先前知识经验对远距离水平映射规则内隐学习的限制

先前研究发现远距离规则能够被内隐地习得和迁移,表明内隐学习获得的知识是底层的抽象规则,那么这一抽象规则的习得和迁移是否会受到先前知识经验的限制?研究采用汉语声调的远距离水平映射规则为材料,通过创设不符合平仄知识经验的任意声调水平映射规则,在控制组块和重复结构等表面特征的条件下,探讨先前知识经验是否限制了远距离水平映射规则的内隐学习和迁移。结果发现相对于符合平仄知识经验的汉语声调水平映射规则,被试不能够内隐地习得和迁移任意声调的水平映射规则,表明先前知识经验在远距离水平映射规则内隐学习过程中发挥着重要作用。     

Implicit task sets in task switching?

In 2 experiments, the authors compare stimulus-based versus task-rule-based task performance. Participants practiced 8 stimulus-response mappings either with or without knowledge about 2 underlying task sets. After practice, 2 transfer blocks with 8 new stimuli were presented. Results show that rule knowledge leads to significant switch and transfer costs, whereas without rule knowledge neither switch nor transfer costs occur. However, significant Task Type x Response Type interactions occurred in both conditions. In a second experiment including only the no rule condition, half of the stimulus-response mappings in the transfer blocks were incongruent to the underlying task rule. Slower response times for these incongruent stimuli as compared with congruent stimuli and the absence of switch costs suggest that participants acquired (presumably implicit) knowledge about 4 different stimulus-response categories.     

Knowledge of Validity

What accounts for how we know that certain rules of reasoning, such as reasoning by Modus Ponens, are valid? If our knowledge of validity must be based on some reasoning, then we seem to be committed to the legitimacy of rule‐circular arguments for validity. This paper raises a new difficulty for the rule‐circular account of our knowledge of validity. The source of the problem is that, contrary to traditional wisdom, a universal generalization cannot be inferred just on the basis of reasoning about an arbitrary object. I argue in favor of a more sophisticated constraint on reasoning by universal generalization, one which undermines a rule‐circular account of our knowledge of validity.     

Implicit learning of nonlocal musical rules: implicitly learning more than chunks

Dominant theories of implicit learning assume that implicit learning merely involves the learning of chunks of adjacent elements in a sequence. In the experiments presented here, participants implicitly learned a nonlocal rule, thus suggesting that implicit learning can go beyond the learning of chunks. Participants were exposed to a set of musical tunes that were all generated using a diatonic inversion. In the subsequent test phase, participants either classified test tunes as obeying a rule (direct test) or rated their liking for the tunes (indirect test). Both the direct and indirect tests were sensitive to knowledge of chunks. However, only the indirect test was sensitive to knowledge of the inversion rule. Furthermore, the indirect test was overall significantly more sensitive than the direct test, thus suggesting that knowledge of the inversion rule was below an objective threshold of awareness.     

Rules for Reasoning from Knowledge and Lack of Knowledge

In this paper, the traditional view that argumentum ad ignorantiam is a logical fallacy is challenged, and lessons are drawn on how to model inferences drawn from knowledge in combination with ones drawn from lack of knowledge. Five defeasible rules for evaluating knowledge-based arguments that apply to inferences drawn under conditions of lack of knowledge are formulated. They are the veridicality rule, the consistency of knowledge rule, the closure of knowledge rule, the rule of refutation and the rule for argument from ignorance. The basic thesis of the paper is that knowledge-based arguments, including the argument from ignorance, need to be evaluated by criteria for epistemic closure and other evidential rules that are pragmatic in nature, that need to be formulated and applied differently at different stages of an investigation or discussion. The paper helps us to understand practical criteria that should be used to evaluate all arguments based on knowledge and/or ignorance.

When seeing is knowing: the role of visual cues in the dissociation between children's rule knowledge and rule use

The Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task requires children to switch from sorting cards based on shape or color to sorting based on the other dimension. Typically, 3-year-olds perseverate, whereas 4-year-olds flexibly sort by different dimensions. Zelazo and colleagues (1996, Cognitive Development, 11, 37-63) asked children questions about the postswitch rules and found an apparent dissociation between rule knowledge and rule use, namely that 3-year-olds demonstrate accurate knowledge of the postswitch rules despite sorting cards incorrectly. Here, we show that children's success with these questions is grounded in their use of available visual cues; children who fail sorting use the target cards to correctly answer questions, and when the cards are unavailable they guess. This suggests that there might not be a dissociation between children's rule knowledge and rule use in the DCCS.     

The Knowledge Rule and the Action Rule

In this paper I compare Timothy Williamson's knowledge rule of assertion with Ishani Maitra and Brian Weatherson's action rule. The paper is in two parts. In the first part I present and respond to Maitra and Weatherson's master argument against the knowledge rule. I argue that while its second premise, to the effect that an action X can be the thing to do though one is in no position to know that it is, is true, its first premise is not: the data do not support the claim that whenever X is the thing for one to do, one is in a position to assert that it is. In the second part I consider Maitra and Weatherson's alternative hypotheses, arguing that they do not provide a better explanation of the linguistic data. I conclude, in particular, that the knowledge rule is preferable to the action rule.     

