Do children really confuse appearance and reality?

Our understanding of many mental, social and physical phenomena hinges on a general understanding that appearances can differ from reality. Yet young children sometimes seem unable to understand appearance-reality dissociations. In a standard test, children are shown a deceptive object and asked what it really is and what it looks like. Many preschool children give the same answer to both questions. This error has been attributed to children's inflexible conceptual representations or inflexibility in representing their own changing beliefs. However, evidence fails to support either hypothesis: new tests show that young children generally understand appearance-reality discrepancies as well as fantasy-reality distinctions. These tests instead implicate children's failure to understand the unfamiliar discourse format of the standard test. This misunderstanding might reveal a subtler difficulty in making logical inferences about questions.     

Three-year-olds understand appearance and reality--just not about the same object at the same time

Young children struggle in the classic tests of appearance versus reality. In the current Study 1, 3-year-olds had to determine which of 2 objects (a deceptive or a nondeceptive one) an adult requested when asking for the "real X" versus "the one that looks like X." In Study 2, children of the same age had to indicate what a single deceptive object (e.g., a chocolate-eraser) looked like and what it really was by selecting one of two items that represented this object's appearance (a chocolate bar) or identity (a regular eraser). Children were mainly successful in Study 1 but not in Study 2. The findings are discussed with a focus on young children's difficulty with "confronting" perspectives, which may be involved in their struggles with a number of classic theory of mind tasks.     

False Beliefs or False Positives? Limits on Children's Understanding of Mental Representation

We designed several modified false belief tasks to eliminate a confound present in the traditional tasks. The confound would allow children to answer correctly without reasoning about beliefs, by using a "perceptual access" approach to knowing in which they reason that a person who has not seen the true state of affairs will not know and will act incorrectly. The modified tasks incorporated 3 response alternatives (knowledge of the real state of affairs, the false belief, and an irrelevant or unjustified belief), and a yes-no question asked of each alternative. They included versions of the common Maxi, Smarties(r), representational change, and appearance-reality tasks, plus a new ("plate") task. In 3 studies (N = 164), children at both 5 and 6 years performed substantially worse on modified tasks compared to traditional versions and gave perceptual access responses in addition to belief-based and reality-based responses. These findings call into question the validity of the traditional false belief task and suggest that more research employing a variety of methods is needed to determine the robustness of young children's understanding of beliefs.     

Development of the appearance-reality distinction

Young children can express conceptual difficulties with the appearance-reality distinction in two different ways: (1) by incorrectly reporting appearance when asked to report reality (“phenomenism”); (2) by incorrectly reporting reality when asked to report appearance (“intellectual realism”). Although both phenomenism errors and intellectual realism errors have been observed in previous studies of young children's cognition, the two have not been seen as conceptually related and only the former errors have been taken as a symptom of difficulties with the appearance-reality distinction. Three experiments investigated 3- to 5-year-old children's ability to distinguish between and correctly identify real versus apparent object properties (color, size, and shape), object identities, object presence-absence, and action identities. Even the 3-year-olds appeared to have some ability to make correct appearance-reality discriminations and this ability increased with age. Errors were frequent, however, and almost all children who erred made both kinds. Phenomenism errors predominated on tasks where the appearance versus reality of the three object properties were in question; intellectual realism errors predominated on the other three types of tasks. Possible reasons for this curious error pattern were advanced. It was also suggested that young children's problems with the appearance-reality distinction may be partly due to a specific metacognitive limitation, namely, a difficulty in analyzing the nature and source of their own mental representations.     

Memory Development or the Development of Memory?

For 30 years, the question "What is memory development the development of?" has guided research on children's memory. As theories and research paradigms have evolved over this period, so too has knowledge of the surprising mnemonic competence of young children and of age-related differences in memory performance. Never the less, there are serious limits to current understanding of the development of memory. Indeed, there have been few investigations of changes over time in the memory skills of individual children, and researchers have yet to shed much light on the more difficult question of "What are the forces that propel the development of skilled remembering?" From our perspective, the answer to this question will require movement toward longitudinal research designs that illuminate the mechanisms that bring about developmental change.     

