Just War: theory and application

ABSTRACT How should just war theory be applied to assess a community's claim to defend itself? The IRA's claim to be fighting a just war to end British rule in Northern Ireland is upheld against the objection (e.g. by Simpson in this Journal, 1986) that they have a right only to self-defence against indigenous tyranny. Under just war theory no unclarity concerning the alien status of British rule could render the IRA claim unjustifiable: only the well-grounded denial of its alien status might serve (though this is doubtful). But if that denial is argued for by identifying a separate British community in Ireland then the IRA must be granted a right to repel alien occupation of nationalist areas. However the IRA's rejection of the ‘two communities’ view can be defended; for what constitutes a single community is subject to moral considerations. Accordingly a genuine community's claim to self-defence is against being wronged, rather than harmed. It is concluded that just war theory cannot be applied without antecedent moral judgements identifying the community potentially wronged.     

Political Violence in Northern Ireland

This study examined political violence, focusing on paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland, particularly that of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). The study argued that the parameters of such behavior are similar in some important respects for all conflict-oriented groups, whether national armed forces or paramilitary organizations. The motivation, personal characteristics, and proximate situational influences involved in the violence in Northern Ireland are considered. The analysis draws on concepts and research from social psychology and attempts to construct a tentative psychological framework to facilitate an understanding of political violence in general.     

Fundamentalism and Political Violence: The Case of Paisley and Ulster Evangelicals

One of the dangers of using the term ‘fundamentalism’ for a wide variety of religiously inspired political movements is that it disguises vital differences. This article examines in great detail the involvement of the evangelical Protestant religious and political leader Reverend Ian Paisley in the political violence of Northern Ireland. It concludes that, despite the context apparently encouraging a Protestant jihad, or holy war, Ulster evangelicals are peaceful and law-abiding. Parallels with American fundamentalism are used to raise the question of contrasts to Islamic fundamentalism. It is argued that fundamentalisms differ in their attitudes towards political violence and that the differences are unlikely to be just a matter of circumstance.     

Fundamentalism and Political Violence: The Case of Paisley and Ulster Evangelicals

One of the dangers of using the term ‘fundamentalism’ for a wide variety of religiously inspired political movements is that it disguises vital differences. This article examines in great detail the involvement of the evangelical Protestant religious and political leader Reverend Ian Paisley in the political violence of Northern Ireland. It concludes that, despite the context apparently encouraging a Protestant jihad, or holy war, Ulster evangelicals are peaceful and law-abiding. Parallels with American fundamentalism are used to raise the question of contrasts to Islamic fundamentalism. It is argued that fundamentalisms differ in their attitudes towards political violence and that the differences are unlikely to be just a matter of circumstance.     

Impure Agency and the Just War

Feminist critiques of intention challenge some aspects of traditional just war reasoning, including the criteria of right intention and discrimination (particularly as interpreted using the doctrine of double effect). I take note of these challenges and propose some directions just war reasoners might take in response. First, right intention can be evaluated more accurately by judging what actors in war actually do than by attempting to uncover inward dispositions. Assessing whether agents in war have taken due care to minimize foreseeable collateral damage, avoided intentional targeting of noncombatants, corrected previous mistakes in their later actions, and taken responsibility to repair unintended damage they cause are examples of ways in which just war reasoners can evaluate intention by looking at actions.     

Flagging difference: Identification and emotional responses to national flags

Flags can be thought of as representations designed to unite the national community. Emotional responses are seen as being particularly important in driving allegiances to flags. In societies affected by conflict, where the nation itself is contested, emotional responses to national symbols however, have the potential to be divisive. In this study, using a large scale sample in Northern Ireland, emotional responses to the in-group and out-group flags and their relationship to national identities are considered. 1,179 respondents reported their self-categorized national identity, as well as explicit emotional responses to both in-group and out-group flags. The strength of identification with preferred national group, British, Irish, or Northern Irish, was also measured. Emotional responses to in-group flags were significantly related to both strength of national identification and the type of emotion, annoyed, hopeful, satisfied, or uneasy, under consideration. Weaker emotional responses and different emotions were reported in response to out-group flags. The results of the study are interpreted as consistent with appraisal and intergroup emotions theory which suggests the strongest emotional responses are evidenced in response to symbols of one's own group. The importance of emotions to understanding the dynamics of intergroup conflict, and in Northern Ireland in particular, is also discussed.     

