A psychological approach to ethics

This article has the purpose of calling attention to C.G. Jung's archetypal concept of the Self as an approach to ethics. The distinction between simple morality and transcendent ethics is established. Comparison is made between the archetype of the Self and Kant's categorical imperative. Freud's superego, however, is assimilated to a natural outlook on morality, such as the notion of altruism in sociobiology. The superego is only the psychic effect of the current moral code—which could be explained either culturally or as a Lamarckian acquired characteristic of the unconscious. Jung's transcendent ethics is expressed in an ethical mandala.     

The knower and the known

This paper is a presentation and discussion of Spinoza's view on the knower, or the mind, as an agent. The knower is on his view to be regarded as an active or generative complex cognitive experience. Imagination, reason and intuition are the cognitive principles. On account of their intrinsic relation to the first law of nature, that of selfpreservation, together with the thesis of the mind as constituted by ideas or knowledge, these principles function at the same time as moral principles. Consequently, it makes sense to speak of an individual's moral attitude toward everything be knows. A discussion of imagination, reason and intuition mainly as cognitive principles is followed by some concluding remarks on the cognitive and moral relation between human beings: To know another human being is to know his knowledge. The moral attitude of individuals to each other is a function of their mutual knowledge of knowledge.     

The endorsement of irrational beliefs in a general clinical population

Burgess' Attitude and Belief Scale, a measure of Ellis' irrational beliefs, was administered to a large sample of outpatients. All 13 subscales demonstrate very adequate internal consistency. A factor analysis yielded one factor accounting for 83% of the variance, which was labeled irrationality. Clients endorsed focused items more than overgeneralized items, self-referential items more than non-self-referential items, and preferential items more than irrational items. Clients also received higher scores on the irrational process of demandingness than they did on the irrational process of awfulizing, self-worth and low frustration tolerance. The results were consistent with new formulations in Rational-Emotive theory. Suggestions were made for the construction of measures of irrational beliefs.     

From Neo-Kantianism to Logicism: Vvedenskij's Mature Years

In the first two decades of the century Vvedenskij developed and defended what he took to be an original argument in support of the impossibility of metaphysical knowledge. This argument, which he hailed as a proof, involved an examination of the four laws of thought alone. As it made no appeal to the highly technical analyses found in Kant's first Critique, Vvedenskij considered it to be more efficient and thereby effective than Kant's own arguments. Although Vvedenskij's estimation of his accomplishment actually increased with the passage of time, the proof rested on highly dubious assumptions.     

Kant's Syntheticity Revisited by Peirce

This paper reconstructs the Peircean interpretation of Kant's doctrine on the syntheticity of mathematics. Peirce correctly locates Kant's distinction in two different sources: Kant's lack of access to polyadic logic and, more interestingly, Kant's insight into the role of ingenious experiments required in theorem-proving. In this second respect, Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction is identical with the distinction Peirce discovered among types of mathematical reasoning. I contrast this Peircean theory with two other prominent views on Kant's syntheticity, i.e. the Russellian and the Beckian views, and show how Peirce's interpretation of Kant solves the dilemma that each of these two views faces. I also show that Hintikka's criterion for Kant's synthetic judgments, i.e. a new individual introduced by the -instantiation rule, does not capture the most important characteristic of Peirce's theorematic reasoning, i.e. the process of choosing a correct individual.     

Suspensions and detentions in an urban,low-income school: punishment or reward?

Disciplinary records for 3rd through 8th grade students (n = 314) in an inner-city, public school were examined for one school year to assess students' variation in response to discipline. Rates of disciplinary referrals were compared for students who received no detentions or suspensions throughout the year (never group n = 117), students who received one or more detention or suspension in the fall but not in the spring (fall group n = 62), and students who received one or more detention or suspension in the fall and one or more detention or suspension in the spring (fall + spring group n = 75). Results indicated that during the fall, the fall group had nearly equivalent rates of referrals to the fall + spring group; however, the fall group exhibited significantly lower rates of referrals during winter and spring that were nearly equivalent to the never group, as would be expected for a punishment procedure. In contrast, the fall + spring group evidenced increases in referrals across the year, suggesting the possibility that detentions and suspensions were functioning as rewards for this group. The fall + spring group was rated by teachers and peers at mid-year as highly aggressive, lacking social skills, and high on hyperactivity, whereas the fall group and the never group were statistically equivalent on teacher and peer ratings. Implications for mental health programs for urban schools are discussed, especially the need for alternatives to detention and suspension for the subset of students who account for the majority of school discipline.     

