Task switching versus cue switching: using transition cuing to disentangle sequential effects in task-switching performance

Recent methodological advances have allowed researchers to address confounds in the measurement of task-switch costs in task-switching performance by dissociating cue switching from task switching. For example, in the transition-cuing procedure, which involves presenting cues for task transitions rather than for tasks, cue transitions (cue switches and cue repetitions) and task transitions (task switches and task repetitions) can be examined in a complete factorial design. Transition cuing removes the confound between cue transitions and first-order task transitions, but it introduces a confound between cue transitions and longer task sequences. In the present study, transition cuing was studied with two cues per transition (REPEAT and AGAIN for task repetitions; SWITCH and CHANGE for task switches), enabling a partial deconfounding of cue transitions and task sequences. Two experiments revealed robust sequential effects, with higher order task transitions affecting performance when cue transitions were held constant and with cue transitions affecting performance when task sequences were held constant. Methodological and theoretical implications of these findings for research on task switching are discussed.     

You can't always get what you want: The influence of unexpected task constraint on voluntary task switching

The current study assessed the effect that unexpected task constraint, following self-generated task choice, has on task switching performance. Participants performed a modified double-registration voluntary task switching procedure in which participants specified the task they wanted to perform, were presented with a cue that, on the majority of trials, confirmed the choice, and then performed the cued task. On a small portion of trials, participants were cued to perform a task that did not match their choice. Trials on which cues unexpectedly failed to match the chosen task were associated with costs. These costs were particularly large when participants chose to switch tasks but had to unexpectedly repeat the previous task. The results suggest that when participants choose to switch tasks, they prepare for that switch in anticipation of the stimulus, and the preparation is durable such that it cannot be readily undone.     

Components of competitor priming in task switching

Executing an action in response to a stimulus is thought to result in the creation of an event code that integrates stimulus and action features (Allport, 1987; Hommel in Visual Cognition 5: 183-216, 1998). When switching between tasks, competitor priming occurs if a distractor stimulus cues the retrieval of a previously established event code in which that distractor is bound to a competing task, creating a source of interference with the current task whereby the observer is encouraged to apply the competing task to the distractor. We propose a second aspect of competitor priming: the misapplication of the retrieved competing task to the target stimulus. We report two task-switching experiments in which tasks applied to picture-word compound stimuli were manipulated to create conditions in which this second aspect of competitor priming could be revealed and distinguished from other sources of task- and stimulus-based priming. A substantial increase in competitor priming was observed when subjects switched between tasks that required very different processing operations and the competing task was highly relevant to the target stimulus. These results are consistent with our claim that competitor priming can result from applying the competing task either to the distractor that cued it or to the target stimulus.     

Persisting activation in voluntary task switching: It all depends on the instructions

We tested the hypothesis that persisting activation from a previous task execution does not contribute to the switch cost in voluntary task switching. We reasoned that voluntary task switching requires the selection of random task sequences, which necessitates the active inhibition of previously executed tasks. The asymmetric switch cost was used as a marker for persisting activation. Participants switched voluntarily between color naming and word naming. One group was instructed to select unpredictable task sequences. The other group was not instructed to do so. When participants were instructed to be unpredictable, no asymmetric switch cost was observed. When participants were not instructed to be unpredictable, an asymmetric switch cost was observed. We conclude that the amount of persisting activation in voluntary task switching is limited and that the switch cost in voluntary task switching reflects the time needed for reconfiguring the cognitive system from one task to another rather than the time needed to compensate for persisting activation.     

