by justice is different from and opposed to that required for intimate relations. Moreover, I argue that the institution of the family provides the soil without which human intimacy withers. Finally, I try to suggest that the need for human. I‐You encounters is a response to aspects of the human condition quite different from those which give rise to institutions of justice and the state.     

Affective Reactions to the Thought of “God”: Moderating Effects of Image of God

Recent understanding of subjective well-being suggests that it consists of global judgments of life satisfaction, hedonic experiences, and beliefs about facets of one’s life. Traditionally, life satisfaction judgments have been the outcome of interest in studies examining the relationship between religiosity and well-being. Two studies were conducted to look at the interactive effects of personal religious beliefs, namely God images, and environmental stimuli, particularly priming the thought of “God.” The first study examines hedonic experiences, which is one of the information sources when constructing a well-being judgment. A second study attempts to replicate the findings with life satisfaction ratings. Results of the first study showed that one’s image of God as a controlling or non-controlling entity moderated the affective response to being primed to think about God. In particular, those who had a high controlling image of God had a negative affective reaction to the God prime. Results of the second study replicated the pattern of results using life satisfaction ratings as the dependent variable.     

Good God?!? Lamentations as a Model for Mourning the Loss of the Good God

This article will address the devastating psychological and social effects due to the loss of one's primary love-object, namely God in the case of faith communities and religious individuals. By using Melanie Klein's Object Relations Theory (Klein in Envy and gratitude and other works 1946/1963. The Free Press, New York, 1975a) as a way to enter the text of Lamentations, I will articulate an alternative reading that can serve as a model for Pastors and Educators to use when walking with individuals and communities through unspeakable losses. I will argue that Lamentations may be used as a tool for naming confounding depression and anxiety that stems from a damaged introjected object (one's personal God). This tool may provide individuals and communities a framework for placing anger and contempt upon God in order to re-assimilate this loved yet hated object, eventually leading toward healing and restoration of the self.     

Concerning the Preservation of God’s Omnipotence

Numerous examples have been offered that purportedly show that God cannot be omnipotent. I argue that a common response to such examples (i.e., that failure to do the impossible does not indicate a lack of power) does not preserve God’s omnipotence in the face of some of these examples. I consider another possible strategy for preserving God’s omnipotence in the face of these examples and find it wanting.

Helping the Homeless: What About the Spirit of God?

This paper argues that the Holy Spirit is missing from services for the homeless. Spirituality is reviewed as a concept, and it is argued that the transforming Spirit that Paul described is not often present in discussions. Instead, the Social Gospel and Modernism have replaced the role of the Holy Spirit, and people who are homeless are being provided with very limited options to transform their lives and escape the desperation they so often feel.     

Pascal’s Wager and the Nature of God

This paper argues that Pascal’s formulation of his famous wager argument licenses an inference about God's nature that ultimately vitiates the claim that wagering for God is in one’s rational self-interest. Specifically, it is argued that if we accept Pascal’s premises, then we can infer that the god for whom Pascal encourages us to wager is irrational. But if God is irrational, then the prudentially rational course of action is to refrain from wagering for him.     

“God is the creator of all life and the energy of this world”: German intersex Christians’ reflection on the image of God and being created in God’s image

ABSTRACT

Intersex individuals are often told they are not human beings because they do not neatly fit into the categories of “female” and “male.” Many are made to feel like monsters. Christianity enforces this model of sexual dimorphism with the notion that to be a human being means to be created clearly “female” or clearly “male” in the image of God. This paper draws on interviews with German intersex Christians to explore their diverse images of God and what it means to be created in God’s image with the goal of creating new “conditions of possibility” that represent the full range of human sex/gender.     

Hartshorne’s Dipolar Theism and the Mystery of God

Anselm said that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, but he believed that it followed that God is greater than can be conceived. The second formula—essential to sound theology—points to the mystery of God. The usual way of preserving divine mystery is the via negativa, as one finds in Aquinas. I formalize Hartshorne’s central argument against negative theology in the simplest modal system T. I end with a defense of Hartshorne’s way of preserving the mystery of God, which he locates in the actuality of God rather than in the divine existence or essence. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

Fool-proof proofs of God?

