Die Entwicklung der Diskussion um die formale Logik in der Sowjetunion

Ohne ZusammenfassungDie Literatur zur Logik in der Sowjetunion ist sehr bescheiden. Nebst einigen Kapiteln in grösseren Werken sind es folgende Schriften: Bochénski, I. M., Soviet Logic,SST, 1, 29–38. — Dahm, H., Renaissance der formalen Logik,Ost-Probleme, 1957,8, 254–267. — Philipov, A.,Logic and Dialectic in the Soviet Union, New York 1952, XI+89 pp. — Winkelmann, A., Die Stellung der formalen Logik im Sowjet-system,Scholastik, 1956,1, 85–89.     

A modification of kendall's tau for measuring association in contingency tables

A coefficient of association is described for a contingency table containing data classified into two sets of ordered categories. Within each of the two sets the number of categories or the number of cases in each category need not be the same.=+1 for perfect positive association and has an expectation of 0 for chance association. In many cases also has –1 as a lower limit. The limitations of Kendall's _a and _b and Stuart's _c are discussed, as is the identity of these coefficients to' under certain conditions. Computational procedure for is given.     

A reduction rule for Peirce formula

A reduction rule is introduced as a transformation of proof figures in implicational classical logic. Proof figures are represented as typed terms in a -calculus with a new constant P ⁽⁽⁾⁾. It is shown that all terms with the same type are equivalent with respect to -reduction augmented by this P-reduction rule. Hence all the proofs of the same implicational formula are equivalent. It is also shown that strong normalization fails for P-reduction. Weak normalization is shown for P-reduction with another reduction rule which simplifies of (( ) ) into an atomic type.This work was partially supported by a Grant-in-Aid for General Scientific Research No. 05680276 of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, Japan and by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. Hiroakira Ono     

New lower and upper bounds for communality in factor analysis

We derive several relationships between communalities and the eigenvalues for ap ×p correlation matrix under the usual factor analysis model. For suitable choices ofj, _j (), where _j () is thej-th largest eigenvalue of , provides either a lower or an upper bound to the communalities for some of the variables. We show that for at least one variable, 1 - _p () improves on the use of squared mulitiple correlation coefficient as a lower bound.This research was done while the second author was at Tokyo Institute of Technology.     

A generalization of the theory of subjective probability and expected utility

A generalization of the usual approach to the expected utility theory is given, with the aim of representing the state of belief of an agent who may decline on grounds of ignorance to express a preference between a given pair of acts and would, therefore, be considered irrational from a Bayesian point of view. Taking state, act, and outcome as primitive concepts, a utility function on the outcomes is constructed in the usual way. Each act is represented by a utility-valued function on the states — but not all such functions are taken to represent acts. A weaker than usual set of axioms on preferences between acts is now postulated. It is shown that any agent can be represented by a risk function that assigns to each (mixed) state a number that gives the maximum loss (in utility) the agent might expect should be the actual state of the world. The form of the risk function is determined, both in general and in important particular cases. The results show that any rational agent behaves as though he were acting under the guidance of a set of Bayesian (or, more generally, pseudo-Bayesian) advisors.     

Stuffed Cabbage in the Old New School Cafeteria

The purpose of this lecture is to celebrate the memory of Aron Gurwitsch by examining and enlarging the domain of phenomenological clarification of some elements of what Gurwitsch called the logic of reality. Chief among those elements are the nature of the taken-for-grantedness of our existential belief, the difference between presentive and non-presentive indices of reality and the ground for the self-illumination of the world of working.     

Demonstrative utterances

Conclusion We have worked out a small part of a program originally devised by Kaplan which included a clarification of the phrase y intends to demonstrate x. The analysis of demonstrative utterances, combined with a theory of deferred ostensive reference, enabled us to account for a much larger class of utterances (accompained by a relevant gesture) than expected. Regrettably, the analysis forces more questions on us than it answers. Although I have used the term gesture quite freely without providing any sort of explication, there is much more to say about gestures and their relation to speech. Especially questions concerning the ontological nature of gestures (What kind of a thing is a gesture anyway?), their epistemological status (How can we tell gestures apart from other actions?), and their semantic status (What makes a gesture have meaning?) have remained largely unexplored. To my knowledge, no philosopher in the analytic tradition has addressed those issues in any systematic manner.     