What people say and what they do: The differential effects of informational cues and task design

Do ratings of tasks accurately reflect the influences on people's choices of tasks? Does information from others have strong effects on attitudes toward tasks, but weak effects on task choices? What effect does direct experience with tasks designed to be stimulating or dull have on task ratings and task choices? To answer these questions, we collected data from 24 male and female undergraduates who individually worked on four tasks involving the analysis of cartoons. Informational cues and task design were cross-cut so that each task was either enriched or unenriched and received either positive or negative cues. Subjects rated the tasks on scales that measured how motivating each task was perceived to be, and how interesting and enjoyable each task was. Then subjects worked on a freely chosen sequence of tasks for 10 min. Cues had significant main effects on task ratings, but not on overall choice of tasks. Task design had no main effect on ratings, but did significantly affect overall choices. These results suggest that behavioral choices are determined more by direct experience with tasks than by information provided by others.     

Executive control of cognitive processes in task switching

In 4 experiments, participants alternated between different tasks or performed the same task repeatedly. The tasks for 2 of the experiments required responding to geometric objects in terms of alternative classification rules, and the tasks for the other 2 experiments required solving arithmetic problems in terms of alternative numerical operations. Performance was measured as a function of whether the tasks were familiar or unfamiliar, the rules were simple or complex, and visual cues were present or absent about which tasks should be performed. Task alternation yielded switching-time costs that increased with rule complexity but decreased with task cuing. These factor effects were additive, supporting a model of executive control that has goal-shifting and rule-activation stages for task switching. It appears that rule activation takes more time for switching from familiar to unfamiliar tasks than for switching in the opposite direction.     

Modeling task switching without switching tasks: a short-term priming account of explicitly cued performance

Switch costs in task switching are commonly attributed to an executive control process of task-set reconfiguration, particularly in studies involving the explicit task-cuing procedure. The authors propose an alternative account of explicitly cued performance that is based on 2 mechanisms: priming of cue encoding from residual activation of cues in short-term memory and compound cue retrieval of responses from long-term memory. Their short-term priming account explains the repeated cue encoding benefit, switch cost, reduction in switch cost with preparation time, and other effects. The authors develop a mathematical model of their priming account and fit it to data from 3 experiments, demonstrating that a set of basic psychological processes can produce several effects--including putative switch costs--without switching tasks.     

Joint task switching

The present study investigates the representation of task-sets in a joint dual-task setting. To this end, a task-switching approach is used. Task switching is associated with a switch cost, which can be decomposed in several markers of task-set coordination. These markers can be used to investigate whether participants represent the co-actor's task-set in a joint dual-task setting. A joint task-switching procedure was used in which two participants performed a distinct task and the participants’ turn to respond could switch or repeat on a trial-by-trial basis. The results indicate that joint task switching also elicits a switch cost. However, this switch cost does not seem to be related to the representation of the co-actor's task-set. It is suggested that the switch cost observed in joint task switching is based on processes of task monitoring, which increase the saliency of task-irrelevant stimulus information.     

The costs of crossing paths and switching tasks between audition and vision

Switching from one functional or cognitive operation to another is thought to rely on executive/control processes. The efficacy of these processes may depend on the extent of overlap between neural circuitry mediating the different tasks; more effective task preparation (and by extension smaller switch costs) is achieved when this overlap is small. We investigated the performance costs associated with switching tasks and/or switching sensory modalities. Participants discriminated either the identity or spatial location of objects that were presented either visually or acoustically. Switch costs between tasks were significantly smaller when the sensory modality of the task switched versus when it repeated. This was the case irrespective of whether the pre-trial cue informed participants only of the upcoming task, but not sensory modality (Experiment 1) or whether the pre-trial cue was informative about both the upcoming task and sensory modality (Experiment 2). In addition, in both experiments switch costs between the senses were positively correlated when the sensory modality of the task repeated across trials and not when it switched. The collective evidence supports the independence of control processes mediating task switching and modality switching and also the hypothesis that switch costs reflect competitive interference between neural circuits.     

