Overcoming the acting/reasoning dualism in intelligent behavior

In a paper that recently appeared in this journal, we proposed a model that aims at providing a comprehensive account of our ability to intelligently use tools, bridging sensorimotor and reasoning-based explanations of this ability. Central to our model is the notion of generalized motor programs for tool use, which we defined as a synthesis between classic motor programs, as described in the scientific literature, and Peircean habits. In his commentary, Osiurak proposes a critique of the notion of generalized motor program, and suggests that the limitations of our model can be solved by integrating it with the view that motor programs are generated by a previous mechanical reasoning, independent from sensorimotor knowledge. Here we reply that while on the one hand our reference to Peircean habits gets over the temptation to consider motor programs as fixed internal entities, it also rejects the view, endorsed by Osiurak, that intelligent practice is a mixture of antecedent abstract reasoning and subsequent motor execution.     

On Some Limitations of Humean Disagreement: Miraculous Testimony and Contrary Religions

As part of his wider critique of the credibility of miraculous testimony, Hume also offers a rather curious argument as to the mutual detriment of conflicting testimony for the miracles of contrary religious worldviews. Scholarship on this aspect of Hume’s reasoning has debated whether or not the considerations are to be understood as essentially probabilistic, and as to whether or not a probabilistic interpretation of the argument is logically valid. The consensus would appear to offer a positive answer to the first question and a negative answer to the second. In this paper I expose a deeper fallacy in Hume’s reasoning that undermines both probabilistic and non-probabilistic readings. My critique is closely based upon analogous considerations in the philosophy of science, and the equally intriguing issue as to the epistemological relevance of conflicting scientific theories throughout the history of science.     

On Ignorance and Contradiction Considered as Truth-Values

A critical view of the alleged significance of Belnap four-valuedlogic for reasoning under inconsistent and incomplete informationis provided. The difficulty lies in the confusion between truth-valuesand information states, when reasoning about Boolean propositions.So our critique is along the lines of previous debates on therelevance of many-valued logics and especially of the extensionof the Boolean truth-tables to more than two values as a toolfor reasoning about uncertainty. The critique also questionsthe significance of partial logic. Received for publication 8 November 2007.     

Being Right,and Being in the Right

This paper presents a critique of a prevailing conception of the relation between moral reasoning and judgment on the one hand, and moral goodness on the other. I argue that moral reasoning is inescapably vulnerable to moral, as opposed to merely theoretical, failure. This, I argue, means that there is something deeply misleading in the way that Kant's moral theory, and some of its main rivals, have invited us to conceive of their subject matter.     

Classical Game Theory, Socialization and the Rationalization of Conventions

The paper begins by providing a game-theoretic reconstruction of Gilbert’s (1989) philosophical critique of Lewis (1969) on the role of salience in selecting conventions. Gilbert’s insight is reformulated thus: Nash equilibrium is insufficiently powerful as a solution concept to rationalize conventions for unboundedly rational agents if conventions are solutions to the kinds of games Lewis supposes. Both refinements to NE and appeals to bounded rationality can plug this gap, but lack generality. As Binmore (this issue) argues, evolutive game theory readily explains the origin of conventional behavior, but that is not Lewis’s project. Gilbert’s critique is generalized by reference to Bacharach’s (2006) work on team reasoning in games. The paper then argues that although Lewis’s account of the rationalization of conventions is shown by the reconstruction of Gilbert’s critique to be incomplete, Gilbert is wrong to conclude that classical (‘eductive’) game theory lacks the resources to explain conformity to conventions among people. A game-theoretic account of the dynamics of socialization, based on Ross’s (2005, 2006) idea of ‘game determination’, rationalizes choices of conventional strategies in overlapping generations contexts, provided agents are products of evolutionary selection and know that other players are also such products.     

The Church in an age of human rights

Abstract

This article reviews the complex origins of modern human rights discourse, and the diversity of views hidden within that discourse. It suggests that the Christian Church should locate itself within this complexity by way of four basic categories: as beneficiary of human rights; as object of human rights obligations; as promoter of public justice; and as exemplar of a community of human flourishing. In each case, there needs to be a careful appropriation and critique of the language and reasoning of human rights.     

Otto Rank: Pioneering Ideas for Social Work Theory and Practice

This article examines Otto Rank's psychology and its profound implications for social work knowledge-building and practice. The paper begins with a brief biographical portrait, highlighting the significance of Rank's relationship and eventual break with Freud, and contextualizing the ideas that became the basis for the Functional Approach. We discuss Rank's conception of human functioning in the social environment, his influence on later theories, and a contemporary critique of Rank's ideas. The paper concludes with a discussion of Rank's contributions to the Functional Approach and to social work practice in general.     

