What is “theory of mind”? Concepts,cognitive processes and individual differences

Research on “theory of mind” has traditionally focused on a narrow participant group (preschool children) using a narrow range of experimental tasks (most notably, false-belief tasks). Recent work has greatly expanded the age range of human participants tested to include human infants, older children, and adults, has devised new tasks, and has adopted methods from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. However, theoretical work has not kept pace with these changes, with the result that studies using one kind of method or participant group often inherit assumptions about the nature of theory of mind from other research, with little regard for whether these assumptions are appropriate. I argue that three distinct approaches to thinking about theory of mind are already implicit in research practice, and that future work, whether with infants, children, or adults, will benefit from articulating these approaches more clearly and following their different implications for what theory of mind is and how it should be studied.     

Does interference between self and other perspectives in theory of mind tasks reflect a common underlying process? Evidence from individual differences in theory of mind and inhibitory control

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to understand that other agents have different beliefs, desires, and knowledge than oneself, has been extensively researched. Theory of mind tasks involve participants dealing with interference between their self-perspective and another agent’s perspective, and this interference has been related to executive function, particularly to inhibitory control. This study assessed whether there are individual differences in self–other interference, and whether these effects are due to individual differences in executive function. A total of 142 participants completed two ToM (the director task and a Level 1 visual perspective-taking task), which both involve self–other interference, and a battery of inhibitory control tasks. The relationships between the tasks were examined using path analysis. Results showed that the self–other interference effects of the two ToM tasks were dissociable, with individual differences in performance on the ToM tasks being unrelated and performance in each predicted by different inhibitory control tasks. We suggest that self–other differences are part of the nature of ToM tasks, but self–other interference is not a unitary construct. Instead, self–other differences result in interference effects in various ways and at different stages of processing, and these effects may not be a major limiting step for adults’ performance on typical ToM tasks. Further work is needed to assess other factors that may limit adults’ ToM performance and hence explain individual differences in social ability.

     

Automaticity and cognitive anatomy: is word recognition "automatic"?

Recent progress in neural imaging technologies such as positron emission tomography and dense-array recording of event-related potentials has greatly increased the capacity for in vivo measurement of cognitively relevant processing activity within the human brain. Data from these neural imaging technologies can be combined with behavioral data from standard chronometric techniques to enhance computational modeling of human cognition. Applications of neural data to issues of attention and automaticity are illustrated in the domain of visual word recognition, addressing the question "Is word recognition automatic?"     

Shape constancy and theory of mind: is there a link?

In three experiments, children aged between 4 and 7 years viewed a circular disc oriented at a slant. The disc was made of luminous material and situated in a darkened chamber. Children of all ages exaggerated the circularity of the disc when they knew that the object was really a circle (the circle task), and the effect was greatest in the younger members of the sample. Crucially, however, a group of children in Experiment 3 who viewed an identical shape that they knew emanated from an actual ellipse did not exaggerate circularity. In the second experiment, children tackled three standard theory of mind tasks in addition to the circle task mentioned above. A significant correlation emerged (even with age partialed) between the extent of exaggeration made by those who knew that the shape was a circle and ability to pass the theory of mind tests. It seems knowledge of reality contaminates judgements of appearance in the circle task. This might be the same bias that features in realist errors in theory of mind tasks.     

What is chaos and how is it relevant for philosophy of mind?

This paper argues, in agreement with Neuringer, Beggs and others, that if we wish to scientifically characterise human choice, we have to work with a probabilistic or chaos-derived model. This has a number of implications for philosophy of mind. Firstly, it is in theory possible to describe human behaviour with some form of law-like equation; it is just a matter of figuring out what equation best captures the states of our central nervous system. Secondly, it means that our choices are not random but are chaotic: deterministic, but just hard to predict due to internal complexity. According to the current research, our actions are most likely caused by ‘precipitated avalanches’ of neural activity, which are difficult to predict due to chaos.     

Understanding the mind as an active information processor: do young children have a "copy theory of mind"?

