共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 62 毫秒
1.
Frank Arntzenius 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):277-297
I argue that standard decision theories, namely causal decision theory and evidential decision theory, both are unsatisfactory.
I devise a new decision theory, from which, under certain conditions, standard game theory can be derived.
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Frank ArntzeniusEmail: |
2.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
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Jeff WisdomEmail: |
3.
Adam Pautz 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):335-347
I develop a problem for the Fregean Reference Shift analysis of that-clause reference. The problem is discussed by Stephen
Schiffer in his recent book The Things We Mean (2003). Either the defender of the Fregean Reference Shift analysis must count certain counterintuitive inferences as valid, or
else he must reject a plausible Exportation rule. I consider several responses. I find that the best response relies on a
Kaplan-inspired analysis of quantified belief reports. But I argue that this response faces some serious problems.
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Adam PautzEmail: |
4.
Jesse R. Steinberg 《Sophia》2007,46(1):1-5
Numerous examples have been offered that purportedly show that God cannot be omnipotent. I argue that a common response to
such examples (i.e., that failure to do the impossible does not indicate a lack of power) does not preserve God’s omnipotence
in the face of some of these examples. I consider another possible strategy for preserving God’s omnipotence in the face of
these examples and find it wanting.
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Jesse R. SteinbergEmail: |
5.
6.
Brian P. McLaughlin 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):149-172
Sydney Shoemaker has proposed a new definition of `realization’ and used it to try to explain how mental events can be causes
within the framework of a non-reductive physicalism. I argue that it is not actually his notion of realization that is doing
the work in his account of mental causation, but rather the assumption that certain physical properties entail mental properties
that do not entail them. I also point out how his account relies on certain other controversial assumptions, including analytical
filler-functionalism for mental properties, and the assumption that causes must be proportional to their effects. I conclude
by pointing out that Shoemaker has provided no explanation of why, on his view, certain physical properties entail mental
properties.
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Brian P. McLaughlinEmail: |
7.
Jens Johansson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):247-256
Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable
in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic
value for a person—can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to
the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long as we keep the tenses and the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction right, the fitting-attitudes analysis of welfare can be shown to survive Heathwood’s criticism.
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Jens JohanssonEmail: Email: |
8.
Andrew Pavelich 《Sophia》2007,46(1):7-20
Many theists believe that God is continuously acting to sustain the universe in existence. One way of understanding this act
of sustenance is to see God as actually creating the universe anew at each moment. This paper argues against the coherence
of this view by drawing out some of its consequences. I argue that the re-creationist must deny the causal efficacy of created
f things, as well as the identity of things across time. Most problematically, I argue that re-creationism ultimately denies
the reality of time itself.
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Andrew PavelichEmail: |
9.
Dan Cavedon-Taylor 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):105-107
Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying
himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands
the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.
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Dan Cavedon-TaylorEmail: |
10.
David Liggins 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):113-127
Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument—an argument which aims
to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical
science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that
this attribution is mistaken. Quine’s argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument
which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. Contrary to appearances, Putnam did not argue for the existence of
abstract mathematical objects at all. I close by suggesting that attention to Quine and Putnam’s writings reveals some neglected
arguments for platonism which may be superior to the indispensability argument.
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David LigginsEmail: |
11.
Jason Kawall 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):153-156
In my “Promising and Supererogation” I argue that one cannot fulfill promises to perform supererogatory actions (such as “I hereby promise to perform one supererogatory action every month”). In a response to my paper, David Heyd argues that there is an alternative solution to the problem I raise. While I agree with much that Heyd says about the examples he discusses, his proposed solution involves a crucial alteration of the problem; his proposed solution does not solve the problem I present.
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Jason KawallEmail: |
12.
Martin Montminy 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):341-356
Some authors have recently claimed that relativism about knowledge sentences accommodates the context sensitivity of our use
of such sentences as well as contextualism, while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of contextualism regarding our
inter-contextual judgments, that is, our judgments about knowledge claims made in other contexts. I argue that relativism,
like contextualism, involves an error theory regarding a certain class of inter-contextual judgments.
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Martin MontminyEmail: |
13.
Peter Alward 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):235-255
In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis
of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the “problem of the essential indexical” reveals
is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and
an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account of belief which encompasses
both explanatory roles and which still treats belief as a two-place relation between subjects and propositions.
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Peter AlwardEmail: |
14.
Cynthia J. Becker 《Contemporary Islam》2009,3(2):143-166
Since the reign of King Mohammed VI in 1999, there has been a recent democratic trend in Morocco that has led to political
liberalization and symbolic concessions. This essay explores how a new generation of artists is beginning to test the notions
of the Islam, the monarch, and the rights of ethnic groups and women within Morocco. I argue that while they are beginning
to test the limits of recent religious, social, and political reforms, these artists show self-restrain and selfcensorship,
creating art that falls within the public discourse allowed by the new Moroccan king.
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Cynthia J. BeckerEmail: |
15.
Luca Moretti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):97-114
Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide
an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization
is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed
to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal
to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence
is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities
though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.
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Luca MorettiEmail: |
16.
Carolina Sartorio 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):117-133
I argue that, according to ordinary morality, there is moral inertia, that is, moral pressure to fail to intervene in certain
circumstances. Moral inertia is manifested in scenarios with a particular causal structure: deflection scenarios, where a
threatening or benefiting process is diverted from a group of people to another. I explain why the deflection structure is
essential for moral inertia to be manifested. I argue that there are two different manifestations of moral inertia: strict
prohibitions on interventions, and constraints on interventions. Finally, I discuss the connection between moral inertia and
the distinction between killing and letting die (or doing and allowing harm).
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Carolina SartorioEmail: |
17.
Steven A. Jauss 《Philosophia》2008,36(3):285-298
According to what Robert Stecker dubs the “ethical-aesthetic interaction” thesis, the ethical defects of a literary work can
diminish its aesthetic value. Both the thesis and the only prominent argumentative strategy employed to support it the affective
response argument have been hotly debated; however, Stecker has recently argued that the failure of the ARA does not undermine
the thesis, since the argument “fails to indentify the main reason [the thesis] holds, when it in fact does.” I critically
examine Stecker’s objection to the familiar versions of the affective response argument and the line of support for ethical-aesthetic
interaction he proposes to install in their place. I conclude that neither is compelling; however, an important insight can
be salvaged from his positive proposal, and I argue that the insight does, in fact, point toward a novel defense of the thesis.
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Steven A. JaussEmail: |
18.
John Martin Fischer 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):15-20
I explore a key feature of Robert Kane’s libertarianism (about which I have been puzzled for some time). Kane claims that
we should separate issues of alternative possibilities from issues of ultimacy, but he further argues that they are connected
in a certain way. I call into question this connection, and I continue to argue for a strict separation of considerations
pertaining to alternative possibilities and “actual-sequence” considerations.
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John Martin FischerEmail: |
19.
Steve Clarke 《Sophia》2009,48(2):127-142
There is overwhelming agreement amongst naturalists that a naturalistic ontology should not allow for the possibility of supernatural
entities. I argue, against this prevailing consensus, that naturalists have no proper basis to oppose the existence of supernatural
entities. Naturalism is characterized, following Leiter and Rea, as a position which involves a primary commitment to scientific
methodology and it is argued that any naturalistic ontological commitments must be compatible with this primary commitment.
It is further argued that properly applied scientific method has warranted the acceptance of the existence of supernatural
entities in the past and that it is plausible to think that it will do so again in the future. So naturalists should allow
for the possibility of supernatural entities.
相似文献
Steve ClarkeEmail: |
20.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
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Stewart CohenEmail: |