Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?

In engaging with the repugnant conclusion many contemporary philosophers, economists and social scientists make claims about what a minimally good life is like. For example, some claim that such a life is quite good by contemporary standards, and use this to defend classical utilitarianism, whereas others claim that it is not, and use this to uphold the challenge that the repugnant conclusion poses to classical utilitarianism. I argue that many of these claims—by both sides—are not well-founded. We have no sufficiently clear sense of what a minimally good life is like. It is a result of this that the repugnant conclusion doesn’t license us in drawing any interesting conclusions.     

Does intermittence in induced rotary movement have any explanatory significance?

Induced rotary movement has been reported to start and stop repeatedly during 1 min of observation. This has been taken as evidence for the involvement either of cyclorotational optokinetic nystagmus or of roll vection. Both assertions are dubious. Regarding cyclorotational optokinetic nystagmus, available evidence shows that it is too weak to be important in induced rotary movement. Also, induced rotary movement and cyclorotational optokinetic nystagmus are affected differently by the velocity of eliciting stimulation. Regarding roll vection, the conditions for its intermittence do not match those for induced rotary movement. Also, although aftereffects for induced rotary movement are negative, those for roll vection are positive and negative. Intermittence in induced rotary movement may be parsimoniously explained as characteristic of a weak effect.     

How Does the Difference Principle Make a Difference?

The paper examines the relationship between the two parts of Rawls’ second principle of justice. More specifically, it explores the ways in which the Difference Principle (DP) may constrain the range of acceptable social arrangements in light of the stated lexical priority of the requirement of fair equality of opportunity (FEO) over the DP. The paper discusses two possibilities. First, it examines the role the DP may play within an institutional scheme that satisfies the requirement of FEO. Second, it discusses the role the principle may play in selecting among different institutional schemes that satisfy FEO. The paper argues that the DP has an important role only if there is a range of institutional arrangements that are equivalent from the point of view of FEO but non-equivalent from the point of view of the DP. Next, it explores the possible sources of the variation among the different FEO-equivalent institutional schemes, and argues that on the most satisfactory reading of the requirement of FEO, there will not be much variation that is relevant from the point of view of the DP. The paper concludes that the role of the Difference Principle is at best very limited in constraining the range of social arrangements that are acceptable from the point of view of justice.     

Does the autistic child have a metarepresentational deficit?

This study examines the claim that autistic children lack a “theory of mind” because of an inability to metarepresent. We argue that if autistic children have a “metarepresentational” deficit in Leslie's (1987, 1988) sense of the term, then they should have difficulty not only with mental representations such as false beliefs, but also with external representations such as photographs. Autistic children's understanding of photographic representations was tested using Zaitchik's (1990) task. This task is modelled on the false belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985: Wimmer & Perner, 1983) but involves “false” photographs where a photographic representation does not conform with the current state of the real world. Like Zaitchik (1990) we found that normal 3 and 4-year-olds found this task as difficult as the false belief task. In sharp contrast, however, the autistic children in our study passed the photograph task but failed the false belief task. As both tasks require the ability to decouple, this evidence challenges the view that autistic children lack “metarepresentational” ability in Leslie's sense. However, the results leave open the question of whether autistic children have a metarepresentational ability in the different sense of the term intended by Pylyshyn (1978), that is, representing the relationship between a representation and what it represents.     

Does training have consequences for the walk-run transition speed?

A number of authors when studying the walk-run transition phenomenon focused either on the mechanical or energy expenditure whilst only a few used both parameters concurrently. Moreover the literature demonstrates that the contribution of these variables changes along with the level and method of training. Consequently the purpose of this study is to find, by analyzing concurrently these two variables, if the walk-run transition speed is linked to the type of training. To this end we calculated two theoretical transition speeds: one based on the metabolic energy expenditure St(1) and the second one based on the internal work St(2). Subjects were divided into three groups (untrained, sprint and endurance-trained men) who were required to walk and run on a treadmill at increasing speeds. Firstly we show that the relationship between St(1) and St(2) differs depending on the groups. Sprinters have a significantly lower St(2) than St(1) whereas the opposite is found for untrained subjects. We also show that the transition speed is linked to the subject's type of training. To conclude it seems that acquiring running techniques through specific training has consequences for the walk-run transition phenomenon.     

What Does the Narcissistic Personality Inventory Measure Across the Total Score Continuum?

The Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) is the most widely used measure of narcissism in the social-personality psychology literature. It contains 40 items that tap into a variety of traits that theoretically comprise narcissism, such as feelings of superiority and willingness to exploit others. Most researchers focus on the total score produced by the NPI and may logically assume that increments in total NPI score correspond with similar increments in underlying narcissism traits. However, research presented in this article suggests that the traits measured by the NPI do not increment at the same rate. Traits reflecting intrapersonally healthy qualities (e.g., leadership, superiority) increment most rapidly within the lower portions of the NPI total score continuum, whereas traits reflecting interpersonally harmful qualities (e.g., entitlement, exploitativeness) increment most rapidly within the upper portions of the NPI continuum. These differences have implications for the meaning of scores on the NPI and how they correlate with other variables. For example, we demonstrate that lower NPI scores best predict self-esteem and higher NPI scores best predict psychopathy.     

