Self-enhancement and belief perseverance

Belief perseverance—the tendency to make use of invalidated information—is one of social psychology’s most reliable phenomena. Virtually all of the explanations proffered for the effect, as well as the conditions that delimit it, involve the way people think about or explain the discredited feedback. But it seems reasonable to assume that the importance of the feedback for the actor’s self-image would also influence the tendency to persevere on invalidated feedback. From a self-enhancement perspective, one might ask: Why would people persist in negative self-beliefs, especially when the basis for those beliefs has been discredited? In the present study, actors and observers completed a word-identification task and were given bogus success or failure feedback. After success feedback was discredited, actors and observers persevered equally in beliefs about the actor’s abilities. However, following invalidation of failure feedback, actors provided significantly higher performance evaluations than observers, thus exhibiting less perseverance on the negative feedback. These results suggest that the motivation to maintain a relatively favorable self-image may attenuate perseverance when discredited feedback threatens an important aspect of the self-concept.     

The perseverance effect in the debriefing paradigm: Replication and extension

A classic study conducted by Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) revealed a perseverance effect wherein people who received positive performance feedback on an alleged social perceptiveness test reported more favorable self-perceptions in this domain than those who received negative feedback despite the fact that they had received standard outcome debriefing (i.e., been informed about the false, predetermined, and random nature of the feedback) prior to reporting self-assessments. The present studies extend this past research by revealing that (a) there is a form of outcome debriefing (i.e., informing participants about the bogus nature of the test as well as the bogus nature of the feedback) that effectively eliminates the perseverance effect, (b) the perseverance effect that occurs after standard outcome debriefing is limited to perceptions of specific task-relevant skills rather than more global abilities, and (c) affective reactions do not underlie the perseverance effect that occurs in the false feedback paradigm.     

They Might Be a Liar But They’re My Liar: Source Evaluation and the Prevalence of Misinformation

Even if people acknowledge that misinformation is incorrect after a correction has been presented, their feelings towards the source of the misinformation can remain unchanged. The current study investigated whether participants reduce their support of Republican and Democratic politicians when the prevalence of misinformation disseminated by the politicians appears to be high in comparison to the prevalence of their factual statements. We presented U.S. participants either with (1) equal numbers of false and factual statements from political candidates or (2) disproportionately more false than factual statements. Participants received fact-checks as to whether items were true or false, then rerated both their belief in the statements as well as their feelings towards the candidate. Results indicated that when corrected misinformation was presented alongside equal presentations of affirmed factual statements, participants reduced their belief in the misinformation but did not reduce their feelings towards the politician. However, if there was considerably more misinformation retracted than factual statements affirmed, feelings towards both Republican and Democratic figures were reduced—although the observed effect size was extremely small.     

Self-focused attention and belief perseverance

The perseverance of an erroneous belief was investigated in the debriefing paradigm as a function of self-focused attention. Subjects were given either success or failure experiences via bogus performance feedback and received this feedback under high or low mirror self-focusing. All subjects were subsequently debriefed about the false nature of the feedback, and then, before answering questions about their estimated actual performance and ability, mirror self-focus was again manipulated. The results showed that self-focus prior to debriefing increased belief perseverance while self-focus after debriefing reduced the perseverance effects. Discussion of these findings emphasized the role of self-focus in information processing before and adherence to veridical standards after debriefing.     

The cognitive processes underlying false beliefs

Why do consumers sometimes fall for spurious claims—for example, brain training games that prevent cognitive decline, toning sneakers that sculpt one's body, flower essence that cures depression—and how can consumers protect themselves in the modern world where information is shared quickly and easily? As cognitive scientists, we view this problem through the lens of what we know, more generally, about how people evaluate information for its veracity, and how people update their beliefs. That is, the same processes that support true belief can also encourage people to sometimes believe misleading or false information. Anchoring on the large literature on truth and belief updating allows predictions about consumer behavior; it also highlights possible solutions while casting doubt on other possible responses to misleading communications.     

Abstract and concrete data in the perseverance of social theories: When weak data lead to unshakeable beliefs

The perseverance effect—the finding that people cling to their initial beliefs more strongly than appears warranted—has been demonstrated in a wide variety of settings. The existing explanation of the effect implies that beliefs based on concrete data should be more resistant to challenges than beliefs based on abstract data. The present studies compared the amount of belief perseverance when the beliefs were initially based on either abstract or concrete data. Subjects examined either two case histories (concrete data) or a statistical summary (abstract data) suggestive of either a positive or a negative relationship between fire fighter trainees' level of preference for high risk and their subsequent success as firefighters. These data sets were equated for the initial strength of beliefs they induced. Subjects were the thoroughly debriefed about the fictitious nature of their initial data. Subsequent assessments of subjects' personal beliefs about the true relationship revealed (a) significant levels of theory perseverance both immediately and 1 week later; (b) significantly more perseverance in the concrete data conditions, both immediately and 1 week later. Experiment 2 revealed that subjects frequently engage in causal processing spontaneously, especially when examining concrete data. Overall, the data suggested that memory for initial data did not contribute to the abstract/concrete effects, but that the generation of general, causal explanations did contribute to the stronger perseverance of theories in the concrete conditions.     