The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives

Abstract

This paper offers a critique of Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kantian instrumental reason. Korsgaard understands Kantian hypothetical imperatives to share a common normative source with the categorical imperative – namely self-legislating, human rational agency. However, her reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, Korsgaard’s agent-centred approach renders incoherent Kant’s analytic-synthetic division. Secondly, by minimising the dualistic framework of Kant’s practical philosophy the dialectical character of practical rationality is lost: norms of instrumental reasoning therefore become confused with those of moral reasoning. Thirdly, this in turn curtails the distinct critical authority of pure practical rationality over instrumental choice. The paper argues that we need to understand the normativity of instrumental rationality through the lens of Kant’s dualisms. An alternative interpretation is offered which highlights how the norms of hypothetical imperatives appeal to standards of theoretical cognition and practical efficiency rather than the self-legislative demands of pure practical reason.     

David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature

This ‘untimely review’ of Hume’s Treatise is written as if the book had just been published. I use this fiction to argue that the Treatise is a more fundamental critique of the concept of reason than most readers have thought. Hume’s analysis of human reasoning is grounded in empirical psychology, in which he made significant discoveries. He presents a non-propositional theory of desires, in which choice can be neither rational nor irrational. He shows that the idea that reason has authority, either in morality or science, has no substance. I argue that this critique remains valid and is not self-defeating.     

Assumptions and consequences of treating providers in therapy studies as fixed versus random effects: reply to Crits-Christoph, Tu, and Gallop (2003) and Serlin, Wampold, and Levin (2003)

In their comments on the authors' article, R. C. Serlin, B. E. Wampold, and J. R. Levin and P. Crits-Christoph, X. Tu, and R. Gallop took issue with the authors' suggestion to evaluate therapy studies with nested providers with a fixed model approach. In this rejoinder, the authors' comment on Serlin et al's critique by showing that their arguments do not apply, are based on misconceptions about the purpose and nature of statistical inference, or are based on flawed reasoning. The authors also comment on Crits-Christoph et al's critique by showing that the proposed approach is very similar to, but less inclusive than, their own suggestion.     

A Dialogic Account of Sense-Making in Scientific Argumentation and Reasoning

This article identifies aspects of argumentation in scientific practice that are key for scientific sense-making and articulates how engagement in these aspects happens both inter-mentally (between people) and intra-mentally (an individual's reasoning). Institutionally, peer review exerts critique on new knowledge claims in science and is comprised by a search for errors, which can be expressed as generation and evaluation of alternative possibilities that contrast with the new knowledge claim. Critique influences construction of claims, and this interplay motivates progress in sense-making. A classroom experiment is presented in which a high school physics class simulated the social interactions between authors and reviewers. These students’ subsequent ability to engage in various forms of sense-making is contrasted with a control class that did the same activity but without simulating the relevant social interactions. The results suggest important support for a principled, practice-based way to simulate scientific discourse in classrooms to support sense-making.     

Naturalized Epistemics and Conditional Reasoning

The continued predominance of SL-logic and deductive paradigms in the research on conditional-based reasoning by experimental psychologists is examined and criticized. After recounting the history and influence of the model, I note the emergence of trends in epistemology and other areas of theory that might provide a springboard for the critique of the model, and I argue that a new approach to examining reasoning with conditionals ought to be developed. I conclude that a superior approach would model such reasoning with sociolinguistic, inductive, and neurophysiological parameters, and that it would not involve any comparison of subjects' reasoning with the standard deductive rules of logic.     

Homo moralis strikes back

Restorative justice presents a morally relevant method for alternative conflict resolution. However, this potential is not always applied fully. Instead, the practice may be used in ways foreign to it. This claim comes to the fore in the practice of restorative justice in domestic violence cases. Despite the persistent feminist critique of it the practice is widely offered. This suggests that the practice can cater to needs not originally depicted in the rationale of it. This paper works out of a wittgensteinian approach and argues that there is a confusing language use going on around mediation. The argument is based on an analysis of public talk of mediation in Finland which shows that it is predominantly conducted in the light of homo economicus. This is problematic. The paper suggests that instead of referring to mediation in terms of homo economicus, the value of it should be counted in terms of homo moralis. This is what restorative justice originally intended to do. The paper establishes a new perspective on the critique of restorative justice in general and offers a fruitful way forward.     

Papineau’s Theoretical Rationality and the Anthropological Difference

A common view in philosophy is that the way human beings reason is not only gradually better, but that our way of reasoning is fundamentally distinctive. Findings in the psychology of reasoning challenge the traditional view according to which human beings reason in accordance with the laws of logic and probability theory, but rather suggest that human reasoning consists in the application of domain specific rules of thumb similar to those that we ascribe to some intelligent non-human animals as well. However, this view on human reasoning is unable to explain human accomplishments like technological innovations or scientific progress. David Papineau offers a theory of human theoretical rationality that is consistent with the psychological view on human reasoning but that can also explain how humans sometimes are able to transcend the limitations of their biologically quick and dirty modes of thought and thereby reach a high level of accuracy. Papineau claims that the abilities that constitute theoretical rationality are unique to the human species and thus, that human reasoning is fundamentally distinctive after all. In this paper I am going to discuss to what extent these abilities in fact are unique to our species and whether this theoretical rationality can be called an anthropological difference.     