Task-set switching and long-term memory retrieval

The authors tested the hypothesis of a close relationship between the intentional component of task-set switching ("advance reconfiguration;" R. D. Rogers & S. Monsell, 1995) and long-term memory (LTM) retrieval. Consistent with this hypothesis, switch costs are reported to be larger when the switched-to task involves high retrieval demands (i.e., retrieval of episodic information) than when it involves low retrieval demands (i.e., retrieval of semantic information). In contrast, switch costs were not affected by a primary-task difficulty manipulation unrelated to intentional retrieval demands (Experiment 2). Also, the retrieval-demand effect on switch costs was eliminated when time for advanced preparation or task cues explicitly specifying the task rules were provided (Experiment 3). Overall, results were consistent with the hypothesis that the intentional switch-cost component reflects the time demands of retrieving appropriate task rules from LTM.     

Task switching with a 2:1 cue-to-task mapping: separating cue disambiguation from task-rule retrieval

An experiment is reported that investigated switching among two numerical judgment tasks with a factorial variation of the cue-to-task mapping (1:1 vs. 2:1) for each of the tasks. In addition, the precuing interval (CSI) was varied. The results suggest that with a long CSI of 1,100 ms, switching performance is almost completely determined by the task-specific conditional probability of a task switch given a cue switch. This effect probably reflects the complexity of task-rule retrieval. Without preparation (CSI = 0 ms), the complexity of cue disambiguation as a function of the number of cues across tasks seems to account for most part of the additional variance observed in this condition. The latter observation is in line with suggestions that increasing the number of cues per task from one to two introduces additional demands on the level of cue processing that reflect the transition from an isomorphic to a homomorphic mapping function.     

Priming cue encoding by manipulating transition frequency in explicitly cued task switching

Explicitly cued task switching with multiple cues per task permits three types of transitions: cue repetitions (cue and task repeat), task repetitions (cue changes but task repeats), and task alternations (cue and task change). The difference between task alternations and task repetitions can be interpreted as a switch cost, but its magnitude varies substantially across experiments. We investigated how switch cost is affected by transition frequency (how often subjects repeat and switch tasks) with an experiment in which each transition had a frequency of .70 in separate sessions. Switch cost was smallest when task alternations were frequent and largest when task repetitions were frequent. Mathematical modeling of the data indicated that the different “switch costs” reflected priming of cue encoding for frequent transitions. Interpretations of our findings based on automatic priming from memory retrieval of past transitions and strategic priming from transition expectancies are discussed.     

Choosing to switch: Spontaneous task switching despite associated behavioral costs

The literature shows that switching among simple cognitive tasks is difficult and involves a performance cost. Accordingly, cost-benefit considerations seem to predict that task switching would not occur spontaneously. Here we show that spontaneous task switching is a robust phenomenon, despite its costs. In Experiment 1, participants had to judge shapes according to one of three possible dimensions. Importantly, they were given the option to choose another relevant dimension or let the computer program change the dimension for them, but only if they wanted to do so. The results showed that spontaneous task switching was prevalent, despite robust switching costs. Experiment 2 extended this finding in showing spontaneous switching from an easy task to a more difficult task. The authors provide two possible explanations for the phenomenon that posit that spontaneous switching may be unpreventable or even advantageous.     

Tasks of a feather flock together: Similarity effects in task switching

Recent research on task switching has paid little attention to how tasks are represented and how the relations between task representations might affect the executive processes engaged to achieve a task switch. Two experiments investigated the effect of task similarity on task switching. Similarity was defined in terms of shared component operations--attentional control settings in Experiment 1 and response modality in Experiment 2--with tasks sharing more component operations said to be more similar to each other than tasks sharing fewer component operations. Across both experiments, task similarity facilitated task switching, seen in reduced switch costs for switching between similar tasks as opposed to dissimilar tasks. These results indicate that task similarity defined in terms of component operations can be used to define a multidimensional task space in which the executive processes of task selection and implementation are active.     

