The cultural dynamics of rewarding honesty and punishing deception

Recent research suggests that individuals reward honesty more than they punish deception. Five experiments showed that different patterns of rewards and punishments emerge for North American and East Asian cultures. Experiment 1 demonstrated that Americans rewarded more than they punished, whereas East Asians rewarded and punished in equivalent amounts. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that these divergent patterns by culture could be explained by greater social mobility experienced by Americans. Experiments 4 and 5 examined how certain consequences of social mobility, approach-avoidance behavioral motivations and trust and felt obligation, can lead to disparate reward and punishment decisions within the two cultures. Moreover, Experiment 4 revealed that Americans exhibited stronger evaluative reactions toward deception but stronger behavioral intentions toward honesty; East Asians did not exhibit this evaluative-behavioral asymmetry. The cross-cultural implications for understanding rewards and punishments in an increasingly globalized world are discussed.     

自主欺骗决策过程与结果评价的ERPs研究

本研究基于事件相关电位技术,以32名大学生为研究对象,采用2(诱发条件：高奖赏、低奖赏)×3(反馈类型：欺骗成功、欺骗失败、诚实)的组内实验设计,以点判断任务操控被试的自主欺骗水平,并结合欺骗及时反馈范式来操纵被试的结果评价。结果发现：(1)在决策过程,做出欺骗决策比诚实决策诱发更大波幅的P300;(2)在结果评价过程,相比欺骗成功反馈和诚实反馈,欺骗失败反馈诱发更负的FRN波幅。结果显示个体做出欺骗决策比诚实决策需要更多的注意资源参与和心理努力,并且对欺骗失败反馈的敏感度远高于欺骗成功反馈和诚实反馈。这一定程度上揭示了个体做出欺骗决策和面对欺骗结果时的心理和神经机制,为教育者采取必要措施来降低和预防青少年欺骗行为奠定了研究基础。     

Do groups lie more than individuals? Honesty and deception as a function of strategic self-interest

An experiment tested whether groups lie more than individuals. Groups lied more than individuals when deception was guaranteed to maximize economic outcomes, but lied relatively less than individuals when honesty could be used strategically. These results suggest that groups are more strategic than individuals in that they will adopt whatever course of action best serves their economic interest.     

Timing and the control of variation

Two rat experiments shed light on how variation in behavior is regulated. Experiment 1 used the peak procedure. On most trials, the 1st bar press more than 40 s after signal onset ended the signal and produced food. Other trials lasted much longer and ended without food. On those trials, the variability of bar-press duration increased greatly after the 1st response more than 40 s after signal onset. In Experiment 2, which asked whether the increase was due to the omission of expected reward or the decrease in reward expectation, reward expectation had a strong effect on response duration, whereas omission of expected reward had little effect. In both experiments, response rate and response duration changed independently, suggesting that they reflect different parts of the underlying mechanism. In Experiment 1, response durations implied that timing of the signal was more accurate than the rate-vs.-time function might suggest. Experiment 2 suggested that lowering reward expectation increases variation in response form.     

The Kernel of Truth in Judgments of Deceptiveness

We investigated the relation between appearance-based impressions of honesty and individuals' willingness to engage in deceptive behaviors. The data reveal that people who were thought to look dishonest were more likely to volunteer to participate in research that was described as requiring deception on their part than were individuals who were perceived to look honest. The data are consistent with the predictions of a self-fulfilling prophecy model of social behavior, as well as recent research that documents a kernel of truth in appearance-based impressions. The results further suggest that naive judgments of deception are more accurate than has been supposed.     

签名对个体诚实度和道德感的影响

探讨签名的位置以及是否预告签名信息对个体诚实行为的影响, 同时探究不同承诺形式对个体道德行为的调节作用, 从而揭示签名对个体道德行为影响的机制。实验1比较不同签名的位置与是否预告签名信息两种条件下, 被试在有奖抛掷骰子的游戏中的诚实性表现。结果发现, 当游戏前告知需要签名时, 签名位置对被试的诚实行为没有显著影响; 而在游戏前不告知需要签名时, 上位签名的被试比下位签名的被试更倾向于做出诚实行为。实验2比较口头承诺方式与签名方式对个体诚实行为的影响, 结果发现, 口头承诺与上位签名均能促使个体做出诚实行为。结果表明, 签名对个体道德行为的影响, 是通过启动个体的自我认同感而实现的; 签名位置的效应, 实际上是由于启动的时段不同造成; 同时, 通过口头承诺的方式, 同样可以启动个体的自我认同感, 从而促进其实施道德行为。     

