Decision Making Characteristics and Decision Styles Predict Adolescents’ Career Choice Satisfaction

Choosing one’s future career represents one of the most important decisions individuals face during their development. In the present study, Croatian college students recollected the process of choosing their future professional paths at the end of high school, and evaluated the outcome of this process. Specifically, students described how they chose between different career options, typically different college majors, available to them at that time. They specified the number and main characteristics of considered alternatives, the underlying motivation and timing of committing to a particular option, and reported how satisfied they were with the made choices. Next, the present study explored the influence of several identified decision making characteristics on participants’ immediate and delayed satisfaction with the chosen option. Additionally, the influence of several decision styles on individuals’ satisfaction was investigated. The obtained results indicate that, among decision making features, decision certainty represented the only significant predictor of participants’ immediate satisfaction with the made decision. The appeal of the preferred option and the number of considered options were revealed as additional significant predictors of delayed satisfaction with the chosen alternative. With regard to decision styles, regret and a distinct commitment factor predicted participants’ satisfaction with the made choice.     

The Impact of Decision Timing on the Effectiveness of Leaders’ Apologies to Repair Followers’ Trust in the Aftermath of Leader Failure

Purpose

The aim of the present research was to investigate how a negative decision outcome generated by a leader in a hasty, timely, or delayed manner impacts upon the need for, and the effectiveness of apologies to restore followers’ trust.

Design/Methodology/Approach

Data were collected using five studies in which the effects of timing of an incorrect decision on the trust repair process were investigated.

Findings

In the aftermath of a leader’s failure, followers experienced a delayed incorrect decision as a more severe transgression than a hasty or a timely incorrect decision. This effect was mediated by procedural fairness concerns (Study 1). The present findings also revealed an interesting paradox. Specifically, in the delayed condition followers expressed the highest need for an apology (Studies 2 and 3), but at the same time expected an apology to be less effective for enhancing trustworthiness than in the timely and the hasty condition (Study 3). Moreover, we also showed that the actual provision of an apology was effective for restoring both trustworthiness (Study 4) and trust (Studies 4 and 5) in the timely and the hasty condition, but ineffective in the delayed condition.

Implications

The present research shows that when the outcome of a decision is uncertain, it is better to make a decision (too) soon rather than (too) late.

Originality/Value

Despite the ubiquity of timing errors in daily life, our studies are the first to focus on the role of timeliness of decisions in the trust repair process.

     

任务框架、损益值大小对自恋者风险偏好的影响

以234名大学生为被试,探讨了任务框架、损益值大小对显性/隐性自恋者风险偏好的影响。结果表明：(1)框架效应较稳定的出现在中等风险水平情境下,且在大损益值条件下更易出现。(2)在获益框架下,被试为小金额决策更冒险,在损失框架下,则为大金额决策更冒险。(3)在损失框架下,高显性自恋者比低显性自恋者更为冒险,在获益框架下,高隐性自恋者比低隐性自恋者更为保守;高隐性自恋者的风险偏好受到任务框架和损益值大小的共同影响。     

Consuming now or later? The interactive effect of timing and attribute alignability

Decisions are often temporally separated from their outcomes. Using theories of structural alignment and temporal construal, we examined how temporal distance and the associated shift in decision processes moderate susceptibility to context effects. Specifically, in two experiments (one hypothetical, one with real outcomes), we demonstrated that people attend more to nonalignable differences when the outcome of the decision is in the distant future than when it is in the near future. This shift in decision processes was found in preference and choice data, as well as coded written protocols. We further show that this temporal shift cannot be explained by differential involvement with the decision or by the feasibility and desirability of the attributes. Our findings establish temporal distance as an important moderator of structural alignment effects and also extend the implications of temporal construal theory beyond the nature of the attributes to the structural relationships among attributes.     

Positive illusions of preference consistency: When remaining eluded by one’s preferences yields greater subjective well-being and decision outcomes

Psychological research has repeatedly demonstrated two seemingly irreconcilable human tendencies. People are motivated towards internal consistency, or acting in accordance with stable, self-generated preferences. Simultaneously though, people demonstrate considerable variation in the content of their preferences, often induced by subtle external influences. The current studies test the hypothesis that decision makers resolve this tension by sustaining illusions of preference consistency, which, in turn, confer psychological benefits. Two year-long longitudinal studies were conducted with graduating students seeking full-time employment. Results show that job seekers perceived themselves to have manifested greater preference consistency than actually exhibited in expressed preferences. Additionally, those harboring illusions of preference consistency experienced less negative affect throughout the decision process, greater outcome satisfaction, and subsequently, received more job offers.     

