老年病诊疗中的几个问题

老年医学是哲学思维和理论含量很高的科学,老年病科医生要学会科学应用哲学的思维方法,克服临床思维过程中的缺点,将哲学思维应用于实际临床实践中,既要科学地分析,又要哲学地概括,在实际工作中做到主观与客观、理论与实践的具体统一,避免误诊、误治,提高老年病人的生活质量.     

关于哲学应用的几个问题

哲学工作者要贯彻理论联系实际的原则,但要注意哲学自身的特点,防止简单化、庸俗化。为此,在哲学的应用中要注意几个问题。首先,要对具体问题作具体分析,不能贴标签。具体分析必须把一般哲学观点与具体科学及经验知识有机地结合起来,形成具体方法,必须对具体事物进行全面深入地调     

老年病科医生的哲学思维

患病老年人属于人口中的一组特殊人群 ,亦属于弱势人群 ,加之老年病所具有的特殊性和复杂性 ,都要求老年病科医生除了要有高度的责任心、广博的专业知识、高超精湛的诊疗技术、丰富的临床经验外 ,还要学会自觉地建立并科学应用哲学的思维方法 ,克服临床思维过程中的主观性、片面性、习惯性、表面性和静止性 ,摒弃思维过程中单纯的感性认识和自身经验总结 ,避免误诊、漏诊、误治、漏治[1～ 3] 。1　正确处理主、客体之间的关系 ,从实际病情出发 ,获取丰富、真实、全面、系统的临床资料在临床实践中 ,患者不仅是医生认识和行为的客体 ,同时又…     

医学思维与哲学思维的结构及其关系刍议

在医学领域中 ,只有对研究成果进行思维的加工 ,才能上升为科学意义上的医学认识 ,因而从这个角度上说 ,医学认识就在于医学思维。尽管医学思维活动中离不开哲学思维的指导作用 ,但哲学思维不能代替医学思维 ,它只能作为医学思维的先导 ;尽管从发生学意义上说 ,二者都起源于人的智慧想要解释人与世界的关系 ,但哲学思维是观念层次的思维 ,它力求以抽象的、无限的方式从整体上把握世界 ,而医学思维作为科学思维的一种 ,则是以具体的、有限的方式把握人类健康和疾病现象 ,是一种实证性的思维[1 ] 。医学家要想在医学思维活动中更好地运用哲学…     

科学临床思维与临床决策

临床医学不仅是经验科学,更是思维和决策的科学,养成科学的临床思维方式是每位医生的首要目标.本文介绍科学临床思维的理论基础和训练方法,进一步阐述科学临床决策的实施步骤,以提高医生的临床思维能力,使其思维真实与病人的客观真实相统一,以便更好地为病人服务.     

论医学哲学的特征

医学哲学也称为医学辩证法,是在总结医学科学成就的基础上,通过对医学理论和实践中一般、普遍、共性问题的研究,揭示医学认识主体思维活动普遍规律的科学：是人们认识和处理健康和疾病问题的一般方法论。无论是与医学还是与哲学相比。医学哲学都有着显著的区别,运用对比分析的方法。对医学哲学的研究对象、理论体系特别是思维方式等不同方面的特征,进行理论探讨。     

辩证逻辑研究方法新探

现代科学的发展对思维科学提出了新的要求。辩证逻辑理论的生命力在于广泛吸取现代科学技术的新成果,概括当代理论思维的新特点,从而科学地揭示人类辩证思维运动发展的规律。辩证逻辑是一门哲学和逻辑学互相渗透、交叉形成的学科。它必须运用现代哲学的理论和方法,去思考和研究逻辑问     

论哲学对科学的反思关系

一、理论思维的两个基本维度哲学和科学是人类理论思维的两种不同方式。它们之间的根本区别,在于它们分别集中地表现着人类理论思维的两个基本维度,即科学集中地表现着思维和存在高度统一的维度,哲学则集中地表现着反思思维和存在关系的维度;前者是“构成思想”的维度,后者则是“反思思想”的维度。因此,哲学对科学的关系,从根本上说,是以“思维和存在的关系问题”为中介所构成的反思关系。科学是人类的一种活动,是人类运用理论思维能力和理论思维方法去探索自然、社会和精神的奥秘,获得关于世界的规律性认识,并用以改造世界、造…     

“正名”与观念“更新”

从某种意义上说,哲学就是一门反思的学问。为了使哲学研究更好地为现代化建设服务,我们不仅要注意研究以理论形态出现的哲学思想,还应密切关注和研究活跃在人们头脑中的、在现实生活中实际起作用的思想、观念、思维方式等等。注意到这一方面,将有助于加强哲学同社会生活之间的相互联系和相互作用。正是出于这种考虑,我们开辟这个小专栏,发表一些形式新颖、文笔生动、充分说理的短论(字数在三千字以内),力求以科学的哲学分析积极地“干预”现实。因为还没想出更好的名称,暂且叫《反思录》。希望得到广大作者和读者的热情支持和扶植。     

科学临床思维与临床决策

临床医学不仅是经验科学,更是思维和决策的科学,养成科学的临床思维方式是每位医生的首要目标。本文介绍科学临床思维的理论基础和训练方法,进一步阐述科学临床决策的实施步骤,以提高医生的临床思维能力,使其思维真实与病人的客观真实相统一,以便更好地为病人服务。     

Why be an Intellectually Humble Philosopher?