Assertion,knowledge, and action

We argue against the knowledge rule of assertion, and in favour of integrating the account of assertion more tightly with our best theories of evidence and action. We think that the knowledge rule has an incredible consequence when it comes to practical deliberation, that it can be right for a person to do something that she can’t properly assert she can do. We develop some vignettes that show how this is possible, and how odd this consequence is. We then argue that these vignettes point towards alternate rules that tie assertion to sufficient evidence-responsiveness or to proper action. These rules have many of the virtues that are commonly claimed for the knowledge rule, but lack the knowledge rule’s problematic consequences when it comes to assertions about what to do.     

A knowledge-resonance (KRES) model of category learning

This article introduces a connectionist model of category learning that takes into account the prior knowledge that people bring to new learning situations. In contrast to connectionist learning models that assume a feedforward network and learn by the delta rule or backpropagation, this model, the knowledge-resonance model, or KRES, employs a recurrent network with bidirectional symmetric connection whose weights are updated according to a contrastive Hebbian learning rule. We demonstrate that when prior knowledge is represented in the network, KRES accounts for a considerable range of empirical results regarding the effects of prior knowledge on category learning, including (1) the accelerated learning that occurs in the presence of knowledge, (2) the better learning in the presence of knowledge of category features that are not related to prior knowledge, (3) the reinterpretation of features with ambiguous interpretations in light of error-corrective feedback, and (4) the unlearning of prior knowledge when that knowledge is inappropriate in the context of a particular category.     

分布式群体在动态系统控制决策中的内隐学习

采用计算机网络模拟技术,考察分布式群体在动态系统控制决策过程中对系统规则的内隐学习效应及其迁移。结果表明,在决策者的显性规则知识量极少且没有增加的情况下,决策绩效随决策进程适应性提高。决策者所能报告的规则知识量与决策绩效的相关也不显著。同时,当决策任务目标转换时,决策的高绩效得以维持。这表明群体决策者能对动态系统规则进行内隐学习,且能正迁移到类似的决策情景中。研究进一步指出,群体决策行为的动态适应与内隐过程有关。     

Theories of artificial grammar learning

Artificial grammar learning (AGL) is one of the most commonly used paradigms for the study of implicit learning and the contrast between rules, similarity, and associative learning. Despite five decades of extensive research, however, a satisfactory theoretical consensus has not been forthcoming. Theoretical accounts of AGL are reviewed, together with relevant human experimental and neuroscience data. The author concludes that satisfactory understanding of AGL requires (a) an understanding of implicit knowledge as knowledge that is not consciously activated at the time of a cognitive operation; this could be because the corresponding representations are impoverished or they cannot be concurrently supported in working memory with other representations or operations, and (b) adopting a frequency-independent view of rule knowledge and contrasting rule knowledge with specific similarity and associative learning (co-occurrence) knowledge.     

Stalnaker on sensuous knowledge

Robert Stalnaker has recently argued that a pair of natural thoughts are incompatible. One of them is the view that items of non-indexical factual knowledge rule out possibilities. The other is the view that knowing what sensuous experience is like involves non-indexical knowledge of its phenomenal character. I argue against Stalnaker’s take on things, elucidating along the way how our knowledge of what experience is like fits together with the natural idea that items of non-indexical factual knowledge rule out possibilities. I am grateful to Nel Block, Dque Chalmers, Benj Hellie, Mike Martin, Susanna Siejel, Robert Stalnaker and especially Majo Spencer for help with this work.     

Learning artificial grammars: No evidence for the acquisition of rules

Two experiments investigated whether there is evidence for acquisition of rules in implicit artificial grammar learning (AGL). Two different methods were used in meeting this goal, multiple regression analysis and analysis of receiver-operating characteristics (ROCs). By means of multiple regression analysis, several types of knowledge were identified that were used in judgments of grammaticality, for example, about single letters and about larger stimulus fragments. There was no evidence for the contribution of rule knowledge. The ROCs were in accord with a similarity-based account of AGL and thus did not support the notion that rule knowledge is acquired in AGL either. Simulations with a connectionist model corroborated the conclusion that the results were in accord with a similarity-based, associative account.     

How we use rules to select actions: A review of evidence from cognitive neuroscience

Much of our behavior is guided by rules, or prescribed guides for action. In this review, I consider the current state of knowledge of how rules are learned, stored in the brain, and retrieved and used as the need arises. The focus is primarily on studies in humans, but the review is informed by relevant studies in nonhuman primates. Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) has been implicated in rule learning, retrieval from long-term memory, and on-line maintenance during task preparation. Interactions between VLPFC and temporal cortex are required for rule retrieval in nonhuman primates, and brain imaging findings in humans suggest that rule knowledge is stored in the posterior middle temporal gyrus. Dorsolateral PFC appears to be more closely related to rule-based response selection than to rule retrieval. An important task for the future is to explain how PFC, basal ganglia, and temporal, parietal, and motor cortices interact to produce rule-guided behavior.     