动态重复决策中先前结果对风险偏好的影响

在没有轮次限制的轮盘赌任务中考察了先前一轮及多轮的决策结果对后续决策风险偏好的影响模式, 结果表明：(1)无论盈亏, 前一轮获益或损失的程度越大后一轮的风险偏好越大; (2)先前获益后, 接下来的下注投入的金额小于先前一轮的获益金额, 先前损失后, 接下来的下注的潜在获益金额大于先前一轮的损失金额。实验结果定量地验证和拓展了私房钱效应(house money effect)和保本效应(break even effect), 在此基础上归纳出了动态重复决策中“决策前景与先前结果合并后规避损失”的决策标准, 即当决策情景具有重复性且可以自由制定决策方案时, 决策的标准是使得先前一次的获益(或损失)与下一次决策的潜在损失(或获益)合并后可以规避损失。实验结果还表明决策者仅合并最近一次的先前结果而不会合并先前连续获益或损失的结果。     

Framing Effects: Dynamics and Task Domains

The author examines the mechanisms and dynamics of framing effects in risky choices across three distinct task domains (i.e., life–death, public property, and personal money). The choice outcomes of the problems presented in each of the three task domains had a binary structure of a sure thing vs a gamble of equal expected value; the outcomes differed in their framing conditions and the expected values, raging from 6000, 600, 60, to 6, numerically. It was hypothesized that subjects would become more risk seeking, if the sure outcome was below their aspiration level (the minimum requirement). As predicted, more subjects preferred the gamble when facing the life–death choice problems than facing the counterpart problems presented in the other two task domains. Subjects’ risk preference varied categorically along the group size dimension in the life–death domain but changed more linearly over the expected value dimension in the monetary domain. Framing effects were observed in 7 of 13 pairs of problems, showing a positive frame–risk aversion and negative frame–risk seeking relationship. In addition, two types of framing effects were theoretically defined and empirically identified. Abidirectional framing effectinvolves a reversal in risk preference, and occurs when a decision maker's risk preference is ambiguous or weak. Four bidirectional effects were observed; in each case a majority of subjects preferred the sure outcome under a positive frame but the gamble under a negative frame. In contrast, aunidirectional framing effectrefers to a preference shift due to the framing of choice outcomes: A majority of subjects preferred one choice outcome (either the sure thing or the gamble) under both framing conditions, with positive frame augmented the preference for the sure thing and negative frame augmented the preference for the gamble. These findings revealed some dynamic regularities of framing effects and posed implications for developing predictive and testable models of human decision making.     

Black and white college women's maternal employment outcome expectations and their desired timing of maternal employment

In an attempt to better understand college women's maternal employment plans, this study compared the ability of different types of maternal employment outcome expectations to predict college women's desired timing of their maternal employment. A mailed questionnaire examined Black (n= 113) and White (n= 189) college women's maternal employment timing preference and their perceptions of the likelihood of 30 possible outcomes of maternal employment. Regressions showed that White women's expectations about the benefits for themselves and the costs for their children predicted their desired maternal employment timing. No variables predicted the timing preference of Black women. Additionally, the Black compared to White respondents expected maternal employment would bring fewer personal costs and more benefits for their children and they desired employment earlier in their child's life. Discussion focuses on Black and White women's conceptions of the integration of the employment and domestic roles.     

A Comparison of Verbal and Numerical Judgments in the Analytic Hierarchy Process

In the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), decision makers make pairwise comparisons of alternatives and criteria. The AHP allows to make these pairwise comparisons verbally or numerically. Although verbal statements are intuitively attractive for preference elicitation, there is overwhelming evidence that people have very different numerical interpretations of the same verbal expressions. This study explores the consequences of these differences for the quality of the AHP analysis. The results of the laboratory study with 180 participants confirm that the 1-to-9 conversion table, as is often used in the AHP, tends to overestimate differences in preference. Concerning the outcome of the AHP analysis the numerical mode shows slightly better results (not significant). Given the preference of many people for the verbal mode we conclude that if accuracy is not of the highest importance, the ease and comfort of verbal expressions may be worth the small loss in decision quality.     

Preference,resistance to change,and the cumulative decision model

According to behavioral momentum theory (Nevin & Grace, 2000a), preference in concurrent chains and resistance to change in multiple schedules are independent measures of a common construct representing reinforcement history. Here I review the original studies on preference and resistance to change in which reinforcement variables were manipulated parametrically, conducted by Nevin, Grace and colleagues between 1997 and 2002, as well as more recent research. The cumulative decision model proposed by Grace and colleagues for concurrent chains is shown to provide a good account of both preference and resistance to change, and is able to predict the increased sensitivity to reinforcer rate and magnitude observed with constant‐duration components. Residuals from fits of the cumulative decision model to preference and resistance to change data were positively correlated, supporting the prediction of behavioral momentum theory. Although some questions remain, the learning process assumed by the cumulative decision model, in which outcomes are compared against a criterion that represents the average outcome value in the current context, may provide a plausible model for the acquisition of differential resistance to change.     

