Respecting Embedded Disability

In certain ways, many disabilities seem to occupy a middle ground between illnesses like cancer and identity‐traits like race: like illnesses, they can present a wide variety of obstacles in a range of social and natural environments and, insofar as they do, they are something we should prevent potential people from having for their own sake; at the same time, those same types of disabilities can be, like race, a valuable part of the identity of the persons who already have them. I consider this seemingly dual nature of a significant class of disabilities to attempt to understand the proper relation of those disabilities to persons and how we should value or respect them. I argue for a distinction between embedded disabilities (e.g. John's blindness) and general disabilities (e.g. blindness‐in‐general); importantly not everyone with a disability will turn out to have an embedded disability. I then show that expressing negative value judgments about general disabilities does not typically express disrespect for people with disabilities — thereby addressing a long‐standing charge made by many in the disabilities community. Finally, I show that unlike with disabilities, expressing negative judgments about the general form of identity‐traits like race does typically express disrespect for people with those identity‐traits.     

Types of inconsistency in health-state utility judgments

In making judgments of health-related quality of life, respondents often compare the relative magnitude of two intervals between health states, such as the interval between normal health and blindness compared to that between normal health and death. We examined two ways of comparing such intervals: person-trade-off (PTO)—in which the judgment concerns matching numbers of people so that two changes are equivalent—and direct judgment of the ratio. Both measures showed ratio inconsistency (a ratio that should be the product of two other ratios is too high) and superadditivity (two ratios that should add to 1 are too high). Some responses in both methods implied that two intervals which should have been different (because they shared a top or bottom point, but differed on the other point) were nevertheless viewed by subjects as being of equal size. These equality responses were more common when death was the bottom (worse end) of both intervals being compared (e.g., the interval between death and blindness is perceived as being the same size as the interval between death and normal health) than when any other condition was at the bottom or when the condition common to the two intervals was at the top. A second experiment indicated that subjects really do consider the intervals to be equal. Our findings argue for giving subjects a chance to reflect on such apparent inconsistencies in practical utility elicitation.     

Experimental Tests of Risk Ladders in the Elicitation of Perceived Likelihood

Risk ladders have the potential to improve numeric judgments of low‐likelihood events by providing information about the likelihoods of comparison risks, thereby letting respondents make risk estimates “in context.” However, to date this tool has been studied systematically only in communication of risk, not in elicitation of perceived likelihoods. In three studies, we evaluated the benefits of risk ladders on the consistency, validity, and mean‐level accuracy of elicited likelihood judgments. When estimates for low‐likelihood hazards were elicited using different numeric response scales (e.g., “1 in x” and “x in 100,000”), scale type had a strong effect on the magnitudes of the elicited estimates, and viewing a risk ladder (Experiment 1) or comparison risks (Experiments 2 and 3) did not attenuate this effect of scale type. Similarly, we found no evidence that risk ladders or comparison risks improved the convergent validity of numeric estimates, as measured using correlations with risk ratings made on alternative scale types. Finally, viewing comparison risks tended to reduce gross overestimation of rare events, with relatively less change in estimates for mid‐likelihood and high‐likelihood hazards. This suggests that comparison risks can spread responses to cover a wider range of values but do not ameliorate scale effects. In the elicitation of numeric risk estimates, how you ask matters, even if you let people make estimates “in context” through the use of comparative risk information. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Subtle Influence of Check and X Marks: How Symbolic Markings Influence Judgment

Symbols can exert an influence on how we think, feel, and even behave. Here we examine whether symbolic markings serve as primes and influence how people make judgments. We propose that making either a check or an X mark to indicate an opinion can lead people to process the same information differently, thereby influencing the judgment people make. Across four experiments, we find that the check and X marks carry different symbolic associations; people associate check with good and X with bad. We also find downstream consequences of these mental associations. People who make positively connoted check marks (as opposed to negatively connoted X marks) to indicate their judgments are more agreeable toward familiar, controversial social policies as well as market research survey items on values and life styles. Differential symbolic markings with check and X marks seem to shape how people think and make judgments.     