Does sport have intrinsic value?

This paper considers the suggestion, central to McFee's (2004 Mcfee, Graham. 2004. Sport, Rules and Values: Philosophical Investigations into the Nature of Sports, London: Routledge. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) moral laboratory argument, that sport is intrinsically valuable. McFee's position is outlined and critiqued and various interpretations of intrinsic value found in the philosophical literature are considered. In addition, Morgan's (2007 Morgan, William J. 2007. Caring, final ends and sports. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 1(1): 7–21. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]) claim that sport is an appropriate final end is considered and partially accepted. The paper draws a number of terminological distinctions and concludes that sport does not have intrinsic value as traditionally conceived, but that this is of little consequence with regard to the role of sport as a moral laboratory.     

Does a panel discussion on analytic technique have any effect on an audience of analysts?

This is a report of a followup study to determine whether attending a panel discussion group on post-termination patient-analyst contact influenced the analytic audience's attitude on that subject. A questionnaire about post-termination contact was given to 21 analysts who did not attend the discussion group and to 45 analysts before they attended. The same questionnaire was given again to both groups six months later. Responses by the 21 analysts who had not been present remained essentially unchanged. Responses of the 45 analysts, after attending the discussion group, when compared to responses of an earlier group of 300 analysts, showed an increase in the proportion of analysts who said, in reference to psychoanalytic psychotherapy patients, either that they hoped to hear from the patient or that they would like the patient to return to see them at some specified period after treatment termination. Attendance at the discussion seems responsible for a significant effect on the analytic audience's attitude on post-termination patient-analyst contact.     

Does reliabilism have a temporality problem?

Philosophical Studies - Matthew Frise claims that reliabilist theories of justification have a temporality problem—the problem of providing a principled account of the temporal parameters of...     

Does Octopus vulgaris have preferred arms?

Previous behavioral studies in Octopus vulgaris revealed lateralization of eye use. In this study, the authors expanded the scope to investigate arm preferences. The octopus's generalist hunting lifestyle and the structure of their arms suggest that these animals have no need to designate specific arms for specific tasks. However, octopuses also show behaviors, like exploration, in which only single or small groups of arms are involved. Here the authors show that octopuses had a strong preference for anterior arm use to reach for and explore objects, which points toward a task division between anterior and posterior arms. Four out of 8 subjects also showed a lateral bias. In addition, octopuses had a preference for a specific arm to reach into a T maze to retrieve a food reward. These findings give evidence for limb-specialization in an animal whose 8 arms were believed to be equipotential.     

Does natural law have non-normative foundations?

This paper addresses one aspect of the natural law theory of Germain Grisez. According to Grisez, practical reason identifies the goods of human life prior to the invocation of any moral or normative notions. It can thus provide a non-normative foundation for moral theory. I present Grisez’s position and argue that the apparently non-normative aspect of natural law cannot support the moral position built upon it. I argue, in particular, that practical principles, as Grisez understands them, are best understood as speech acts. If this is correct, it is possible to develop a sceptical challenge to Grisez’s position. I am grateful to Michael Frede, Robert George, Richard Holton, Philip Pettit, and two anonymous reviewers for many helpful comments on this paper. This paper was presented at a seminar in the Department of Philosophy at Princeton University in November 1987, and I am grateful for the comments I received from the audience—in particular, Germain Grisez—on that occasion.     

Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later

On the 30th anniversary of Premack and Woodruff's seminal paper asking whether chimpanzees have a theory of mind, we review recent evidence that suggests in many respects they do, whereas in other respects they might not. Specifically, there is solid evidence from several different experimental paradigms that chimpanzees understand the goals and intentions of others, as well as the perception and knowledge of others. Nevertheless, despite several seemingly valid attempts, there is currently no evidence that chimpanzees understand false beliefs. Our conclusion for the moment is, thus, that chimpanzees understand others in terms of a perception-goal psychology, as opposed to a full-fledged, human-like belief-desire psychology.     

Is the All-Subjected Principle Extensionally Adequate?

Res Publica - This paper critiques the All-Subjected Principle. The All-Subjected Principle is one of the most prominent answers to the Boundary Problem, which consists in determining who should be...     

Respect for the Dignity of People: What Does This Principle Mean in Practice?

Researchers have found that disrespectful behaviour can have a notable psychological impact on victims and observers thereof. It is not surprising, therefore, that law and all the major psychology codes of ethics acknowledge the principle of respect for the dignity of persons. The practical implications of this principle, however, are not clear. In this article we argue, with reference to the philosophical roots of the principle, that there are rules of manners in all societies that describe how people should demonstrate respect for persons. Generally, the profession cannot require psychologists to adhere to the rules of manners, not even those that demonstrate respect for persons, but it can, and does, prescribe to psychologists how they should act while they practice as psychologists. We proceed to examine the principles and standards of the Australian Psychology Society's Code of Ethics (2007) that require psychologists to demonstrate respect for persons while acting as psychologists.     

Does luck have a place in epistemology?

Some epistemologists hold that exploration and elaboration of the nature of luck will allow us to better understand knowledge. I argue this is a mistake.