Good Ethics Can Sometimes Mean Better Science: Research Ethics and the Milgram Experiments

All agree that if the Milgram experiments were proposed today they would never receive approval from a research ethics board. However, the results of the Milgram experiments are widely cited across a broad range of academic literature from psychology to moral philosophy. While interpretations of the experiments vary, few commentators, especially philosophers, have expressed doubts about the basic soundness of the results. What I argue in this paper is that this general approach to the experiments might be in error. I will show that the ethical problems that would prevent the experiments from being approved today actually have an effect on the results such that the experiments might show less than many currently suppose. Making this case demonstrates two conclusions. The first is that there are good reasons to think that the conclusions of many of Milgram’s commentators might be too strong. The second conclusion is a more general one. The ethics procedures commonly used by North American research ethics boards serve not only to protect human participants in research but also can sometimes help secure, to an extent, the integrity of results. In other words, good ethics can sometimes mean better science.

Milgram, Method and Morality

In Milgram's experiments, subjects were induced to inflict what they believed to be electric shocks in obedience to a man in a white coat. This suggests that many can be persuaded to torture, and perhaps kill, another person simply on the say-so of an authority figure. But the experiments have been attacked on methodological, moral and methodologico-moral grounds. Patten argues that the subjects probably were not taken in by the charade; Bok argues that lies should not be used in research; and Patten insists that any excuse for Milgram's conduct can be adapted on behalf of his subjects. (Either he was wrong to conduct the experiments or they do not establish the phenomenon of immoral obedience). We argue that the subjects were indeed taken in, that lies (though usually wrong) were in this case legitimate, and that there were excuses available to Milgram which were not available to his subjects. So far from 'disrespecting'his subjects, Milgram enhanced their autonomy as rational agents. We concede however that it might be right to prohibit what it was right to do. [1]     

The Milgram Experiments, Learned Helplessness, and Character Traits

The Milgram and other situationist experiments support the real-life evidence that most of us are highly akratic and heteronomous, and that Aristototelian virtue is not global. Indeed, like global theoretical knowledge, global virtue is psychologically impossible because it requires too much of finite human beings with finite powers in a finite life; virtue can only be domain-specific. But unlike local, situation-specific virtues, domain-specific virtues entail some general understanding of what matters in life, and are connected conceptually and causally to our traits in other domains. The experiments also make us aware of how easily unobtrusive situational factors can tap our susceptibilities to obedience, conformity, irresponsibility, cruelty, or indifference to others’ welfare, thereby empowering us to change ourselves for the better. Thus, they advance the Socratic project of living the examined life. I note a remarkable parallel between the results of the baseline Milgram experiments and the results of the learned helplessness experiments by Martin Seligman et al. This provides fresh insight into the psychology and character of the obedient Milgram subjects, and I use this insight to argue that pusillanimity, as Aristotle conceives of it, is part of a complete explanation of the behavior of the obedient Milgram subjects.     

Practice effects, workload, and reaction time in deception

Cognitive theorists argue that deception may involve attentional capture, working memory load, or perceived incongruity with memory, whereas psychophysiologists argue for stimulus salience, arousal, and emotion. This article presents a comprehensive model of deception and assesses the effect of practice on deceptive responding. A three-session longitudinal study examined the effect of practice on reaction time (RT) in relation to deception and response congruity. Participants evaluated self-referent sentences and responded truthfully or deceptively. Findings indicate that deceptive responding generates longer RTs than does truthful responding and that this relationship remains constant with practice. We use these findings to support a cognitive model of deception.     

Online deception: prevalence, motivation, and emotion.

This research has three goals: first, to find out how prevalent online deception is within a sample of Israeli users, second, to explore the underlying motivations to deceive online, and third, to discover the emotions that accompany online deception. A web-based survey was distributed in 14 discussion groups, and the answers of 257 respondents were analyzed. It was found that, while most of the respondents believe that online deception is very widespread, only about one-third of them reported engaging in online deception. Frequent users deceive online more than infrequent users, young users more than old, and competent users more than non-competent. The most common motivations to deceive online were "play" on the one hand and privacy concerns on the other. Most people felt a sense of enjoyment while engaging in online deception. The results are discussed in light of a possible mechanism for changing personal moral standards.     

Sensation-seeking, Internet dependency, and online interpersonal deception.

This study aimed to elaborate the relationships between sensation-seeking, Internet dependency, and online interpersonal deception. Of the 707 individuals recruited to this study, 675 successfully completed the survey. The results showed high sensation-seekers and high Internet dependents were more likely to engage in online interpersonal deception than were their counterparts.     