Maximization of sums of quotients of quadratic forms and some generalizations

Monotonically convergent algorithms are described for maximizing six (constrained) functions of vectors x, or matricesX with columns x₁, ..., x _r . These functions are h₁(x)= _k (xA _kx)(xC _kx)^–1, H₁(X)= _k tr (XA _k X)(XC _k X)^–1, h₁(X)= _{k l} (x _l A _kx _l ) (x _l C _kx _l )^–1 withX constrained to be columnwise orthonormal, h₂(x)= _k (xA _kx)²(xC _kx)^–1 subject to xx=1, H₂(X)= _k tr(XA _kX)(XA_kX)(XC_kX)^–1 subject toXX=I, and h₂(X)= _{k l} (x _l A _kx _l )² (x _l C _kX _l )^–1 subject toXX=I. In these functions the matricesC _k are assumed to be positive definite. The matricesA _k can be arbitrary square matrices. The general formulation of the functions and the algorithms allows for application of the algorithms in various problems that arise in multivariate analysis. Several applications of the general algorithms are given. Specifically, algorithms are given for reciprocal principal components analysis, binormamin rotation, generalized discriminant analysis, variants of generalized principal components analysis, simple structure rotation for one of the latter variants, and set component analysis. For most of these methods the algorithms appear to be new, for the others the existing algorithms turn out to be special cases of the newly derived general algorithms.This research has been made possible by a fellowship from the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences to the author. The author is obliged to Jos ten Berge for stimulating this research and for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Third Men: The Logic of the Sophisms at Arist. SE 22, 178b36–170a10

This article aims at elucidating the logic of Arist. SE 22, 178b36–179a10 and, in particular, of the sophism labelled "Third Man" discussed in it. I suggest that neither the sophistic Walking Man argument, proposed by ancient commentators, nor the Aristotelian Third Man of the , suggested by modern interpreters, can be identified with the fallacious argument Aristotle presents and solves in the passage. I propose an alternative reconstruction of the Third Man sophism and argue that an explanation of the lines regarding the identity of Coriscus and Coriscus the musician (178b39–179a3) is indispensable for its correct understanding, since they hint at another sophism in some important aspects analogous. Finally, I show that two contradictions concerning spotted by scholars in the passage are only apparent and can be dissolved once the assumption that the anti-Platonic Third Man argument is at stake here is discarded, and once the passage is read in the light of its agonistic context.     

