Can power be self‐legitimating? Political realism in Hobbes,Weber, and Williams

Political realists seek to provide an alternative to accounts of political legitimacy that are based on moral standards. In this endeavor, they face the challenge of how to interpret the maxim that power cannot be self‐legitimating. In this paper, we argue that work by Bernard Williams sheds light on the possible answers to this challenge. While Williams aligns himself with the realist tradition, his account of legitimacy contains an implicit critique of political realism. This is evident, we show, in his rejections of the views of Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber. Williams is not satisfied with Hobbes because he conflates legitimacy and political order, eliminating space for criticizing power. Weber's view, however, offers a non‐moralist standard of legitimacy that has critical purchase. This critical purchase emerges from the demands made on rulers to uphold the values that underlie their legitimation, combined with the ethic of responsibility. The resulting grounds for criticism are thus consistent with the maxim that power cannot be self‐legitimating—the very maxim that Williams puts at the heart of his realism. By showing that Williams's partial rejection of Hobbes and Weber cannot be sustained only on realist grounds, our analysis clarifies the limits of political realism.     

POLITICAL LIBERALISM,BASIC LIBERTIES,AND LEGAL PATERNALISM

This essay argues that neutral paternalism (NP) is problematic for antiperfectionist liberal theories. Section 2 raises textual evidence that Rawlsian liberalism does not oppose and may even support NP. In section 3, I cast doubt on whether NP should have a place in political liberalism by defending a partially comprehensive conception of the good I call “moral capacity at each moment,” or MCEM, that is inconsistent with NP. I then explain why MCEM is a reasonable conception on Rawls's account of reasonableness. In section 4, I handle concerns that showing NP fails the test of Rawlsian public justification is a nonstarter since NP does not threaten any of our basic liberties. I sketch an argument that, if this is so, the burden is on political liberalism to defend its particular account of basic liberties, since MCEM is reasonable on Rawlsian grounds. More precisely, MCEM is a conception that challenges the way Rawls characterizes basic liberties; that is, his list of basic liberties should be more inclusive by political liberalism's own structural commitments, including Rawls's “liberal principle of legitimacy.” On this revised account, political liberalism can mount a strong opposition to hard legal paternalism.     

Legitimacy, Democracy and Public Justification: Rawls’ Political Liberalism Versus Gaus’ Justificatory Liberalism

Public justification-based accounts of liberal legitimacy rely on the idea that a polity’s basic structure should, in some sense, be acceptable to its citizens. In this paper I discuss the prospects of that approach through the lens of Gerald Gaus’ critique of John Rawls’ paradigmatic account of democratic public justification. I argue that Gaus does succeed in pointing out some significant problems for Rawls’ political liberalism; yet his alternative, justificatory liberalism, is not voluntaristic enough to satisfy the desiderata of a genuinely democratic theory of public justification. So I contend that—pace Gaus, but also Rawls—rather than simply amending political liberalism, the claims of justificatory liberalism bring out fatal tensions between the desiderata of any theory of liberal-democratic legitimacy through public justification.     

Islam, Law, and Political Control in Contemporary Iran

Muslims agree that the establishment of an Islamic state requires the implementation of Islamic principles and laws. In Iran, Khomeini and his supporters developed doctrinal justifications for uncontested clerical rule to ensure political order and social conformity. By emphasizing "communal interest" in legislation and establishing an extensive institutional mechanism of legal control, the clerics gradually marginalized the Shari'ah and sacrificed the Islamic notion of universality of law for legal territoriality. This legal trend is separating the clerics from their traditional role and is undermining their legitimacy. Ironically, the current attempts at legal and political reform by the reformers, as harshly opposed by the hard-line clerics, would benefit the clerical class by pursuing a more liberal legal and political agenda consistent with the Shari'ah.     