Cultivating expertise in informal reasoning.

People generally develop some degree of competence in general informal reasoning and argument skills, but how do they go beyond this to attain higher expertise? Ericsson has proposed that high-level expertise in a variety of domains is cultivated through a specific type of practice, referred to as "deliberate practice." Applying this framework yields the empirical hypothesis that high-level expertise in informal reasoning is the outcome of extensive, deliberate practice. This paper reports results from two studies evaluating the hypothesis. University student participants completed 12 weeks of deliberate practice in informal reasoning. Quantity of practice was recorded by computer, and additionally assessed via self-report. The hypothesis was supported: Students in both studies showed a large improvement, and practice, as measured by computer, was related to amount of improvement in informal reasoning. These findings support adopting a deliberate practice approach when attempting to teach or learn expertise in informal reasoning.     

Entitled to Speak: Talk in the Classroom

For young children, learning begins in conversation contexts such as schools. The author of this paper contends that talk activities are fundamental to future knowledge and understanding. Implicit is critique of a current British model that values the practice of speaking through effective talk. This view is contrasted to one centered on expressive speech and authentic listening.     

Cochrane Review as a “Warranting Device” for Reasoning About Health

Contemporary reasoning about health is infused with the work products of experts, and expert reasoning about health itself is an active site for invention and design. Building on Toulmin’s largely undeveloped ideas on field-dependence, we argue that expert fields can develop new inference rules that, together with the backing they require, become accepted ways of drawing and defending conclusions. The new inference rules themselves function as warrants, and we introduce the term “warranting device” to refer to an assembly of the rule plus whatever material, procedural, and institutional resources are required to assure its dependability. We present a case study on the Cochrane Review, a new method for synthesizing evidence across large numbers of scientific studies. After reviewing the evolution and current structure of the device, we discuss the distinctive kinds of critical questions that may be raised around Cochrane Reviews, both within the expert field and beyond. Although Toulmin’s theory of field-dependence is often criticized for its relativism, we find that, as a matter of practical fact, field-specific warrants do not enjoy immunity from external critique. On the contrary, they can be opened to evaluation and critique from any interested perspective.     

Competing Conceptions of Diagnostic Reasoning – Is There a Way Out?

Diagnostic errors are more frequently a result of the clinician's failure to combine medical knowledge adequately than of data inaccuracy. Diagnostic reasoning studies are valuable to understand and improve diagnostic reasoning. However, most diagnostic reasoning studies are characterized by some limitations which make these studies seem more simple than diagnostic reasoning in real life situations actually is. These limitations are connected both to the failure to acknowledge components of knowledge used in clinical practice as well as to acknowledge the physician-patient relationship's influence on clinical knowledge and on the reasoning process itself. In addition the modes of reasoning described in these studies frequently is oversimplified. In this paper three simplistic and competing models of diagnostic reasoning are analyzed and criticized, followed by an evaluation of two alternative models proposing a combined view.     

Ethical Embodiment and Moral Reasoning: A Challenge to Peter Singer

This paper addresses Peter Singer's claim that cognitive ability can function as a universal criterion for measuring moral worth. I argue that Singer fails to adequately represent cognitive capacity as the object of moral knowledge at stake in his theory. He thus fails to put forth credible knowledge claims, which undermines both the trustworthiness of his moral theories and the morality of the actions called for by these theories. I situate Singer's methods within feminist critiques of moral reasoning and moral epistemology, and argue that Singer's methods are problematic for moral reasoning because they abstract from their object valuable contextual features. I further develop this claim by showing the importance of embodiment for the construal of objects of moral knowledge. Finally, I develop the moral and scholarly implications of this critique. By showing that the abstract, universal methods of reasoning Singer employs cannot credibly construe the objects of ethical inquiry, I call into question the validity of these methods as a means to moral knowledge in general. Furthermore, since moral reasoning takes place within an embodied moral landscape, it is itself a moral enterprise. Singer's moral reasoning, and ours, must be held accountable for its knowledge claims as well as its concrete effects in the world.     

Critique,Ethics, and the Apparatus of Experience: A Foucauldian Framework

The paper explores examples of contemporary experience in order to demonstrate the moralisation of new areas of behaviour (especially in relation to environmental issues).It sketches a Foucauldian framework for understanding the historical transformation of experience,in terms of the "apparatus of experience." On that basis,it presents a novel account of critique,in which critique is seen as the potentially transformational,experiential practice of re-experiencing the contemporary apparatuses of experience.In other words,critique is "experience squared." It is this re-experiencing of our everyday experience that permits us,to a certain extent,to "get over ourselves" and thus to reflect critically on the processes of moralisation and de-moralisation in which we participate.