Adult Age‐Related Differences in the Misinformation Effect for Context‐Consistent and Context‐Inconsistent Objects

The present study examined age‐related differences in the misinformation effect for objects that were consistent or inconsistent with their environmental settings. Young and older adults viewed one of two slide sequences, each containing context‐consistent items (e.g., a blender in a kitchen setting or a saw in a woodshop setting) and context‐inconsistent items (a saw in a kitchen setting or a blender in a woodshop setting). After receiving misinformation through post‐event narratives, participants received tests of yes/no recognition requiring remember/know judgments (Experiments 1–3) and source monitoring (Experiments 2 and 3) for slide details. Although age‐related differences in the misinformation effect were nonreliable, older adults tended to report misinformation as remembered more often than young adults, and source monitoring tests reduced the misinformation effect for both age groups. Misinformation effects were equivalent or larger for inconsistent objects than for consistent objects. Theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Eliciting Subjective Probabilities through Pair‐wise Comparisons

We propose and test a novel approach for eliciting subjective joint probabilities. In the proposed approach, judges compare pairs of possible outcomes and identify which of the two is more likely and by how much. These pair‐wise comparative judgments create a matrix of ratio judgments from which the target probabilities are extracted using the rows' (or columns') geometric means. In Study 1, subjects provided direct assessments of the likelihood of joint events (e.g., sunny days and stock market gains) and also made pair‐wise comparisons of the same joint events. Subjects in Study 2 learnt the distribution of hypothetical events pairs and provided direct and ratio estimates. In both studies, the ratio estimates were significantly more accurate than the direct estimates. The results suggest that it is possible to elicit probabilistic estimates without explictly asking for probabilities and that the pair‐wise approach is a candidate for complementing or replacing traditional elicitation approaches. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Wisdom of Individuals: Exploring People's Knowledge About Everyday Events Using Iterated Learning

Determining the knowledge that guides human judgments is fundamental to understanding how people reason, make decisions, and form predictions. We use an experimental procedure called 'iterated learning,' in which the responses that people give on one trial are used to generate the data they see on the next, to pinpoint the knowledge that informs people's predictions about everyday events (e.g., predicting the total box office gross of a movie from its current take). In particular, we use this method to discriminate between two models of human judgments: a simple Bayesian model ( Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006 ) and a recently proposed alternative model that assumes people store only a few instances of each type of event in memory (Min K ; Mozer, Pashler, & Homaei, 2008 ). Although testing these models using standard experimental procedures is difficult due to differences in the number of free parameters and the need to make assumptions about the knowledge of individual learners, we show that the two models make very different predictions about the outcome of iterated learning. The results of an experiment using this methodology provide a rich picture of how much people know about the distributions of everyday quantities, and they are inconsistent with the predictions of the Min K model. The results suggest that accurate predictions about everyday events reflect relatively sophisticated knowledge on the part of individuals.     

Preschoolers' use of spatiotemporal history, appearance, and proper name in determining individual identity

Humans construe their environment as composed largely of discrete individuals, which are also members of kinds (e.g., trees, cars, and people). On what basis do young children determine individual identity? How important are featural properties (e.g., physical appearance, name) relative to spatiotemporal history? Two studies examined the relative importance of these factors in preschoolers' and adults' identity judgments. Participants were shown pairs of individuals who looked identical but differed in their spatiotemporal history (e.g., two physically distinct but identical Winnie-the-Pooh dolls), and were asked whether both members in the pair would have access to knowledge that had been supplied to only one of the pairs. The results provide clear support for spatiotemporal history as the primary basis of identity judgments in both preschoolers and adults, and further place issues of identity within the broader cognitive framework of psychological essentialism.     

When being far away is good: Exploring how mortality salience,regulatory mode,and goal progress affect judgments of meaning in life

Research indicates that death‐relevant thoughts (mortality salience) have a nuanced effect on judgments of life's meaningfulness. Thoughts of death diminish meaning in life only among people who lack or do not readily engage psychological structures that confer meaning. Building on this past research, the current research examined how an important source of meaning, long‐term goal progress, affects the ways that death‐relevant cognitions impact judgments of life's meaning. In Study 1 (N = 118), mortality salience decreased perceptions of meaning in life only among participants who were induced to feel closer to (vs. farther from) completing a long‐term goal. Study 2 (N = 259) extended these findings by demonstrating the moderating influence of individual differences in locomotion. Mortality salience again decreased perceptions of meaning in life among participants who felt closer to accomplishing a long‐term goal, but it only did so among people who do not quickly adopt new goals to pursue (i.e., those low in locomotion). The implications of these findings for better understanding how people maintain meaning in the face of existential concerns and how aspects of goal pursuit affect these processes are discussed.     

