The Milgram Experiments, Learned Helplessness, and Character Traits

The Milgram and other situationist experiments support the real-life evidence that most of us are highly akratic and heteronomous, and that Aristototelian virtue is not global. Indeed, like global theoretical knowledge, global virtue is psychologically impossible because it requires too much of finite human beings with finite powers in a finite life; virtue can only be domain-specific. But unlike local, situation-specific virtues, domain-specific virtues entail some general understanding of what matters in life, and are connected conceptually and causally to our traits in other domains. The experiments also make us aware of how easily unobtrusive situational factors can tap our susceptibilities to obedience, conformity, irresponsibility, cruelty, or indifference to others’ welfare, thereby empowering us to change ourselves for the better. Thus, they advance the Socratic project of living the examined life. I note a remarkable parallel between the results of the baseline Milgram experiments and the results of the learned helplessness experiments by Martin Seligman et al. This provides fresh insight into the psychology and character of the obedient Milgram subjects, and I use this insight to argue that pusillanimity, as Aristotle conceives of it, is part of a complete explanation of the behavior of the obedient Milgram subjects.     

Milgram, Method and Morality

In Milgram's experiments, subjects were induced to inflict what they believed to be electric shocks in obedience to a man in a white coat. This suggests that many can be persuaded to torture, and perhaps kill, another person simply on the say-so of an authority figure. But the experiments have been attacked on methodological, moral and methodologico-moral grounds. Patten argues that the subjects probably were not taken in by the charade; Bok argues that lies should not be used in research; and Patten insists that any excuse for Milgram's conduct can be adapted on behalf of his subjects. (Either he was wrong to conduct the experiments or they do not establish the phenomenon of immoral obedience). We argue that the subjects were indeed taken in, that lies (though usually wrong) were in this case legitimate, and that there were excuses available to Milgram which were not available to his subjects. So far from 'disrespecting'his subjects, Milgram enhanced their autonomy as rational agents. We concede however that it might be right to prohibit what it was right to do. [1]     

ON THE SURPRISING LONGEVITY OF FLOGGED HORSES:

Abstract— Critictsms of null-hypothesis significance tests (NHSTs) are reviewed Used as formal, two-valued decision procedures, they often generate misleading conclusions. However, critics who argue that NHSTs are totally meaningless because the null hypothesis is virtually always false are overstating their case Critics also neglect the whole class of valuable significance tests that assess goodness of fit of models to data Even as applied to simple mean differences, NHSTs can be rhetorically useful in defending research against criticisms that random factors adequately explain the results, or that the direction of mean difference was not demonstrated convincingly Principled argument and counterargument produce the lore, or communal understanding, in a field, which in turn helps guide new research Alternative procedures—confidence intervals, effect sizes, and meta-analysis—are discussed Although these alternatives are not totally free from criticism either, they deserve more frequent use, without an unwise ban on NHSTs     

Veracity is in the eye of the beholder: A lens model examination of consistency and deception

Research has attempted to explain perceived cues to deception based upon self-report of what participants believe are ‘good’ cues to deception, or self-report of what cues participants say they base their veracity judgements on. However, it is not clear to what extent participants can accurately self-report what influences their decision-making. Using a within-subjects design, 285 participants completed a questionnaire regarding their beliefs about deception before rating a selection of truthful and deceptive statements on a variety of cues. Expert coders also rated the statements for the same cues. Laypeople and expert coders do not conceptualise between-subject consistency in the same way. A lens model showed that whilst perceptions of cues, such as consistency and amount of detail, influence veracity judgements, these perceptions (and overall veracity judgements) are mostly inaccurate. Fundamentally, there seems to be inconsistencies between how deception research examines consistency and how it is understood and used by laypeople.     

No‐self,real self,ignorance and self‐deception: Does self‐deception require a self?

In this paper I dispute Eliot Deutsch's claim [See Deutsch, Eliot (1996) Self‐deception: a comparative study, in: Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds) Self and Deception: a cross‐cultural enquiry (Albany, State University of New York Press), pp. 315–326] that examining self‐deception from the perspective of non‐Western traditions (i.e. how it is understood in those cultures) can help us to better understand the nature of the phenomenon in one's own culture. Although the claim appears to be uncontrover‐sial and perhaps even self‐evident, I shall argue that it is fundamentally mistaken. What is important about both the claim and my critical assessment of it is not what it tells us about self‐deception. I shall show that it tells us little about self‐deception; that Deutsch confuses ignorance with self‐deception; and that he straightforwardly equivocates on the concept. Instead, what is interesting is what Deutsch's treatment of self‐deception in comparative perspective can tell us about comparative philosophy. The significance of what follows in this paper is less about self‐deception than it is about comparative philosophy.     

