On nothing and nobody with an addendum on William Hogarth.

While phase-related traumata are often accepted as sufficient explanation of patients' reporting that they feel like "nothing" or "nobody," it is the thesis of this paper that such feelings often derive from intrapsychic conflict and that the working through of such conflict leads to significant therapeutic benefit. In support of this thesis, two cases are presented, together with an addendum on Hogarth's Mr. Nobody.     

Psychic reality and the nature of consciousness

In this paper we make the case for a psychoanalytically informed reconsideration of the phenomena of consciousness. Classically, following Freud, who viewed consciousness as merely a reflection or perception of unconscious mental activity, psychoanalysts have tended to regard a focus on conscious experience as potentially reductionistic and at risk of overlooking the mind's deeper structures. We describe the case of Mr K, a patient who experienced disturbances of consciousness that forced us to consider the possibility that the capacity to experience ourselves as conscious, intentional agents in a coherent world of objects is not merely a modality of perception but rather a maturational and developmental achievement that to some degree depends on adequate experiences of caregiving and is vital in ensuring the possibility of human communication. As such, it is a capacity that is vulnerable to experiences of neglect and maltreatment. We suggest that as well as compromising the capacity to think about one's own and other people's feelings, such experiences may have the further adverse consequence of leading the individual to experience and risk becoming conscious of certain dangerously maladaptive, destructive states of mind which in normal development remain inaccessible to conscious experience. Phenomenologically, such states of mind are experienced as fragmentation and disturbances of consciousness. We discuss the clinical implications of these reflections and the limitations they place on psychoanalytic work in the context of their impact on the work with Mr K.     

On the nature and meaning of sinuosity in magnitude-estimation functions

Magnitude-estimation functions for single observers, derived from multiple judgments of closely spaced stimuli, exhibit a sinuous form in logarithmic coordinates, an observation frequently confirmed since first reported by Luce and Mo (1965). We propose that this can result from reliance on a restricted pool of responses, called preferred numbers by Baird and Noma (1975). We describe a model featuring a response band centered on an assumed power function, from which the observer selects from among preferred numbers with equal probability. In simulations, the expected values of these selections oscillate around the underlying power function with an appearance similar to that of Luce-Mo functions. The appearance of these functions depends on values assumed for the scale factor of the power function, the range of intensities considered, and the width of the band from which responses are drawn. We conclude that sinuosity in magnitude-estimation functions does not disconfirm the psychophysical power law.     

Struggle with ultimate meaning: Nuanced associations with search for meaning,presence of meaning,and mental health

Struggle with ultimate meaning reflects concerns about whether one’s life has a deeper meaning or purpose. We examined whether this construct could be distinguished from presence of meaning in life and search for meaning. In two US samples – a web-based sample (N = 1047) and an undergraduate sample (N = 3978) – confirmatory factor analyses showed that struggle with ultimate meaning loaded on a factor that was distinct from but related to presence (negatively) and search (positively). Moderated regression analyses showed that people with low levels of presence combined with high levels of search for meaning were particularly likely to struggle with ultimate meaning. Additionally, when compared to presence and search, struggle with ultimate meaning related more strongly to depressive symptoms than presence or search. These results suggest that struggle with ultimate meaning represents a distinct component of how people grapple with meaning that has implications for mental health.     

Narrative, meaning, interpretation: an enactivist approach

After establishing its roots in basic forms of sensorimotor coupling between an organism and its environment, the new wave in cognitive science known as ??enactivism?? has turned to higher-level cognition, in an attempt to prove that even socioculturally mediated meaning-making processes can be accounted for in enactivist terms. My article tries to bolster this case by focusing on how the production and interpretation of stories can shape the value landscape of those who engage with them. First, it builds on the idea that narrative plays a key role in expressing the values held by a society, in order to argue that the interpretation of stories cannot be understood in abstraction from the background of storytelling in which we are always already involved. Second, it presents interpretation as an example of what Di Paolo et al. (2010) have called in their recent enactivist manifesto a ??joint process of sensemaking??: just like in face-to-face interaction, the recipient of the story collaborates with the authorial point of view, generating meaning. Third, it traces the meaning brought into the world by interpretation to the activation and, potentially, the restructuring of the background of the recipients of the story.     