Ensuring Community Participation During Program Planning: Lessons Learned During the Development of a HIV/STI Program for Young Sexual and Gender Minorities

HIV/STI incidence has shifted to a younger demographic, comprised disproportionately of gay and bisexual men, transgender women, and people of color. Recognizing the importance of community organizing and participatory engagement during the intervention planning process, we describe the steps taken to engage diverse constituents (e.g., youth and practitioners) during the development of a structural‐level HIV/STI prevention and care initiative for young sexual and gender minorities in Southeast Michigan. Our multi‐sector coalition (MFierce; Michigan Forward in Enhancing Research and Community Equity) utilized a series of community dialogues to identify, refine, and select programmatic strategies with the greatest potential. Evaluation data (N = 173) from the community dialogues highlighted constituents’ overall satisfaction with our elicitation process. Using a case study format, we describe our community dialogue approach, illustrate how these dialogues strengthened our program development, and provide recommendations that may be used in future community‐based program planning efforts.     

Beyond self-report in the study of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being: Correlations with acquaintance reports, clinician judgments and directly observed social behavior

Surprisingly little is known about how well-being is related to social reputation, clinician judgments, and directly observed social behaviors. This study presents data that bear directly on these issues, along with comparing the personality and behavioral correlates of subjective happiness, a measurement based on a hedonic conceptualization of well-being, with psychological well-being, a eudaimonic conceptualization. The findings demonstrate remarkable consistency in the pattern of correlates of the two measures across acquaintance ratings, clinician judgments, and directly observed social behaviors. By either conceptualization, people high in well-being enjoy positive social reputations (e.g., cheerful, sociable, satisfied with life), are rated as well-adjusted by clinicians (e.g., consistent, resilient), and can be observed to exhibit adaptive social behaviors (e.g., social skill, expressiveness).     

Preference Consistency and Preference Strength: Processing and Judgmental issues1

Recent research in motivated reasoning has examined processing of information that is consistent or inconsistent with one's preferences. This paper extends the work by examining the micro‐processes of the processing of such information. In addition, it examines the moderating impact of preference strength and argument quality on processing of and judgments associated with preference‐consistent and preference‐inconsistent information. Across 2 studies, evidence was obtained suggesting that preference‐inconsistent information is processed in greater depth as well as in a more biased manner. Findings are also reported indicating that when preferences are weak, people are less resistant to changing their preferences, particularly when exposed to strong arguments accompanying preference‐inconsistent information. Implications for comparative advertising in a consumer marketing context are discussed.     

The distinctiveness and utility of a measure of trait emotional awareness

There has been a proliferation of new measures of individual differences in emotional processing, but too little research that evaluates the distinctiveness and utility of such measures. We critically evaluated the Level of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS), which is a measure of people's awareness of emotions in both the self and others. Across two studies, university students (N=124 and 107 for study 1 and 2, respectively) completed the LEAS, as well as a battery of personality measures and ability tests, and a mood-induction task. The LEAS was statistically distinct from a wide variety of personality measures, emotional intelligence tests, and self-report ability measures. In addition, both studies demonstrated that people high in emotional awareness were less likely than others to show mood congruent biases in their judgments (e.g. when bad moods lead to negative judgments and good moods to good judgments). The LEAS appears to be both distinctive and useful in understanding mood-relevant processes.     

Cultivating the Opinionated: The Need to Evaluate Moderates the Relationship Between Crime Drama Viewing and Scary World Evaluations

The literature on cultivation processes assumes that second‐order judgments (e.g., attitudes) are repeatedly updated during viewing (i.e., on‐line) and can be reported when asked. In this article, we propose this reasoning only holds for people high in their need to evaluate (NTE). Low‐NTE individuals do not update their opinions on‐line and have to construct their attitudes memory‐based, limiting the likelihood of finding second‐order relationships. Results from a cross‐sectional survey among 226 adolescents indicate that crime drama viewing and scary world beliefs are only correlated among high‐NTE individuals. NTE does not moderate cultivation through nonfiction. The theoretical implications of memory‐based attitudes for second‐order cultivation are discussed, and suggestions are made for future research on attitudinal media effects.     