Foundations of a new system of probability theory

The aim of my book is to explain the content of the different notions of probability.Based on a concept of logical probability, which is modified as compared with Carnap, we succeed by means of the mathematical results of de Finetti in defining the concept of statistical probability.The starting point is the fundamental concept that certain phenomena are of the same kind, that certain occurrences can be repeated, that certain experiments are identical. We introduce for this idea the notion: concept K of similarity. From concept K of similarity we derive logically some probability-theoretic conclusions:If the events E() are similar —of the same kind - on the basis of such a concept K, it holds good that intersections of n of these events are equiprobable on the basis of K; in formulae: E(₁)...E( _{n K} E('₁)...E(' _n , _{i j} ,' _j ' _j for ij On the basis of some further axioms a partial comparative probability structure results from K, which forms the starting point of our further investigations and which we call logical probability on the basis of K.We investigate a metrisation of this partial comparative structure, i.e. normed -additive functions m _K, which are compatible with this structure; we call these functions m _K measure-functions in relation to K.The measure-functions may be interpreted as subjective probabilities of individuals, who accept the concept K.Now it holds good: For each measure-function there exists with measure one the limit of relative frequencies in a sequence of the E().In such an event, where all measure-functions coincide, we speak of a quantitative logical probability, which is the common measure of this event. In formulae we have: l _K (h _n lim h _n )=1 in words: There is the quantitative logical probability one that the limit of the relative frequencies exists. Another way of saying this is that the event ^* (h_n lim h _n) is a maximal element in the comparative structure resulting from K.Therefore we are entitled to introduce this limit and call it statistical probability P.With the aid of the measure-functions it is possible to calculate the velocity of this convergence. The analog of the Bernoulli inequation holds true: m _K (¦h _n –P¦)1–1/4n².It is further possible in the work to obtain relationships for the concept of statistical independence which are expressed in terms of the comparative probability.The theory has a special significance for quantum mechanics: The similarity of the phenomena in the domain of quantum mechanics explains the statistical behaviour of the phenomena.The usual mathematical statistics are explained in my book. But it seems more expedient on the basis of this new theory to use besides the notion of statistical probability also the notion of logical probability; the notion of subjective probability has only a heuristic function in my system.The following dualism is to be noted: The statistical behaviour of similar phenomena may be described on the one hand according to the model of the classical probability theory by means of a figure called statistical probability, on the other hand we may express all formulae by means of a function, called statistical probability function. This function is defined as the limit of the relative frequencies depending on the respective state of the universe. The statistical probability function is the primary notion, the notion of statistical probability is derived from it; it is defined as the value of the statistical probability function for the true unknown state of the universe.As far as the Hume problem, the problem of inductive inference, is concerned, the book seems to give an example of how to solve it.The developed notions such as concept, measure-function, logical probability, etc. seem to be important beyond the concept of similarity.The present work represents a summary of my book Grundzüge zu einem neuen Aufbau der Wahrscheinlich-keitstheorie [5], For this reason, I have frequently dispensed with providing proof and in this connection refer the interested reader to my book.     

Set theory as modal logic

A logical systemBM ⁺ is proposed, which, is a prepositional calculus enlarged with prepositional quantifiers and with two modal signs, and These modalities are submitted to a finite number of axioms. is the usual sign of necessity, corresponds to transmutation of a property (to be white) into the abstract property (to be the whiteness). An imbedding of the usual theory of classesM intoBM ⁺ is constructed, such that a formulaA is provable inM if and only if(A) is provable inBM ⁺. There is also an inverse imbedding with an analogous property.     

Interpretations of the first-order theory of diagonalizable algebras in peano arithmetic

For every sequence |p _n } _n of formulas of Peano ArithmeticPA with, every formulaA of the first-order theory diagonalizable algebras, we associate a formula ⁰ A, called the value ofA inPA with respect to the interpretation. We show that, ifA is true in every diagonalizable algebra, then, for every, ⁰ A is a theorem ofPA.     

A Different Sort of Contextualism

A number of virtue epistemologists endorse the following thesis: Knowledge is true belief resulting from intellectual virtue, where Ss true belief results from intellectual virtue just in case S believes the truth because S is intellectually virtuous. This thesis commits one to a sort of contextualism about knowledge attributions. This is because, in general, sentences of the form X occurred because Y occurred require a contextualist treatment. This sort of contextualism is contrasted with more familiar versions. It is argued that the position: (a) yields a better solution to the lottery problem, and (b) may be grounded in a more general theory of virtue and credit.     

The logical structure of linguistic commitment II: Systems of relevant commitment entailment

In The Logical Structure of Linguistic Commitment I (The Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1994), 369–400), we sketch a linguistic theory (inspired by Brandom's Making it Explicit) which includes an expressivist account of the implication connective, : the role of is to make explicit the inferential proprieties among possible commitments which proprieties determine, in part, the significances of sentences. This motivates reading (A B) as commitment to A is, in part, commitment to B. Our project is to study the logic of . LSLC I approximates (A B) as anyone committed to A is committed to B, ignoring issues of whether A is relevant to B. The present paper includes considerations of relevance, motivating systems of relevant commitment entailment related to the systems of commitment entailment of LSLC I. We also consider the relevance logics that result from a commitment reading of Fine's semantics for relevance logics, a reading that Fine suggests.     