DRM范式下心境一致性错误记忆的认知机制

本研究以自编情绪DRM词表为实验材料, 用音乐诱发正常大学生被试正性、负性和中性心境, 探讨在被试处于某种心境下时是否产生心境一致性错误记忆现象、预警能否减少心境一致性错误记忆的发生。结果表明, 正性关键诱饵在正性心境下的错误再认率显著高于中性和负性心境, 负性关键诱饵在负性心境下的错误再认率显著高于中性和正性心境, 说明正常被试也会产生心境一致性错误记忆; 预警和无预警条件下被试对关键诱饵和心境一致性关键诱饵的错误再认率无显著差异, 说明外显的预警提示并不能消除部分由无意识产生的错误记忆和心境一致性错误记忆。研究结果支持记忆的扩散激活理论和情感的联想网络理论。     

Susceptibility to memory distortion: how do we decide it has occurred?

When given suggestive information, some people can be led to believe that they had experiences that they did not actually have. For example, they may come to believe falsely that they got sick eating particular foods as children, and as a result of that belief they may avoid the foods. But how do we know that someone has developed a false belief or memory in this research? The criteria we choose when classifying whether someone has fallen for the suggestion are somewhat arbitrary. We reanalyze our prior data, using different criteria for deciding that a person fell for the suggestion (called a "believer") or did not (called a "non-believer"). Changing criteria obviously affects the percentage of people who are called susceptible and could conceivably affect the conclusions reached about that group. Comparisons between false memories and true memories could differ, too, depending on how memories are defined.     

The Impact of A Discredited Key Witness

An experiment was conducted in order to assess the impact of discredited testimony presented by a key witness in a court setting. One of two videotaped cases was presented to subjects who were asked to assume the role of jurors and to make judgments as to the defendant's liability on the basis of the evidence presented. The three possible effects of discredited testimony on judgments were examined: logic, overcorrection, and perseverance. Subjects dealt with discredited testimony logically, ignoring it, except in one version of one of the cases where the witness' discredited testimony constituted a false accusation. In this version, subjects overcorrected in their judgments.     

The Persistence of Erroneous Information in Memory: The Effect of Valence on the Acceptance of Corrected Information

People often have difficulty changing previously held, but erroneous, beliefs. This finding is particularly worrisome in politics where misinformation is regularly distributed about political candidates. We examined whether initial inferences about a fictional political candidate could be corrected, and whether people's willingness to accept a correction was influenced by the valence of the information being corrected. Participants read a list of statements describing a politician running for re‐election in which a negative, positive or neutral piece of information about the politician was later corrected. Results showed that receiving a correction reduced reliance on the original information for all types of information: positive, negative and neutral. Results also showed that participants tended to rely on negative information the most when answering inference questions, regardless of whether it was corrected or not. Results have implications for decision‐making in politics and other applied areas.Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

哲学性向、生活事件与精神信仰关系的研究

该文从实证的角度,探讨哲学性向、生活事件与精神信仰的关系。研究表明:1)哲学性向对宗教、神灵、金钱、家族崇拜起负向作用;对政治、国家和民族主义起正向作用。2)生活事件对神灵、生命和家庭起负向预测作用;生活事件通过与哲学性向的交互作用对民族信仰起预测作用。     

How misinformation taints our belief system: A focus on belief updating and relational reasoning

This commentary complements Stanley et al.'s (2022) target article by concentrating on the process of false belief construction and its associated cognitive mechanisms. It also concurs with the target article that a deeper understanding of the cognitive mechanisms by which consumers revise their truth judgments in view of new evidence is needed. Specifically, this essay develops two main dimensions: the first about what we know from the actual construction of truth judgments; the second about what we know from the cognitive mechanisms by which truth judgments are constructed. Particularly on this second dimension, I develop the idea that relational reasoning is key to understanding how individuals integrate new information within their internal belief systems. These two dimensions are both process-minded, yet one is about how beliefs evolve over time, whereas the other is about the cognitive mechanisms that underlie belief construction. Overall, an understanding of these two elements is crucial to finding behavioral interventions that may curb the spread of misinformation.     

The consequences of suggesting false childhood food events

We combined data across eight published experiments (N = 1369) to examine the formation and consequences of false autobiographical beliefs and memories. Our path models revealed that the formation of false autobiographical belief fully mediated the pathway between suggesting to people that they had experienced a positive or negative food-related event in the past and current preference for that food. Suggestion indirectly affected intention to eat the food via change in autobiographical belief. The development of belief with and without memory produced similar changes in food preferences and behavior intention, indicating that belief in the event drives changes in suggestion-related attitudes. Finally, positive suggestions (e.g., “you loved asparagus the first time you tried it”) yielded stronger effects than negative suggestions (e.g., “you got sick eating egg salad”). These findings show that false autobiographical suggestions lead to the development of autobiographical beliefs, which in turn, have consequences for one's attitudes and behaviors.     