On the nature of meaning and its indeterminacy: Davidson''s view in perspective

In order to illustrate the nature of the indeterminacy of meaning, Donald Davidson sometimes compares it to the fact that we can measure length or temperature on different scales. In the following paper I try to explain first why we are supposed to expect such an analogy, given the semantics of the word meaning and of the word length or temperature. In the second part I examine how close the analogy is by distinguishing different forms of indeterminacy of meaning (viz., the indeterminacy of reference and the indeterminacy of truth) and ask whether both forms have an equivalent in a theory of measurement. I shall conclude that this is indeed the case.I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for his or her detailed comments on a first version of this paper, which helped me to clarify my views considerably.     

You,me, and meaning: an integrative review of connections between relationships and meaning in life

Social relationships are seen to be vital to human functioning, both in terms of psychological functioning and physical health. Relationships are a cornerstone of well-being. For instance, having positive relationships has been linked to greater happiness, life satisfaction and physical health outcomes. Meaning in life, or the perception that one's life is significant and has a purpose, is another prominent cornerstone of well-being. As such, social relationships and meaning in life should have reciprocal associations. In this paper, cross-cultural theory and empirical research will be reviewed to explore the role of family, romantic and friendship relationships in supporting meaning in life. Further, we will discuss the implications of the current research and propose new directions for future research.     

One, two, three, four, nothing more: an investigation of the conceptual sources of the verbal counting principles

Since the publication of [Gelman, R., & Gallistel, C. R. (1978). The child's understanding of number. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.] seminal work on the development of verbal counting as a representation of number, the nature of the ontogenetic sources of the verbal counting principles has been intensely debated. The present experiments explore proposals according to which the verbal counting principles are acquired by mapping numerals in the count list onto systems of numerical representation for which there is evidence in infancy, namely, analog magnitudes, parallel individuation, and set-based quantification. By asking 3- and 4-year-olds to estimate the number of elements in sets without counting, we investigate whether the numerals that are assigned cardinal meaning as part of the acquisition process display the signatures of what we call "enriched parallel individuation" (which combines properties of parallel individuation and of set-based quantification) or analog magnitudes. Two experiments demonstrate that while "one" to "four" are mapped onto core representations of small sets prior to the acquisition of the counting principles, numerals beyond "four" are only mapped onto analog magnitudes about six months after the acquisition of the counting principles. Moreover, we show that children's numerical estimates of sets from 1 to 4 elements fail to show the signature of numeral use based on analog magnitudes - namely, scalar variability. We conclude that, while representations of small sets provided by parallel individuation, enriched by the resources of set-based quantification are recruited in the acquisition process to provide the first numerical meanings for "one" to "four", analog magnitudes play no role in this process.     

The meaning of the h-index

The h-index originates from the assumption that the number of citations received by a scientist is a better indicator of the relevance of his or her work than the number of papers he or she publishes or the journals where they are published. It takes into account the number of papers published and the citations to those papers in a balanced way, and thus is useful to make comparisons between scientists. The present paper addresses the most frequent questions about the h-index. Specifically, it explains its origin, its advantages compared to other indices, the factors that can influence it (e.g. age, field of knowledge, topic of research and language of publication), its variants, and the injustices it may lead to. In short, this paper provides a clear exposition of the hoped-for role of the h-index in the evaluation of scientists: that it serves as a useful complement to other indicators that are more subjective, and that it contributes to the progress of science by aiding decision-making on allocation of research resources in a more effective way, and on rewarding researchers who contribute to scientific progress in a more fair way.