But is it evolution…?

We applaud Müller & Schumann (M&S) for bringing needed attention to the problem of motivation for common non-addictive drug use, as opposed to the usual focus on exotic drugs and addiction. Unfortunately, their target article has many underdeveloped and sometimes contradictory ideas. Here, we will focus on three key issues.     

When is Death Bad,When it is Bad?

Philosophia - On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of...     

The phonological store of working memory: is it phonological and is it a store?

The phonological store construct of the working memory model is critically evaluated. Three experiments test the prediction that the effect of irrelevant sound and the effect of phonological similarity each survive the action of articulatory suppression but only when presentation of to-be-remembered lists is auditory, not visual. No evidence was found to support the interaction predicted among irrelevant speech, modality, and articulatory suppression. Although evidence for an interaction among modality, phonological similarity, and articulatory suppression was found, its presence could be diminished by a suffix, which is an acoustic, not a phonological factor. Coupled with other evidence--from the irrelevant sound effect and errors in natural speech--the action attributed to the phonological store seems better described in terms of a combination of auditory-perceptual and output planning mechanisms.     

But is it Unique to Nanotechnology?

Attempts have been made to establish nanoethics as a new sub-discipline of applied ethics. The nature of this sub-discipline is discussed and some issues that should be subsumed under nanoethics are proposed. A distinction is made between those issue that may ensue once nanotechnology applications become available and procedural issues that should be integrated into the decision structure of the development. A second distinction relates to the central value of the ethical issue. The conditions for the ethical debate differ depending on whether the value(s) in question is internal to the technological development (i.e. health and safety) or external to it (i.e. privacy, equity etc).     

Experience‐What is it?

The author takes a renewed look at the constitutive aspects of experience, looking at it as process rather than contents. Recently more psychoanalytic voices are discernible that argue for the complexity and multi-leveled nature of inner experience. Yet the predominant and preeminent psychoanalytic voice has traditionally emphasized the linearity and single-factored nature of experience and all that is based on it: development, object relations, psychopathology, and treatment. The author offers an understanding of experience as stemming from the operation of two contiguous, ongoing modalities of processing internal and external input, and reflecting two polarities of the subject-object experience: of separateness and instrumentality, and of oneness and ongoing being. Such a conceptual reframing of experience harbors multiple implications for understanding subjectivity and inter-subjectivity, inter-relatedness as well as single-person psychology, and the all-important role of an experiential 'goodness-of-fit' in the analytic situation and elsewhere.     

What is it to Depsychologize Psychology?

In this essay, I distinguish two ways of depsychologizing psychology: ‘anti‐psychologism’ and ‘non‐psychologism’. Both positions are responses to the Fregean sharp distinction between the logical and the psychological. But where anti‐psychologism, which I find in John McDowell, attempts to overcome the sharp distinction by arguing that psychological states and their expressions are apt to be articulated into judgments, Stanley Cavell's non‐psychologism, a powerful and neglected alternative, wants to overcome the sharp distinction by abandoning judgment as the paradigm expression of thought and communication.     

What is it to be healthy?

According to Christopher Boorse's Bio-Statistical Theory (BST), 'health' is statistically normal function in a reference class, and 'health' and 'disease' are empirical, objective and value-free concepts. I demonstrate that the success of the BST depends on its choice of reference classes; different reference classes result in different accounts of health. I argue that nothing in nature empirically or objectively dictates the use of reference classes Boorse proposes. Reference classes in the BST, and the concept of health, are therefore not value-free. Nor is there a reason to favour the BST over accounts of health that use different reference classes.     

What is it to lose hope?

This paper addresses the phenomenology of hopelessness. I distinguish two broad kinds of predicament that are easily confused: ‘loss of hopes’ and ‘loss of hope’. I argue that not all hope can be characterised as an intentional state of the form ‘I hope that p’. It is possible to lose all hopes of that kind and yet retain another kind of hope. The hope that remains is not an intentional state or a non-intentional bodily feeling. Rather, it is a ‘pre-intentional’ orientation or ‘existential feeling’, by which I mean something in the context of which certain kinds of intentional state, including intentional hope, are intelligible. I go on to discuss severe depression, lack of aspiration, demoralisation and loss of trust in the world, in order to distinguish some qualitatively different forms that loss of hope can take.     

Perceptions of wisdom: What is it and who has it?

One hundred fifty-five men and 233 women, aged 20 to 79 years, were asked to name both the most wise and the most interpersonally wise persons they knew personally and to give the age and sex of each. Participants were also asked for the areas in which their nominees were particularly wise. Overall, men and women responded similarly. The subjects tended to nominate individuals who were older than they were; the difference between their own age and their nominees' age decreased with increasing age. Subjects nominated males more often than females as wise and this tendency increased with the subjects' age. With the exception of older women, participants nominated females more often than males as interpersonally wise. When asked to report the areas in which their wise nominees were particularly wise, subjects tended to mention specific skill areas (e.g., business or science) for male nominees and interpersonal skill areas for female nominees.Please note that Nancy W. Denney is deceased.     