In this paper, I sketch an answer to the question “Why be an intellectually humble philosopher?” I argue that, as far as philosophical argumentation is concerned, the historical record of Western Philosophy provides a straightforward answer to this question. That is, the historical record of philosophical argumentation, which is a track record that is marked by an abundance of alternative theories and serious problems for those theories, can teach us important lessons about the limits of philosophical argumentation. These lessons, in turn, show why philosophers should argue with humility.     

Philosophers should prefer simpler theories

Recent years have seen considerable attention paid to the methodology of philosophy. The puzzle is simple—if philosophy is not an empirical discipline, how can one philosophical theory be rationally preferred over another? One answer to this question is that we should apply the theoretical virtues. Foremost among these theoretical virtues is simplicity—so perhaps we should prefer simpler philosophical theories to more complex ones. Huemer (Philos Q 59:216–236, 2009) objects that the reasons to prefer simpler theories in science do not apply in philosophy. I will argue that Huemer is mistaken—the arguments he marshals for preferring simpler theories in science can also be applied in philosophy. Like Huemer, I will focus on the philosophy of mind and the nominalism/Platonism debate. But I want to engage with the broader issue of whether simplicity is relevant to philosophy.     

Normativity in the Philosophy of Science

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative.     

WHEN IS PARSIMONY A VIRTUE?

Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories. Is it also a virtue of philosophical theories? I review four contemporary accounts of the virtue of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and consider how each might apply to two prominent appeals to parsimony in the philosophical literature, those made on behalf of physicalism and on behalf of nominalism. None of the accounts of the virtue of parsimony extends naturally to either of these philosophical cases. This suggests that in typical philosophical contexts, ontological simplicity has no evidential value.     

The collapse argument

Philosophical Studies - We can divide philosophical theories of consciousness into two main camps: First-Order theories and Higher-Order theories. Like all Higher-Order theories, many First-Order...     

Counseling Theory: The Problem of Definition

It is proposed that (a) research in counseling and counseling practice do not generally make explicit their roots in counseling theory, (b) this lack of connectedness to theory may represent a weakness in our theories for failing to be useful, (c) this fault may be a function of our current definitions of theory, and (d) we should focus upon philosophical premises at this time. The philosophical premise of syntony is used to illustrate how many of the commonly accepted assumptions which set our standards are not necessarily so, and how the broadening of such assumptions may encourage more activity in theory development. Counseling approaches which do not qualify as theory must at least qualify in the realm of rationale by making explicit their philosophical or value premises.     

Philosophical Responses to Underdetermination in Science

What attitude should we take toward a scientific theory when it competes with other scientific theories? This question elicited different answers from instrumentalists, logical positivists, constructive empiricists, scientific realists, holists, theory-ladenists, antidivisionists, falsificationists, and anarchists in the philosophy of science literature. I will summarize the diverse philosophical responses to the problem of underdetermination, and argue that there are different kinds of underdetermination, and that they should be kept apart from each other because they call for different responses.     

自我实现的幸福——心理幸福感研究述评

心理幸福感是基于实现论的幸福感研究范式,研究者认为幸福并不只是情感上的体验,而更应该关注个人潜能的实现,从理论出发建构幸福感的结构,指导幸福感测量的发展。已有的研究表明,人口学变量、人格变量和生活事件等内外因素可以较为有效地预测心理幸福感水平。近年来,心理幸福感与主观幸福感之间呈现出整合的趋势。此外,中国人的幸福感研究在借鉴西方成果的同时,仍然需要立足于本土文化,做进一步的理论探讨和实证检验     

Does empirical moral psychology rest on a mistake?

Many philosophers assume that philosophical theories about the psychological nature of moral judgment can be confirmed or disconfirmed by the kind of evidence gathered by natural and social scientists (especially experimental psychologists and neuroscientists). I argue that this assumption is mistaken. For the most part, empirical evidence can do no work in these philosophical debates, as the metaphorical heavy-lifting is done by the pre-experimental assumptions that make it possible to apply empirical data to these philosophical debates. For the purpose of this paper, I emphasize two putatively empirically-supported theories about the psychological nature of moral judgment. The first is the Sentimental Rules Account, which is defended by Shaun Nichols. The second is defended by Jesse Prinz, and is a form of sentimentalist moral relativism. I show that both of the arguments in favour of these theories rely on assumptions which would be rejected by their philosophical opponents. Further, these assumptions carry substantive moral commitments and thus cannot be confirmed by further empirical investigation. Because of this shared methodological assumption, I argue that a certain form of empirical moral psychology rests on a mistake.