Intrinsic Finks and Dispositional/Categorical Distinction

The central theme of this paper is the dispositional/categorical distinction that has been one of the top agendas in contemporary metaphysics. I will first develop from my semantic account of dispositions what I think the correct formulation of the dispositional/categorical distinction in terms of counterfactual conditionals. It will be argued that my formulation does not have the shortcomings that have plagued previously proposed ones. Then I will turn my attention to one of its consequences, the thesis that dispositional properties are not susceptible to intrinsic finks. This thesis was first advanced by me and has ever since stirred up a big controversy, endorsed by some philosophers like Handfield, Bird, and Cohen but rejected by others like Clarke and Fara. Against this background, I will remedy my defense of the impossibility of intrinsically finkable dispositions and then refute some of apparently powerful criticisms of it. And so the upshot is that it is much more reasonable to hold on to the thesis that dispositions are intrinsically unfinkable. This will have the effect of putting the dispositional/categorical distinction on firmer and more secure ground.     

Intrinsic Motivation,Organizational Justice,and Creativity

For employees to generate creative ideas that are not only original, but also useful to their company, they must interact with their workplace environment to determine organizational needs. Therefore, it is important to consider aspects of the individual as well as their environment when studying creativity. Intrinsic motivation, a predictor of individual level creativity, is associated with feelings of enjoyment and interest in the task at hand. To the extent that tasks are nested in an environment, intrinsically motivated individuals may perceive their environment more favorably than individuals who are not interested in the task. Specifically, such individuals may view the rewards (i.e., distributive justice), decision-making procedures (i.e., procedural justice), and their interpersonal treatment (i.e., interpersonal justice) in their work environment as more fair, due to the positive affect associated with intrinsic motivation. This study examines the relationships between intrinsic motivation, perceptions of organizational fairness, and creativity. Participants (n = 133) worked on a task in a laboratory setting and completed measures of intrinsic motivation and organizational justice. Findings were supportive that intrinsically motivated participants viewed their environment as fairer than participants that were uninterested in the task. Consequently, distributive and interpersonal justice were shown to significantly mediate the relationship between intrinsic motivation and creativity. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

Intrinsic Value,Alternative Possibilities,and Reason

I address three issues in this paper: first, just as many have thought that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of judgments of moral responsibility, is there reason to think that the truth of judgments of intrinsic value also presupposes our having alternatives? Second, if there is this sort of requirement for the truth of judgments of intrinsic value, is there an analogous requirement for the truth of judgments of moral obligation on the supposition that obligation supervenes on goodness? Third, if the truth of judgments of intrinsic value and those of moral obligation do presuppose our having access to alternatives, what should be said about whether determinism imperils the truth of such judgments? I defend an affirmative answer to the first question, a more guarded answer to the second, and a yet more restrained answer to the third.     

Fission,Fusion and Intrinsic Facts1

Closest‐continuer or best‐candidate accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it is hard to say why. the standard criticism is that such accounts violate the ‘only a and b’ rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, again, we do not seem to have an independent justification for this supervenience claim. Instead, I argue that closest continuer accounts are committed to unexplained correlations between distinct existences, and that this is their fundamental flaw. We can have independent justification for rejecting such correlations, but what the justification is depends upon much broader issues in ontology. There is no one‐size‐fits all objection to closest‐continuer accounts of persistence.     

Intrinsic feedback, interpolation, and the closed-loop theory

The amount of experience of a target location, or its surrounding locations, was manipulated to test Adams' (1971) prediction that the perceptual trace (stored perception of the correct response) is based on repeated sensations of the correct response. Sixteen learning trials, each followed by knowledge of results, on a linear-positioning task were permitted for all subjects. Each learning trial required movement to an adjustable physical stop. In learning condition without target experience, movements never terminated in a zone within which the target was interpolated. Other groups experienced movements terminating at the target point. The strength of the perceptual trace was inferred from the ability to move to the target during 20 test trials with the stop removed and without knowledge of the results. Slow movements could be made to a novel location equally as well as to a repeatedly practiced location.     

Organizational, Nonorganizational, and Intrinsic religiosity and academic dishonesty

The present study was a preliminary examination of the relations among the Organizational, Nonorganizational, and Intrinsic dimensions of religiosity and academic dishonesty. 244 college students completed the Duke Religion Index and nine questions assessing academic dishonesty. Analysis indicated that (1) regardless of sex, High Nonorganizational and Intrinsic religiosity was associated with lower reported rates of academic dishonesty, and (2) there was an interaction between Organizational religiosity and sex, with High Organizational women and men reporting similar rates of academic dishonesty. Furthermore, the frequency of academic dishonesty reported by High Organizational women was higher than the rates reported by Moderate and Minimal Organizational women.     