Quantitative research as an interpretive enterprise: The mostly unacknowledged role of interpretation in research efforts and suggestions for explicitly interpretive quantitative investigations

Many critics of positivism in psychology oppose the use of quantitative research methods. The author first argues that a premise accepted by both critics and supporters of quantitative research is mistaken. Contrary to what many critics and supporters alike believe, interpretation plays key, unacknowledged roles in how quantitative methods are actually employed. The author then argues that a hermeneutic perspective based on practices leads to the view that our understanding of psychological phenomena is irreducibly interpretive and also leads to recognizing that quantitative research can make a unique contribution to inquiry. In the final section of the article, the author offers suggestions about how to conduct explicitly interpretive quantitative investigations. These suggestions are based on the view that although the influence of positivism is not all-constraining (and, therefore, interpretation typically does enter into quantitative methods as they are actually employed), commitments to positivism do constrain how quantitative researchers pursue their work. As part of marking out a different critical viewpoint on positivism, the author attempts to identify what is really involved in going beyond a modernist approach.     

Self–Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe

In the debate over the nature of self–deception, "intentionalists" argue that self–deception requires an intention to deceive oneself, and "motivationists" argue that a desire, and not an intention, typically plays a crucial causal role in self–deception. Intentionalists have criticized motivationist views for ignoring what is distinctive about self–deception, and for failing to account for cases of "twisted" self–deception. I offer a new motivationist account whose distinctive element is the desire to believe. I argue that this account identifies what is common to cases of both "twisted" and "straight" self–deception, and that it captures what is distinctive about self–deception.     

Deception in research: distinctions and solutions from the perspective of utilitarianism

The use of deception in psychological research continues to be a controversial topic. Using Rawls's explication of utilitarianism, I attempt to demonstrate how professional organizations, such as the American Psychological Association, can provide more specific standards that determine the permissibility of deception in research. Specifically, I argue that researchers should examine the costs and benefits of creating and applying specific rules governing deception. To that end, I offer 3 recommendations. First, that researchers who use deception provide detailed accounts of the procedures they used to minimize the harm created by deception in their research reports. Second, that the American Psychological Association offer a definition of deception that describes techniques commonly used in research. Finally, I recommend that the informed consent procedure be revised to indicate that the researcher may use deception as part of the study.     

The science of ethics: Deception, the resilient self, and the APA code of ethics, 1966-1973

This paper has two aims. The first is to shed light on a remarkable archival source, namely survey responses from thousands of American psychologists during the 1960s in which they described their contemporary research practices and discussed whether the practices were "ethical." The second aim is to examine the process through which the American Psychological Association (APA) used these survey responses to create principles on how psychologists should treat human subjects. The paper focuses on debates over whether "deception" research was acceptable. It documents how members of the committee that wrote the principles refereed what was, in fact, a disagreement between two contemporary research orientations. The paper argues that the ethics committee ultimately built the model of "the resilient self" into the APA's 1973 ethics code. At the broadest level, the paper explores how prevailing understandings of human nature are written into seemingly universal and timeless codes of ethics.     

The effects of suspiciousness of deception and the perceived legitimacy of deception on task performance in an attitude change experiment1

Subjects participated in two immediately consecutive experiments In the first, they either experienced a deception and debriefing, learned about deception in the abstract, did not learn about deception In the second, they either did or did not hear a reference to the possibility of a deception in that experiment A measure of incidental learning of the message in the second experiment showed that experiencing deception and learning about it in the abstract were not functionally equivalent, that only experiencing deception tended to produce absolute bias, that this bias was probably caused by “vigilance” rather than by “negativism,” that the reference to deception before the second experiment did not itself cause bias, and that the reference eliminated the difference in performance due to experiencing a deception as opposed to only learning about it in the abstract Furthermore, suspiciousness and the reported legitimacy of deception were positively related to each other at the group mean level Separating out their contribution to experimental performance showed that they complexly interacted to determine performance. These results were discussed with reference to the fear that subjects who have heard about deception from friends might perform differently from subjects who have not, with reference to the necessity for deception in some attitude change research, with reference to one alternative to deception, and with reference to explanations of why some experiments have shown no relationship between suspiciousness and experimental performance while others have shown a negative relationship     

