The Shifting Border Between Perception and Cognition

The distinction between perception and cognition has always had a firm footing in both cognitive science and folk psychology. However, there is little agreement as to how the distinction should be drawn. In fact, a number of theorists have recently argued that, given the ubiquity of top‐down influences (at all levels of the processing hierarchy), we should jettison the distinction altogether. I reject this approach, and defend a pluralist account of the distinction. At the heart of my account is the claim that each legitimate way of marking a border between perception and cognition deploys a notion I call ‘stimulus‐control.’ Thus, rather than being a grab bag of unrelated kinds, the various categories of the perceptual are unified into a superordinate natural kind (mutatis mutandis for the complimentary categories of the cognitive).     

Relevant Alternatives,Perceptual Knowledge and Discrimination

This paper examines the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination in the light of the so‐called ‘relevant alternatives’ intuition. It begins by outlining an intuitive relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge which incorporates the insight that there is a close connection between perceptual knowledge and the possession of relevant discriminatory abilities. It is argued, however, that in order to resolve certain problems that face this view, it is essential to recognise an important distinction between favouring and discriminating epistemic support that is often overlooked in the literature. This distinction complicates the story regarding how an alternative becomes relevant, and in doing so weakens the connection between perceptual knowledge and discrimination. The theory that results, however—what I term a ‘two‐tiered’ relevant alternatives theory of perceptual knowledge—accommodates many of our intuitions about perceptual knowledge and so avoids the revisionism of some recent proposals in the epistemological literature.     

On Quantum Propensities: Two Arguments Revisited

Peter Milne and Neal Grossman have argued against Popper's propensity interpretation of quantum mechanics, by appeal to the two-slit experiment and to the distinction between mixtures and superpositions, respectively. In this paper I show that a different propensity interpretation successfully meets their objections. According to this interpretation, the possession of a quantum propensity by a quantum system is independent of the experimental set-ups designed to test it, even though its manifestations are not.     

Block's Overflow Argument

This article challenges Block's ‘overflow argument’ for the conclusion that phenomenal consciousness and access‐consciousness are distinct. It shows that the data can be explained just as well (or better) in terms of a distinction between contents that are made globally accessible through bottom–up sensory stimulation and those that are sustained and made available in working memory through top‐down attention.     

The Informational Fallacy in the Philosophy of Consciousness

This article argues that theories which regard the mind as merely a form of information processing are guilty of a fallacious conflation of the informational contents of consciousness with consciousness itself, with the consciousness of those contents. Such theories lie behind the thought that a consciousness could be transferred or uploaded onto a substrate other than the brain it initially occurred in. It is argued here that the ontology of information is that of a formal structure that can be instantiated in physical reality innumerable times, whereas the ontology of consciousness is that of an irreducibly singular subjective experience of being alive.     

The Self: the Incredulous Stare Articulated

This paper is an examination of Galen Strawson’s theory of the human person as a succession of momentary selves (or SESMETs: Subjects of Experience that are Single MEntal Things). Insofar as there is a clear distinction between enduring objects and events or processes, SESMETs would seem to partake of the features of both, for they are at once short‐lived subjects of consciousness and brief episodes of consciousness. Strawson in fact rejects the object/ process distinction, and contends that there is no sense in which a SESMET is a process and a rock is not a process. Strawson’s rejection of the object/process distinction is essential to his attempt to meet the charge that the concept of a SESMET is an incoherent conflation of the concept ‘object’ and the concept ‘process.’ But many philosophers will find the rejection of the object/process distinction objectionable on general metaphysical grounds. I suggest that these philosophers (I am one of them) and Strawson will not be able usefully to discuss issues in the philosophy of mind (such as his theory of SESMETs) till they have reached agreement about what the most fundamental ontological categories are.     