奖赏通过增强信号监测提升认知控制

认知控制是动态的、过程性的认知调控, 涉及监测和控制两个过程。先前研究表明奖赏可以提升认知控制, 但是奖赏是通过增强信号监测来提升认知控制的, 还是作用于控制过程来提升认知控制的, 是一个有待研究的重要问题。在本研究中, 我们设计了三个实验来调查这一问题。实验1采用Stop-Signal任务验证奖赏是否能提升认知控制; 实验2通过改变反应规则将Stop-Signal任务信号监测加工分离出来, 探讨实验1中奖赏的提升作用是否来源于奖赏对信号监测的增强; 实验3通过操纵注意资源损耗分析, 考察注意资源分配对信号监测的促进作用。实验1结果显示, 个体能更快地根据奖赏信息做出抑制反应。实验2结果表明, 在信号监测任务中, 个体能更加快速地监测到与当前抑制状态相冲突且和奖赏相关的反应信号, 据此可认为奖赏通过增强对相关信号的监测, 有助于个体更早地启动奖赏刺激信号所对应的反应, 更高效地控制冲突。实验3结果说明, 当任务难度增大, 注意资源损耗, 奖赏相关信号的反应时和正确率仍优于无奖赏信号, 说明注意资源的分配可以调节相关信号的监测速度。总体来看, 本研究通过一系列实验表明, 以目标为导向的行为发生过程中, 奖赏能有效提升认知控制效率, 其关键机制在于通过注意资源分配增强相关信号的监测。     

In money we trust? The use of financial compensations to repair trust in the aftermath of distributive harm

Trust is vital yet vulnerable in economic exchange relations. In these relations, a widely used strategy in response to distributive harm consists of having the transgressor pay a financial compensation to the victim. This research examines whether financial compensations can increase trust towards a transgressor, and whether the size of the compensation is relevant to this process. We hypothesized and found that whether larger compensations will elicit more trust, depends on how clear the perpetrator’s intention to transgress was. Experiment 1 revealed that trust perceptions increased more by a slight overcompensation of the inflicted harm as compared to an exact or a partial compensation, but not if the transgressor’s bad intentions became clear through the use of deception in the violation. In Experiments 2 and 3, we replicated these findings and further showed that it is not the use of deception per se, but rather the attribution of bad intent that moderates the effect of compensation size. Experiment 4, using a trust game paradigm revealed that this effect not only occurs for small overcompensations, but also for larger overcompensations.     

Testing the Compatibility Test: How Instructions, Accountability, and Anticipated Regret Affect Prechoice Screening of Options

Subjects screened a set of jobs, retaining those for which they wished to apply and rejecting those that were no longer under consideration. In Experiment 1, subjects who indicated the jobs for which they would apply/not apply screened out fewer jobs than those with instructions to reject/not reject or those with instructions simply to screen (control). There were no differences between the reject and control conditions. Experiment 2 used a design similar to that of Experiment 1, but subjects were made accountable for their screening judgments. The reject-apply discrepancy remained, but the accountability manipulation made the subjects more stringent in their screening compared to those who were not accountable for their judgments. In Experiment 3, subjects were told to consider either the regret resulting from retaining a bad option (regret bad) or the regret from rejecting a good option (regret good). Subjects in the regret bad condition rejected more jobs than did subjects in the regret good condition, but not more than subjects in the control condition. As predicted by image theory, the normal screening process appears to be to screen out the bad options rather than screen in the good options. This is demonstrated by screening in the control condition being similar to screening under the reject instructions (Experiment 1) and under regret bad instructions (Experiment 3), since these conditions were shown to focus attention on the bad options. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.     

6~8岁儿童公平行为的内在动机：社会信号的作用

公平行为是个体对自己或别人不偏不倚的行为,存在本质公平与表现公平。本质公平,即个体本身渴望公平,能够依据某种公平原则做出公平行为;表现公平,即个体在行为上做出公平的表现而实质并非来自本身的意愿。研究1选取270名6~8岁儿童,采用资源分配任务考察儿童在有无社会信号作用下表现公平行为的发展特点,研究2选取300名6~8岁儿童,采用抛硬币任务来考察儿童是否会用公平程序来掩盖其不公平行为。结果表明：(1)有无社会信号条件对儿童公平行为存在显著影响,并存在显著的年龄差异。有社会信号条件下,儿童更多选择公平行为,无社会信号条件下,儿童更多选择对自己有利的不公平分配。(2)儿童选择通过抛硬币的方式来获取奖品的人数随着年龄增长显著上升,抛硬币的儿童报告自己得到好的奖品的概率显著多于得到不好奖品的概率。结论：社会信号作用下儿童更多会做出表现公平而非本质公平。     

Washing away your (good or bad) luck: physical cleansing affects risk-taking behavior

Many superstitious practices entail the belief that good or bad luck can be "washed away." Consistent with this belief, participants who recalled (Experiment 1) or experienced (Experiment 2) an episode of bad luck were more willing to take risk after having as opposed to not having washed their hands, whereas participants who recalled or experienced an episode of good luck were less willing to take risk after having as opposed to not having washed their hands. Thus, the psychological effects of physical cleansings extend beyond the domain of moral judgment and are independent of people's motivation: incidental washing not only removes undesirable traces of the past (such as bad luck) but also desirable ones (such as good luck), which people would rather preserve.     