Defending a Law of Peoples: Political Liberalism and Decent Peoples

In this paper I reconstruct and defend John Rawls' The Law of Peoples, including the distinction between liberal and decent peoples. A “decent people” is defined as a people who possesses a comprehensive doctrine and uses that doctrine as the ground of political legitimacy, while liberal peoples do not possess a comprehensive doctrine. I argue that liberal and decent peoples are bound by the same normative requirements with the qualification that decent peoples accept the same normative demands when they are reasonably interpreted and from their comprehensive doctrine, not from political liberalism. Normative standards for peoples appear in a law of peoples in two places: as internal constraints carried forward from political liberalism which regulate domestic affairs and as principles derived from a second original position that provide the normative ground for a society of peoples. This first source of normative standards was unfortunately obscured in Rawls' account. I use this model to defeat the claim that Rawls has accommodated decent peoples without sufficient warrant and to argue that all reasonable citizens of both liberal and decent peoples would accept the political authority of the state as legitimate. Although my reconstruction differs from Rawls on key points, such as modifying the idea of decency and rejecting a place for decent peoples within a second original position, overall I defend the theoretical completeness of political liberalism and show how a law of peoples provides reasonable principles of international justice. This paper explores theoretical ideas I introduced in embryonic form in a paper presented at the International Conference on Human Rights: Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights, 17–18 May, 2003, Mofid University (Qom, Iran). That paper, “Political Liberalism and Religious Freedom: Asymmetrical Tolerance for Minority Comprehensive Doctrines” (forthcoming in the Proceedings of the conference), addressed specific issues related to religious toleration, but left unexplored theoretical questions regarding the status of decent peoples. I wish to thank participants in the conference for their helpful feedback on my interpretation of Rawls' international political theory, especially Jack Donnelly, Michael Freeman, Stephen Macedo, Samuel Fleishacker, Omar Dahbour, Yasien Ali Mohamed, and Saladin Meckled-Garcia. In addition, I wish to offer my sincere appreciation to the Executive Committee of the Conference and especially to Sayyed Masoud Moosavi Karimi, Nasser Elahi, and Mohammad Habibi Modjandeh.     

Critical notice of On the people's terms: a Republican theory and model of democracy,by Philip Pettit,Cambridge University Press, 2012, xii+333pp.

This paper is a critical notice of Philip Pettit's On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Pettit argues that only Republicanism can respond appropriately to the ‘evil of subjection to another's will – particularly in important areas of personal choice’ because its ideal of liberty – freedom as non-domination – both captures better than liberalism our commitment to individual liberty and explains better our commitment to the legitimacy of democratic decision-making than standard democrat accounts. If this argument succeeds, it demonstrates that there is no real tension between the liberal thought that justice provides a standard for evaluating public decisions independent of the fact that they are taken democratically and the democratic thought that the fact that a decision is democratic suffices to make it legitimate. I argue, however, that Pettit finds himself caught between two contradictory positions: a version of Isaiah Berlin's negative concept of liberty and a positive liberty account of democracy. And I show that his attempt to resolve the tension fails because it requires him to embrace the positive liberty account he is committed to rejecting.     

Political Moralism and Constitutional Reasoning: A Reply to Bernard Williams

Res Publica - Williams’s well-known critique of the ‘moralism’ of liberal political philosophy—its disconnect from political reality—holds special significance for the...     

意识形态的合法性诠释功能及其限制

意识形态最主要的政治功能就是为统治秩序提供一种合法性辩护,唤起被统治者对既有政治秩序的合法性信仰。但是,意识形态的合法性功能是有限度的,政治合法性具有一定的由政治秩序本身决定的不依统治者意志为转移的客观性规定,意识形态的合法性诠释不能违背政治统治最基本的道义原则。同时,意识形态功能的发挥还必须同其它合法性策略有机地结合起来。在建构合法性的政治实践中滥用意识形态,往往会进一步加剧政治合法性危机,导致严重的政治后果。     