Experiences of school bullying in Northern Ireland: data from the Life and Times Survey

Little is known about the levels of bully/victim behaviors in schools in Northern Ireland. The aim of the present study was to supplement previous research findings from Northern Ireland by examining the self-reported experiences of school bullying among Northern Ireland children through data collected as part of the 1998 "Youth Life and Times Survey." A random sample of 397 12 to 17-year-olds living throughout Northern Ireland were interviewed during 1998 and 1999. As part of the larger survey, six questions were asked relating to experience of bullying behaviors and being a victim of such behaviors. The findings suggests that the incidence of school bullying in Northern Ireland may be higher than those found in the rest of Ireland and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the data supplements previous findings among Northern Irish children employing alternate measures of bully/victim problems.     

Development of Family Therapy in Ireland

In Ireland family therapy is a small profession, with under 200 registered therapists. The Irish family therapy movement began in the mid-1970s. By 1980 the Family Therapy Network of Ireland in the Republic of Ireland and the Northern Ireland Branch of the UK Association Family therapy had been founded. At present there are three main family therapy training centers in Ireland: two in the south (the Mater University Hospital, affiliated to University College Dublin and Clanwilliam Institute) and one in the north (at Queen’s University Belfast). There is no statutory registration and licensing of family therapists in Ireland. Accredited professional family therapy programs in Ireland are 4-year part-time courses culminating in masters level qualifications. A primary degree in medicine, nursing, psychology, social science or education is a prerequisite for entry. Family therapists in Ireland work in both private practice and the public health service. Most family therapists in the public sector are employed as social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists or nurses, and conduct family therapy as part of their broader professional roles. Couple therapy in Ireland is provided by family therapists, and also by voluntary couple counselors based in networks of local centers, some of which were originally religiously affiliated, without a formal connection to national family therapy associations. The three major future challenges for Irish family therapy are creating a research infrastructure, developing a career structure in the public health service, and introducing statutory registration.     

Religion,trauma and non-pathological dissociation in Northern Ireland

This study assessed the relationships between non-pathological dissociation, trauma and religion in members of the Northern Irish diaspora in England. One hundred and seventy-nine opportunity sampled participants completed the non-pathological absorption and imaginative involvement items from the Dissociative Experiences Scale, the Age Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic Religious Orientation Scale, and a measure of exposure to traumatic events in the form of political violence derived from the Irish Social Mobility Survey (1973), the Social Attitudes Survey (1978), the Social Identity Survey (1995) and the Northern Ireland Referendum and Election Survey (1998). Analysis indicated that non-pathological dissociative experiences were not significantly predicted by intrinsic religiosity, extrinsic religiosity, direct exposure to political violence or indirect exposure to political violence, but were significantly predicted by some specific religious practices. Findings are discussed with specific reference to research on dissociation, trauma, and religion.     

Luck, Evidence and War

abstract   We seem to have conflicting intuitions regarding luck and war, and we seem to be faced with a dilemma. Either, we deny that a war can be made just or unjust as a result of luck, and we accept that we should not appeal to the outcome when claiming that the war was or was not justified. Or, alternatively, we allow that it is legitimate to base our judgements on the outcome, but as a result we must accept that luck can make a war just or unjust. Traditionally, these have been taken to be the two forks of the dilemma, but, in this paper, I argue that they are not the only options. Rather, we can appeal to the outcome of our actions without claiming that this is, in anyway, an appeal to moral luck. Rather, the outcome provides us with evidence.     

Soldiers: a suitable case for treatment?

This paper examines the soldier's world in order the illuminate their potential psychotherapeutic need. It briefly explores the history of therapeutic treatment of soldiers from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/1905 to modern conflicts as well as covering operations other than war, such as peacekeeping in Northern Ireland. Specific conditions, including PTSD, are considered and some general points are made for counsellors and psychotherapists without a military background.     