Can chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) discriminate appearance from reality?

A milestone in human development is coming to recognize that how something looks is not necessarily how it is. We tested appearance-reality understanding in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) with a task requiring them to choose between a small grape and a big grape. The apparent relative size of the grapes was reversed using magnifying and minimizing lenses so that the truly bigger grape appeared to be the smaller one. Our Lens test involved a basic component adapted from standard procedures for children, as well as several components designed to rule out alternative explanations. There were large individual differences in performance, with some chimpanzees’ responses suggesting they appreciated the appearance-reality distinction. In contrast, all chimpanzees failed a Reverse Contingency control test, indicating that those who passed the Lens test did not do so by learning a simple reverse contingency rule. Four-year-old children given an adapted version of the Lens test failed it while 4.5-year-olds passed. Our study constitutes the first direct investigation of appearance-reality understanding in chimpanzees and the first cross-species comparison of this capacity.     

Determinism, possibility, and ethics

This essay reexamines the age-old "determinism-free will" problem from a psychoanalytic perspective. The first section recapitulates the author's (1985) earlier argument on the nature of causation in psychoanalysis; the second part examines the compatibility of determinism and freedom; and the final section looks at the ethical ramifications of the issues at hand. The author exposits his adherence to universal determinism and attempts to answer the question, "What sort of possibility and ethics are permitted in a deterministic universe?"     

Please May I Have a Bike? Better Yet, May I Have a Hug? An Examination of Children’s and Adolescents’ Happiness

Academic research on children’s and adolescents’ happiness has been slow to develop. This research provides an empirical investigation to answer the question, “What makes children and adolescents happy?” We explore this question in two studies with a total of 300 participants ages 8–18. Study 1 asks participants to answer the open-ended question, “What makes me happy?” There were five emergent themes—“people and pets,” “achievements,” “material things,” “hobbies,” and “sports”. Study 2 also asks participants to answer the question, “What makes me happy?”, but uses two different measures (a semi-structured thought listing task and a collage task). Using three different happiness measures, we found consistent age differences in what children perceive to make them happy.     

Taking seriously the "what then?" question: an ethical framework for the responsible management of medical disasters

When healthcare resources become overwhelmed in medical disasters, as they inevitably will, we have to ask, in an unflinching fashion, the question: "What then?" or more precisely, "What should we do when we run out of resources?" In a mass casualty event worthy of the designation, we will indeed run out of resources, perhaps quite quickly. This article provides an ethical framework for the responsible management of medical disasters in which the "What then?" question must be asked. The framework begins with a critique of existing guidance from professional associations of physicians and then argues for an alternative approach that qualifies the obligation to preserve life, takes seriously the ethical challenges of overwhelmed healthcare resources, and countenances physician-assisted suicide as a last resort.     

TRANSFORMING LESBIAN SEXUALITY

Women are objectified and sexualized by the media and the economy, so that they live in a culture of sex. Lesbians are excluded from the mainstream sexual and appearance norms for women, yet are affected by these norms, including the association of sex and violence against women. The word sexuality has been used to connote both sexual orientation and sexual activity, and it is argued that this dual meaning illustrates the dominance of patriarchal definitions of women's sexuality. This article discusses methodologic issues in understanding who is a lesbian and presents various models or dimensions for understanding who is included in research about lesbians. It asks the question "What is sex?" and reviews the implications of this question for lesbian sexual activity. This question has implications for a collorary question: "What is a lesbian relationship?", and the article discusses the implications of this question on various forms of sexual and nonsexual relationships among lesbians.     