International Justice,Human Rights and Neutrality

A number of theorists have tried to resolve the tension between a western-oriented liberal scheme of human rights and an account that accommodates different political systems and constitutional ideals than the liberal one. One important way the tension has been addressed is through a “neutral” or tolerant, notion of human rights, as present in the work of Rawls, Scanlon and Buchanan. In this paper I argue that neutrality cannot by itself explain the difference between rights considered appropriate for liberal states and rights considered to be human rights proper. The central arguments used by neutralist theorists presuppose, rather than justify, this differential treatment. Instead, that difference can be understood only by reference to the purpose of human rights as distinct from the constitutional rights of a liberal state. This requires us to reassess the point and purpose of a theory of international justice, in contrast to justice for a domestic and politically separate society. In the case of a theorist like Rawls, human rights represent guides to the foreign policy of a liberal state, rather than to principles by which all states are expected to abide. That is because of Rawls’ acceptance that no common, authoritative, third-party, institutions capable of imposing duties on all agents uniformly exist or can exist. This also makes his theory inherently conservative about human rights, given that they are simply to act as a guide to which states can be treated as legitimate when it comes to liberal foreign policy: those that possess institutions that can be said to represent a peoples, rather than being imposed through violence. This standard is lower than the ideal set of rights extended to all in a liberal society. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Empowerment or Intrusion? The Input and Output Legitimacy of Introductory Programs for Recent Immigrants

Recent changes in the social policy regimes of western European countries have raised questions about the normative legitimacy of policy measures. Welfare states may face difficult dilemmas when efficient social policy measures clash with principles of the liberal state, like equal treatment and individual autonomy. Is output legitimacy achieved at the expense of the input legitimacy dimensions of individual autonomy and human dignity? In this paper, a standard for evaluating the normative legitimacy of social policy interventions is proposed, and subsequently applied on the concrete example of the Norwegian introductory programs for immigrants. The paper concludes that activation measures in some of its implementations may actually represent fewer threats to input legitimacy than does the alternative regime of unconditional social assistance.     

Immigration and Democratic Principles: On Carens’ Ethics of Immigration

Carens has done more than any other political theorist or philosopher to develop the normative perspective of prospective migrants from within the liberal democratic tradition, but he has not sufficiently engaged with the other side of the argument – in particular, with the value of political community and the principle of collective self‐determination. What is at stake for the immigrant‐receiving country that might justify its claim to control immigration? I first examine Carens’ theory of social membership and its connection to political community. I then discuss his method of ‘political theory from the ground up’ and his interpretation of democratic principles. I conclude with a discussion of the principle of collective self‐determination.     

Justice: Metaphysical,After All?

Political liberals, following Rawls, believe that justice should be ‘political’ rather than ‘metaphysical.’ In other words, a conception of justice ought to be freestanding from first-order moral and metaethical views. The reason for this is to ensure that the state’s coercion be justified to citizens in terms that meet political liberalism’s principle of legitimacy. I suggest that privileging a political conception of justice involves costs—such as forgoing the opportunity for political theory to learn from other areas of philosophy. I argue that it is not clear that it provides any benefit in return. Whether a political conception of justice more adequately satisfies the liberal principle of legitimacy than a metaphysical conception of justice is an open question. To show this, I describe three ways in which political conceptions of justice have been developed within the literature. I then argue that while each might be helpful in finding reasons that reasonable citizens can accept, all face challenges in satisfying the liberal principle of legitimacy. Political conceptions of justice confront the same set of justificatory problems as ‘metaphysical’ conceptions. The question of whether a political conception is preferable should receive greater scrutiny.     

Democratic dictatorship: Political legitimacy in Marxist perspective

This article aims to contextualise, explain, and defend the relevance of Marx's analysis of the dictatorship of the proletariat for contemporary debates on political legitimacy. I call my reconstruction of the Marxist contribution to this debate: the limited legitimacy theory of political authority. Such a theory, I contend, offers a plausible alternative to existing liberal and anarchist accounts and has important implications for a number of key debates in political theory, including the normative significance of the state, the relationship between authority and freedom, the role of democracy, and the meaning and relevance of communist utopia.     

On the Relationship between Truth and Liberal Politics

This paper examines the relationship between truth and liberal politics via the work of Bernard Williams and Richard Rorty. I argue that Williams is right to think that there are positive relations between truth, specifically a realist understanding of truth, and liberal politics that Rorty's abandonment of the realist vocabulary of truth undermines. At the heart of this concern is the worry that abandoning the realist vocabulary opens up the possibility that the standards of justification for our true beliefs can be manipulated by those with the power to do so in order to further their own political ends. The political benefit of realism is that it fixes the standards of justification and makes them immune to manipulation by the use of power. However, I suggest that there is a form of realism available that Rorty can accept which would deliver the political benefits of the realist vocabulary without requiring him to accept the thick realist metaphysics that he wants to avoid. My conclusion is that there is a positive and important relationship between truth and liberal politics, a relationship that can be sustained without any necessary commitment to realist metaphysics.     