Summary Two claims have been explored, the first, that fool-proof proofs of the sort that there could be if there were a God like the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are not to be expected, on good religious grounds (a claim I found wanting); and second, that there cannot be philosophical proofs of God which work beyond reasonable doubt.The argument that there cannot be philosophical proofs beyond a reasonable doubt is supported by an examination of some of the fundamental issues in the traditional discussions of proofs for God's existence, and by claims about the relativity of methodological rules to world-views which, I maintain, the traditional discussions indicate. I do not claim to have proved that relativity, only to have illustrated the claim that it is there.It is my further opinion, but I do not claim really to have proved it, that the failure of religious excuses for the lack of public demon strations constitutes a good reason for concluding that there is no God of the sort described as the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; hence that if there is a God, it must be the God of the philosophers. However I admit that there might be sufficient hidden reasons which would offer persuasive excuses for the God of the ordinary believer.Lastly, I have made some comments about what I think is the more valuable way to view the proofs for God. Such an interpretation does justice to the otherwise baffling and continual philosophical disagreements better than rival theories. It is time we take these disagreements with utmost seriousness, and one can hardly do that while treating basic metaphysical arguments as fool-proof proofs.Readers of the literature on proofs will recognize many of the historical and current discussions on which comment is being made. To provide sources for all the comments would be not only cumbersome but impossible because they are found in so many different places and are not the property of any one in particular.     

God meets Satan’s Apple: the paradox of creation

It is now the majority view amongst philosophers and theologians that any world could have been better. This places the choice of which world to create into an especially challenging class of decision problems: those that are discontinuous in the limit. I argue that combining some weak, plausible norms governing this type of problem with a creator who has the attributes of the god of classical theism results in a paradox: no world is possible. After exploring some ways out of the paradox, I conclude that the classical theist should accept Marilyn Adams’s view that no norms (of morality or of rationality) apply to gods.     

Who Is This God of Whom You Speak? Counseling Students' Concept of God

Many clients bring a belief in God or a Higher Power into counseling sessions. What is less clear, however, is how counselors conceptualize “god,” which may affect how spirituality is integrated in the counseling process. To explore this question, the authors conducted a concept map study of god images among counseling students. Results suggest that students harbor broad and diverse conceptualizations of god, which may affect the counseling process.     

Ignoring God Triune? The Doctrine of the Trinity in Dutch Theology

This article presents an overview of Dutch trinitarian theology in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It will become clear how and why leading Dutch theologians either ignored the doctrine, or used it for their own purposes, or uttered critical reservations regarding its sense and significance. After having reviewed the ways in which this majority of Dutch theologians has dealt with the doctrine, some notable constructive exceptions are explored. In conclusion, the authors raise the question as to Low Dutch theology might, starting from its own tradition, catch up with the recent international and inter-denominational tendency towards a well-developed trinitarian theology.     

A new member of the family? The continuum of being,artificial intelligence,and the image of God

Abstract

Are the scientific and religious definitions of life irreconcilable or do they overlap in significant areas? What is life? Religion seems to imply that there is a qualitative distinction between human beings and the rest of creation; however, there is a strong tradition in Christianity and in Eastern thought that suggests that the natural world also has a relationship with God. Human dominion over other parts of creation exists, but does not obviate this connection, nor give humans a circle unto themselves. The concept of humans being created in the image of God can be used to explain why we might believe humans are in a circle unto themselves, yet we can expand this concept to include artificially intelligent computers, a new potential member of the cognitive family. Our quest for artificial intelligence tells us both what we value in our humanity, and how we might extend that valuation to the rest of creation.     

D. Z. Phillips on the grammar of “God”

In this essay dedicated to the memory of D. Z. Phillips, I propose to do two things. In the first part I present his position on the grammar of God and the language game in some detail, discussing the confusion of “subliming” the logic of our language, the contextual genesis of sense and meaning, the idea of a world view, language game, logic, and grammar internal to each context, the constitution of the religious context, and the grammar of God proper to that context. In the second part I present my appreciative critical reflection by arguing that the conception of context and language game must be made more dialectical, that the grammar of God needs more systematic metaphysical analysis, and that a greater sense of the radical transcendence of God over a language game is necessary in order to avoid reductionism always inherent in any contextual approach.     

Can Models of God Compete?

Though the very task of modeling God implies that the reality of God is to some degree unknowable, there are a variety of positions one may take concerning the degree to which one has epistemic access to God. If our models of God are too influenced by subjectivity, it makes no sense to test them against each other in rational competition. In this essay, I define four possible positions that may underlie the task of God-modeling: mysteriosophy, theopoetics, critical realism, and fallibilism. Of these four, I propose that fallibilism is the most appropriate method for constructing models of God. Fallibilism simultaneously assumes that our models are able to refer to a divine reality, and yet always with a tentative stance, as absolute confirmation or universal consensus concerning them will almost certainly never be obtained. Models of God can engage in rational competition, but a final decision will probably be delayed indefinitely. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.