Sequential task predictability in task switching

Many studies of task switching have found that a prolonged preparation time reduces switch costs. An alternative manipulation of task preparation is based on sequential task predictability, rather than preparation time. In Experiments 1 and 2 of the present study, participants performed explicitly instructed task sequences (i.e., AABB) and were then transferred to a random sequence. The observed benefit of predictability-based task preparation was not switch specific. In Experiment 3, the participants changed from random to predictable tasks. The observed predictability benefit again was not switch specific. The data thus suggest that task switching does not necessarily require a switch-specific reconfiguration process. Rather, task-specific control processes may be needed in both task switches and repetitions.     

Preparatory adjustment of cognitive control in the task switching paradigm

In this article, the authors investigate the assumption that preparation while switching between cognitive tasks is dynamically adjusted to the current task demands. Performance in high-shift blocks (75% shifts) was compared with performance in high-repetition blocks (75% repetitions). This probability information was given either at the beginning of a block (global condition) or by specific probability cues before every trial (local condition). The authors report strong preparation effects (activation of the probable task and inhibition of the improbable task) in high-shift blocks, especially when specific probability cues were provided. In high-repetition blocks, however, the preparation effects were less pronounced. The results support the assumption that preparation is dynamically adjusted to the expected task requirements.     

Voluntary task switching: chasing the elusive homunculus

In the voluntary task switching procedure, subjects choose the task to perform on a series of bivalent stimuli, requiring top-down control of task switching. Experiments 1-3 contrasted voluntary task switching and explicit task cuing. Choice behavior showed small, inconsistent effects of external stimulus characteristics, supporting the assumption of top-down control of task choice. Switch costs were smaller when subjects chose to switch tasks than when instructed by an external cue. Experiments 4-6 separated choice costs from switch costs. These findings support models of task switching that incorporate top-down processes in accounts of switch costs. The degree to which task switching procedures capture top-down versus bottom-up processes may depend on the extent of environmental support provided by the procedure.     

Task switching

Everyday life requires frequent shifts between cognitive tasks. Research reviewed in this article probes the control processes that reconfigure mental resources for a change of task by requiring subjects to switch frequently among a small set of simple tasks. Subjects' responses are substantially slower and, usually, more error-prone immediately after a task switch. This 'switch cost' is reduced, but not eliminated, by an opportunity for preparation. It seems to result from both transient and long-term carry-over of 'task-set' activation and inhibition as well as time consumed by task-set reconfiguration processes. Neuroimaging studies of task switching have revealed extra activation in numerous brain regions when subjects prepare to change tasks and when they perform a changed task, but we cannot yet separate 'controlling' from 'controlled' regions.     

Clever homunculus: is there an endogenous act of control in the explicit task-cuing procedure?

Does the explicit task-cuing procedure require an endogenous a act of control? In 5 experiments, cues indicating which task to perform preceded targets by several stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs). Two models were developed to account for changes in reaction time (RT) with SOA. Model 1 assumed an endogenous act of task switching for cue alterations but not for cue repetitions. Model 2 assumed no such act. In Experiments 1 and 2, the cue was masked or not masked. Masking interacted underadditively with repetition and alternation, consistent with Model 2 but not Model 1. In Experiments 3 and 4, 2 cues were used for each task. RT was slower for task repetition than for cue repetition and about the same as RT for task alternation, consistent with Model 2 but not Model 1. The results suggest that the explicit task-cuing procedure does not require an endogenous act of control.     

Control processes in voluntary and explicitly cued task switching

Explicitly cued task switching slows performance relative to performing the same task on consecutive trials. This effect appears to be due partly to more efficient encoding of the task cue when the same cue is used on consecutive trials and partly to an additional task-switching process. These components were examined by comparing explicitly cued and voluntary task switching groups, with external cues presented to both groups. Cue-switch effects varied in predictable ways to dissociate explicitly cued and voluntary task switching, whereas task-switch effects had similar characteristics for both instructional groups. The data were well fitted by a mathematical model of task switching that included a cue-encoding mechanism (whereby cue repetition improves performance) and an additional process that was invoked on task-switch trials. Analyses of response-time distributions suggest that this additional process involves task-set reconfiguration that may or may not be engaged before the target stimulus is presented.