A notorious affair called exportation

In Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes, Quine held (a) that the rule of exportation is always admissible, and (b) that there is a significant distinction between a believes-true (Ex)Fx and (Ex) a believes-true F of x. An argument of Hintikka's, also urged by Sleigh, persuaded him that these two intuitions are incompatible; and he consequently repudiated the rule of exportation. Hintikka and Kaplan propose to restrict exportation and quantifying in to favoured contexts — Hintikka to contexts where the believer knows who or what the person or thing in question is; Kaplan to contexts where the believer possesses a vivid name of the person or thing in question. The bulk of this paper is taken up with criticisms of these proposals. Its ultimate purpose, however, is to motivate an alternative approach, which imposes no restrictions on exportation or quantifying in, but repudiates Quine's other intuition: this is the approach taken in my A Logical Form for the Propositional Attitudes.This paper is based on my doctoral dissertation (Rockefeller University, 1977). I wish to thank Susan Haack for her help in turning a draft into the present version.     

Applying modal logic

The main purpose of the paper is to introduce philosophers and philosophical logicians to dynamic logic, a subject which promises to be of interest also to philosophy. A new completeness result involving both after — and during — operators is announced.The work on this paper was supported in part by an Academy of Finland fellowship för längre hunna vetenskapsidkare during the former half of 1979. The paper itself was read as an invited address at the Conference on Practical and Philosophical Motivations of Non-classical Logics held at Toru, August 15–19, 1979.     

A further note on freeman's measure of association

This note extends and elaborates Hubert's attempt to provide an interpretation of Freeman's measure of association,. The measure is used in a a contingency table when observations are ordered on one variable and unordered on the other. No attempt is made explore the distribution of.     

Intellectual fascism

Intellectual fascism is the arbitrary belief that individuals possessing certain good traits (such as intelligence and creativity) are intrinsically superior to those possessing bad traits (such as stupidity or lack of artistry). Although it is true that under certain conditions and for various purposes some human traits are more advantageous or better than others, rating people as good or bad on the basis of their intellectual performances is inaccurate and is often as pernicious as is political-social fascism. Moreover, where political fascists at least rate themselves highly while damning and persecuting others, intellectual fascists tend to severely damn themselves (as well as others) when they lack superlative intellectual and artistic traits. According to RET, all global ratings of people tend to be fascistic overgeneralizations. Intellectual fascism is political-social fascism with the trait names changed—the same hearse with different license plates.This article is a revision of one that originally appeared in a book by Dr. Ellis entitledSuppressed.     

Algebraic aspects of deduction theorems

The first known statements of the deduction theorems for the first-order predicate calculus and the classical sentential logic are due to Herbrand [8] and Tarski [14], respectively. The present paper contains an analysis of closure spaces associated with those sentential logics which admit various deduction theorems. For purely algebraic reasons it is convenient to view deduction theorems in a more general form: given a sentential logic C (identified with a structural consequence operation) in a sentential language I, a quite arbitrary set P of formulas of I built up with at most two distinct sentential variables p and q is called a uniform deduction theorem scheme for C if it satisfies the following condition: for every set X of formulas of I and for any formulas and , C(X{{a}}) iff P(, ) AC(X). [P(, ) denotes the set of formulas which result by the simultaneous substitution of for p and for q in all formulas in P]. The above definition encompasses many particular formulations of theorems considered in the literature to be deduction theorems. Theorem 1.3 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a logic to have a uniform deduction theorem scheme. Then, given a sentential logic C with a uniform deduction theorem scheme, the lattices of deductive filters on the algebras A similar to the language of C are investigated. It is shown that the join-semilattice of finitely generated (= compact) deductive filters on each algebra A is dually Brouwerian.A part of this paper was presented in abstracted form in Bulletin of the Section of Logic, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1983), pp. 111–116, and in The Journal of Symbolic Logic.     

An Exploration of Johnson's Sense of ‘Argument’

This essay attempts to give definitions and identity conditions for the two predominant senses of Argument currently in use, the one involving reasons for a conclusion and the other denoting an expressed disagreement with ensuing verbal behaviour by two parties. I see Johnson's new concept of Argument, as developed in his book Manifest Rationality, as a hybrid of the two common senses of Argument, and, accordingly, I try to define and give the identity conditions of Johnson-arguments. Finally, I disagree with Johnson on the nature of the definition he thinks he has proposed, and I conclude with observations suggesting that his logical perspective has dialectical and rhetorical components.