Social information processing in strategic decision-making: Why timing matters

In strategic decision situations, as modeled in games, the outcome depends on all decision-makers involved. In such situations, people make different decisions when they move simultaneously as compared to when they move sequentially without knowledge of prior moves. This is called the timing effect, which is not predicted by classic game theory. We hypothesize that pseudo-sequential game structures activate concepts of social interactions, which in turn increase individual’s interpersonal trust and decreases cautiousness in situations of interdependence. Simultaneous game structures are more likely to activate concepts of games of chances, as a consequence of which the possibility of an actual total loss is more salient. In four experiments, participants played a coordination game either simultaneously or pseudo-sequentially. We manipulated processing time (Experiment 1), assessed participants’ perception of game features (Experiment 2), manipulated activation of concepts such as social interaction (Experiment 3), and asked participants what decision they make being in a social interaction or a game of a chance (Experiment 4). The results support our hypothesis that different cognitive processes, which either intensify or diminish the focus on the other person, mediate the timing effect. In Experiment 5 we reversed the timing effect by embedding the game in a competitive context.     

解释水平视角下的自己-他人决策差异

研究基于解释水平理论, 考察自己决策和为他人提供建议是否存在认知和偏好上的差异。实验一采用2(自己决策/为他人建议)×2(价值：高/低)×2(可行性：高/低)被试间设计, 165名被试代表自己或他人评价选项的吸引力。实验二采用3×2混合设计, 81名被试代表自己、相似或不相似他人, 为“高价值-低可行”和“低价值-高可行”两选项出价。结果支持了“自己-他人决策差异”：自己决策比为他人提建议在更大程度上受可行性高低的影响, 更为偏爱可行性高的选项; 人际相似性能在一定程度上缩小上述差异。     

Asymmetry of the group context effect on delay discounting

Binary choice delay discounting tasks require participants to indicate preference between smaller, immediate, and larger, delayed rewards. Previous research indicates that when the delayed reward is shared with others, the delayed outcome is preferred compared with when the outcomes are for the self only, resulting in lower rates of delay discounting. The present series of studies sought to replicate and extend this finding. Study 1 compared delay discounting on a standard task in which both immediate and delayed outcomes are for the self and a group context task where the delayed outcome was shared with one other person. Replicating previous results, group context resulted in lower rates of delay discounting, and this effect was independent of how the shared outcome was presented. Study 2 compared delay discounting on a standard task and a group context task where the immediate outcome was shared. In contrast to Study 1, group context resulted in higher rates of delay discounting, suggesting that preference in intertemporal choice tracks the shared outcome. Moreover, this effect was not independent of how the shared outcome was presented. This is the first study to reveal that group context, when applied to the immediate outcome, can result in higher rates of delay discounting.     

Decision difficulty and illusion of transparency in Japanese university students

People tend to believe that their inner thoughts are readily apparent to others. This study was conducted to examine effects, related to the difficulty of making decisions of personal preference, on the illusion of transparency, that is, the tendency people have to regard their own preference as more apparent to others when they have made their decision easily as opposed to situations in which they felt their decision to be difficult. In three studies in which the customary "transparency" experimental paradigm was used, university students were asked to rank choices of wedding dresses (Studies 1 and 3) or Korean movie stars (Study 2). Analysis suggested that the less difficulty participants felt in making their judgments (the first and last preference vs mid-ranking preference), the more they expected judgments to be transparent, especially when they had the clear intent to convey their thoughts to others. However, observers discerned first preferences no better than mid-ranking preferences. How inner subjective information contributes to the illusion of transparency is also discussed.     

The Landslide Victory That Wasn't: The Bias Toward Consistency in Recall of Election Support1

Experiments that test for the judgmental bias that results from a preference for cognitive consistency often contain two threats to their internal validity. First, the subjects are asked to make judgments about themselves. Thus, the biases that result may be explained in terms of cognitive consistency or the motivation to see oneself in a positive light. Second, the decision subjects are asked to make is often difficult to verify objectively. The present research sought evidence in support of cognitive consistency using a methodology that avoided these two confounds. The context chosen was the tendency of perceivers to use the outcome of a group decision to make inferences about the magnitude of group members’ support for the outcome. The present experiment examined whether people in Richmond, Virginia, would use the outcome of a gubernatorial election to make decisions regarding the percentage of people in favor of the winning candidate. Although the winner won by less than one-half of one percent of the popular vote, we found that the subjects significantly overestimated the degree of voter support he received and underestimated the degree of support his opponent received. Moreover, this tendency was exacerbated over time.     