What is conscience and why is respect for it so important?

The literature on conscience in medicine has paid little attention to what is meant by the word ‘conscience.’ This article distinguishes between retrospective and prospective conscience, distinguishes synderesis from conscience, and argues against intuitionist views of conscience. Conscience is defined as having two interrelated parts: (1) a commitment to morality itself; to acting and choosing morally according to the best of one’s ability, and (2) the activity of judging that an act one has done or about which one is deliberating would violate that commitment. Tolerance is defined as mutual respect for conscience. A set of boundary conditions for justifiable respect for conscientious objection in medicine is proposed.

The taxon concept: is it taxonic?

The question of whether the concept of a "taxon" (a nonarbitrary latent category) is itself categorical, or is a matter of degree, has lain dormant within taxometrics. I analyze the problem conceptually. Part of the meaning of "taxon," I hold, goes beyond the manifest statistical properties of admixed probability distributions; any of certain forms of causal nexus leading to admixed distributions are involved as well. I defend the thesis that the threshold question, "Is there a taxon?" has a yes-or-no answer, establishing that "taxonicity" is categorical (taxonic), but also that as some taxa are much more readily distinguished from their complement classes than are others, the taxon question is also quantitative. It is on this basis that Meehl and others held the view that taxonicity is a matter of degree; however, they were wrong to hold that it is only a matter of degree.     

Speech-specific auditory processing: where is it?

Are speech-specific processes localized in dedicated cortical regions or do they emerge from developmental plasticity in the connections among non-dedicated regions? Here we claim that all the brain regions activated by the processing of auditory speech can be re-classified according to whether they respond to non-verbal environmental sounds, pitch changes, unfamiliar melodies, or conceptual processes. We therefore argue that speech-specific processing emerges from differential demands on auditory and conceptual processes that are shared by speech and non-speech stimuli. This has implications for domain- vs. process-specific cognitive models, and for the relative importance of segregation and integration in functional anatomy.     

What is it like to be Oscar?

Oscar is going to be the first artificial person — at any rate, he is going to be the first artificial person to be built in Tucson's Philosophy Department. Oscar's creator, John Pollock, maintains that once Oscar is complete he will experience qualia, will be self-conscious, will have desires, fears, intentions, and a full range of mental states (Pollock 1989, pp. ix–x). In this paper I focus on what seems to me to be the most problematical of these claims, viz., that Oscar will experience qualia. I argue that we have not been given sufficient reasons to believe this bold claim. I doubt that Oscar will enjoy qualitative conscious phenomena and I maintain that it will be like nothing to be Oscar.     

What is chaos and how is it relevant for philosophy of mind?

This paper argues, in agreement with Neuringer, Beggs and others, that if we wish to scientifically characterise human choice, we have to work with a probabilistic or chaos-derived model. This has a number of implications for philosophy of mind. Firstly, it is in theory possible to describe human behaviour with some form of law-like equation; it is just a matter of figuring out what equation best captures the states of our central nervous system. Secondly, it means that our choices are not random but are chaotic: deterministic, but just hard to predict due to internal complexity. According to the current research, our actions are most likely caused by ‘precipitated avalanches’ of neural activity, which are difficult to predict due to chaos.     

Secondary control critiqued: is it secondary? is it control? Comment on Morling and Evered (2006)

In an insightful review on secondary control, B. Morling and S. Evered argued that the seminal article spawning the construct (F. Rothbaum, J. R. Weisz, & S. S. Snyder) contained the roots of two distinct conceptualizations focusing on "fit" and "control" and that distinguishing between them clarifies inconsistent research findings. They concluded that the best definition of secondary control focuses on fit. The author of the current commentary agrees with Morling and Evered's premises but draws the opposite conclusion. Herein, it is argued that (a) current control-focused definitions have more valid claims to the term secondary control, and (b) current incarnations that focus on "fit" are important, but they are not secondary and they are not control. Hence, fit-focused constructs should be liberated from the domain of control and studied in their own right, under their own more appropriate label, such as accommodative processes. Moreover, theoretical clarity and depth regarding the functions of fit-focused processes can be gained by examining these processes in relation to other underlying motives, such as belongingness or autonomy, to which they are more closely allied.     

Emotional intelligence: what is it,and do Anglican clergy have it?

The development of the term “emotional intelligence” (EI), its conceptualisation and three attempts to measure it are outlined. The Assessing Emotions Scale is used as part of a longitudinal study with Anglican clergy in England and Wales in their 14th year in ordained ministry. Clergy by their role are expected to be pastors, counsellors and visitors. Contrary to expectations, the clergy scored lower on EI than any other group reported by the authors of the Assessing Emotions Scale.