Why do I feel this way? Attributional assessment of happiness and unhappiness

ABSTRACT

Much research has shown that how people explain events affects subjective well-being (SWB), in particular when they explain positive events as being due to internal, stable, and global factors, and negative events as being due to external, unstable, and local factors. In the current research, we asked: how do people explain their SWB itself, and how do such attributions in turn relate to SWB? In repeated measures studies 1 (N = 281) and 2 (N = 169) participants viewed happy feelings as more personally controllable, stable, and internally caused compared to unhappy feelings. In Study 3 (N = 142) participants made causal attributions about accurate SWB feedback, or about randomly assigned false (low or high) SWB feedback. Those in the false low-SWB feedback condition attributed their SWB to external and unstable factors controlled by others compared to those in the high-level feedback condition. In all three studies, attributing SWB to stable, personally controllable factors was positively associated with SWB.     

Knowledge Attributions and Behavioral Predictions

Recent work has shown that knowledge attributions affect how people think others should behave, more so than belief attributions do. This paper reports two experiments providing evidence that (a) knowledge attributions also affect behavioral predictions more strongly than belief attributions do, and (b) knowledge attributions facilitate faster behavioral predictions than belief attributions do. Thus, knowledge attributions play multiple critical roles in social cognition, guiding judgments about how people should and will behave.     

The Wished‐For Always Wins Until the Winner Was Inevitable All Along: Motivated Reasoning and Belief Bias Regulate Emotion During Elections

How do biases affect political information processing? A variant of the Wason selection task, which tests for confirmation bias, was used to characterize how the dynamics of the recent U.S. presidential election affected how people reasoned about political information. Participants were asked to evaluate pundit‐style conditional claims like “The incumbent always wins in a year when unemployment drops” either immediately before or immediately after the 2012 presidential election. A three‐way interaction between ideology, predicted winner (whether the proposition predicted that Obama or Romney would win), and the time of test indicated complex effects of bias on reasoning. Before the election, there was partial evidence of motivated reasoning—liberals performed especially well at looking for falsifying information when the pundit's claim predicted Romney would win. After the election, once the outcome was known, there was evidence of a belief bias—people sought to falsify claims that were inconsistent with the real‐world outcome rather than their ideology. These results suggest that people seek to implicitly regulate emotion when reasoning about political predictions. Before elections, people like to think their preferred candidate will win. After elections, people like to think the winner was inevitable all along.     

The role of the counterfactually satisfied desire in the lag between false‐belief and false‐emotion attributions in children aged 4–7

A robust lag was evidenced between the attribution to an individual of a false belief about the world and the attribution of the false emotion associated with this false belief (Bradmetz & Schneider, 1999). This lag was unexpected in the frame of current theories of mind which consider that emotion has a rational cognitive basis. The present paper refers to the theory of appraisal which links emotion to the belief about desire satisfaction rather than the belief concerning the state of the world. The authors claim that, even if counterfactual belief is understood, the associated emotion and belief about counterfactual satisfaction of desire are not automatically understood because they depend on the success of an action. Two experiments conducted on happiness, fear, and anger confirmed this view: Attributing false belief about counterfactual desire satisfaction is much more difficult than attributing false belief about a current state of affairs, and the emotion attributed to the individual is more closely linked to a belief about desire than to a belief about the world. A four‐step developmental sequence is proposed, and the link between action and realist bias is discussed.     

Who do we trust? Differences in types of trust and beliefs in conspiracy theories between vaccinated and unvaccinated Europeans across 17 European countries

A plethora of research has highlighted that trust in science, political trust, and conspiracy theories are all important contributors to vaccine uptake behavior. In the current investigation, relying on data from 17 countries (N = 30,096) from the European Social Survey we examined how those who received (and wanted to receive the COVID-19 vaccine) compared to those who did not differ in their trust in: science, politicians and political parties, international organizations and towards people in general. We also examined whether they differed in how much they believed in conspiracy theories. Those who received (or wanted to receive) the COVID vaccine scored significantly higher in all forms of trust, and lower in conspiracy theory beliefs. A logistic regression suggested that trust in science, politicians, international organizations, as well as belief in conspiracy theories were significant predictors, even after accounting for key demographic characteristics.     

Distinguishing between level and impact of rumination as predictors of depressive symptoms: An experience sampling study

Rumination—repetitively thinking about one's emotional state, its causes and consequences—exacerbates negative mood and plays an important role in the aetiology and maintenance of depression. Yet, it is unclear whether increased vulnerability to depression is associated with simply how much a person ruminates, or the short-term impact rumination has on a person's negative mood. In the current study, we distinguish between the level versus the impact of rumination, and we examine how each uniquely predicts changes in depressive symptoms over time in an undergraduate sample. Using experience sampling, we assessed students’ (N = 101) subjective experiences of positive and negative affect and their use of rumination and distraction in daily life for seven days. Participants also reported their depressive symptoms before and after the experience sampling. Increases in depressive symptoms over the week were predicted by how much people ruminated, but not by its impact on negative mood.