Insight Into Behavior Displayed During Deception

Previous research suggests that liars are not aware that they tend to decrease their movements during deception. Moreover, it is unclear how liars will behave if someone informs them about their behavioral rigidity during deception, and to what extent several processes (tension, attempted behavioral control, and cognitive effort) are associated with deception. In the present experiment, subjects were interviewed twice. During one interview, they told the truth, and during the other interview, they lied. In the information-present condition, before both interviews, subjects were told that deception is usually associated with a decrease in movements. In the information-absent condition, no information was given. The results revealed that whereas subjects believed that they increased their movements during deception, a decrease in movements, in fact, occurred. Provision of information about deceptive behavior had no effect. The results also showed that a decrease in movements was associated with attempted control and cognitive load processes, and occurred independently from the tension experienced by deceivers.     

Eliciting cues to deception and truth: What matters are the questions asked

In this paper we argue that there is little need for more of the traditional deception detection research in which observers assess short video clips in which there are few (if any) cues to deception and truth. We argue that a change in direction is needed and that researchers should focus on the questions the interviewer needs to ask in order to elicit and enhance cues to deception. We discuss three strands of research into this new ‘interviewing to detect deception’ approach. We encourage practitioners to use the proposed techniques and encourage other researchers to join us in conducting more research in this area. We offer some guidelines for what researchers need to keep in mind when carrying out research in this new paradigm.     

Online deception: prevalence, motivation, and emotion.

This research has three goals: first, to find out how prevalent online deception is within a sample of Israeli users, second, to explore the underlying motivations to deceive online, and third, to discover the emotions that accompany online deception. A web-based survey was distributed in 14 discussion groups, and the answers of 257 respondents were analyzed. It was found that, while most of the respondents believe that online deception is very widespread, only about one-third of them reported engaging in online deception. Frequent users deceive online more than infrequent users, young users more than old, and competent users more than non-competent. The most common motivations to deceive online were "play" on the one hand and privacy concerns on the other. Most people felt a sense of enjoyment while engaging in online deception. The results are discussed in light of a possible mechanism for changing personal moral standards.     

Criticizing groups from the inside and the outside: an identity perspective on the intergroup sensitivity effect

Research on group criticism has demonstrated that criticisms are received less defensively when made by an ingroup member than when made by an outsider (the intergroup sensitivity effect). Three experiments tested the extent to which this effect is driven by social identity concerns or by judgments of how experienced the source of the criticism is. In Experiments 1 and 2, Australians who criticized Australia (ingroup critics) were met with less defensiveness than were foreigners who criticized Australia (outgroup critics), regardless of the amount of experience the foreigner had with Australia. Furthermore, the effects of speaker type on evaluations were mediated by perceptions of the extent to which the criticisms were intended to be constructive but not by perceptions of experience. Finally, Experiment 3 indicated that although experience does not help outgroup critics, a lack of experience can hurt ingroup critics. Recommendations are provided as to how people can reduce defensiveness when making group criticisms.     

The social psychological power of photography: can the image‐freezing machine make something of nothing?

Sontag ( 1990 ) proposed that taking a photograph imparts social significance to the moment being captured. Two experiments were conducted to examine how the experience of being photographed affects the social relations of those who are photographed. In Experiment 1 (N=92), unacquainted members of dyads who were photographed together and then saw the resulting image displayed greater social self‐categorization and greater affinity for each other than did dyads who were not photographed (p<0.05). In Experiment 2 (N=282), pairs of photographed strangers also displayed greater social self‐categorization and mutual affinity than pairs of nonphotographed strangers (p<0.05). This effect occurred whether pair members were explicitly framed together in photographs or not. This result was unaffected by whether the photographed strangers were shown or were not shown their photograph. Merely opening and closing the shutter of a camera was sufficient for the development of a photo‐bonding effect. Results are discussed in terms of how the experience of being photographed can affect interpersonal perception and relationship formation. The significance of being photographed (Milgram, 1977 ; Sontag, 1990 ) apparently is so strong that it promotes social self‐categorization (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987 ) both when people are photographed simultaneously and sequentially. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Free will,grace, and anti-Pelagianism