World Religions and the Northern Ireland Curriculum

The aim of this article is to assess the arguments for and against the inclusion of a study of world religions within the religious education provision of schools in Northern Ireland. The point of departure for our discussion is the Inter-Faith Forum's recent claim that exclusively Christian content may be in breach of equality and human rights legislation. It is concluded that there should be teaching about world religions but that multi-faith religious education of the form espoused in England and Wales, whereby a wide range of religions is covered, is inappropriate to the Northern Irish educational and cultural context.     

Harming Civilians and the Associative Duties of Soldiers

According to International Humanitarian Law and many writing on just war theory, combatants who foresee that their actions will harm or kill innocent non‐combatants are required to take some steps to reduce these merely foreseen harms. However, because often reducing merely foreseen harms place burdens on combatants – including risk to their lives – this requirement has been criticised for requiring too much of combatants. One reason why this might be the case is that combatants have duties to each other and to their compatriots, such as duties to keep them safe, which are weighty enough to override their duties to foreign non‐combatants. In this article, I argue that arguments against the requirement to limit merely foreseen harms which rely on combatants' associative duties fail to establish that it is permissible for combatants to prioritise their own safety over the reduction of merely foreseen harms. Although the argument based on associative duties might work in individual cases, factors peculiar to the situation of combatants mean that such justifications are not normally available to them.     

Mediums and messages: an argument against biotechnical enhancement of soldiers in the armies of liberal democracies

Assuming that one believes that individuals and states can morally defend values, beliefs, and institutions with force (in short, that just wars are morally possible), one logically wants just combatants to possess the physical, mental, and spiritual capacities that will enable them to win the war. On the other hand, being a just combatant in a just war does not morally entitle that combatant to do anything to win that war. The moral requirement for just combatants to fight justly is codified in international law of war and in state-specific legal documents such as the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice. While it is almost unequivocally clear to soldiers and civilians who soldiers cannot harm in the performance of their duties, and why these people are exempt from harm, it is less clear what the state itself (assuming throughout the discussion that the state is a just combatant in a just war) can morally do to its own soldiers to enhance their chances of victory: can the state do anything to soldiers to give them an advantage on the field of battle? For United States soldiers and their counterparts in most Western liberal democracies, the answer is obviously no. Deeply embedded social and cultural norms in Western democracies mandate that the state set and enforce rigid lines which drill sergeants and earnest commanders cannot cross, even in the name of combat readiness, grounding these norms in notion of basic rights appealed to in the U.S. Constitution. In this essay, I argue against some types of drug-induced internal biotechnical enhancement of soldiers on the grounds that, in the present state of technology, it is not reasonable to suppose that the military can perform such enhancement operations on soldiers without causing irrevocable psychological damage that would certainly and unjustifiably alienate the soldiers from the very society they serve.     

Business is not just war. Transferring the principle of double effect from war to business

Abstract

In this article the validity of transferring the Principle of Double Effect from the just war tradition to the domain of business is critically reviewed. If a case can be build for sufficient analogies between war and business, the principle of double effect can legitimately be transferred from war to business. If, on the other hand it can be shown that there are aspects in which business differ substantially from just war, then the transfer to business of a principle developed within the context of war becomes more problematic. After exploring the nature of arguments of analogy and fallacious arguments of weak analogy some important disanalogies between war and business are highlighted. Given these disanalogies it is then contended that the just war background of the Principle of Double Effect had some bearing on both the content and manner of application of the Principle of Double Effect. Finally it is argued that these disanalogies require some revisions to the Principle of Double Effect with regard to both its content and its manner of application before it can be applied meaningfully to foreseeable negative side-effects of business.     

Internal reflections of an external peace process: A case study

Abstract

This case study records and analyzes how external changes, emanating from the ceasefires in Northern Ireland in 1994, resulted in significant changes within the internal world of a Northern Irish Client     

