Comprehending envy

The authors reviewed the psychological research on envy. The authors examined definitional challenges associated with studying envy, such as the important distinction between envy proper (which contains hostile feelings) and benign envy (which is free of hostile feelings). The authors concluded that envy is reasonably defined as an unpleasant, often painful emotion characterized by feelings of inferiority, hostility, and resentment caused by an awareness of a desired attribute enjoyed by another person or group of persons. The authors examined questions such as why people envy, why envy contains hostile feelings, and why it has a tendency to transmute itself. Finally, the authors considered the role of envy in helping understand other research domains and discussed ways in which people cope with the emotion.     

Varieties of envy

In this paper I present a novel taxonomy of envy as a psychological state, according to which there are four kinds of envy: emulative, inert, aggressive, and spiteful envy. The first section introduces the intuition that there is more than one kind of envy, together with the anecdotal and linguistic evidence that supports it. The second section proposes and explains in detail a definition of envy tout court. The third section presents a recurring distinction between the behavioral tendencies of envy that have been explained in two distinct ways, one mostly proposed by psychologists, the other discernible in the philosophical tradition. The fourth section argues that these models of explanation track two variables—focus of concern and obtainability of the good—whose interplay is responsible for the existence of the four kinds of envy. The fifth section illustrates four paradigmatic cases and provides a detailed analysis of the phenomenology, motivational structure, and typical behavioral outputs of each. The paper ends with a brief discussion of the implications of the taxonomy for moral education.     

Why envy outperforms admiration

Four studies tested the hypothesis that the emotion of benign envy, but not the emotions of admiration or malicious envy, motivates people to improve themselves. Studies 1 to 3 found that only benign envy was related to the motivation to study more (Study 1) and to actual performance on the Remote Associates Task (which measures intelligence and creativity; Studies 2 and 3). Study 4 found that an upward social comparison triggered benign envy and subsequent better performance only when people thought self-improvement was attainable. When participants thought self-improvement was hard, an upward social comparison led to more admiration and no motivation to do better. Implications of these findings for theories of social emotions such as envy, social comparisons, and for understanding the influence of role models are discussed.     

When envy leads to schadenfreude

Previous research has yielded inconsistent findings concerning the relationship between envy and schadenfreude. Three studies examined whether the distinction between benign and malicious envy can resolve this inconsistency. We found that malicious envy is related to schadenfreude, while benign envy is not. This result held both in the Netherlands where benign and malicious envy are indicated by separate words (Study 1: Sample A, N = 139; Sample B, N = 150), and in the USA where a single word is used to denote both types (Study 2, N = 180; Study 3, N = 349). Moreover, the effect of malicious envy on schadenfreude was independent of other antecedents of schadenfreude (such as feelings of inferiority, disliking the target person, anger, and perceived deservedness). These findings improve our understanding of the antecedents of schadenfreude and help reconcile seemingly contradictory findings on the relationship between envy and schadenfreude.     

Unconscious sensations

D. M. Armstrong proposes to explain the possibility of unconscious sensations by means of a distinction between the perceptual consciousness, which is essentially involved in sensations, and our introspective consciousness of sensations. He holds that unconscious sensations are instances of perceptual consciousness of which we are not introspectively conscious. I contend that, although Armstrong's distinction is plausible and significant, it fails to explain his own examples of unconscious sensation. I argue that the puzzle of how unconscious sensations are possible arises at the level of perceptual consciousness and does not concern our introspective awareness of mental states.This paper grew out of research supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities at Cornell University in 1985. I would like to express my gratitude to the National Endowment, to Cornell, and to Sydney Shoemaker.     

Unconscious Emotion

Abstract— Conscious feelings have traditionally been viewed as a central and necessary ingredient of emotion. Here we argue that emotion also can be genuinely unconscious. We describe evidence that positive and negative reactions can be elicited subliminally and remain inaccessible to introspection. Despite the absence of subjective feelings in such cases, subliminally induced affective reactions still influence people's preference judgments and even the amount of beverage they consume. This evidence is consistent with evolutionary considerations suggesting that systems underlying basic affective reactions originated prior to systems for conscious awareness. The idea of unconscious emotion is also supported by evidence from affective neuroscience indicating that subcortical brain systems underlie basic "liking" reactions. More research is needed to clarify the relations and differences between conscious and unconscious emotion, and their underlying mechanisms. However, even under the current state of knowledge, it appears that processes underlying conscious feelings can become decoupled from processes underlying emotional reactions, resulting in genuinely unconscious emotion.     

Unconscious Evidence

Can beliefs that are not consciously formulated serve as part of an agent's evidence for other beliefs? A common view says no, any belief that is psychologically immediate is also epistemically immediate. I argue that some unconscious beliefs can serve as evidence, but other unconscious beliefs cannot. Person‐level beliefs can serve as evidence, but subpersonal beliefs cannot. I try to clarify the nature of the personal/subpersonal distinction and to show how my proposal illuminates various epistemological problems and provides a principled framework for solving other problems.     

Unconscious Insights

From early in the history of psychology, theorists have argued about whether insights are initially unconscious or whether they are conscious from the start. Empirically identifying unconscious insights has proven difficult, however: How can we tell if people have had an insight if they do not tell us they have had one? Fortunately, although obtaining evidence of unconscious insights is difficult, it is not impossible. The present article describes an experiment in which evidence of unconscious insights was obtained. Almost 90% of second graders generated an arithmetic insight at an unconscious level before they were able to report it. Within five trials of the unconscious discovery, 80% of the children made the discovery consciously, as indicated by their verbal reports. Thus, the initial failure to report the insight could not be attributed to the children lacking the verbal facility to describe it. The results indicate that at least in some cases, insights arise first at an unconscious level, and only later become conscious. Rising activation of the new strategy may be the mechanism that leads children to become conscious of using it.     

The role of attachment styles in malicious envy

The current study addresses the link between attachment styles and manifestations of malicious envy. One hundred twenty-four Israeli undergraduate students completed measures of attachment styles, self-esteem, social comparison, and participated in a subject manipulation tapping malicious envy using tools developed for the present study. These measures were developed to examine envy in a direct way while controlling confounding variables such as the general tendency to see others in negative ways. Our findings revealed that dismissive avoidants exhibited higher levels of malicious envy manifestations in comparison to fearful avoidants. Theoretical implications of the findings were discussed by the authors.     

无意识信息加工中的“完型”——无意识捆绑假说的新证据

采用连续闪烁范式(Continuous Flash Suppression,CFS)考察了无意识状态下完型能否发生.研究通过2(线条完整性)×2(意义破坏)×2(熟悉性)的被试内实验设计考察了8种条件下图片的突破抑制时间(Suppression Time,ST).结果发现:线条完整和意义未破坏的图片能更快地克服噪音图片的抑制进入意识;熟悉性不影响突破抑制时间.重要的是,不完整的图片也可以出现意义破坏效应.这表明即使在被抑制的状态下,不完整图形的信息也能够传达至与完型相关的高级视觉区域形成客体表征.研究为无意识捆绑假说(The Unconscious Binding Hypothesis)提供了新的实验证据.