Development,Ethics, and the Ethics of Development

This article investigates three things: (1) what development might be, (2) how development and ethics might be related, and (3) what an ethics of development might look like. First, I show how if we move away from an essentialist metaphysics of being to a possibilist-functionalist metaphysics of becoming in our understanding of development, we can reconceptualize ethics as self-directed ontogeny. Thus, ethics turns out to be a part of development. Secondly, I sketch out the possibility of an ethics of development, showing how it should be based on three desiderata: (1) sustainability, promoting the long-term existence of the maximum human and non-human biodiversity, (2) democracy, promoting human-human relationships that are bidirectional and, to the extent possible, non-imposing, and (3) non-ethnocentrism, promoting true modernity; a modernity not predicated on a non-existent abstract universality but on concrete syncretism. The ultimate aim of this ethics of development is the optimization of individual and collective subjectivity and agency across time.     

Machiavellianism and sexual behavior: Motivations,deception and infidelity

The current study investigated the influence of Machiavellianism, a personality trait characterized by a manipulative interpersonal style and willingness to exploit others (Christie & Geis, 1970), on three areas of sexual behavior. Men (N = 90) and women (N = 192) aged 18–81 years (M = 25.82, SD = 9.85) completed the Mach IV (Christie & Geis, 1970), YSEX Questionnaire (Meston & Buss, 2007), Sexual Deception Scale (Marelich, Lundquist, Painter, & Mechanic, 2008) and Intentions Towards Infidelity Scale (Jones, Olderbak, & Figueredo, 2011). Those with high levels of Machiavellianism were more likely to engage in sexual behavior for physical reasons, goal attainment and insecurity. In particular, Machiavellian men and women endorsed stress reduction, experience seeking, resources, social status, revenge, utilitarian reasons, boosting self-esteem, duty/pressure, and mate guarding as motivations for sexual behavior. Machiavellianism was also a significant predictor of each form of sexual deception investigated (blatant lying, self-serving and avoiding confrontation) and intentions to engage in infidelity. Sex did not moderate the influence of Machiavellianism on sexual behavior.     

Cues to deception

Do people behave differently when they are lying compared with when they are telling the truth? The combined results of 1,338 estimates of 158 cues to deception are reported. Results show that in some ways, liars are less forthcoming than truth tellers, and they tell less compelling tales. They also make a more negative impression and are more tense. Their stories include fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual contents. However, many behaviors showed no discernible links, or only weak links, to deceit. Cues to deception were more pronounced when people were motivated to succeed, especially when the motivations were identity relevant rather than monetary or material. Cues to deception were also stronger when lies were about transgressions.     

Extraversion and the detection of deception

Extraversion, neuroticism and threat of punishment were investigated in a detection of deception paradigm. Half of the 96 subjects, by instruction, had committed a mock crime while the other half were innocent of such an act. Extraversion was related to accuracy of detection such that those with high scores on this dimension were more likely to be classified correctly as guilty or innocent. This result had been predicted on the basis that detection is not determined by overall physiological responsiveness to questions but by contrasting responsiveness to critical and non-critical questions. Thus those high on extraversion, who were conceived of as difficult to arouse, responded only to the critical questions in the test while the more arousable introverts masked contrast by responding indiscriminately to both critical and non-critical questions. Neither of the other variables, neuroticism and threat of punishment, were related to detection.     

Attribution of Responsibility and Trust in the Milgram Obedience Experiment1

The two primary theoretical explanations for the findings of the Milgram (1963, 1974) obedience studies are that of Milgram, stressing the role of relinquished responsibility to the authority on the one hand, and that of Mixon (1971, 1972), for whom trust in the experimenter is the key element on the other hand. The aim of the 2 studies reported in this article, using edited portions of the film Obedience (Milgram, 1965), was to explore the naive social perceiver's understanding of the dynamics of obedience to authority through his or her attributions about responsibility and trust, and thereby to provide some input into the theoretical controversy between Milgram and Mixon. Both studies were more supportive of Milgram's than of Mixon's position.     

Me, myself, and lie: The role of self-awareness in deception

Deception has been studied extensively but still little is known about individual differences in deception ability. We investigated the relationship between self-awareness and deception ability. We enlisted novice actors to portray varying levels of deception. Forty-two undergraduates viewed the videotaped portrayals and rated the actors’ believability. Actors with high private self-awareness were more effective deceivers, suggesting that high self-monitors are more effective at deceiving. Self-awareness may lead to knowledge of another’s mental state (i.e., Theory of Mind), which may improve an individual’s deception ability.     

Power and deception in ultimatum bargaining

In two experiments we investigated the relation between power and deception in ultimatum bargaining. Results showed that recipients of an ultimatum used deception to obtain better offers and that more recipients did so in a low power position. Further analyses showed that the recipient’s use of deception was mediated by concerns about receiving a low offer. For allocators, being in a low power position did not increase the use of deception. Instead, allocators increased their offer when they were in a low power position. The results are discussed in terms of an instrumental approach to deception. This approach incorporates the notion that bargainers (a) will use deception as a means to reach their goals in bargaining but (b) may refrain from using deception when they have alternative means to reach their goals.