A model of the hierarchy of behaviour, cognition, and consciousness

Processes comparable in important respects to those underlying human conscious and non-conscious processing can be identified in a range of species and it is argued that these reflect evolutionary precursors of the human processes. A distinction is drawn between two types of processing: (1) stimulus-based and (2) higher-order. For 'higher-order,' in humans the operations of processing are themselves associated with conscious awareness. Conscious awareness sets the context for stimulus-based processing and its end-point is accessible to conscious awareness. However, the mechanics of the translation between stimulus and response proceeds without conscious control. The paper argues that higher-order processing is an evolutionary addition to stimulus-based processing. The model's value is shown for gaining insight into a range of phenomena and their link with consciousness. These include brain damage, learning, memory, development, vision, emotion, motor control, reasoning, the voluntary versus involuntary debate, and mental disorder.     

How many kinds of consciousness?

Ned Block's influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is untenable. Though mental states that have qualitative character plainly differ from those with no mental qualities, a mental state's being conscious is the same property for both kinds of mental state. For one thing, as Block describes access consciousness, that notion does not pick out any property that we intuitively count as a mental state's being conscious. But the deeper problem is that Block's notion of phenomenal consciousness, or phenomenality, is ambiguous as between two very different mental properties. The failure to distinguish these results in the begging of important theoretical questions. Once the two kinds of phenomenality have been distinguished, the way is clear to explain qualitative consciousness by appeal to a model such as the higher-order-thought hypothesis.     

Phenomenal and access consciousness in olfaction

Contemporary literature on consciousness, with some exceptions, rarely considers the olfactory system. In this article the characteristics of olfactory consciousness, viewed from the standpoint of the phenomenal (P)/access (A) distinction, are examined relative to the major senses. The review details several qualitative differences in both olfactory P consciousness (shifts in the felt location, universal synesthesia-like and affect-rich experiences, and misperceptions) and A consciousness (recovery from habituation, capacity for conscious processing, access to semantic and episodic memory, learning, attention, and in the serial-unitary nature of olfactory percepts). The basis for these differences is argued to arise from the functions that the olfactory system performs and from the unique neural architecture needed to instantiate them. These data suggest, at a minimum, that P and A consciousness are uniquely configured in olfaction and an argument can be made that the P and A distinction may not hold for this sensory system.     

The only X and Y principle

In this paper, I consider the validity and proper formulation of the only‐x‐and‐y principle, which states, roughly, that whether a later individual, y, is numerically identical to an earlier individual, x, can depend only on facts about x and y and the relationships between them. In the course of my investigation, I distinguish between two classes of physical entities?–?those that exist in a ‘real’ sense, and those that exist in a mere Cambridge sense. This distinction is grounded in Peter Geach's distinction between ‘real’ and mere Cambridge change. I argue in favor of a modified version of the only‐x‐and‐y principle?–?the qualified only‐x‐and‐y principle?–?which applies to entities that exist in a ‘real’ sense, but not to mere Cambridge entities. It is also argued that the plausibility of the qualified only‐x‐and‐y principle has more to do with facts about the nature of causality than with intuitions we have about existence or numerical identity. I finish by considering some traditional objections to the only‐x‐and‐y principle, and conclude that they do not succeed in refuting the qualified only‐x‐and‐y principle.     

Explaining personality or explaining variance? A comment on Creed and Funder (1998)

Based on factor analyses of the private self‐consciousness scale, Creed and Funder (1998) posit ‘two faces of private self‐consciousness’: self‐reflectiveness, which relates to negative outcomes, and internal state awareness, which relates to positive outcomes. The significance of this distinction is questioned. I contend (i) that the existence of two subfactors is a fatal deficiency in the private self‐consciousness scale, not a benefit; (ii) that factor analysis can never discover aspects of personality; (iii) that only an underlying theoretical network, not unique variance, makes a scale useful; and (iv) that the SR and ISA distinction exemplifies the undesirable Aristotelian approach (Lewin, 1931) to personality. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Aspects in Dual‐Aspect Monism and Panpsychism: A Rejoinder to Benovsky

Neutral monism aims at solving the hard problem of consciousness by positing entities that are neither mental nor physical. Benovsky has recently argued for the slightly different account that, rather than being neutral, natural entities are both mental and physical by having different aspects, and then argued in favour of an anti‐realist interpretation of those aspects. In this essay, operating under the assumption of dual‐aspect monism, I argue to the contrary in favour of a realist interpretation of these aspects by showing that the anti‐realist interpretation collapses into neutral monism and that the realist interpretation is an interesting alternative. I close with a discussion of the realist interpretation of the aspects and its relation with panpsychism.     