Critics of synergism often complain that the view entails Pelagianism (or at least semi-Pelagianism), and so, critics think, monergism looks like the only live (orthodox) option. Critics of monergism often claim that the view entails that the blame for human sin ultimately traces to God. Recently, several philosophers (including Richard Cross, Eleonore Stump, and Kevin Timpe) have attempted to chart a middle path by offering soteriological accounts which are monergistic (and thus avoid Pelagianism) but maintain the resistibility of God’s grace (with the aim of blocking the tracing of sin to God). In this paper, we present a challenge to such accounts of the resistibility of grace, namely that they imply that human beings are praiseworthy for omitting to resist God’s grace. Even if such views escape Pelagianism as it is typically defined, they fail to avoid the worry at the heart of prominent criticisms of Pelagianism concerning the praise for a human being’s salvation. At the end of the paper, we suggest three possible solutions to this problem.     

How people cope with uncertainty due to chance or deception

In making social judgments people process effects caused by humans differently from effects caused by non-human agencies. We assume that when they have to predict outcomes that are attributed to non-human causes, people acknowledge their ignorance and try to focus on what is most diagnostic. However, when events are attributed to human agency, they believe that nothing is arbitrary and that one can understand the decision situation well enough to eliminate error. If so, then people should behave differently when an uncertainty is attributed to chance (a non-human agency) or to deception (a human agency). We tested this prediction using the probability-matching paradigm and found reasonable support for our analysis in four experiments. Individuals who attributed uncertainty to deception were less likely to adopt the optimal rule-based strategy than those who attributed it to chance. Indeed, only when the former were prevented from thinking about and elaborating the outcomes (the high-interference condition in Experiment 3) was their performance comparable to the level of individuals in the chance condition.     

Towards a Cognitive Theory of Cyber Deception

This work is an initial step toward developing a cognitive theory of cyber deception. While widely studied, the psychology of deception has largely focused on physical cues of deception. Given that present-day communication among humans is largely electronic, we focus on the cyber domain where physical cues are unavailable and for which there is less psychological research. To improve cyber defense, researchers have used signaling theory to extended algorithms developed for the optimal allocation of limited defense resources by using deceptive signals to trick the human mind. However, the algorithms are designed to protect against adversaries that make perfectly rational decisions. In behavioral experiments using an abstract cybersecurity game (i.e., Insider Attack Game), we examined human decision-making when paired against the defense algorithm. We developed an instance-based learning (IBL) model of an attacker using the Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational (ACT-R) cognitive architecture to investigate how humans make decisions under deception in cyber-attack scenarios. Our results show that the defense algorithm is more effective at reducing the probability of attack and protecting assets when using deceptive signaling, compared to no signaling, but is less effective than predicted against a perfectly rational adversary. Also, the IBL model replicates human attack decisions accurately. The IBL model shows how human decisions arise from experience, and how memory retrieval dynamics can give rise to cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias. The implications of these findings are discussed in the perspective of informing theories of deception and designing more effective signaling schemes that consider human bounded rationality.     

Is Forgotten Evidence a Problem for Evidentialism?

The “problem of forgotten evidence” is a common objection to evidentialist theories of epistemic justification. This objection is motivated by cases where someone forms a belief on the basis of supporting evidence and then later forgets this evidence while retaining the belief. Critics of evidentialist theories argue that in some of these cases the person's belief remains justified. So, these critics claim that one can have a justified belief that is not supported by any evidence the subject possesses. I argue that these critics are mistaken.     

Lie Detection from Multiple Cues: A Meta‐analysis

Despite the importance of judgments of veracity in many settings, research suggests that it is difficult to detect lies. In this meta‐analysis, we assess the detectability of lies from constellations of multiple cues, with a particular focus on whether lie detectability increases as the conditions approach real‐life, forensic settings, as some critics of laboratory research have argued. We synthesized 144 samples, including 9380 liars and truth tellers providing a total of 26,866 messages. We examined the accuracy with which deception could be predicted on the basis of multiple behavioral cues and to what extent lie detectability was moderated by the motivation of the sender, the presence of strong emotion, the content of the lie, the context in which the lie was told, and the demographics of the senders. The findings show that lies can be detected with nearly 70% accuracy. This level of detectability is stable across settings. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.