The teleological/deontological distinction

Conclusion In almost every introductory ethics course the student is taught that there are two basic kinds of moral theories: teleological and deontological. If the conclusions of this paper are correct, this practice must stop. As a minimum, discussion of the teleological/deontological distinction should be replaced by discussions of the axiological/deontological distinction. In addition, the student should be introduced to various of the other fundamental classificatory distinctions. This, I believe, will result in more penetrating theory criticism, and more creative theory construction. The hegemony of the teleological/deontological distinction must end.

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A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Rejecting Kant's absolute opposition to revolution, I propose a modified Kantian perspective for reflecting on political violence, drawing from Kant's basic ideas but abandoning some dubious assumptions. Developing suggestions in earlier papers, the essay sketches a model for moral legislation that combines the core ideas of each of Kant's formulas of the Categorical Imperative. Though only a framework for deliberation, not a complete decision procedure, this excludes extremist positions, prohibitive and permissive, about political violence. Despite Kant's hopes, the values implicit in his fundamental principle fail to support easy, inflexible solutions; but they place strong presumptions against lawless coercion and killing, undermining social order, treating persons as dispensable, underestimating options, arrogant faith in one's own judgment, and reckless simplicity in political thinking.     

Delay of gratification as a function of exchange values and appetitive values of the rewards

This study examined the manner in which the probability of delaying gratification is affected by the exchange values and the appetitive values of the rewards offered. Several delay-of-gratification questions were used, requiring a choice between an early small reward and a reward twice as great due at a later time. A total of 6,799 fourth- and sixth-grade Israeli public school pupils participated in the study. Results consistent across sexes, grades, and two delay conditions (now versus in a week from now and in a week versus in a month) indicated that the tendency to delay gratification is directly related to the exchange values of the rewards offered but inversely related to their appetitive values. Several implications of these results for the Value X Expectancy model of delay behavior were discussed.The present report is based on data collected as part of a nationwide study on educational achievement in public schools in Israel supported by the Van Leer Foundation (Holland) and the Ministry of Education of Israel.     

Impulse and Self-Reflection: Frankfurtian Responsibility versus Free Will

Harry Frankfurt's early work makes an important distinction between moral responsibility and free will. Frankfurt begins by focusing on the notion of responsibility, as supplying counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities; he then turns to an apparently independent account of free will, in terms of his well-known hierarchy of desires. But the two notions seem to reestablish contact in Frankfurt's later discussion of issues and cases. The present article sets up a putative Frankfurtian account of moral responsibility that involves the potential for free will, as suggested by some of Frankfurt's later remarks about taking responsibility. While correcting what seem to be some common misinterpretations of Frankfurt's view, the article attempts to extract some reasons for dissatisfaction with it from consideration of cases of unfreedom, particularly cases involving addiction.     

Characteristics of Calls to Israeli Hotlines During the Gulf War

The current study presents results of a survey of 3,215 calls received at seven centers of telephone emergency services (TES) in Israel during the Gulf War, when citizens of Israel experienced severe stress resulting from SCUD missile attacks. Whereas former surveys have shown that characteristics of calls to TES in Israel are generally not affected by external stressogenic events, a remarkable change was recorded in both the quantity and quality of calls received in TES centers in Israel during the Gulf War. The relative frequencies of problem categories presented by callers during the Gulf War revealed a significant increase in environmental pressures, a category that reflected the stressful situation of the war, as opposed to intra- or interpersonal problems typical of peacetime calls. A comparison between this group of war calls and a control group of nonwar calls, revealed that the two groups represented populations of callers differing in sociodemographic characteristics, expectations, and benefits from the calls. Results are discussed in reference to the unique role of TES as a source of psychological first-aid in a community crisis situation.     