Attention versus consciousness in the visual brain: differences in conception, phenomenology, behavior, neuroanatomy, and physiology.

A common confound between consciousness and attention makes it difficult to think clearly about recent advances in the understanding of the visual brain. Visual consciousness involves phenomenal experience of the visual world, but visual attention is more plausibly treated as a function that selects and maintains the selection of potential conscious contents, often unconsciously. In the same sense, eye movements select conscious visual events, which are not the same as conscious visual experience. According to common sense, visual experience is consciousness, and selective processes are labeled as attention. The distinction is reflected in very different behavioral measures and in very different brain anatomy and physiology. Visual consciousness tends to be associated with the "what" stream of visual feature neurons in the ventral temporal lobe. In contrast, attentional selection and maintenance are mediated by other brain regions, ranging from superior colliculi to thalamus, prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate. The author applied the common-sense distinction between attention and consciousness to the theoretical positions of M. I. Posner (1992, 1994) and D. LaBerge (1997, 1998) to show how it helps to clarify the evidence. He concluded that clarity of thought is served by calling a thing by its proper name.     

SEX DIFFERENCES IN THE ATTRIBUTION OF SOCIALLY DESIRABLE AND UNDESIRABLE TRAITS TO OUT-GROUP MEMBERS*

One hundred and forty-four male and female Australian subjects rated an Australian or a Vietnamese target group on the possession of five socially desirable and five socially undesirable personality traits. As predicted, the out-group was perceived less favourably than the in-group, but only by the males, the females not making the distinction.     

IN DEFENSE OF THE WHAT‐IT‐IS‐LIKENESS OF EXPERIENCE

It is common parlance among philosophers who inquire into the nature of consciousness to speak of there being something it is like for the subject of a mental state to be in it. The popularity of the ‘what‐it‐is‐like’ phrase stems, in part, from the assumption that it enables us to distinguish, in an intuitive and illuminating way, between conscious and unconscious mental states: conscious mental states, unlike unconscious mental states, are such that there is something it is like for their subjects to be in them. The ‘what‐it‐is‐like’ phrase, however, has not gone unopposed; some very clever philosophers have vigorously disputed it. Peter Hacker, for example, argues that the phrase should be abandoned because it is ungrammatical, and Paul Snowdon argues that it should be abandoned because the propositions expressed by its usage are either trivial or false. This paper mounts a case for the claim that neither of these conclusions is warranted. Against Hacker, it is argued that the arguments he produces for the ungrammaticality of the phrase are unpersuasive; and, against Snowdon, it is argued that he fails to consider a plausible and independently motivated interpretation of the phrase and that on this interpretation, the propositions expressed by its usage are nontrivially true.     

`Funda-Mentality': is the conscious mind subtly linked to a basic level of the universe?

Age-old battle lines over the puzzling nature of mental experience are shaping a modern resurgence in the study of consciousness. On one side are the long-dominant `physicalists' who view consciousness as an emergent property of the brain's neural networks. On the alternative, rebellious side are those who see a necessary added ingredient: proto-conscious experience intrinsic to reality, perhaps understandable through modern physics (panpsychists, pan-experientialists, `funda-mentalists'). It is argued here that the physicalist premise alone is unable to solve completely the difficult issues of consciousness and that to do so will require supplemental panpsychist/pan-experiential philosophy expressed in modern physics. In one scheme proto-conscious experience is a basic property of physical reality accessible to a quantum process associated with brain activity. The proposed process is Roger Penrose's `objective reduction' (OR), a self-organizing `collapse' of the quantum wave function related to instability at the most basic level of space-time geometry. In the Penrose-Hameroff model of `orchestrated objective reduction' (Orch OR), OR quantum computation occurs in cytoskeletal microtubules within the brain's neurons. The basic thesis is that consciousness involves brain activities coupled to self-organizing ripples in fundamental reality.