Developmental changes in consistency of preferential feeling for peers and objects around age four

When do young children come to have an individual mental image of each peer? Forming a stable impression of each person requires maturation of at least two cognitive abilities, inferring the other's mind and episodic memory. According to past studies, the critical period for both these abilities is around age four. Thus, it was hypothesized that the child begins to form a consistent mental image of each peer at or after age four. To test this hypothesis, the temporal consistency of preference for peers was examined in 3-, 4-, and 5-yr.-olds. Each subject was asked "Who do you like better than others in this class?" once a week for three times (Study 1). The results indicated that most of the 3-yr.-olds answered different names as their favorite friends or nonsense things inconsistently week by week, whereas older children tended to answer the same names across weeks. However, changing the question to "Which object do you like best of these alternatives?" dramatically changed the response pattern (Study 2): preferences among nonhuman objects (playthings) were temporally consistent even for 3-yr.-olds. These results indicate that children before age four do have a temporally consistent feeling toward general objects but do not have a consistent firm feeling about personal relationships among peers. The results are discussed in relation to the critical developmental changes about age 4 in other cognitive abilities.     

What does the MTA study tell us about effective psychosocial treatment for ADHD?

Discussed the initial findings from the recently published, National Institute of Mental Health-sponsored Multimodal Treatment Study (MTA) of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). These findings can be summarized as follows: Medical management alone was found to be significantly more effective for the core symptoms of ADHD as compared to behavioral treatment alone and routine (community) care, and behavioral treatment did not significantly improve outcome when combined with medical treatment. In discussing these findings, it is important to be explicit about the research questions the study was and was not designed to answer. The MTA study provided useful information regarding the question, "Does a very intensive form of behavioral treatment deliver greater benefits than the less intensive forms of behavioral treatment investigated in prior studies?" but little insight on the question, "What type of treatment by what type of therapist is most effective in dealing with what specific problems among specific children with ADHD?" It is suggested that the clearest finding from the MTA study is that the effectiveness of psychosocial intervention for ADHD hinges on the degree to which a broad range of treatment ingredients are considered, carefully selected, matched, and tailored to the individual needs of each child with the disorder, and implemented and monitored over the long term.     

外表真实区别、表征变化和错误信念的任务分析

自20世纪80年代以来,“心理理论”已成为发展心理学的研究热点和最活跃、最多产的领域。为了分析和比较“心理理论”的实验任务,该研究以济南市3所幼儿园中的233名3—6岁儿童为有效被试。进行了“意外转移。和“欺骗外表”两种心理理论实验任务。得出如下主要结论：(1)意外转移任务中内隐错误信念显著难于标准错误信念,易化错误信念与标准错误信念的难度不存在显著差异。(2)欺骗外表任务中外表真实区别难度显著低于表征变化和错误信念。(3)意外转移任务的错误信念显著难于欺骗外表任务的错误信念。     

Where to look first for children's knowledge of false beliefs

Recent research has shown that, although young children have a substantial knowledge of beliefs as internal mental states, they have considerable difficulty in understanding how a false belief can lead to an outcome which is in conflict with a desire. However, this evidence has come from tasks which assume that children follow an experimenter's "implicatures" in conversation and interpret the question "Where will a person (with the false belief) look for the object?" to mean "Where will the person look first?" rather than "Where will the person have to look (or go to look) to find the object?" In our investigation, even 3-year-olds often responded correctly when asked to predict the initial behavior of a story character with a false belief. We discuss these results in terms of the conversational worlds of children and adults.     

When children ask, "What is it?" what do they want to know about artifacts?

When children ask, "What is it?" are they seeking information about what something is called or what kind of thing it is? To find out, we gave 2-, 3-, and 4-year-olds (32 at each age) the opportunity to inquire about unfamiliar artifacts. An ambiguous question was answered with a name or with functional information, depending on the group to which the children were assigned. Children were inclined to follow up with additional questions about the object when they had been told its name, but seemed satisfied with the answer when they had been told the object's function. Moreover, children in the name condition tended to substitute questions about function for ambiguous questions over the course of the session. These results indicate that children are motivated to discover what kinds of things novel artifacts are, and that young children, like adults, conceive of artifact kinds in terms of their functions.     