Decision making under internal uncertainty: the case of multiple-choice tests with different scoring rules

This paper assesses framing effects on decision making with internal uncertainty, i.e., partial knowledge, by focusing on examinees' behavior in multiple-choice (MC) tests with different scoring rules. In two experiments participants answered a general-knowledge MC test that consisted of 34 solvable and 6 unsolvable items. Experiment 1 studied two scoring rules involving Positive (only gains) and Negative (only losses) scores. Although answering all items was the dominating strategy for both rules, the results revealed a greater tendency to answer under the Negative scoring rule. These results are in line with the predictions derived from Prospect Theory (PT) [Econometrica 47 (1979) 263]. The second experiment studied two scoring rules, which allowed respondents to exhibit partial knowledge. Under the Inclusion-scoring rule the respondents mark all answers that could be correct, and under the Exclusion-scoring rule they exclude all answers that might be incorrect. As predicted by PT, respondents took more risks under the Inclusion rule than under the Exclusion rule. The results illustrate that the basic process that underlies choice behavior under internal uncertainty and especially the effect of framing is similar to the process of choice under external uncertainty and can be described quite accurately by PT.     

Abstractionist and processing accounts of implicit learning

Five experiments evaluated the contributions of rule, exemplar, fragment, and episodic knowledge in artificial grammar learning using memorization versus hypothesis-testing training tasks. Strings of letters were generated from a biconditional grammar that allows different sources of responding to be unconfounded. There was no evidence that memorization led to passive abstraction of rules or encoding of whole training exemplars. Memorizers instead used explicit fragment knowledge to identify the grammatical status of test items, although this led to chance performance. Successful hypothesis-testers classified at near-perfect levels by processing training and test stimuli according to their rule structure. The results support the episodic-processing account of implicit and explicit learning.     

Assertion: A Function First Account

This paper aims to develop a novel account of the normativity of assertion. Its core thesis is that assertion has an etiological epistemic function, viz. to generate knowledge in hearers. In conjunction with a general account of etiological functions and their normative import, it is argued that an assertion is epistemically good if and only if it has the disposition to generate knowledge in hearers. In addition, reason is provided to believe that it makes sense to regulate the practice of assertion by a speaker rule—and, more specifically, by a knowledge rule—as so regulating assertion contributes to ensuring that assertion fulfils its etiological function reliably.     

Implicit learning of a recursive rule in an artificial grammar

Participants performed an artificial grammar learning task, in which the standard finite state grammar (J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behavior 6 (1967) 855) was extended with a recursive rule generating self-embedded sequences. We studied the learnability of such a rule in two experiments. The results verify the general hypothesis that recursivity can be learned in an artificial grammar learning task. However this learning seems to be rather based on recognising chunks than on abstract rule induction. First, performance was better for strings with more than one level of self-embedding in the sequence, uncovering more clearly the self-embedding pattern. Second, the infinite repeatability of the recursive rule application was not spontaneously induced from the training, but it was when an additional cue about this possibility was given. Finally, participants were able to verbalise their knowledge of the fragments making up the sequences-especially in the crucial front and back positions-, whereas knowledge of the underlying structure, to the extent it was acquired, was not articulatable. The results are discussed in relation to previous studies on the implicit learnability of complex and abstract rules.     

The effects of control on perceived fairness of procedures and outcomes

On the basis of Thibaut and Walker's theory of procedural justice, it was predicted that subjects who experienced control through choosing a trial decision rule would be more satisfied with the outcome of a dispute and the conflict resolution procedure than would yoked subjects who were not given control. Two additional conditions were added to the design in order to investigate the extent to which control had an influence on trial evaluations independent of being allowed to discuss the rules and obtaining a preferred rule in the absence of actual choice. Regardless of role in the dispute (accuser, accused, or no knowledge) and the nature of the rule adopted, those subjects who exercised control through rule choice evaluated all aspects of the trial experience more positively than subjects who did not exercise control through rule choice. The results also revealed that discussion of the rules and obtaining the preferred rule without choice contributed positively to evaluations of the trial procedure and verdict.     

A blueprint of ELI: A new method for eliciting subjective probability distributions

A blueprint of a new method for eliciting uncertain knowledge about continuous quantities is presented. The direct realization of a proper scoring rule in a graphically oriented interactive computer program is one of the central features of the new elicitation methodology. Uncertain knowledge is internally represented through subjective probability distributions. However, in its interaction with assessors, the elicitation method uses a score representation. A proper scoring rule is applied to transform probability density functions into score functions. In order to study its merits, central ideas for the new method were implemented in an experimental version of the elicitation technique ELI. The results were promising and encouraged further development of the technique.