Cosmopolitanism as a Corrective Virtue

This paper defends an account of cosmopolitanism as a corrective virtue of the sort endorsed by Philippa Foot. In particular, it argues that cosmopolitanism corrects a common and dangerous tendency to form overly strong identifications with political entities such as countries, nations, and cultures. The account helps to unify the current heterogeneous collection of cosmopolitan theories, as is illustrated by a discussion of the cultural cosmopolitanism of Jeremy Waldron, and the political cosmopolitanism of Simon Keller. The account also helps distinguish cosmopolitans from their critics, most of whom share the cosmopolitan’s commitment to respect for human rights: for example, liberal patriots, liberal nationalists and liberal culturalists.     

Self-restraint and the Principle of Consent: Some considerations of the Liberal Conception of Political Legitmacy

This article discusses the legitimacy argument on which many liberals ground their demand for restraining the use of religious convictions in processes of political deliberation and decision making. According to this argument the exercise of political power can only be justified by 'neutral' grounds, i.e. grounds that are able to find reciprocal, hypothetical consent. The author argues that this understanding of political legitimacy is not distinctive of the liberal tradition. His thesis is that reciprocal, hypothetical consent is not sufficient and only in a certain, restricted sense necessary for justifying the use of political power.     

Self-defeat and the foundations of public reason

At the core of public reason liberalism is the idea that the exercise of political power is legitimate only if based on laws or political rules that are justifiable to all reasonable citizens. Call this the Public Justification Principle. Public reason liberals face the persistent objection (articulated by, among others, Joseph Raz, Steven Wall, Allen Buchanan, and David Enoch) that the Public Justification Principle is self-defeating. The idea that a society’s political rules must be justifiable to all reasonable citizens is intensely controversial among seemingly reasonable citizens of every liberal society. So, the objection goes, the Public Justification Principle is not justifiable to all reasonable citizens, and thus fails its own test of legitimacy. And this, critics conclude, undermines the public reason liberal project. This article argues that answering the self-defeat objection to public reason liberalism requires fundamentally rethinking prevailing accounts of the Public Justification Principle’s role. My aim is to develop an account of the Public Justification Principle that vindicates its coherence and moral appeal in the face of reasonable disagreement.     

Sex-role attitudes,identities, and political ideology

This study examines whether sex-role identities and attitudes toward sex roles are part of a more general liberal—conservative dimension of political ideology. Survey data are analyzed from two independent random samples of Indiana University students in 1974–1975. Sex-role attitudes are measured by two scales, dealing with evaluations of the traditional sex-based division of labor and levels of sex-stereotyping of various tasks. The Bem Sex Role Inventory is used to measure respondents' sex-role identities. Those who score more liberal or flexible on each measure of sex-role attitudes are also very likely to hold liberal political attitudes. These correlations are strong and consistent enough to indicate that sex-role attitudes fit into a more general liberal—conservative ideology, at least among college students. Correlations between sex-role identities and political attitudes are much weaker. Among men, liberal political attitudes are associated with a more flexible (androgynous) sex-role identity; among women, in contrast, liberal political attitudes are related more consistently to a more traditionally masculine sex-role identity.We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the Indiana University Women's Studies Program, Michael A. Maggiotto, Christine Williams, and especially Barbara Allen for her insightful comments and capable data analysis.     

From Lhasa to Rome: Williams’s Unexpected Way

IntroductionPaul Williams is professor of Indian and Tibetan philosophy at the University of Bristol in England. He is the author of four earlier books on Buddhist thought and numerous scholarly papers. In The Unexpected Way (Edinburgh, T&T Clarke, 2002), his fifth book, Williams departs from the normal academic genre and writes a partly autobiographical, partly apologetic account of his conversion from Tibetan Buddhism to Roman Catholicism. The title anticipates the pretty standard response that traffic is typically in the opposite direction. The book is a mixture of philosophical discussion, personal musings, ‘analytical meditations’, and catechetical-style instruction that seeks to convince the reader that his choice was rational, warranted and personally enriching.