Advances in Behaviorism: It's Not What It Used to Be

Behaviorism has changed over the past half century and its modern form is not familiar to many educators and other applied professionals. Put briefly, behaviorism has changed from the molecular and absolutist form of years past, when basic researchers, therapists and educators sought to modify isolated target behaviors. Modern behaviorism is relativistic and molar and the articles included in this issue are meant to illustrate this changed emphasis. The first article shows how the matching law has redefined the old law of effect and how that affects application. The second shows how relational frames provide a behavioral treatment of cognitive variables that dispels the stereotyped view of behavior modification. The third treats molar classes of behaviors as traits, and individual behaviors as states, applying that distinction to aspects of the relative frequencies of behaviors of children at home and at school. Finally, the last article shows specifically how behavioral methods have been (and are) applied to the behavior of autistic children, in a program that has been extremely successful over the past few years.     

Moral dilemmas,disjunctive obligations,and Kant's principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’

In moral dilemmas, where circumstances prevent two or more equally justified prima facie ethical requirements from being fulfilled, it is often maintained that, since the agent cannot do both, conjoint obligation is overridden by Kant's principle that ought implies can, but that the agent nevertheless has a disjunctive obligation to perform one of the otherwise obligatory actions or the other. Against this commonly received view, it is demonstrated that although Kant's ought-can principle may avoid logical inconsistency, the principle is incompatible with disjunctive obligation in standard deontic logic, and that it entails paradoxically that none of the conflicting dilemma actions will in fact occur. The principle appears to provide the only plausible safeguard against deontic antinomy, but cannot be admitted because of its collision with considered moral judgments.     

The Revival of Rejective Negation

Whether assent (acceptance) and dissent (rejection) are thought of as speech acts or as propositional attitudes, the leading idea of rejectivism is that a grasp of the distinction between them is prior to our understanding of negation as a sentence operator, this operator then being explicable as applying to A to yield something assent to which is tantamount to dissent from A. Widely thought to have been refuted by an argument of Frege"s, rejectivism has undergone something of a revival in recent years, especially in writings by Huw Price and Timothy Smiley. While agreeing that Frege"s argument does not refute the position, we shall air some philosophical qualms about it in Section 5, after a thorough examination of the formal issues in Sections 1–4. This discussion draws on – and seeks to draw attention to – some pertinent work of Kent Bendall in the 1970s.     

Impartial welfarism and the concept of a person

This paper examines some work in welfare economics based upon generalized social welfare function (GSWFs). Impartial welfarism consists in a set of apparently quite weak moral axioms concerning GSWFs. Using that framework, welfare economists have derived both utilitarian and Rawlsian doctrines. These results would seem to be of great importance to moral philosophy. I argue, however, that applying them presupposes a view of persons as mere place holders for preferences, thereby limiting the theorems' appeal for moral philosophers. I propose a more satisfactory view of impartial welfarism by replacing the term person by the more general welfare recipient, but this still fails to make the doctrine available to all moral philosophers.     

Comorbidity between and within childhood externalizing and internalizing disorders: reflections and directions

The term and concept of lcomorbidity has been mired in controversy, although there is little question that the existence of covariation among psychiatric diagnoses poses significant challenges to current models of psychiatric classification and diagnosis. The papers in this Special Section underscore a number of important issues relevant to the comorbidity between and within childhood externalizing and internalizing disorders, and illustrate both methodological and substantive reasons for such comorbidity. Weiss, Susser, and Catron's distinction among common, broad-band specific, and narrow-band specific features provides a helpful framework for understanding the comorbidity of childhood externalizing and internalizing disorders (B, Weiss, K. Susser, & T. Catron, 1998). Hierarchical models of psychopathology help to dissolve the distinction between splitters and lumpers and point to variables that may elucidate the etiology of externalizing and internalizing disorders.     

Davidson on the Impossibility of Psychophysical Laws

Donald Davidsons classic argument for the impossibility of reducing mental events to physicallistic ones is analyzed and formalized in relational logic. This makes evident the scope of Davidsons argument, and shows that he is essentially offering a negative transcendental argument, i.e., and argument to the impossibility of certain kinds of logical relations. Some final speculations are offered as to why such a move might, nevertheless, have a measure of plausibility.