What's in a name: what analyst and patient call each other

Awkward moments often arise between patient and analyst involving the question, "What do we call each other?" The manner in which the dyad address each other contains material central to the patient's inner life. Names, like dreams, deserve a privileged status as providing a royal road into the paradoxical analytic relationship and the unconscious conflicts that feed it. Whether an analyst addresses the patient formally, informally, or not at all, awareness of the issues surrounding names is important.     

The Development of Symbolic Coordination: Representation of Imagined Objects,Executive Function,and Theory of Mind

Children's developing competence with symbolic representations was assessed in 3 studies. Study 1 examined the hypothesis that the production of imaginary symbolic objects in pantomime requires the simultaneous coordination of the dual representations of a dynamic action and a symbolic object. We explored this coordination of symbolic representations in 3- to 5-year-olds with a modified action pantomime task that employed both a "dynamic action + object" condition and a "hold + object" condition. Consistent with earlier research, production of imaginary symbolic objects rather than body-part-as-objects increased with age, although, even at age 5, children did not perform at adult levels. As hypothesized, children produced fewer body-part-as-object anchors when they were simply asked to hold an object, rather than perform a dynamic action with the object. Study 2 repeated the conditions of Study 1 and examined these conditions in relation to performance on the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task. This study replicated the developmental findings of the earlier study and indicated a modest relation between pantomime and the DCCS, which disappeared with age partialled out. Study 3 examined the action pantomime task in relation to the DCCS, false belief, and appearance-reality with 3- to 5-year-olds. Though performance on the DCCS was related to theory of mind, production of imaginary symbolic objects in pantomime was not strongly related to theory of mind or the DCCS. Results are discussed in terms of children's developing reflective competence in coordinating symbolic representations.     

Metacognitive development of deaf children: lessons from the appearance-reality and false belief tasks

'Theory of mind' development is now an important research field in deaf studies. Past research with the classic false belief task has consistently reported a delay in theory of mind development in deaf children born of hearing parents, while performance of second-generation deaf children is more problematic with some contradictory results. The present paper is aimed at testing the metacognitive abilities of deaf children on two tasks: the appearance-reality paradigm designed by Flavell, Flavell and Green (1983) and the classic false belief inference task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner, 1986). Twenty-eight second-generation deaf children, 60 deaf children of hearing parents and 36 hearing children, aged 5 to 7, were tested and compared on three appearance-reality and three false belief items. Results show that early exposure to language, be it signed or oral, facilitates performance on the two theory of mind tasks. In addition, native signers equal hearing children in the appearance-reality task while surpassing them on the false belief one. The differences of performance patterns in the two tasks are discussed in terms of linguistic and metarepresentational development.     

Making sense of memory.

The current work explores how people make recognition and belief judgments in the presence of obvious repetition primes. In two experiments, subjects received a 200-ms prime ("cheetah"), either before or after reading a trivia question ("What is the fastest animal?") but always before being presented with the target answer ("cheetah"). Results showed that repetition priming decreased "old" claims (Recognition--Experiment 1), while it increased truth claims (Belief--Experiment 2). Furthermore, repetition prime placement affected recognition but not belief. Combined, these results suggest that dissociations in memory performance are a natural outcome of task and processing demands and reflect the dynamic, flexible nature of memory.     

Conceptual development and conversational understanding

Children's understanding of the implications of conversation can influence their responses on tasks designed to measure conceptual development. These responses are in keeping with developmental changes in the ability to recognize and resolve ambiguity in communicative contexts, as shown, for example, in children's ability to compute "scalar implicatures". Examining steps children take to overcome difficulties in processing the relevant features of tasks and in correctly interpreting task instructions promise to illuminate mechanisms of conceptual development. We review recent research in this area, focussing on early knowledge of the appearance-reality distinction and knowledge of cosmological concepts.