Framing in Resource Dilemmas: Loss Aversion and the Moderating Effects of Sanctions

Two resource dilemmas, the commons dilemma, in which individuals take from a common resource, and the public goods problem, in which individuals give to a common good, were experimentally compared. Although they provide equivalent outcomes, the two dilemmas involve different frames of reference and are not psychologically equivalent. We also examined sanction systems, which involve contributions by individuals in the dilemma to provide rewards and penalties for cooperation. The results of Experiment 1 supported the hypothesis that public goods problems ("give dilemmas") activate greater loss aversion and less cooperation than commons dilemmas ("take dilemmas"), and that this effect is moderated by sanction systems. No difference between dilemmas was obtained when either the reward or penalty sanction was present, indicating that sanctions cause a shift in frame of reference to the aspiration of obtaining the reward or avoiding the penalty. The penalty sanction and especially the reward sanction produced greater cooperation. Also, as expected, loss aversion heightened exploitation: when the others were cooperative, a give dilemma generated less cooperation than a take dilemma. In Experiment 2, we extended the concept of frame and loss aversion to the structure of sanction systems, finding that subjects were more likely to contribute to a "take sanction" than to a "give sanction." We discuss potential sources of reference points and loss aversion in resource dilemmas and the likely impact on cooperation.     

Facial and vocal cues of deception and honesty

Facial expressions and vocal cues (filtered speech) of honest and deceptive messages were examined in posed and spontaneous situations. The question of interest was the degree to which nonverbal cues transmit information about deception. Results indicated that (a) for both the facial and vocal channels, posing (as compared to spontaneous behavior) produced a higher level of communication accuracy; (b) facial expressions of deceptive (as compared to honest) messages were rated as less pleasant, while vocal expressions of deception were rated as less honest, less assertive, and less dominant, particularly in the posed condition; (c) the sender's ability to convey honesty was negatively correlated with his/her ability to convey deception, suggesting the existence of a demeanor bias—individual senders tend to appear and sound consistently honest (or dishonest) regardless of whether they deliver an honest or a deceptive message; (d) in the posing condition, the sender's abilities to convey honesty/deception via facial and vocal cues were positively and significantly correlated, whereas in the spontaneous condition they were not; and (e) senders whose full (unfiltered) speech indicated more involvement with their responses were judged as more honest from both their vocal (filtered speech) and facial cues, in both the honest and deceptive conditions.     

Reactions to acceptance and rejection: Effects of level and sequence of relational evaluation

Two experiments examined the effects of various levels and sequences of acceptance and rejection on emotion, ratings of self and others, and behavior. In Experiment 1, participants who differed in agreeableness received one of five levels of acceptance or rejection feedback, believing that they either would or would not interact with the person who accepted or rejected them. In Experiment 2, participants who differed in rejection sensitivity received one of four patterns of feedback over time, reflecting constant acceptance, increasing acceptance, increasing rejection, or constant rejection. In both studies, rejection elicited greater anger, sadness, and hurt feelings than acceptance, as well as an increased tendency to aggress toward the rejector. In general, more extreme rejection did not lead to stronger reactions than mild rejection, but increasing rejection evoked more negative reactions than constant rejection. Agreeableness and rejection-sensitivity scores predicted participants’ responses but did not moderate the effects of interpersonal acceptance and rejection.     

Children correlate infrequent behaviors with minority groups: a case of illusory correlation

Adults perceive an illusory correlation between negative social behaviors and membership in the smaller of two groups — the minority group (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). Two experiments investigated the development of this illusory correlation. We created pictorial stimuli showing children performing good or bad behaviors. In Experiment 1 we told participants (children in grades 1, 3, 5, and 7 and adults) that each picture depicted a child from one of two groups. Group membership and behavior were uncorrelated, but, like adults, children perceived a correlation between the smaller group and negative behaviors. Children’s attributions of good and bad behaviors to the two groups showed a weak but significant bias. Their estimations of the number of children in each group who behaved badly showed a stronger bias. Children also rated the smaller group more negatively on many dimensions. Experiment 2 showed that the illusory correlation is not dependent on social stimuli. Children performed essentially the same tasks, but good and bad behaviors were replaced by the colors red and green, and the group members were represented as squares and triangles. The results were strikingly similar to those obtained with social stimuli. In both experiments, the strength of the illusory correlation did not vary significantly with age. The results are discussed from the perspective of theories that have been proposed to account for adult behavior and the implications of no developmental trend.     