Rolston, Lonergan, and the Intrinsic Value of Nature

In recent metaethical debate over ways to justify the notion of intrinsic natural value, some neopragmatists have challenged realist conceptions of scientific and moral truth. Holmes Rolston defends a critical-realist epistemology as the basis for a metaphysics of projective nature and a cosmological narrative—both of which set up a historical ontology of objective natural value. Pure ecological science informs the wilderness experience of Rolston's ideal epistemic subject, the sensitive naturalist. The author argues that Rolston's account of the relation between knowing and valuing can be clarified and strengthened by appropriating Bernard Lonergan's transcendental method. Conversely, Lonergan's view of moral self-transcendence can be developed further in light of Rolston's virtue epistemology, which is embodied in the figure of the sensitive naturalist.     

Meditation and Masks,Drums and Dramas Experiential and Participatory Exercises in the Comparative Religions Classroom

In an effort to create a context in which my students might have the opportunity to touch, and to be touched by, the richness, texture, and power of different religious worlds, I have experimented throughout the years with a wide variety of experiential and participatory exercises in the classroom. For example, the students and I (at times with the assistance of an invited expert practitioner) have drummed, danced, gone on shamanic journeys, made masks, done tai chi and hatha yoga, performed dhikr, engaged in mythic psychodramas, practiced different styles of meditation, and so on. In this paper, I examine some of the difficulties and rewards of utilizing these techniques within a university setting. I also explore some of the ways in which a willingness to incorporate these types of exercises into the classroom challenges several current academic pedagogical assumptions.     

Organic Unities, Non-Trade-Off, and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value

Whether or not intrinsic valueis additively measurable is often thought todepend on the truth or falsity of G. E. Moore'sprinciple of organic unities. I argue that thetruth of this principle is, contrary to received opinion, compatible with additivemeasurement. However, there are other veryplausible evaluative claims that are moredifficult to combine with the additivity ofintrinsic value. A plausible theory of the goodshould allow that there are certain kinds ofstates of affairs whose intrinsic value cannotbe outweighed by any number of states ofcertain other, less valuable, kinds. Such``non-trade-off' cannot reasonably be explainedin terms of organic unities, and it can bereconciled with the additivity thesis only ifwe are prepared to give up some traditionalclaims about the nature of intrinsic value.     

Life's Intrinsic Value: Science,Ethics and Nature

Book Information Life's Intrinsic Value: Science, Ethics and Nature. By Nicholas Agar. Colombia University Press. New York. 2001. Pp. x + 200. Paperback, £17.00.     

Maximality and Intrinsic Properties

A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs.' Maximality makes trouble for a recent analysis of intrinsicality by Rae Langton and David Lewis (1998).     

Self-Efficacy,Perceptions of Success,and Intrinsic Motivation for Exercise1

A number of investigators have attempted to identify the determinants of continued participation in exercise regimens. Within a social cognitive framework, the present study examined the relationships among self-efficacy cognitions, perceptions of success, and multidimensional intrinsic motivation in the exercise domain. Multivariate analyses of variance indicated that highly efficacious individuals were more intrinsically motivated toward aerobic dance than were their less efficacious counterparts. However, multiple regression analyses revealed both perceptions of success and self-efficacy to account for significant variance in intrinsic motivation at both the composite and dimensional levels. Moreover, perceptions of success were considerably stronger predictors than were efficacy cognitions. The results are discussed in terms of the need for multiple measures of perceived success, the employment of longitudinal designs to determine the direction of causality among these variables, and possible implications for adherence issues.     

Consciousness, the Vegetative State, and the Intrinsic Value of Life

Using the controversy surrounding the views of the Princeton University ethicist Peter Singer as a foil, the authors address the commonly held view that the appropriate time to terminate the life of a human being is when the individual has lost consciousness and there is no hope that he or she will regain it. They make an admittedly dubious case for the vegetative state, with which loss of consciousness is commonly equated, in order to clear the way for a more defensible basis for the termination of a human life, that of the person’s own personal, even if idiosyncratic view of when his or her life is no longer worth living.     

Intrinsic Value

Philosophical Studies -     

Intrinsic properties

Conclusion It seems that no quasi-logical analysis of naturalness, intrinsicality, or duplication is possible; this at least in part lends credibility to the practice of taking one as a primitive. And I have argued that Lewis's analysis of intrinsicality is indeed successful, Dunn's objections notwithstanding. There are other important questions about Lewis's project that I have not answered. Is his analysis of duplication successful? Does the notion of naturalness make sense? Even if naturalness cannot be defined, can it be explained in an illuminating manner? Rather than taking one of the notions as primitive, should we analyze the notions in terms of some other extra-logical notion? Important questions, but questions for another time.