When Mental States Matter,When They Don't,and What That Means for Morality

Research has shown that moral judgments depend on the capacity to engage in mental state reasoning. In this article, we will first review behavioral and neural evidence for the role of mental states (e.g., people's beliefs, desires, intentions) in judgments of right and wrong. Second, we will consider cases where mental states appear at first to matter less (i.e., when people assign moral blame for accidents and when explicit information about mental states is missing). Third, we will consider cases where mental states, in fact, matter less, specifically, in cases of “purity” violations (e.g., committing incest, consuming taboo foods). We will discuss how and why mental states do not matter equivalently across the multi‐dimensional space of morality. In the fourth section of this article, we will elaborate on the possibility that norms against harmful actions and norms against “impure” actions serve distinct functions – for regulating interpersonal interactions (i.e., harm) versus for protecting the self (i.e., purity). In the fifth and final section, we will speculate on possible differences in how we represent and reason about other people's mental states versus our own beliefs and intentions. In addressing these issues, we aim to provide insight into the complex structure and distinct functions of mental state reasoning and moral cognition. We conclude that mental state reasoning allows us to make sense of other moral agents in order to understand their past actions, to predict their future behavior, and to evaluate them as potential friends or foes.     

Ownership and object history

Appropriate behavior in relation to an object often requires judging whether it is owned and, if so, by whom. The authors propose accounts of how people make these judgments. Our central claim is that both judgments often involve making inferences about object history. In judging whether objects are owned, people may assume that artifacts (e.g., chairs) are owned and that natural objects (e.g., pinecones) are not. However, people may override these assumptions by inferring the history of intentional acts made in relation to objects. In judging who owns an object, people may often consider which person likely possessed the object in the past--such reasoning may be responsible for people's bias to assume that the first person known to possess an object is its owner.     

The influence of ethnicity,social class,and context on judgments about U.S. women

In 2 studies, the authors investigated impression formation as influenced by category-based stereotypes associated with ethnicity and social class. The participants in Study I made judgments about 1 target woman, described as interested in running for office in the Parent Teacher Organization (PTO) of her children's school. The hypothetical woman was presented to the respondents along with her photograph and information about her ethnic background (Anglo-Saxon, Latina, or Jewish) and occupation (middle class or working class). In Study 2, the authors changed the context and presented a younger target woman (also varied by ethnicity and social class) to the respondents as the new girlfriend of their older brother or cousin. In both studies, judgments were assessed by the participants' responses to 45 bipolar adjectives that, in each case, yielded 8 component factors. In both hypothetical contexts, social class was a powerful trigger for a variety of negative expectations: With respect to ethnicity, the Latina women were judged to be more unsuitable for the job of PTO vice president than were the Anglo-Saxon or Jewish women. The authors discussed potential psychological and social consequences of such category-based judgments.     

The effects of schema on recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects

We examined how the schema affects recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects. First, participants watched consecutive slides that described a man in the kitchen. In the slides, the man performed schema‐consistent actions and schema‐inconsistent actions, and schema‐consistent objects and schema‐inconsistent objects were left in the kitchen space. After watching the slides, participants completed a recognition test, a remember/know test, and a Perception/Thought/Emotion/Context questionnaire. For objects, the discrimination between targets and distracters was more accurate for schema‐inconsistent items than for schema‐consistent items, owing to perceptual, thought, and emotional recollections for schema‐inconsistent object targets. For actions, schema‐consistent targets were more frequently recognized than schema‐inconsistent targets, with more remember judgments based on perceptual and contextual recollections. While item‐specific information of schema‐inconsistent targets could be elaborated for objects, the perceptual details and the contextual relationship of schema‐consistent targets could be elaborated for actions. We also found less false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters than for schema‐consistent object distracters. The retrieval of the perceptual details of schema‐consistent action targets could prevent false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters.     

Suppression and hypothesis testing: does suppressing stereotypes during interactions help to avoid confirmation biases?

Recent work indicates that trying not to think in stereotypical terms increases the accessibility of stereotypical information, which paradoxically results in more stereotypical judgments. The present study translated the colour‐blindness ideology in general and stereotype suppression research in particular into an hypothesis testing setting. Participants who were asked to suppress their stereotypes when selecting a set of questions were indeed less guided by ambient stereotypes than control participants, thereby showing a reduction of the classical confirmation orientation in question preferences. Still, compared to control participants, suppressors also later reported more polarized impressions such that consistent targets were seen as more stereotypical and inconsistent ones as more counter‐stereotypical. Moreover, group evaluations were more stereotypical for suppressors than for controls indicating that suppression had led to stronger activation of the stereotypical representation. Results are discussed in light of the prevailing belief regarding the benefits of political correctness and colour‐blindness. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.