Simplified approaches for multicriteria decision making under uncertainty

The problem of uncertainty in the outcome of decisions has tended to be glossed over by many MCDM methods, with the exception of multiattribute utility theory (MAUT). MAUT does, however, require quite complicated preference elicitations and knowledge of the full multivariate distribution of outcomes. Results from a series of simulation studies indicate that the preference orderings of MAUT are only minimally changed when using a simple additive aggregation of marginal utilities, especially in relation to the natural imprecisions inherent in preference elicitation. It is shown in the simulations that by far the most critical aspect of multicriteria decision analysis under uncertainty is not the form of aggregation, but the correct elicitation of marginal utilities which properly represent decision maker preferences over gambles. We relate the results obtained here to other results on the approximation of distributions by three- or five-point discrete distributions, and suggest that the use of deterministic MCDM methods of any form (not necessarily value function techniques), applied to an extended formulation in which each criterion measure is repeated for three or five ‘scenarios’, can be justified.     

Eyes on the Prize? Evidence of Diminishing Attention to Experienced and Foregone Outcomes in Repeated Experiential Choice

Recently, there has been increased interest in decisions‐from‐experience (where decision makers learn from observing the outcomes of previous choices), which provide valuable insights into the learning and preference construction processes underlying many daily decisions. Several process models have been developed to capture these processes, and while such models often fit the data well, many assume that the decision maker is a vigilant observer, processing each outcome. In two studies, we provide a critical test of this assumption using eye tracking to record directed visual attention when participants choose repeatedly among two options, each time being shown the outcome for their chosen option and for the foregone option. Consistently, we find that the vigilance assumption is not supported, with decision makers often not attending to outcome information. Moreover, (in)attention to outcomes is predictable, with vigilance decreasing as more choices are made, and being greater for obtained than for foregone outcomes, and when options deliver only gains as opposed to losses or a mixture of gains and losses. Furthermore, we find that this variation in attentional allocation plays a central role in the apparent indecisiveness (inconsistency) in choice, with increased attention to foregone outcomes predicting switches to that option on the next choice. Together, these findings highlight the value of eye tracking in investigations of decisions‐from‐experience, providing novel insight into the cognitive processes underlying them. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Taking the easy way out: preference diversity, decision strategies, and decision refusal in groups

It has often been argued and found that preference diversity is beneficial for the quality of group decisions. However, this literature has neglected the fact that in many situations, it is also possible not to choose. Further, preference diversity can be based on attractions, aversions, or both. The authors argue that some types of preference diversity can lead to biased discussions and choice refusal (i.e., the group refuses to choose any of the available options). In a laboratory experiment, three different patterns were observed. When group members held different aversions before discussion, discussions were aversion driven and group members quickly agreed to refuse all alternatives. When each alternative had both a proponent and an adversary, discussions were longer and unbiased but still often led to refusal, which was accompanied by relatively low levels of outcome satisfaction. Only when preference diversity was based only on attractions did it lead to unbiased discussion, low prevalence of refusal, and high outcome satisfaction. Implications for group decision making are discussed.     

Biased attributions regarding the origins of preferences in a group decision situation

The current research investigated biases in attributions of the origins of others' preferences in a group decision situation. In two experiments, students indicated their preferred alternative in a decision on an important issue in their school, and then explained the bases for preferences of those agreeing and disagreeing with them. Results showed that participants saw preferences of those who agreed as more rationally and less externally based than of those who disagreed. This effect increased with perceived issue importance, when the decision was made by in‐group representatives, when the decision outcome was concordant with their own preference (Study 1), and, on the externality dimension, when their representatives were in the majority when deciding on an important issue (Study 2). Findings have important implications for our understanding of the tolerance of others and acceptance of group decisions, and ultimately, how group members behave and interact. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Feedback Delays: How Can Decision Makers Learn Not to Buy a New Car Every Time the Garage Is Empty?

Decision makers in dynamic environments (e.g., stock trading, inventory control, and firefighting) learn poorly in experiments where feedback about the outcomes of their actions is delayed. In searching for ways to mitigate these effects, this paper presents two computational models of learning with feedback delays and contrasts them against human decision-makers' performance. The no-memory model hypothesizes that decision makers always perceive feedback as immediate. The with-memory model hypothesizes that, over time, decision makers are able to develop internal representations of the task that help them to perform with delayed feedback. As borne out by human subjects, both models predict that a display of past history improves learning with delay and that increasing delay increasingly degrades performance. Even though the length of training in this task exceeds that used in many laboratory-based dynamic tasks, neither the two models nor the subjects are able to effectively learn without decision aids when faced with feedback delays. When given an amount of training that more closely approximates that provided in functioning dynamic environments, the with-memory model predicts that human decision makers may learn without decision aids over the long term if feedback delays are simple. These results raise several issues for continued theoretical investigation as well as potential suggestions for training and supporting decision makers in dynamic environments with feedback delays. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.