When is Death Bad,When it is Bad?

Philosophia - On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of...     

How Bad Is Rape?

I argue that to be compelled to do routine work is to be gravely harmed. Indeed, that pink-collar work is a more serious harm to women than rape. My purpose is to urge politically active feminists and feminist organizations to arrange their priorities accordingly and devote most of their resources to working for the elimination of sex segregation in employment.     

Is Bad News Always Bad?: Cue and Feedback Effects on Intrinsic Motivation

Although previous research has suggested that, in general, negative feedback concerning performance reduces intrinsically motivated activity, results of the present study indicate that mild negative feedback can increase intrinsic motivation when associated with environmental cues signalling self-determination (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Subjects working on brain-teasers who were given mild negative feedback—but who had a choice of problems to solve, no expectation of evaluation, and who received scores privately—retained as much or more intrinsic motivation than subjects given positive feedback under the same conditions. Subjects in controlling contexts showed less intrinsic motivation. The measure of intrinsic motivation used in this study was a sum of standardized mood and target activity, following recent criticisms of the use of strictly behavioral measures to operationalize intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 1986).     

Good to Bad or Bad to Bad? What is the relationship between valence and the trait content of the Big Two?

In this article we directly assessed the relationship between valence and relevant traits of the Big Two dimensions (i.e., communion and agency). Drawing on previous research, we expected that the relationship with valence would be less monotonous and more variable in direction across agency-related traits, compared to communion-related traits. In three repeated measures studies we assessed the perceived valence of each trait dimension on a continuum of seven points. Studies 1 and 2 defined each continuum verbally. In Study 3 each continuum was defined by facial features. Results across these studies show that valence is linearly and more consistently related with communion-related traits than with agency-related traits. Within agency, however, competence established a positive linear relationship with valence, whereas dominance showed a target-sensitive relationship with valence: quadratic in evaluation of trait concepts, and negative and linear in face evaluation. We discuss the implications of these data for Big Two-related research.     

How Bad Can Good People Be?

Can a virtuous person act contrary to the virtue she possesses? Can virtues have “holes”—or blindspots—and nonetheless count as virtues? Gopal Sreenivasan defends a notion of a blindspot that is, in my view, an unstable moral category. I will argue that no trait possessing such a “hole” can qualify as a virtue. My strategy for showing this appeals to the importance of motivation to virtue, a feature of virtue to which Sreenivasan does not adequately attend. Sreenivasan’s account allows performance alone to be a reliable indicator of the possession of virtue. I argue that, at least with respect to a classical, Aristotelian conception of virtue, this assumption is mistaken: a person is said to possess a virtue only when she is properly motivated. In my view, the nature of motivation required for the possession of Aristotelian virtue does not admit of blindspots. I am not primarily interested in details about the situationist critique of virtue theory but rather the implications that blindspots have for our conception of virtue. I argue that because the practical reasoning of the virtuous requires both cognitive and motivational coherence, the motivational structure of the virtuous agent cannot accommodate blindspots. My conclusion is neither a defense of motivational internalism nor of an idealized conception of Aristotelian virtue. My aim is to show that because blindspotted virtue does not cohere well with Aristotle’s conception of virtuous agency, friends of virtue theory must choose one or the other; they cannot have both.     

糟糕的医学之根源——Bad Medicine绪论

与古老的蟑螂相比,我们确实是一种稚嫩的生物.最古老的人类也不过是150 000年前才出现在中非的长草丛中,他们带着尖锐的石块和强烈的好奇心,动身起程开始征服世界.几千年过去了,仍然很难说谁是真正的赢家.     

Good ‘Cat’, Bad ‘Act’

Philosophia - A widespread intuition is that words, musical works, and flags are intentionally produced and that they’re abstract types that can have incorrect tokens. But some philosophers,...     

Is Retirement Good or Bad for Subjective Well-Being?

Retirement has been viewed either as a transition that is accompanied by psychological distress or as a time of continued, or even enhanced, subjective well-being. Existing evidence is mixed, with some studies reporting retirement as positively related to well-being and others reporting a negative relationship or none at all. Our research indicates that developmental and social contexts shape an individual’s retirement decisions and experiences, so that retirement should be studied in its ecological and life-course context. Research on marital quality and subjective well-being in retirement has demonstrated both similarities and differences between men and women, as well as the need to consider couples conjointly (rather than viewing individuals in isolation). Future research focusing on the retirement process as it unfolds over time and in ecological context can serve to illuminate the circumstances under which retirement promotes or detracts from the quality of life.     

Bad Woman, Bad Victim? Disentangling the Effects of Victim Stereotypicality, Gender Stereotypicality and Benevolent Sexism on Acquaintance Rape Victim Blame

Based on the assertion that previous research may have inadvertently confounded two stereotypes, we considered the impact of benevolent sexism on rape victim blame in the context of independent manipulations of gender and the perceived genuineness (victim stereotypicality) of an acquaintance rape victim. We predicted that for blame, benevolent sexism may be independently positively associated with gender and victim counter-stereotypicality. Following pilot work, 120 Australian undergraduates read an acquaintance rape scenario. Results indicated that benevolent sexism was only positively associated with blame of the gender counter-stereotypical victim when that victim was also counter-stereotypical in terms of victim stereotypes. This result indicates a more moderate role than previously indicated for benevolent sexism in accounting for rape victim blame.     