Psychological distance boosts value-behavior correspondence in ultimatum bargaining and integrative negotiation

The present research examined how construal level and social motivation interact in influencing individuals’ behavior in social decision making settings. Consistent with recent work on psychological distance and value-behavior correspondence (Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, & Chaiken, 2009), it was predicted that under high construal level individuals’ behavior is based on the social motivation they endorsed, no matter whether pro-social or pro-self. Two experiments involving ultimatum game (Experiment 1) and face to face negotiation (Experiment 2) supported the “increased value-behavior correspondence” hypothesis by showing that pro-socials were more cooperative and pro-selves were more competitive under high rather than low construal level. Implications for research on social decision making and psychological distance are discussed.     

People avoid situations that enable them to deceive others

Information advantage enables people to benefit themselves by deceiving their counterparts. Using a modified ultimatum bargaining game with an exit option, we find that people are more likely to avoid settings enabling them to privately deceive their counterparts than settings which do not enable deception. This tendency is explained by people's reduced desire to become responsible for the other's outcomes when deception is possible. Results of three experiments show that people avoid entering a setting that enables deception by appearing fair while being unfair (Exp. 1–3). Experiment 2 showed that this tendency was reduced when interaction partners were displayed as competitive rather than cooperative. Experiment 3 showed a stronger tendency to avoid tempting situations that enable private deception than to approach situations in which one can privately benefit others. We conclude that when navigating through social space, people avoid situations enabling them to deceive others.     

黑白背景颜色对诚信行为的影响

从诚信的“诚实”和“守信”两个维度来探讨黑白隐喻表征对诚信行为的影响。实验1使用信息传递-接收任务范式,发现任务信息呈现在白色背景上时个体会表现出更多的诚实行为;实验2采用改编的“信任游戏”范式,发现白色背景同样会促进守信行为。本研究从具身认知角度对此进行了深入探讨。     

欺骗判断与欺骗行为中自我控制的影响

欺骗判断与欺骗行为有着不同的心理机制, 正确认识二者之间的关系有助于增强人际间的信任和团队的长远利益。采用行为学实验从两种视角下考察自我控制对欺骗的影响。实验1采用材料评定的方法考察了识别他人自我控制能力状况对欺骗判断的影响, 结果发现对比高自我控制能力的人, 被试更倾向于认为低自我控制能力的人更有可能为了自己的利益产生欺骗行为和欺骗倾向。实验2采用颜色Stroop任务考察了识别他人自我控制资源衰竭状况对欺骗判断的影响, 结果发现当识别他人自我控制资源衰竭时, 在评价他人为自己利益去欺骗、为他人利益去欺骗以及在特定情境中欺骗倾向上, 没有发现任何显著的主效应或交互作用。实验3采用视觉−感知任务来考察不同水平的自我控制能力对欺骗行为的影响, 结果发现, 对比高自我控制组, 低自我控制组有更多的欺骗行为和欺骗倾向。实验4采用颜色Stroop任务和视觉−感知任务来考察自我控制资源对欺骗行为的影响, 结果发现, 对比控制组, 自我控制资源衰竭组有更多的欺骗行为和欺骗倾向。这些研究结果表明, 在进行欺骗判断时, 相比自我控制资源状况, 个体会优先识别他人的自我控制能力水平来判断其是否具有欺骗动机或欺骗倾向。在欺骗行为中, 高自我控制能力的个体, 能够更好地抑制自私动机, 更多的考虑长远利益, 出于自身利益去欺骗的可能性会更小; 自我控制资源充足的个体, 更有可能会经得住诱惑, 自私自利的欺骗行为发生的可能性也会更小。     

The effects of culture and friendship on rewarding honesty and punishing deception

The present research explores whether the type of relationship one holds with deceptive or honest actors influences cross-cultural differences in reward and punishment. Research suggests that Americans reward honest actors more than they punish deceptive perpetrators, whereas East Asians reward and punish equally (Wang & Leung, 2010). Our research suggests that the type of relationship with the actor matters for East Asians, but not for Americans. East Asians exhibit favoritism toward their friends by rewarding more than punishing them, but reward and punish equally when the actors are strangers (Experiment 1 and 2); Americans reward more than they punish regardless of the type of relationship (Experiment 2). Furthermore, the findings were replicated when the proposed mechanism – social mobility – was manipulated within the same culture (Experiment 3). We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding how friends versus strangers are rewarded and punished in an increasingly relationally complex world.