Most 4-, but no 3-year-olds, were able to understand the mind's active role in evaluating the truth of verbal information. They appreciated that a statement, whether true or false, will be disbelieved if the listener has existing beliefs to the contrary and that it will be believed if no such beliefs exist. Four- and 5-year-olds were equally competent in understanding the need for interpretation of pictorial material. They realized that an uninitiated person cannot make sense of a "droodle", which in itself is an uninterpretable section of a larger meaningful drawing. We discuss the impact of our findings on the question of whether children at this age entertain a copy theory of mind.     

What is the canonical theory of assimilation?

Throughout the past century, assimilation has been the hegemonic theory of ethnic group relations in sociology, and Robert E. Park is generally considered to be the key figure associated with the articulation of assimilation's canonical formulation. Based on a careful reading of Park's main essays on assimilation, this article argues that those who associate his position with the melting pot (with its assumption of the eradication of ethnic traits and ties), the race-relations cycle, or a straight-line process of incorporation misconstrue his views. This article is in part corrective and in part revisionist insofar as it is intended to indicate aspects of Park's theory that have particular relevance to current sociological efforts to understand the implications of assimilation in multiethnic liberal democracies.     

Metacognition and metarepresentation: is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition?

Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe metacognitive contents, metacognition and metarepresentation are functionally distinct.     

Emotional regulation of fertility decision making: What is the nature and structure of "baby fever"?

Baby fever-a visceral physical and emotional desire to have a baby-is well known in popular culture, but has not been empirically studied in psychology. Different theoretical perspectives suggest that desire for a baby is either superfluous to biological sex drives and maternal instincts, a sociocultural phenomenon unrelated to biological or evolutionary forces, or an evolved adpatation for regulating birth timing, proceptive behavior, and life history trajectories. A series of studies (involving 337 undergraduate participants and 853 participants from a general population Internet sample) found that: (a) a simple scale measure could elicit ratings of desire frequency; (b) these ratings exhibited significant sex differences; (c) this sex difference was distinct from a general desire for sexual activity; and (d) these findings generalize to a more diverse online population. Factor analyses of ratings for desire elicitors/inhibitors identified three primary factors underlying baby fever. Baby fever appears to be a real phenomenon, with an underlying multifactorial structure. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

What is the relationship between ideas in the human mind and ideas in the mind of God for Spinoza?

The relation between ideas in the human mind and ideas in the mind of God in Spinoza is problematic because it is often expressed in obscure language and because Spinoza seems to be making puzzling and contradictory statements about it. I try to eliminate the problem by going from the idea that God has of himself to his idea of the essence and existence of the human mind and the human body. I then go from the idea of the essence of the human mind to the idea of the essence of other things, including God.     

The ‘theory theory’ of mind and the aims of Sellars’ original myth of Jones

Recent proponents of the ??theory theory?? of mind often trace its roots back to Wilfrid Sellars?? famous ??myth of Jones?? in his 1956 article, ??Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind??. Sellars developed an account of the intersubjective basis of our knowledge of the inner mental states of both self and others, an account which included the claim that such knowledge is in some sense theoretical knowledge. This paper examines the nature of this claim in Sellars?? original account and its relationship to more recent debates concerning ??theory of mind??, in particular the theory theory. A close look reveals that Sellars?? original view embodied several distinctions that would enable more recent theory theorists to accommodate certain phenomenological objections that have been raised against that outlook. At the heart of the philosophical issue is an overlooked complexity involved in Sellars?? account of the ??theory/observation?? distinction, involving a conception of the distinction that is both independently plausible and a key to the issue in dispute.     

How shall we study individual differences in cognitive abilities?—Methodological and theoretical perspectives

Selected studies in recent research literature are examined with regard to (a) their methodological adequacy in establishing dimensions of individual differences in information-processing abilities, and (b) the theoretical problems involved in inferring psychological processes from individual difference dimensions. Many methodological inadequacies are noted, including use of small Ns, questionable procedures in establishing variables (e.g., use of raw difference scores), improper or inadequate use of factor analysis and other multivariate statistical techniques, and poor presentation of results. On the whole, little progress has been made thus far in identifying psychological processes through research in individual differences, even though this research approach is viable and potentially useful. Serious theoretical difficulties arise in attempting to infer the nature and operation of psychological processes merely from the identification of individual difference trait dimensions. Promising research, however, is represented by studies in which an effort is made to analyze tasks into their components, to vary task characteristics, and/or to consider the strategies that individuals can employ in performing the tasks.