Risking Aggression: Toleration of Threat and Preventive War

Generally speaking, just war theory (JWT) holds that there are two just causes for war: self‐defence and ‘other‐defence’. The most common type of the latter is popularly known as ‘humanitarian intervention’. There is debate, however, as to whether these can serve as just causes for preventive war. Those who subscribe to JWT tend to be unified in treating so‐called preventive war with a high degree of suspicion on the grounds that it fails to satisfy conventional criteria for jus ad bello; – particularly the just cause and last resort criteria. Francisco di Vitoria held that the only just cause for war was ‘a wrong received’, which renders impossible any justification for preventive war. There are assumptions implicit in recent military practice, however – most notably, the US‐led invasion of Iraq in 2003 – that challenge this ban on preventive war. Interestingly, both supporters and critics attempt to justify their views through the broader logic of JWT; viz., through a conception of what is good for both political communities and individuals, and through a legitimate defence of these goods. Supporters point to situations where so‐called rogue states represent ‘grave and imminent risk’ of committing acts of aggression as grounds that justify preventive war; critics argue that to attack another political community on the basis of crimes not yet committed is a breach of the very rights JWT was created to defend. The advocate of preventive war does not appreciate important aspects concerning the morality of war. In the ongoing tension between Iran and The United States and her allies – if the rhetoric is to be believed – I am asked to tolerate a threat to my security and liberty, and to risk suffering aggression in defence of the rights of the antagonistic, but not yet aggressive, state. The crucial question is how such tolerance and risk fit in with the logic of just war: at what point, if any, does the risk of being attacked become great enough to justify declaring war in anticipation? In this paper I highlight some of the theoretical and practical difficulties in determining what counts as a grave and imminent threat, focusing especially on the complicated case of ‘imminence’ in the face of so‐called ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’. Secondly, I will argue that not only is the notion of preventive war inconsistent with the defence of the rights of political communities that JWT requires; it is also forbidden by the proportionality requirement of jus ad bellum. A risk of being subjected to aggression is the price for global peace. Whilst political communities can do much to prevent aggression and prepare themselves in case it occurs, the conditions for just war require that this prevention and preparation stop short of declaring war. We must live with a certain degree of risk in this area.     

‘Mixed’ Religion Relationships and Well-being in Northern Ireland

Religion plays a pivotal role in intergroup and interpersonal relationships in Northern Ireland, and individuals traditionally marry within their own religious group. However, ‘mixed’ marriages between Catholics and Protestants do occur and present an interesting, yet under researched, dynamic within this divided society. Both religion and committed relationships have been associated with physical and psychological health, but little is known about how divergence in religious beliefs within relationships impacts on health. A secondary data analysis of the Northern Ireland cohort of the Understanding Society: the UK Household Longitudinal Study was conducted to investigate the impact of mixed religion relationships on physical and psychological well-being in Northern Ireland. Less than 10 % of relationships were mixed religion relationships, and being in a mixed relationship was associated with poorer mental health but not with physical health. Mixed religion relationships in Northern Ireland are relatively uncommon in Northern Ireland, but are an important form of intergroup contact, as such it is important to fully understand the implications for the individuals involved and develop mechanisms to support those individuals psychological well-being.     

Nonlethal Weapons,Noncombatant Immunity,and Combatant Nonimmunity: A Study of Just War Theory

Frequently, the just war principle of noncombatant immunity is interpreted as morally prohibiting the intentional targeting of noncombatants. Apparently, many just war theorists assume that to target means to (intend to) kill. Now that effective nonlethal weapons have been envisaged, it should be evident that there is no conceptual connection between intentionally targeting and intentionally killing. For, using nonlethal weapons, there could be intentional targeting without intentional killing. This paper explores the question of whether the noncombatant immunity principle should be revised, so as to allow uses of nonlethal weapons. Preliminary to answering this question, some other questions are explored, among which are the following. Why should a noncombatant immunity principle be accepted? Why is it morally permissible to intentionally target enemy combatants? Are noncombatants grievously harmed when they are incapacitated by nonlethal weapons? Is it morally permissible to intentionally incapacitate enemy combatants with nonlethal weapons, while knowingly but not intentionally incapacitating noncombatants? In order to focus on moral questions involving nonlethal weapons, questions about their effectiveness or legality are set aside. Instead of the idea of noncombatant immunity as expressed above, a delimited principle of noncombatant immunity is proposed—namely, that, in the conduct of war, the intentional grave injuring or killing of noncombatants is morally prohibited. Also proposed is a principle of noncombatant targeting, which would allow some uses of nonlethal weapons to intentionally incapacitate noncombatants.