Korsgaard’s Constitutivism and the Possibility of Bad Action

Neo-Kantian accounts which try to ground morality in the necessary requirements of agency face the problem of “bad action”. The most prominent example is Christine Korsgaard’s version of constitutivism that considers the categorical imperative to be indispensable for an agent’s self-constitution. In my paper I will argue that a constitutive account can solve the problem of bad action by applying the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules to the categorical imperative. The result is that an autonomous agent can violate the categorical imperative in so far as it amounts to a regulative rule of morality; however, an agent cannot call into question the categorical imperative as a constitutive rule of the practice of morality without losing her or his identity as a moral agent. The paper then compares this approach to bad action with the one Korsgaard provides and outlines also a new way of grounding the categorical imperative.     

Acting Under the Guise of the Bad – Editorial Introduction

I introduce the topic of the Special Issue and highlight the central themes that the six contributors address in their essays. The moral-philosophical problem of the possibility of bad action is situated within the broader context of its action-theoretical significance, that is, as the most important challenge to the influential idea that an intentional action is necessarily performed under the guise of the good. J. David Velleman’s discussion of the character of Milton’s Satan is mentioned to illustrate the Special Issue’s main question of whether instantiations of individual and collective agency are conceivable that deliberately act for the sake of the bad.     

Babies Born Dying: Just Bad Karma? A Discussion Paper

The paper examines the notion of being born dying and karma. Karma is a belief upheld by Buddhists and non-Buddhists: That is, karma follows people from their previous lives into their current lives. This raises a difficult question: Does karma mean that a baby’s death is its own fault? While great peace can be found from a belief in karma, the notion of a baby’s karma returning in some sort of retributive, universal justice can be de-emphasized and is considered “un-Buddhist.” Having an understanding of karma is intrinsic to the spiritual care for the dying baby, not only from the perspective of parents and families who have these beliefs, but also for reconciling one’s own beliefs as a healthcare practitioner.     

The Guise of the Bad in Augustine’s Pear Theft

In the second book of his Confessions, Augustine of Hippo presents his famous juvenile Pear Theft as an apparent case of acting under the guise of the bad. At least since Thomas Aquinas’ influential interpretation, scholars have usually taken Augustine’s detailed discussion of the case to be dispelling this “guise of the guise of the bad”, and to offer a solid “guise of the good”-explanation. This paper addresses an important challenge to this view: Augustine offers two different “guise of the good”-explanations in his text rather than just one, and the two explanations seem to be mutually exclusive. A number of more recent attempts to reconcile Augustine’s two lines of explanation are discussed and found wanting, and a new suggestion is made. The proposed solution focuses on the Pear Theft as a joint action, and it departs from the Aquinian interpretation in that it accounts for a way in which the “guise of the bad”-hypothesis survives the explanation.     

Bad or Mad? Personality disorders and legal responsibility-the German situation

Criminal offenders have a high rate of personality disorders (PDS), especially Antisocial Personality Disorders and psychopathy, but criminal acts are not necessarily the result of PD. Findings from psychiatric research suggest that the development of PD is influenced by genetic factors, that can result in deviant traits in temper, emotionality and cognitive style. There is general agreement that those peculiarities and vulnerabilities find their expression and structure only under a complex interplay of stimulating or impairing environmental influences. Do these genetic factors-or other factors-diminish a person's criminal responsibility? There is no difficulty in diagnosing PDs, but the challenging questions arise in forensic assessments of defendants for criminal responsibility who have a PD. This article discusses the German legal situation and special problems created by the term of "diminished" criminal responsibility. In contrast to the Anglo-American legal situation, the German criminal law obliges the court to order an indeterminate forensic - psychiatric confinement, in addition to punishment, if the offender had acted under diminished criminal responsibility and is now still considered to be dangerous. The convicted offender remains under the control of the criminal court during psychiatric hospitalization. The change from handling the personality disordered offender as a criminal to handling him as someone with a mental disorder creates a social option for extended state interventions, including indeterminate hospitalization.     

Clergy Role Stress and Satisfaction: Role Ambiguity Isn’t Always Bad

This study examined relationships between role conflict and role ambiguity and clergy satisfaction with their church appointment. Questionnaire data obtained from 293 United Methodist clergy suggested that role conflict and role ambiguity each have a negative relationship with appointment satisfaction. However, when considered together, they displayed a more complex relationship with appointment satisfaction. Contrary to conventional wisdom, results indicated that although these stressors operate together to influence appointment satisfaction, their combined effect is not simply cumulative. That is, when role conflict is low, clergy report the most satisfaction when role ambiguity is high. However, when role conflict and role ambiguity are both high, appointment satisfaction is low. These findings are interpreted in light of clergy influence strategies. And, recommendations for remedying clergy role stress are offered. Furthermore, it is suggested that interactive models of role stressors could lead to more in-depth understanding of organizational stress as well as advances in role stress theory.